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PREFACE 
In October 1975 a team under my leadership was set up at the 
International Institute of Management of the Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin 
to study regional incentives in the countries of the European Community 
(EC). The project was financed by the EC, the Federal German Ministry 
of Economics in Bonn, Land Hessen and the Wissenschaftszentrum. The 
objective of the work was the compilation of a comprehensive, detailed 
and up-to-date survey of regional incentives in the EC countries and 
the development of methodologies for an inter-country comparison of the 
value of these incentives, as well as drawing out the possible policy 
implication of the findings - for the EC and for regional incentive 
policy in general in the member countries. 
At the International Institute of Management Berlin the team 
involved in the work was Ullrich Casper (Germany), Chris Hull (France), 
Silvio Ronzani (Italy) and Douglas Yuill (the United Kingdom). The 
other EC countries were covered by "consultants" - Lotty Boersma in the 
Netherlands, James Eustace in Ireland, Jean-Paul Schmit in Luxembourg, 
Gert Strande-Sjírensen in Denmark and Paul van Rompuy and Rik Donckels in 
Belgium. An additional active member of the team was Ken Smith of the 
University of Glasgow who, throughout the project, was our advisor on 
valuation methodologies and systems. 
This report represents one output of the work of the team. In 
addition, the team compiled bibliographies on regional problems and 
policies in the EC counties, and also produced major background studies 
of the regional incentives in the member countries. 
The bibliographies were compiled because of our view that although 
our remit was to study regional incentives, it was vital for an 
understanding of these that they be set in the context of regional 
problems and policies generally in the various countries. The 
bibliographies were a component of this context. For each country, 
therefore, structured bibliographies were prepared - structured 
according to a standard list of heads. Among these heads were: 
bibliographical material; major historical surveys or references; 
the regional problem: unemployment, activity rates, migration, income 
per head, social indicators; industrial structure and regional growth; 
major problem area industries; major area studies; the locational 
requirements and experiences of manufacturing and of services; the 
goals and objectives of regional policy; the delineation of intervention 
areas ; financial incentives ; disincentives and controls ; the 
results and worthwhileness of regional policy; continuing official 
statistical sources on regional problems and policies; the 
administration of regional policy; European regional policy. Three 
of these bibliographies (the Federal Republic of Germany, the United 
Kingdom and Italy) have already been published in the International 
Institute of Management publication series and others will follow over 
the next few months. 
Just as the bibliographies were essential background material for 
this report, so too were the background studies of the regional incentives -
which were submitted to our sponsors in late 1976 and early 1977. These 
papers were very detailed (involving in total some 3,000 pages or so). The 
information within them was structured according to a standard list of 
features which we felt to be key for an understanding of the incentives. 
The features examined were in fact the same as those covered in this report -
legal basis, administration, eligible activities, activity discrimination, 
spatial, project-type and size discrimination, eligible items of expenditure, 
eligible forms of expenditure, further conditions, actual awards, tax treat-
ment, timing and phasing of award, topping up, addability, clawback, turndown, 
cost, jobs associated, investment associated, anticipated duration, change 
provisions, miscellaneous. These background working papers probably represent 
the most comprehensive survey of regional incentives in the EC countries that 
has ever been made. 
The condensing of working papers and assimilation of other context 
material into this final report was not an easy task. It had been 
agreed with our sponsors that the final report had to be short (200 pages 
or so). The task seemed at times to be one of trying to get a quart 
into a pint pot! Obviously, it meant that we had to limit ourselves to 
the most salient points of the incentive schemes, and we also had to 
adopt a format which would be cryptic but at the same time readable. 
Moreover, because our prime objective was comparison we had to present 
information on the various schemes in a standard and comparable manner. 
The main difference between this report and other work in the field of 
regional incentives is in fact that it is specifically comparative -
both in the examination of incentive features and in the estimation of 
incentive values. Somebody once said that all that international 
research in the social sciences could do was "to tell a good story". 
We have tried to go beyond this by imposing a strong structure on our 
presentation. Given the difficulties of comparability and the effort 
needed to standardise and secure comparable information, we wished at 
times that we had curbed our ambitions and limited ourselves to story 
telling. 
For all the team, work on this study has been exciting, even if 
at times frustrating. One particular problem of international research 
in this area is the changeability of policy. Even over our two years 
of study there have been major changes in the incentive policies of a 
number of countries, and many minor changes in others. Drafts which 
had been carefully prepared and edited, had, at short notice, to be 
revised, and sometimes, totally rewritten. Yet another problem, and one 
which is largely peculiar to international comparative studies, was 
the need to revise and align as the information picture built up. 
Sometimes the alignment was upwards as information from one country 
indicated to us new scope for the work in other countries. More often, 
however, it was downwards as information shortcomings were discovered in 
particular countries. Really comparative international research in the 
social sciences must to some extent involve an adjustment to the "lowest 
common denominator". This is a fact of life which only those who have 
actively worked in the field of comparative studies can appreciate. 
The changeability of policy and the continuing need for re-alignment 
meant that this study went through more drafts than any other study with 
which I have been involved. The fact that these had to be written by 
people for whom English is a second language is one testament to the 
involvement of my team in this work. 
I have, indeed, been fortunate in the team which worked on this 
study. The effort and time involved in securing information, drafting 
and redrafting reports can only be described as massive. I must say 
that I have been enormously impressed by the hard work, ingenuity, 
patience and tolerance which have been demonstrated by the team over the 
past two years. For my part, I am delighted that although this report 
has been completed the team will, by and large, remain in existence and 
continue to work in the area of regional policy. 
We have also been fortunate in a number of other ways over the 
past two years. In member countries administrators and others involved 
in regional policy have been most cooperative. Without their help, 
and often their encouragement, the compilation of this report would not 
have been possible. In many cases not only did they provide information 
but also commented on various drafts, even though understanding that 
final decisions and interpretations inevitably had to rest with us. We 
are also grateful to our sponsors, not only for their financial support 
but also for their understanding and encouragement. They too have 
commented on various drafts and, where possible, helped with the provision 
of information. The International Institute of Management in Berlin has 
provided funds for the work and also an environment which is both 
stimulating and encouraging. We are, in consequence, grateful to all 
of our colleagues in the Institute, but in particular would like to 
thank Professor Fritz W. scharpf for his continuing help and guidance. 
This project on regional incentives was "twinned" with another project 
at the International Institute of Management - one on regional 
disincentives, directed by Reinhart Wettmann. Cooperation between the 
two teams has been very good and in many instances time and resources 
were saved by the exchange of information. Our thanks go too, therefore, 
to the members of the disincentives team. Redrafting was, as I have 
said, a continuing feature of the project. We were particularly 
fortunate, therefore, in having secretaries who faced up to this task 
with such good will, and retyped papers at extraordinary speed. In 
particular we would want to mention Linda Plewa who served as the full-
time secretary to the project, and also Alexandra Harmsworth and Lorraine 
Crayton who were actively involved in the final typing. Most valuable 
technical assistance for the team was provided by Michael Brõsamle. 
Finally, but certainly not least, we are grateful to Andrea Cendali-
Pignatelli of the University of Naples for providing information on 
sub-national aid systems in Italy, and in particular on the incentive 
schemes in the autonomous regions of Sicily and Sardinia. 
The help which we have received from sponsors and individual 
countries has been such that we could perhaps avoid taking the 
usual responsibility for errors of fact or judgement which remain in 
10 
this report. But this would be a break with tradition, at least! 
It is, however, because of the cooperation which we have received 
from so many quarters that we feel less uneasy than usual about taking 
such responsibility. 
Kevin Allen 
International Institute of Management, Berlin 
October 1977. 
This report was submitted to sponsors in English in October 1977 
and in German in February 1978. It was accepted by the sponsoring 
bodies in Germany in May 1978. The report was discussed with the 
Services of the European Commission in Spring 1978 and Addendum 1 (on the 
sensitivity of our effective value calculations to changes in assumptions) 
was submitted in June 1978. The report was then distributed to members 
of the Regional Policy Committee and was discussed with that Committee 
at meetings in October 1978 and February 1979. Member states were 
given the opportunity of pointing out errors of fact and most took 
advantage of this opportunity. In total fewer than twenty errors and 
ambiguities were pointed out. In April 1979 the text was revised to 
take account of these points. The text was not however updated, and 
so the reference date of the report remains at late summer 1977. 
Kevin Allen 
Centre for the Study of Public Policy, University of Strathclyde. 
May 1979. 
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INTRODUCTION 
All countries of the European Community (EC) have "regional problems -
areas which are economically and socially deprived. The normal indicators 
of economic deprivation are unemployment, activity rates, migration and 
income per head. Relative to the rest of the country unemployment is 
high, activity rates and income per head are low. These regions also 
often suffer from heavy outward migration; frequently adding to the 
problems of the "pressured" regions. 
For political, social and economic reasons, all the EC countries 
have implemented regional policy measures aimed at resolving their 
regional problems. These policies are of long standing, going back to 
the 1930's in some countries, and differ considerably between countries. 
Given that the nature and intensity of the regional problem is not the 
same in each country inter-country differences in the form of policy 
are not surprising. The fact that regional policies -are normally adjuncts 
to, or spatial modifications of, national policies" is a further reason 
for inter-country differences. 
Some countries have made the development of infrastructure the 
key element of policy while others have emphasised state industry. 
Some have seen growth area policy (and associated settlement restructuring) 
as the pre-requisite of regional development while others have laid stress 
on disincentives in the non-problem areas. But there is one element of 
regional policy which is common to all countries - financial and fiscal 
incentives aimed at encouraging industrial movement to, or expansion in, 
the problem regions, or at least compensating for the extra costs of 
movement and/or operations in these regions. 
There is a formidable list of such regional incentives in Europe, 
including: loans on favourable conditions; grants on capital; 
employment premia; social security concessions; training aids; tax and 
investment allowance concessions; factory rent concessions; contributions 
towards share capital; subsidies on public utility charges; operating 
and settling-in subsidies. 
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Expenditure on such regional incentives has risen markedly over the 
post-war period. In the EC countries as a whole (and limiting the 
calculations to the major regional incentives) some 1,150 million U.S. 
dollars worth of investment grants were approved or paid out in 1975 (a year 
of low expenditure in many countries) and some 5,270 million dollars of 
subsidised loans. The Italian social security concession, the Irish 
export profits tax relief and the French local business tax concession 
added a further 1,220 million dollars to the bill. These sums, as we have 
said, are limited to the major regional incentives in the EC countries 
and they exclude a variety of fiscal concessions where cost data is not 
available - the special depreciation allowances in the Netherlands, France, 
Ireland, Belgium and the Federal Republic of Germany, and the tax 
concessions in Luxembourg and Italy. 
In total then, non-repayable regional incentives amounting to 
some 2,370 million dollars and soft loans of a further 5,270 million 
dollars were approved or paid out in 1975, together with a number of 
major, but unquantifiable, fiscal concessions. By any standards, 
expenditure on regional incentives in the EC countries is high. This 
report is concerned with regional incentives. 
The report is in two parts. Part I is a survey of the key 
features and values of the major regional incentives in the individual 
EC countries. It is both country specific and largely descriptive, 
in contrast to Part II which is comparative and analytical - involving 
a comparison of the incentive features and values between countries 
and drawing out what we see as being the policy implications for 
individual member countries and for the EC. 
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PART I 
F E A T U R E S AND VALUES 

This part of the report has two objectives - to provide a 
comparative survey of the key features of the major regional 
incentives in each of the EC countries; and to estimate for each 
country the value of these incentives, both individually and as 
packages. The features and valuations are covered in individual 
country sections, each of which falls into four distinct parts. The 
first is a short introductory overview of the regional incentive 
system - describing the key incentives and their relative importance 
within the regional incentive package as well as providing background 
information on other, minor, regional incentives. Maps of the 
assisted areas are also presented, as are indications of the importance 
of these areas in relation to the national area and population. 
Finally, the introductory overviews have been used to comment on any 
particular feature of the country or its regional incentives which need 
an explanation if the incentives are to be fully understood. The second part 
of the country sections is made up of what we call synopsis tables. 
These provide information on a standard list of 24 key features for 
each major regional incentive. The third part of the country sections 
is an introduction to the valuations. It notes the incentives 
covered (usually the same as in the synopsis tables), the normal 
incentive combinations received by investors, and any other information 
needed to guide the reader through the valuation tables. The final 
part of each country section is the valuation itself, with tables of 
effective values and accompanying explanatory notes. 
Before moving on to the country sections we want, by way of 
introduction, to note briefly the incentives which are covered in the 
various countries, the features which are examined with respect to 
each incentive and the methods which are used to value these incentives. 
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THE INCENTIVES COVERED 
There are a very great number of regional incentives in operation 
in the EC countries - certainly more than 50, even excluding local and 
other sub-national incentives. This report ie concerned primarily with 
the most important of these incentives (in expenditure terms), and with 
national, not sub-national, regional incentives; though some of the 
minor incentives are briefly discussed in the introductions to each 
country section. In total, 27 regional incentives are covered accounting 
for at least 85 percent of regional incentive expenditure in the EC 
countries. In order to give an overview of these incentives, and their 
prime characteristics, it is worthwhile going through each of the 
incentives individually; albeit briefly and even though much of this 
information is repeated in the 'basic details' sections of the 
synopsis tables. The areas referred to can be found in the maps 
accompanying the country sections. 
BELGIUM 
There are two major incentives in Belgium - an interest subsidy 
and a capital grant (which can partly or wholly replace the interest 
subsidy). We concentrate on these two aids but consider, too, the most 
important of a variety of fiscal concessions, an accelerated depreciation 
allowance. 
The interest subsidy is a discretionary, project-related concession 
on loans offered through 'approved credit institutions' such as banks 
and public financial organisations. The maximum regional subsidy is 
5 percentage points (6 percentage points for advanced technology projects 
and 'progress contracts', 7 percentage points under special cyclical 
conditions) on up to 75 percent of investment, over a maximum 5 years; 
compared to standard national maxima of 4 percentage points (5 percentage 
points for advanced technology), 66 percent and 4 years (6 years under 
special cyclical conditions) respectively. Repayment is annual on a 
straight-line basis with a maximum repayment holiday (available only in 
respect of the regional subsidy) of 2 years. No interest free period is 
available. 
The capital grant is also discretionary and project-related. It can, 
partly or totally, replace interest subsidies in those cases where the 
aided investment is at least 50 percent internally financed. The level 
of grant is calculated by summing the undiscounted annual interest 
subsidies which would have been due had the 'own finance' been in the 
form of a 10 year interest-subsidised loan, repaid annually on a 
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straight-line basis, with neither principal repayment holidays nor 
interest free periods. 
The accelerated depreciation allowance is a discretionary, project-
related fiscal concession on the cost price of plant, equipment and 
industrial buildings. If an accelerated depreciation allowance is 
awarded the straight-line rate (depreciation is normally linear over 20 
years for industrial buildings and 10 years for plant) is doubled for a 
fixed three consecutive years. Accelerated depreciation is normally 
only awarded to projects already receiving a capital grant or interest 
subsidy, and indeed is best viewed as a form of topping up of these 
incentives. It is payable only in the Belgian Development Zones. 
DENMARK 
Denmark has three major regional incentives - a company soft loan, 
an investment grant and a municipality soft loan. 
The company soft loan is a discretionary, project-related incentive 
(available in the General and Special Development Regions) of up 
to 20 years duration for buildings and up to 10 years for plant. 
Repayment is six-monthly on a straight-line basis. The maximum repayment 
holiday is five years (in practice, two years). No interest free 
period is available. A maximum of 90 percent of eligible project costs 
(i.e. project fixed capital costs minus the maximum mortgage credit 
loan - normally about 60 percent of project fixed capital costs - and 
any investment grant awarded) can be covered. The current interest rate 
is 7.5 percent. Using the EC reference rate (discussed in detail in 
the valuation section) as the market rate, the current concession is 
2.75 percentage points. 
The investment grant is a discretionary, project-related incentive 
available only in the Special Development Regions. The grant 
may not exceed 25 percent of eligible project fixed capital costs less 
the difference between the nominal value and the market price of the 
mortgage deeds issued iri respect of the project by the mortgage-credit 
institution which is part-financing the project. 
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The municipality soft loan is available to municipalities in the 
General and Special Development Regions to allow them to build, 
for specified clients, industrial buildings which are then normally rented 
but which can be bought. Loan repayment is six-monthly on a straight-line 
basis over a standard 25 years (although the legal maximum is 30 years). 
The current interest rate is 7 percent. Using the EC reference rate as 
the market rate, the current concession is 3.25 percentage points. 
There are no repayment holidays and no interest free periods. The loans 
cover a standard 75 percent of building costs but municipalities are 
obliged to subsidise the remaining 25 percent on the same terms when 
calculating the appropriate rental or selling price. Annual rent is 
therefore 4 percent (i.e. l/25th) of total costs plus 7 percent of the 
outstanding loan plus general running expenses. The leaseholder can 
buy the building at any time during the course of the lease at total 
costs (less subsidy) minus any rental instalments paid. 
FRANCE 
The main regional incentive in France is the regional 
development grant. The other two major incentives are a local business 
tax concession and a special depreciation allowance. 
The regional development grant is project-related, is limited 
basically to setting up and extension projects, and is awarded primarily 
to manufacturing industry. It has largely automatic eligibility 
conditions and rates of award even though these vary both spatially 
and by project type. The designated areas are divided into three 
zones and awards are calculated as the lower of X percent of eligible 
investment and FF Y per job created, ranging from 25 percent/FF 25,000 
for setting up in the maximum rate zone to 12 percent/FF 12,000 for 
extension in the minimum rate zone. 
The local business tax concession is a project-related concession 
on the local business tax. The concession is limited to a maximum of 
up to five years and .100 percent of tax liability. It may be on either 
or both the departement or commune levy. The typical concession is 
the maximum concession on both levies. The concession goes predominantly 
to setting up and extension projects in mobile manufacturing industry. 
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In the case of extension projects, the award is limited to the net new 
investment. Eligibility is largely automatic within a matrix of 
conditions. The areas in which the concession applies are the award zones 
eligible for the regional development grant plus a substantial part of 
the rest of the national territory, excluding the Paris basin. 
The special depreciation allowance, available basically in Corsica 
and in West and South-Western France in those areas where the regional 
development grant is payable, is a fixed 25 percent first-year 
depreciation allowance on new buildings. The concession is project-
related, for setting up and extension projects. Although certain 
tertiary projects qualify - which is equally true of the other two 
French incentives - awards go predominantly to mobile manufacturing 
industry. Eligibility is largely automatic within a matrix of conditions. 
The allowance is additional to linear depreciation - 20 years is the 
typical fiscal life for industrial buildings. 
GERMANY 
An investment allowance, an investment grant, ERP regional soft 
loans and a special depreciation allowance are the four main regional 
incentives in the Federal Republic of Germany. They are available 
throughout the designated problem areas - the so called GA areas 
(Gemeinschaftsaufgabengebiete) - with the exception of the special 
depreciation allowance which is available only in the Zonenrandgebiet 
(ZRG). 
The investment allowance is the cornerstone of the German regional 
incentive system. It is a fairly automatic project-related capital 
grant of a fixed 7.5 percent of eligible investment. In contrast, the 
investment grant is a discretionary project-related capital grant with 
rates of up to 25 percent of eligible investment depending on a matrix 
of location and project type criteria. 
The ERP regional soft loans are project-related and largely 
automatic. Their duration is up to 15 years for buildings and up to 
10 years for plant, according to the life time of the asset. Repayment 
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is six-monthly on a straight-line basis. A repayment holiday of between 
18 and 24 months, depending on the starting date of the loan, is 
available. No interest free period can be obtained. The current interest 
rate is 6 percent (5 percent in the ZRG). Using the EC reference rate 
as the market rate, the current concession is 2 percentage points (3 
percentage points in the ZRG). The loans cover up to two-thirds of 
investment with the actual proportion being determined by set formula 
on the basis of project size. 
The special depreciation allowance is, as we have said, only available 
in the ZRG. It is an item-related concession involving a high initial 
depreciation allowance of up to 50 percent of eligible costs for plant 
and machinery and up to 30 percent for buildings. The concession can, 
in exceptional cases, be used prior to acquisition of the asset as a tax 
free reserve. Although in principle the decision whether or not to award, 
-and the rate of.award, are discretionary, in practice little discretion is 
exercised. The allowance can only be used on condition that it does 
not give rise to losses or exacerbate an existing loss situation. 
Otherwise, the timing of use is, within a five year limit, at the 
discretion of the beneficiary. 
IRELAND 
Ireland has three major regional incentives - capital grants 
awarded by the Industrial Development Agency (IDA) export profits tax 
relief and an investment allowance. 
The capital grants are discretionary and project-related. In 
law the grant structure has two tiers - a basic grant not exceeding 
40 percent of eligible fixed investment in designated areas (25 percent 
elsewhere), plus an extra maximum 20 percent grant which may be offered 
to projects satisfying "additional criteria". In practice the position 
is more complex, the maximum administrative percentages for the two main 
IDA grant schemes being (for Designated Areas, Non-designated Areas and 
Dublin respectively) 50 : 35 : 25 for setting-up projects and major 
extensions, and 35 : 25 : 25 for re-equipment projects. 
The export profits tax relief is a non-discretionary fiscal incentive 
operated nationwide for companies which export manufactured goods - the 
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incentive being total relief on taxable profits attributable to such exports, 
payable until 1990. 
The investment allowance is a non-discretionary, item related 
fiscal concession. The allowance, a fixed 20 percent of capital 
expenditure on new plant and machinery, is available to set against 
taxable profits in the Designated Areas only. It is awarded on top of 
the national capital allowance scheme (of, amongst other things, free 
depreciation for plant and machinery) and thus permits a total of 120 
percent of the cost of new plant and machinery to be claimed for tax 
purposes in the Designated Areas. 
ITALY 
A capital grant, a soft loan scheme, a social security concession 
and tax concessions Are the major Italian regional incentives. 
The capital grant, payable only in the Mezzogiorno, is project-
related with standard fixed rates determined by project size. The first 
L 2 mrd. of eligible investment is subsidised at 40 percent, the next 
L 5 mrd. at 30 percent, the next L 8 mrd. at 20 percent and all further 
eligible investment, at 15 percent. Projects in "priority sectors" or 
"priority areas" get an increase of the standard rate of grant by one 
fifth; priority sector and location by two fifths. 
The national soft loan scheme involves largely automatic, project-
related, soft loans containing a strong spatial element. A distinction 
is drawn between (1) the Mezzogiorno, (2) the insufficiently developed 
zones of Central Italy, (3) the insufficiently developed zones of 
Northern Italy, and'(4) the rest of Italy. The loans cover a fixed 40 
percent of eligible investment in (1), 60 percent in (2) and (3) and 
50 percent in (4). The maximum loan duration is 10 years (except for 
setting up projects in (1) where it is 15 years). Repayment holidays, 
related to the loan drawing down period, are available for up to 3 years 
on 10 year loans and up to 5 years on 15 year loans. No interest free 
period is available. The interest concession is a fixed 70 percent of 
a "reference rate" (basically the market rate) in (1), 60 percent in 
(2) and (3) and 40 percent in (4). Loan repayment is six-monthly, with 
equal (interest plus principal repayment) instalments spread over the 
period of the loan. 
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The social security concession is a highly automatic, non-project 
related incentive (available only in the Mezzogiorno) on employer 
social security liabilities payable to INPS (National Social Security 
Institute). For additional labour hired between 1.7.76 and 31.12.80 the 
full social security liabilities (amounting to some 27 percent of wage 
costs, including overtime) are paid by the state until 1986. In addition 
there are "historical" concessions, running out in 1980, with currently 
three different rates according to hiring dates and employment levels: 
at least 8.5 percent (of wages and salaries, excluding overtime) for all 
employees, if not qualifying for higher concessions; 18.5 percent for 
the net increase of employment between 1.10.68 and 31.12.70, and for those 
individual employees taken on before 1.10.68 and currently still with the 
firm; 28.5 percent for the net increase of employment between 1.1.71 and 
1.7.76. The wide coverage of the incentive and the scale of the 
concessions mean that large sums of money are involved - some L 1,112 
mrd.in 1975, nearly three times as much as was involved with grants. 
Finally there are project-related tax concessions relating to 
the two main Italian profits taxes - ILOR and IRPEG (14.7 and 25 percent of 
profits respectively). The concession takes three forms: a. A full ILOR 
exemption on project profits for 10 years after profits first arise. 
The concession applies to projects in the Mezzogiorno and in the aided 
areas of Central and Northern Italy. Outside the Mezzogiorno it is 
limited to small and medium sized firms, b. A full ILOR exemption on 
up to 70 percent of profits earned in Italy and reinvested in industrial 
projects in the Mezzogiorno, c. A 50 percent reduction of IRPEG on profits, 
for 10 years after profits first arise, where a company is newly founded 
in the Mezzogiorno and has both a legal and fiscal base there. 
LUXEMBOURG 
There are two major incentives in Luxembourg - a capital grant 
and a tax concession. 
The capital grant is discretionary and project-related. The 
maximum award is 15 percent of eligible investment. The grant is payable 
throughout the Grand Duchy. 
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The tax concession is a discretionary fiscal incentive for new 
enterprises and production lines, and is a fixed 25 percent relief from 
taxable profits of the new enterprise/production line for a period of 
eight years. The benefit is lost in those years when losses are made. 
It is also lost when the applicant company makes losses since the 
incentive cannot exceed 25 percent of the profits of the applicant 
company. The incentive is available through the country. Awards are 
rare and normally go to projects in receipt of a capital grant. 
NETHERLANDS 
The main regional incentive in the Netherlands is the investment 
premium. In addition, however, there is an accelerated depreciation 
allowance available throughout the Netherlands outside the Randstad. 
The investment premium is a project-related capital grant payable 
in the designated development areas. The standard award is a fixed 25 
percent of eligible fixed capital costs up to a maximum of Fl 4 million; 
except in a few specified municipalities where it is a fixed 15 percent 
up to a maximum of Fl 2.4 million. For large projects an additional 
discretionary award can be made for eligible fixed capital costs beyond 
Fl 16 million. The maximum additional award is 25 percent of the extra 
investment (except in the few specified municipalities noted above where 
it is 15 percent). A little-used alternative to the 25 percent premium 
(but not the 15 percent grant) is a "mixed premium", which is based on 
job creation as well as investment expenditure. 
As already noted the accelerated depreciation allowance has a spatial 
coverage beyond the grant aided areas. It applies to the whole of the 
Netherlands except the Randstad. It is an automatic, item-related 
fiscal concession on the price of industrial and commercial buildings. 
Half of the cost price (up to a maximum 25 percent in any one year) can 
be depreciated arbitararily above the normal rate of depreciation, while 
the other half is depreciated normally. If accelerated depreciation is 
not used in any one year then in that year normal depreciation applies. 
In subsequent years the concession is available in respect of half the 
non-depreciated part of the cost price. 
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UNITED KINGDOM 
In the United Kingdom the regional incentive package is composed of 
three main incentives - regional development grants, selective financial 
assistance soft loans and, as an alternative to these loans, interest 
relief grants. 
The regional development grant is an automatic, item-related grant 
payable on specified types of fixed capital investment in the British 
designated problem regions. A fixed 22 percent of approved capital 
expenditure is obtainable in the Special Development Areas, with 20 
percent being the fixed award in the other problem regions. Both plant/ 
machinery and buildings/works expenditure is eligible in the Special 
Development and Development Areas. However, in the Intermediate Areas only 
buildings/works expenditure qualifies for assistance. 
Selective financial assistance soft loans are discretionary, project-
related loans of between five and seven years duration. Repayment is six-
monthly on a straight-line basis and there are maximum repayment holidays 
of 3 years in the Special Development Areas and 2 years in both the 
Development and Intermediate Areas. Interest free periods run concurrently 
with any repayment holiday awarded. The current interest rate is 3 
percentage points below the Department of Industry's "broadly commercial" 
rate. 
Closely related to the above soft loans (and indeed an alternative 
to them) are discretionary, project-related interest relief grants 
calculated in relation to the notional loan which would have been awarded 
had a soft loan offer been made. Where no interest-free period would 
have been awarded in conjunction with the loan, the grant is at 3 percent 
of the notional loan for up to 4 years. Where an interest-free period 
would have been awarded the grant is at what is known as the higher 
interest relief grant rate (generally in line with the Department of 
Industry's "broadly commercial" rate) before reverting to 3 percent of 
the notional loan for up to a further 4 years. 
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THE INCENTIVE FEATURES COVERED 
For each of the major regional incentives information is provided 
in the synopsis tables on 24 key features. The tables have been 
designed to allow comparison of these incentive features within and 
between countries. It is worthwhile going through these features to 
explain their general coverage. 
Head number 1 - Basic Details - is aimed at giving an overview 
of each incentive, indicating not only the nominal rate of award but also 
whether it is discretionary or automatic, project or item-related. 
Head number 2 - Legal Basis - is fairly straightforward giving the 
main legislative base of the incentive and, where relevant, key 
administrative guidelines and circulars. Under head number 3 
- Administration - information is provided on where applications must be 
sent (indicating any intermediaries involved where this is relevant), 
who decides on the award, who pays out the money, and who is involved 
in monitoring. 
The three heads so far covered are very much of. an introductory 
nature. With head number 4 - Eligible Activities - we move on to a more 
central series of heads concerned with questions of eligibility and 
discrimination. Head number 4 itself indicates the industries, sectors, 
and functions which are eligible for the incentives as well as specifying 
those which are not. As with many other heads in the synopsis tables 
an attempt is made to distinguish between theory and practice - trying 
to specify which activities are, in fact, the main beneficiaries. Head 
number 5 - Activity Discrimination - is very much related to the 
previous head in that it attempts to show where there is any specified 
discrimination between eligible activities in terms of the decision 
whether or not to award, and the rate of award. When no such specification 
exists we have tried to indicate whether the form of the incentive -
discretionary or automatic, with fixed or "up to" rates - would or would 
not give scope for such discrimination. Only rarely have we been able 
to comment on the extent to which such scope has been used. 
While heads number 4 and 5 are concerned separately with eligibility 
and discrimination by activity, the following three heads consider 
eligibility and discrimination together in relation to area, project 
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type, and size respectively. Thus, head number 6 - Spatial Discrimination -
not only specifies those areas which are eligible for the incentive but 
also notes any intra-problem area differences in terms of rates or 
conditions of award. Head number 7 - Project Type Discrimination - covers 
similar issues for a list of standard project types (setting up, extension, 
rationalisation, reorganisation, modernisation, transfer, takeover, and 
replacement) while head number 8 - Size Discrimination - indicates 
whether there are any limits - upper or lower - to project or firm 
eligibility, and whether size can affect the rate of award. 
Beyond the introductory first three heads, the other heads so far 
discussed have one common feature, they are concerned with eligibility 
in one form or another. This is also true of heads number 9 and 10 which 
cover - Eligible Items - and - Eligible Forms of Expenditure - respectively. 
The first provides information on eligible items of expenditure (i.e. those 
items eligible for the incentives) not only in respect of the standard 
project cost items like land, buildings, plant and equipment, vehicles 
and working capital; but also in respect of a group of other items 
whose treatment often differs between countries - short life 
and small value assets, second hand assets, and replaced assets. In 
contrast, the head - Eligible Forms of Expenditure - looks at whether 
assets purchased through phased payments, hire purchase or leasing 
are eligible. 
The final head dealing with the issue of eligibility, head number 11 -
Further Conditions - is a "catch all" in that it notes conditions 
of eligibility or award which are not related to activity, space, project 
type or size. In particular it details any job, investment or viability 
conditions. 
Head number 12 - Actual Awards - tries to do two things within 
the limits of the information available (and the point does need to be 
made that information was often lacking for this feature) - to identify 
average as opposed to nominal rates of award and to show the scale of 
the incentive, using a variety of measures to indicate this, including 
number of cases aided, total awards, and average awards per case. 
Annual data have been provided where possible. One point which must be 
stressed in respect of this head is that the notes concerning the basis 
of the information require careful attention. In some countries, 
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and for some incentives, the figures relate'to actual expenditure, 
while for others they are estimates on the basis of approved awards. 
This, on occasion, makes it very difficult to relate these 
figures to associated investment and associated jobs (covered in heads 
number 20 and 21 respectively). 
The head Actual Awards represents the start of a move away 
from nominal rates of award towards what we later call effective values. 
Head number 13 - Tax Treatment - is a further step in this direction 
(though other heads have also been relevant in this context and 
especially the heads concerned with eligible items and eligible forms 
of expenditure). It surveys the extent to which incentives are taxed -
either directly in that they are counted as income and pass immediately 
into taxable profits; or indirectly in that they result in an increase 
of taxable profits (as in the case of capital grants) because assets 
must be depreciated for tax purposes net of any grant awarded or (as 
with soft loans) because of reduced debt servicing charges. Timing 
and Phasing of award (head number 14) similarly has an effect on the 
real value of incentives. Under this head we indicate when the 
incentive is paid in relation to expenditure being incurred. In addition, 
this head also shows when application needs to be made (and in particular 
whether it needs to be made before project construction starts) and 
whether projects can start before a decision on the application has been 
reached. The normal application processing period is also specified. 
Systems for Topping Up and the issue of Addability (heads number 15 
and 16 respectively) are also relevant for assessing the real value of 
the regional incentives. The head on topping up sets out the possibilities 
for the authorities to make an award over and above the formal or advertised 
maxima; while the head on addability surveys whether or not, and to what 
degree, one incentive can be combined with another and, where such 
combination is possible, whether there are any side effects of combination 
such that the value of the combined incentives is less than the sum of 
the individual incentives. 
Clawback is the title of head number 17 and it specifies under 
what circumstances awards can be clawed back, and the clawback systems 
used - for example, whether the whole or only a part can be clawed back. 
Where possible, some indication is given as to the importance of clawback. 
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Head number 18 - Turndown - is related to the clawback head in one respect 
and this is that while the latter covers post award "turndown", the former 
reflects the more conventional meaning of the term turndown. Where 
quantitative information was available on the reasons for turndown this 
has been provided - though in the vast majority of cases this was not 
possible. The point needs to be stressed that the figures given in 
this head refer solely to formal turndown. In many countries, and for 
many incentives, "informal turndown" (i.e. applicants withdrawing 
when advised informally of the likelihood of failure) assumes considerable 
proportions. Thus, the figures provided in this head understate the extent 
of turndown - although not consistently between countries or incentives. 
Head number 19 is concerned with the Cost of the incentives.. 
Annual figures have been provided where possible, although it must be 
said that for many, and particularly the fiscal incentives, there were 
often no reliable statistics available. As with our comments on head 
number 12 above, it is vital that the basis of these cost figures be 
clearly appreciated. They do in fact vary considerably between countries 
and incentives - some being based on awards decided and others on awards 
paid out. 
Jobs Associated and Investment Associated are the titles of 
heads number 20 and 21 respectively. It should be noted that we have 
used the word associated rather than "created", information on the latter 
being very rare indeed. In fact, especially for the fiscal incentives, 
there is very little quantitative information, even on investment and jobs 
"associated". In many instances, and in particular where incentives 
are operated as a package, there is often no meaningful information on 
the jobs or investment associated with individual financial incentives. 
Where figures for individual incentives are provided, and where incentives 
can be combined, those figures should be treated with caution since it 
is not possible to say which jobs and investment are associated with a 
particular incentive. Certainly any adding of the figures for jobs and 
investment associated with each incentive will often result in double 
counting. 
The heads - Anticipated Duration - and - Change Provisions - (heads 
number 22 and 23 respectively) are related. The first provides information 
on the formal specified life of the incentive (if any, since the great 
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majority of regional incentives in the EC countries have no specified 
life) while the second indicates what arrangements exist in the event of 
incentive change and in particular whether applications in the pipeline 
are paid on the basis of the old or new provisions, or whether more ad hoc 
arrangements exist. 
The final head, number 24, (Miscellaneous) has been 
used, as can be imagined, to cover issues or aspects of the 
incentives which the structure which we have adopted for the synopsis 
tables would not allow to be covered - but yet which we thought to be 
important. 
These, then, are the features covered by the synopsis tables. 
There are, in addition several general points which we want to stress 
about the tables. The first is that they are largely descriptive. The 
comparison and analysis is left until Part II of the report. Secondly, 
the synopsis table approach, in spite of all its advantages of giving a 
structured overview of the main regional incentives in the various 
countries, must force a substantial element of selectivity. We have 
limited ourselves to those points under each head which we consider to 
be important. Thirdly, the format of the synopsis tables is such that 
they do not allow speculation. Where no clear information was available, 
therefore, we have not been reluctant to write "no information". In 
many cases, with the application of some ingenuity, we could have 
"compiled" relevant figures. But such figures would have required 
explanation and justification; and the synopsis table approach gives no 
scope for this. Finally, the synopsis tables are based on information 
available in late summer 1977. 
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VALUATION METHODS 
Following on from the synopsis tables, for each country there is a 
set of country-specific valuation tables. By way of introduction to 
these tables there is a brief description of the incentives to be valued 
(generally those treated in the synopses), covering in particular the 
differences (if any) between maximum and average rates of award, as well 
as the standard incentive combinations found in each type of problem area. 
Features peculiar to the valuation tables are also explained. The valua-
tion introduction, further, tries to give a broad indication of the scale 
of assistance in the country under consideration. This is necessary 
complementary information for the interpretation of the valuation tables 
since these are concerned, above all, with incentive intensity (i.e. the 
value of incentives to aided projects). Before going on to detail the 
stages and steps of the valuation and to set out the general assumptions 
made, it is worthwhile looking at the features covered in these tables 
and at the valuation denominators used. 
FEATURES AND DENOMINATORS COVERED 
The tables themselves (there are two of them) reflect the two stages 
of our approach to incentive valuation. The first table (Table A) traces 
out for each individual incentive, normally by type of problem area and 
normally also distinguishing between maximum and average rates of award, 
how the real or effective value of the incentive decreases relative to 
its nominal value as account is taken of three incentive features - tax 
treatment, payment delays and eligible items of expenditure. The table 
therefore has four columns, the first showing the nominal value of the 
incentive (usually as a percentage of eligible investment), the second the 
effective value after incentive tax treatment has been taken into account, 
the third the after-tax effective value after adjusting for delays in 
payment, and the fourth column the effective subsidy value after a final 
adjustment to take account of the eligibility or otherwise of particular 
items of expenditure - land, buildings, plant or working capital. This 
final column therefore shows the effective value of the incentive as a 
percentage of total initial capital costs after tax treatment, payment 
delays and eligible expenditure have been taken into account; or, put 
another way, the after tax net present value of the incentive as a per-
centage of total initial capital costs. 
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Obviously in moving from nominal to effective values, from column 
one to column four of Table A, various assumptions have to be made. The 
general considerations surrounding these assumptions will be detailed 
shortly. The specific assumptions made in respect of each incentive 
valued appear in the country-specific "Notes and Assumptions" to Table A. 
No valuation table should be read, and certainly no conclusions should be 
drawn from the figures presented/without a clear understanding of both 
the general and specific assumptions being made. 
As already noted. Table A values each incentive individually. In 
contrast, the second table (Table B) is concerned with incentive packages. 
For the standard incentive combinations in each country (and distinguish-
ing as before between maximum and average awards wherever possible) the 
table shows the effective value of award as a percentage of three distinct 
denominators - total initial capital costs, annual capital costs (gross 
profits) and value added. The first of these denominators is applied in 
column one of Table B. As the country-specific "Notes and Assumptions" 
to that table make clear it is not always the case that this column is 
the simple addition of the final column results of Table A. Very often 
incentives in combination have a joint value less than the sum of their 
individual components. Sometimes this is because of direct constraints 
like public sector contribution limits; at other times it reflects more 
indirect factors like, for example, the bringing of a grant more rapidly 
into taxable income (which obviously reduces its value after tax) whenever 
it is awarded in conjunction with a special depreciation allowance. The 
second denominator, annual capital costs (column two of Table B) is 
obtained by applying an annuitising factor (to be described in detail 
below) to the column one subsidy values. It is of interest as a denomina-
tor not only because, amongst other things, it allows a distinction 
to be made between incentives explicitly available on replacement invest-
ment and those which are not, but also because it makes possible the move 
to the third denominator presented in Table B, value added. 
We now wish to elaborate on these three denominators in turn, con-
centrating in particular on why we believe such denominators to be rele-
vant to the measurement of incentive value. Thereafter we set out the 
aims and limitations of our approach to valuation before going through 
the individual stages and steps of the valuation exercise in detail. 
33 
Total initial capital costs 
To this denominator, as noted above, we relate the after tax dis-
counted net present value (or "net grant equivalent") of all incentives 
which eure, in some sense, linked to investment outlay. This measure of 
incentive value is most clearly of relevance in relation to investment 
and location decisions. It has conventionally been regarded as being 
of key importance at the level of individual projects (being a simple 
measure of ex ante regional comparative advantage in relation to initial 
project investment outlay) and has been widely used by the EC in their 
regional policy co-ordination exercises (though not covering working 
capital). It is also, if strictly applied, the most "transparent" of the 
denominators in that the number of assumptions required to value incen-
tives is, in most cases, at a minimum - perhaps the prime reason for the 
EC's emphasis on this denominator as a control ceiling. 
It must be stressed that when using total initial capital costs as 
a denominator we consider only capital-related incentives. There are 
certain labour-related regional incentives which could in principle be 
related to initial Investment costs - those which are causally linked to 
this denominator. However to take account of these in the procedures we 
use would require the specification of a particular form of capital : 
labour relationship for valuation purposes. No reliable data is readily 
available for this. For this reason, labour subsidies are considered 
only in terms of our value added denominator. On the other hand, the 
point does need to be made that there is only one major regional labour 
subsidy in the EC countries, and covered in this report - the Italian 
social security concession. 
Total annual capital costs 
This denominator stands as a proxy for gross profits in that, as we 
shall show in our description of the detailed valuation steps below, the 
annual capital cost (ACC) figure used in the calculation of the appropriate 
annuitising factor is the sum of a depreciation charge and a measure of 
the overall cost of capital. It thus corresponds broadly to the so-called 
"user cost of capital" derived from the neo-classical economic theory of 
investment behaviour and utilised in much econometric work on the impact 
of investment incentives. 
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But why should the denominator "total annual capital costs" be of 
particular interest for our purposes? First, we regard it as an alternative 
presentation of how firms might see the incidence of subsidies (i.e. as 
reductions in annual factor costs). In practice, few incentives are actually 
received as lump sums and even those which are may not be viewed as lump sums 
subsequent to the decision to invest. For example, insofar as incentives are 
brought into financial accounts over the anticipated economic life of 
aided assets (and this seems common practice) they may be regarded as 
giving rise to constant annual reductions in those on-going capital costs 
which the ACC denominator proxies. In slightly different terms, the ACC 
of incremental investment may be regarded as an expression of one com-
ponent of per unit "long run marqinal cost". Viewed in this light, the 
annual capital cost denominator clearly relates to the potential competi-
tive effects of incentives, to which we turn shortly. 
But annual capital cost is also of interest as a denominator because 
it offers a means of presenting the quantitative difference between 
incentive systems which aid replacement investment and those which do not 
(although, as we make clear elsewhere in this report, there is in practice 
no "black and white" distinction to be made here). Further, within the 
annual capital cost framework, we can take account of the fact that 
individual assets have different economic lives and, in particular that 
some assets, notably land and "working capital"j are not conventionally 
depreciable. The final attraction of the ACC procedure is that it pro-
duces a measure of incentive values in relation to gross profits and, 
therefore, given the available data on the relationship of gross profits 
to other annual factor costs, prepares the way for the aggregation of 
capital and labour subsidies - something which is done in respect of our 
last denominator, value added. 
Value added 
Procedurally the move to value added is a simple step in the valua-
tion exercise, given the availability of data on the relationship of 
gross profits (and hence also labour costs) to value added. It is fairly 
conventional to find value added suggested as a denominator in the 
literature on effective protection (effective protection normally being 
measured by reference to the proportionate increase in value added per 
unit of output under protection) and international trade distortion. 
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In addition, and as already noted, a value added denominator allows the 
aggregation of capital and other subsidies. Moreover, it gives a measure 
of the overall return on factors employed and hence of the discretionary 
element at the disposal of firms. It is therefore a particularly inter-
esting denominator when considering the possible impact of incentives on 
competitiveness. 
In an attempt to move even closer to the relationship of incentives 
to the competitive position of firms we tried at one stage to include a 
further step within the valuation procedure by introducing total pro-
duction costs as a denominator. The attraction of this denominator is 
that it offers a measure of the maximum extent to which the prices of 
aided output might be reduced by incentives. In the event, however, we 
found no internationally comparable data which was reliable enough to 
justify the attempt. 
Having presented the main steps involved in the valuation exercise 
in broad outline and the rationale of our concentration on the initial 
capital costs, annual capital costs and value added denominators, we now 
want to turn to the detail of the valuation steps and associated assumptions. 
There are, however, four general but important points which must be made 
by way of introduction. 
First, we have chosen to ignore the implications of inflation for the 
effective values of the incentives covered. Using the initial capital cost 
denominator, our figures therefore probably overstate the real values of 
the.incentives and certainly exaggerate the value of those incentives awarded 
in absolute terms relative to those given as a percentage of factor costs. 
However, since delays in payment are, as we shall see, not of major import-
ance for incentive values, the ranking of incentives and countries in respect 
of the initial capital costs denominator is unlikely to change by taking 
inflation into account unless inflation rates are both high and markedly 
different between countries. Using the annual capital cost/value added 
denominators, where the calculations are made over a long period of time, 
inflation could obviously have a more important impact on incentive values. 
On the other hand, as long as inflation rates in the long run remain similar 
between countries, the ranking of incentive packages (which, as we make 
clear below, is our prime concern) will not change, other things being equal. 
Of course, if inflation rates were high and differed markedly between 
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countries, and continued over a very long period of time, then rankings 
could change; but in the total absence of data on long-run rates of 
inflation by country, and being reluctant to speculate, it is impossible 
to say just how they would change. 
Secondly, our calculations are in terms of gross rather than net 
values. They do not take account of short run dislocation costs (or long run 
locational disadvantages, though it would seem reasonable to assume that 
no firm would relocate where it suffered such long run disadvantages) or 
incidence (the extent to which incentives are passed on to increase the 
reward to factors of production other than capital) - and this because 
information on incidence is virtually non-existent while that on dislocation 
costs (beyond indicating that such costs are often substantial) is 
generally not quantified. 
Thirdly, in the interest of comparability, the assumptions made within 
the valuation exercise are on occasion somewhat more simplified than they 
would have been had the aim been to produce nine separate (and not necess-
arily comparable) valuations. Since, however, our prime concern is with 
international comparisons, we view the simplifications as being justified. 
More complex assumptions would not in any event have led to markedly 
different results. We shall later look in more detail at the assumptions 
made and the sensitivity of the results to these assumptions. 
Finally, and closely related to the previous point, it must be heavily 
underlined that the main objective of the valuation is to compare the value 
(or regional advantage) of regional incentives and incentive packages both 
between countries and between problem regions in these countries. It is 
not to try to place absolute values upon the incentives and this for the 
very good reason that, although the broad ranking of incentive packages as 
they apply to comparable projects is generally insensitive to the assump-
tions which must be made as part of our valuation exercise,, the absolute 
value of these packages for individual projects can vary markedly from 
project to project. Although the figures in the country-specific valua-
tion tables could be interpreted as being of relevance for the "average" 
aided project and, from this (using "best guesses" of such features as 
price elasticity, capital output ratios, elasticity of investment in 
relation to cost of capital) could be used to assess the possible "average" 
impact on investment or trade, both the data problems and the element of 
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speculation involved are such that, in the context of this report, we 
have not felt it desirable to move forward in this way. We believe that 
what we have to say about the values obtained is important, and did not 
want to undermine this by speculation in other areas. Our emphasis, 
therefore, reflecting the strength of our methodology, is on comparability 
and ranking, a point which must never be lost sight of either in the next 
few pages as we consider the general steps and assumptions which make up 
the valuation or later when we come to present and thereafter discuss the 
valuation results themselves. 
STEPS AND ASSUMPTIONS 
As already noted, the valuation results are presented for each country 
in the form of two tables. These tables reflect the two main stages of 
the valuation exercise. In Stage A (Table A) we trace out the move from 
nominal to effective values for each incentive individually. while in 
Stane Β (Table Β) the effective values of various incentives and incentive 
combinations are denoted as a percentage of initial capital costs, annual 
capital costs and v al u e added. We now want to consider the detailed steps 
and associated assumptions involved in these two stages in turn. 
Stage A: Nominal to Effective Value 
A preliminary decision to be made within Stage A concerns the choice 
of discount rate. Both theory and empirical evidence are inconclusive as 
regards the appropriate discount rate to use. Possible rates include the 
short-term banking rate, the average external loan rate, the long-term 
corporate debenture rate, the weighted average of the "actual" cost of 
capital to the firm, a very high (uncertainty-adjusted or risk-averse) 
rate, and a zero rate (this last for firms who do not use discounting or 
are more concerned with liquidity effects). Since no strong case based 
on empirical evidence can be made for any one of these alternatives (or 
indeed any other discount rate), we settled in the end for the country-
specific rates used by the EC in their co-ordination work - the so-called 
EC reference rates (broadly equivalent to the market lending rate in each 
country). As a check, we did however repeat the valuation calculations 
for what can be considered to be extreme discount rate assumptions -
rates of zero and 25 per cent. Although the absolute value of the incen­
tives inevitably varied with the discount rate being used, the broad 
country rankings were not significantly different from those thrown up 
by using the EC reference rates. 
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Step 1 : Identification of nominal values 
For capital grants the identification of nominal rates of award as 
a percentage of eligible investment is obviously a straightforward step. 
For soft loans and interest subsidies the step is more complex. We take 
as their nominal value the net grant equivalent of the subsidy element 
of the soft loan/interest subsidy as a percentage of the loan award on 
which the subsidy is made. Although this sounds complicated it can, in 
fact, be calculated relatively easily as long as information is available 
on the following key features of the soft loan/interest subsidy scheme: 
the duration of the loan and (if different) of the concession 
- the duration of any interest free period awarded 
- the duration of any principal repayment holidays awarded 
- the loan repayment system 
- the level of the concession, as a percentage point reduction of the 
market rate. 
Only this last feature involves any assumptions since the appropriate 
market rate has to be identified. However, since the EC reference rate 
is, as we have seen, broadly equivalent to the market lending rate in 
each country, we had less qualms about using it for this purpose than as 
a discount rate. On the other hand, it must be recognised that, for 
particular projects and firms (those operating at the margin and thus 
facing the high cost end of the capital market rate structure) the EC 
reference rate probably understates the market rate of interest and 
therefore the concessionary element of the subsidy. But there again, 
for many large firms the EC reference rate probably lies above what they 
normally would have to pay for capital. 
We have so far considered the identification of nominal rates for 
grants and soft loans. For accelerated depreciation allowances and 
capital allowances, the nominal value of award is the net present value 
of the tax saving brought about by delayed payment of tax (due to receipt 
of an allowance) as a percentage of the value of the asset on which the 
allowance is made. As with interest subsidies/soft loans the calculation 
here is straightforward given information on the nature of the allowance, 
the standard national depreciation system against which the allowance is 
to be measured, and the effective rate of tax saved through receipt of 
the allowance. It should be noted that within this step account is taken 
of both taxation and delays in payment, thus making Steps 2 and 3 below 
unnecessary for the valuation of accelerated depreciation and capital 
allowances. 
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Step 2: Adjustment for taxation 
Within this step we must first identify the relevant rate of tax paid 
by firms in respect of incentives received. Our basic assumption here is 
that firms consider the relevant tax rate for all managerial decisions to 
be the full rate of corporation tax on retained earnings (since the tax 
payable on distributions, where this is greater, may typically be regarded 
as being borne by shareholders). This rate is, of course, only applicable 
if the investing company bears a full tax charge on the incentive-related 
"profits". With the exception of Ireland and Italy, where we take 
account of the availability of profits tax concessions, we have based our 
calculations on this premise. 
For capital grants there are, in general, three possible forms of tax 
treatment. At the one extreme they are not subject to tax since they are 
not considered to be part of income and hence taxable profits; while at 
the other they are "directly" subject to tax, passing straight into taxable 
profits. The middle case is where the grant enters into income and hence 
taxable profits only indirectly, as would occur, for example, when the 
value of the grant has to be deducted from the value of the subsidised 
assets for depreciation purposes. This middle case is obviously the most 
complex to deal with since, in addition to information on the timing and 
phasing of tax payments, the appropriate depreciation regime for the grant-
aided assets must be identified, as well as the distribution of these 
assets into land, buildings and plant. In this regard we use the same 
asset mix as identified in Step 4 below. 
The tax treatment of soft loans and interest subsidies is straight-
forward and indeed is the same for all countries. The concessionary 
element present within these incentives is taxed since (as a result of 
the concession) there are lower interest payments to set against taxable 
profits. 
Step 3 : Adjustment for delays in payment 
This step takes account of delays in the payment of incentives. These 
delays are of two broad types - delays in the submission of claims (in a 
number of cases for example claim submission must await the completion of 
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the project construction phase) and delays in the processing of claims. 
We take as our base date for the measurement of these delays the date of 
asset expenditure. The delay we are adjusting for, therefore, is the 
delay between asset expenditure and the receipt of a subsidy on that asset. 
In most cases delays are specific to the incentive system in each country. 
We have however made one common assumption (to which incidentally the 
results are not sensitive) namely, that the standard project construction 
period is one year (so that given uniform project expenditure the average 
delay before a claim can be made in those cases where project construction 
must be complete before claim submission is typically six months). 
Step 4: Adjustment for ineligible items of expenditure 
Not all project expenditure is eligible for incentive assistance. Indeed, 
as we shall see, working capital is only rarely subsidised while land, 
buildings and plant are not aided in every case. To take account of 
differences in the coverage of incentives (using the information in the 
synopsis tables) we need, first, to decide on an appropriate land : buildings 
plant key for a typical project in each country and, secondly, to identify 
the typical relationship (if any) of fixed to working capital. 
As far as the distribution of fixed asset costs is concerned we have 
chosen to use the keys applied in the EC's regional policy co-ordination 
system in the main valuations, since these are meant to represent the 
fixed asset breakdown of typical projects in the EC countries. These 
keys are: 
Country 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Land 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
10 
Buildings 
40 
45 
50 
30 
50 
30 
50 
40 
20 
Plant 
55 
50 
45 
65 
45 
65 
45 
55 
70 
It could be argued that, for the purposes of international comparison, 
one should in fact use the same fixed asset key in all countries. With 
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this in mind we tested for sensitivity by applying two other keys - one 
land/building intensive (i.e. land 10 buildings 60 plant 30) and the 
other plant intensive (i.e. land 5 buildings 25 plant 7ο) - uniformly 
to all incentive packages to see what the impact of this would be on 
the ranking of the various packages. In terms of ranking the results 
were not significantly different from those found using the EC co-ordina­
tion keys - not particularly surprising since, as we shall see in the 
synopsis tables (and also in Part II of this report), eligible items of 
expenditure do not differ markedly between incentives and specified dis­
crimination between eligible items is rare. 
As far as the relationship of working capital to fixed capital is 
concerned, this is an especially difficult key to quantify there being 
little project level information available. What information there is 
suggests that working capital might typically account for 30 percent of 
initial investment costs, and this is the figure we have used in the 
valuations. Now of course at the project level there will be large 
variations around this percentage, but as long as the working capital 
figure for a comparable project does not vary significantly from country 
to country, the ranking of incentive schemes is relatively insensitive to 
the figure chosen, a direct consequence of the fact that only three 
regional incentives include working capital as an eligible item of 
expenditure - the Italian national soft loan and the United Kingdom 
interest relief grants and soft loans, both part of UK selective financial 
assistance. 
Stage B: Effective Value as a Percentage of Initial Capital Costs, 
Annual Capital Costs and Value Added 
This stage of the valuation exercise can be treated much more briefly 
since most of the relevant points have already been covered . 
Step 1 : Initial capital cost denominator 
This denominator is reached as a result of Step 4 of Stage A. The 
main difference between Stage Β and Stage A is that within the former 
the emphasis is on incentive combinations rather than individual incentives. 
In this regard it should be noted again that it is not always the case 
42 
that the value of incentives in combination is the sum of their separate 
values. 
Step 2: Annual capital cost denominator 
As already mentioned, the conversion of lump sum figures (investment 
costs and subsidy values) into annual equivalents is accomplished by 
means of a standard annuitising procedure based on the annual capital 
charge formula: 
a = A.q with the annuitising factor q = r (1 + r) 
(1 + r ) n - 1 
where a is the annual equivalent of the initial value A given a life-
time of n and a discount/interest rate of r. The details of the procedure 
can most easily be presented in terms of three sub-steps. 
The first sub-step involves the calculation of a weighted capital 
cost factor. Within this sub-step, the annual capital charge factor 
is calculated for each asset type separately. This requires assumptions 
to be made about both asset lives (our interest here is in actual economic 
lives) and discount/interest rates. As far as the latter is concerned 
we use the EC reference rates, as in Stage A. As for asset lives, we 
assume a building life of 50 years and a plant life of 10 years in all 
EC countries (alternative asset life assumptions are possible but would 
not affect the ranking of the various incentive schemes unless there were 
marked differences between countries in asset lives.) Land and working 
capital are non-depreciable. For them, the annual capital charge factor 
is identical to the interest rate. Once the annual capital charge factor 
has been calculated for each asset type the results are summed using the 
already-identified weights of asset expenditure within project costs (see 
p.41 above). The resultant figure we term the weighted annual capital 
cost factor. 
Within the second sub-step an annual subsidy factor is calculated. 
Just as investment costs must be annuitised so must the subsidies awarded 
in respect of these costs. In doing this the annual capital charge formula 
is again relevant. There arises, however, the interesting issue of the 
appropriate value for "n" in the formula - that is, the appropriate "life" 
over which to spread the subsidy. In the case where item-related replace-
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ment is subsidised the issue is easily resolved. Clearly, the subsidy 
should be spread over the life of the asset to which it relates - 10 
years for plant, 50 years for buildings. But what if item-related 
replacement is not subsidised? The inevitable problem is to decide on an 
appropriate subsidy life. One possibility is to use the life of the 
longest asset (the fifty-year building life). Another, and one which 
tries to take into account the fact that not only setting-up projects 
but also other project types like rationalisation are aided, is to adopt 
a somewhat shorter subsidy life - at least in the case of plant. 
In the valuation tables we have assumed that (in those cases where 
replacement is not specifically subsidised) the appropriate plant subsidy 
life is 20 years - twice the lifetime of the plant. This is perhaps one 
of the weakest assumptions in the whole valuation exercise. It is one 
which we feel to be appropriate, but is difficult to substantiate. For 
this reason it could perhaps be argued that we should simply have settled 
for the 50 year subsidy life assumption. However, and this is an important 
point to make, the results would not in fact have been very different 
from those produced in the tables, and there would certainly have been 
no significant change in the ranking or grouping of countries. 
The third sub-step of the annuitising procedure involves simply 
dividing, for each incentive in turn, the annual subsidy factor by the 
weighted annual capital cost factor (i.e. the outcome of sub-step (ii) 
by the outcome of sub-step (i)). The resultant annuitising factor is 
used to transform the column one results of valuation Table Β into 
column two results. In so doing, it moves the valuations from the initial 
to the annual capital cost denominator. 
Step 3 : Value added denominator 
The transformation from annual capital costs to value added is 
technically very straightforward. If annual capital costs are interpreted 
to mean "gross profits" in the national income accounting sense of the 
term (profits before deduction of depreciation, interest payments and 
taxation) then it is no major task to identify the link between gross 
profits and value added. We use aggregate national data (as presented 
in Eurostat, National Accounts: 1970-74, Eurostat Yearbook 2-1975, Statistical 
Office of the European Communities, 1975, Table 5) as a proxy for this 
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relationship in comparable projects in each country. The justification 
for using country-specific keys is that this picks up differences in the 
actual factor cost mix confronting firms in particular locations, which 
a priori can be expected to vary internationally, not least since 
mechanisms tending to equalise factor costs work very slowly. For 
those who do not accept this, or who argue that, given the quality of 
the data, a common gross profits : value added ratio should have been 
adopted, it is important to note that, with a common gross profits : 
value added key the ranking of incentive packages is obviously 
identical to that thrown up by the annual capital cost denominator 
(except perhaps where labour subsidies are paid). 
As a final point to this general introduction to the valuation 
tables, it will be noted that no direct attempt is made within the 
tables to value direct tax concessions (as opposed to depreciation 
allowances). The reason for this is the simple one that data on 
taxable profits is not consistently or comprehensively available. 
Nevertheless, as additional notes to the valuation tables, some broad 
indication of the value of any available tax concessions is given under 
very specific assumptions. 
In the remainder of Part I, we present, for each Community 
country in turn, a survey of the regional incentives in that country. 
These surveys consist of a brief overview of the regional incentive 
system, detailed synopsis tables covering key features of the main 
regional incentives, an introduction to the valuation of these 
incentives, and, finally, the valuation tables themselves together 
with explanatory notes. 
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COUNTRY SURVEYS 

BELGIUM 
THE INCENTIVES 
Within the framework of its industrial and regional policy, 
Belgium operates a number of financial and fiscal incentives, the 
bulk of which originate from the so-called General Expansion Laws of 1959, 1966 
and 1970. In 1959 two such laws were introduced - one national in 
character aimed at improving the sectoral structure of the economy 
while the second (regional) law instituted special measures to combat 
the economic and social difficulties of certain problem regions. This 
regional dimension to the General Expansion Laws was further accentuated 
by the specifically regional laws of 1966 and 1970. 
The 1970 Expansion Law created two categories of development zone 
(Categories I and II). These zones have not, however, been 
operationalised, with the result that the zones established under the 
1959 and 1966 laws remain in force. In the accompanying map, we term 
as 'Category I zones' those areas designated in 1966 while 'Category II 
zones' are those areas delineated in 1959 but not included within the 
1966 zones. As already noted, there is no practical difference at 
present between these areas in terms of award levels. Together they 
cover 34 percent of the surface area of the country and hold some 42 
percent of the national population. 
The great majority of financial incentives on offer in Belgium 
have no specified regional dimension. State guarantees, for example, 
covering the whole or partial redemption of public credit institute loans 
are national aids, as is financial assistance (in the form of grants 
which, amongst other things, cover transport and removal costs) payable 
to encourage the geographical mobility of unemployment workers. 
Similarly ,interest free advances for management consultancy and research 
and development, as well as the provision of equity finance through the 
National Investment Corporation, are available on a country-wide basis. 
A five year exemption from real estate income tax is another measure 
which is available nationally. Incentives (through interest subsidies, 
grants and loan guarantees) for the purchase and equipping of industrial 
sites by public bodies are also national, as is the government purchase 
or construction of factory buildings for subsequent sale or letting (a 
provision which has not so far been used). Aid for advanced technical 
labour training (with grants, generally at some 25 percent of the 
combined wages and social security costs of the labour undergoing 
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BELGIUM 
training) has a minor regional element in that the rate of award is 
slightly higher in the development zones. 
The two specifically regional financial incentives in Belgium 
are interest subsidies and capital grants. Both are project-based, 
are discretionary, and are closely inter-related one with the other 
in that grants can partly or totally replace interest subsidies, and 
that grant rates are largely calculated on the basis of interest subsidy 
values. Conditions of award are, however, more stringent for the grant 
(and, in particular, aided investment must be at least 50 percent 
internally financed); the majority of projects, some 75 percent, 
awarded financial aids get an interest subsidy rather than a grant. 
Turning to regional fiscal incentives in Belgium the main ones 
are:tax-exemption from the non-inflationary element of capital gains; 
exemption from the registration tax levied at the incorporation of 
companies; and an accelerated depreciation allowance. (In addition, 
provinces and municipalities can offer fiscal incentives in addition to 
those embedded in the national laws but, in common with the treatment 
of such local incentives in the other countries, they have been 
considered outside the scope of the synopsis tables). Although no 
hard information is available on expenditure on any of these fiscal 
incentives, the two tax exemptions are certainly not of major significance. 
The main fiscal incentive, rather, is the accelerated depreciation 
allowance and it is this which is covered in the synopsis tables 
(although it must be emphasised that it is very much less important 
than either the interest subsidy or the capital grant and, indeed, 
can be viewed, to a large extent, as a form of topping up of these 
financial incentives). The accelerated depreciation allowance is a 
discretionary project-related concession on the cost price of plant, 
equipment and industrial buildings and involves a doubling, for three 
consecutive years, of the normal national straight line depreciation 
allowance (20 years fiscal life for industrial buildings and 10 years 
for plant). 
Two final points need to be made in the context of Belgian 
incentives before moving on to the synopsis tables. The first is 
that, as we have seen, the regional incentives are based on the 
General Expansion Laws and are largely regional variations of these. 
One outcome of this is that many of the published figures are for the 
nation as a whole rather than for the problem areas per se. Therefore, 
where the synopsis tables indicate that figures are on the basis of 
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the General Expansion Laws these are national figures and do not refer 
to the problem regions alore. The second point relates to the 
administrative system. Because of the three region structure of 
Belgium, applications for incentives are generally evaluated by the 
appropriate Regional State Secretaries for Economic Affairs (in 
Flanders, WalIonia or Brussels) in line with administrative directives 
specified by the region's Departmental Committee for Regional Affairs. 
Large projects (of between BF 150 million and BF 300 million) are 
however dealt with specifically by these regional committees while 
still larger projects (of over BF 300 million) are the responsibility 
of the national Departmental Committee for Economic and Social 
Coordination which also coordinates the work of the three regional 
authorities. 
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2. Legal Basis 
3. Admini«tration 
en 
Basic de tai IB 
4. Eligible 
Activitiea 
Activity 
Di scriminatimi 
Interest Subsidy 
Discretionary, project­related interest 
subsidy on loans offered through 'approved 
credit institutions' such as banks and public 
financial organisations. The maximum 
regional subsidy is 5 percentage points (6 
percentage points for advanced technology 
projects and 'progress contracts', 7 percent­
age points under special cyclical conditions) 
on up to 75 percent of investment over a 
maximum 5 years compared to standard national 
maxima of l* percentage points (5 percentage 
points for advanced technology), 66 percent 
and 4 years (6 years under special cyclical 
conditions) respectively. Repayment is 
annual on a straight­line basis with a 
maximum repayment holiday (available only in 
respect of the regional subsidy) of 2 years. 
No interest­free period is available. 
Law of 30 December 1970: General Expansion 
Law. (Belgisch Staatsblad : Moniteur Belge 1 
January 1971). 
Application is made through an approved credit 
institute to the appropriate State Secretary 
for Regional Economy (in Flanders or 
Wallonia or Brussela). For moat projecta he 
decides on the level of award subject to the 
legal maxima and in line with administrative 
directives specified by his region's 
Departmental Committee for Regional Affaira 
This regional committee is however directly 
reaponsible for large projects (see 
introduction) while for very large projects 
responsibility lies with a national inter­
departmental committee (again, see intro­
duction). Any subsidy awarded is paid to the 
approved credit institute which in turn offers 
a loan to the applicant firm at the market 
rate of interest minus the government subsidy. 
Industrial activities (including mining), 
artisan activities, and enterprises in the 
service sector involved in trade, tourism, 
management and engineering techniques, and 
research and development are all eligible. 
Agriculture is not eligible unless of an 
industrial or service character, while 
construction is eligible only in as far as it 
deals with construction materials and pré­
fabrication. 
In principle only priority ] sectors receive 
the maximum percentage point subsidy: for 
priority 2 sectors, the maximum ia reduced by 
1 percentage point and, for non­priority 
sectors, by 2 percentage points. In practice, 
however, no distinction is made between 
priority land 2 sectors. Within the maxima 
laid down the rate of concession is at the 
discretion of the authorities (aa is the 
decision whether or not to make an award) thus 
divine some SCODO for discrimination. 
Capital Grant 
Discretionary, project­related capital grants 
can partly or totally, replace interest 
subaidies in those cases where the aided 
investment is at least 50 percent internally 
financed. The level of grant is calculated 
by summing the undiscounted annual interest 
subsidies which would have been due had the 
'own finance' been in the form of α 10 year 
interest­subsidised loan, repaid annually on 
a straight­line basis, with neither principal 
repayment holidays nor intereet free periods. 
For the appropriate interest subsidy maxima, 
see Interest subsidy. 
Aa intereet subsidy. 
As interest subsidy, except that application 
is made directly to the competent 
administration. 
As interest aubsidy. 
Aa intereat subsidy. 
Accelerated Depreciation 
A discretionary, project­related fiscal 
concession on the cost price of plant, 
equipment and industrial buildings. If 
accelerated depreciation is awarded the 
straight­line rate (depreciation is norm­
ally linear over 20 years for industrial 
buildings and 10 years for plant) is 
doubled for a fixed three consecutive 
years. Accelerated depreciation is 
normally only awarded to projects already 
receiving a capital grant or interest 
subsidy and indeed should be viewed as a 
form of topping up of these incentives. 
As interest subsidy 
Application is made to the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (for small firms, the 
Ministry of Trading Classes). The award 
decision is taken by the appropriate 
State Secretary for Regional Economy (in 
Flanders nr Vallonia or Brussels). If 
an award is made, claims are administered 
as part of the company tax system. 
An interest subsidy. 
None in terms of rates of award these 
being fixed. The decision whether or 
not to award is however discretionary, 
thus giving scope for some industrial 
discrimination. 
en 
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6. Spati« 
Diserti 
7. Project Typ· 
Discriminatie 
β. Si«« Di s cr tar­
in st ion 
9. Eligible 
Items 
10. Eligible Furros 
of Expenditure 
11. Further 
Intereat Subsidy 
The regional interest subsidy is available 
only on project» located In category I end II 
develop··«! zones. In principle, the 
maximum subsidies ere limited to category I 
zones but in practice no distinction is made 
between the two zone types (see introduction) 
Ho further specified discrimination within 
these zones (but see S above). 
All project types are eligible except take­
over end replacesMnt projects (unless 
spécial permission i« granted) although for 
transfers only the net Investment increase 
qualifie». Mo specified discrimination 
between eligible project types (but see 5 
above). 
Ια tenu of eligibility, projects which cost 
the state less than BF 100,000 per annua are 
excluded (except when proposed by inali firas 
of less than 50 employee») while projecte of 
aore than FM 100 alll. aay be required to 
undertake counterpart action (i.e. the 
transfer of convertible bonds to the state). 
In tema of ratea there is no direct 
discrimination although, because of the 
presence of particularly favourable national 
schemes, the regional differential for small 
projects is less than for other projects. 
Beyond this, no specified size discrimination 
(but see 5 above). 
All direct investment in the acquisition or 
construction of buildings, plant and 
equipment (including site purchase, merket 
organisational studies etc.) is eligible, as 
Is the reconstitution of working capital. 
Vehicles are generally ineligible except for 
small and medium sized firms» while second 
hand assets are eligible only under special 
conditions. Ancilltary buildings arc eligible 
only when ­ like offices and canteens ­ they 
are a constituent part of the project. There 
is no lower item­value limit but short­life 
assets are generally ineligible since the 
lifetime of α subsidised aaset should at least 
rover the subsidy period. 
Assets purchased with cash or through phased 
payments are eligible as are leased assets, 
but not those bought on hire purchase. 
In making awards the main general criteria 
taken into account are: creation of employ­
ment; effect on economic structure; 
financial soundness of the applicant enters 
prise; agreement with national environmental 
taction and enti­ini latlon policies; and 
product type (with energy­saving products, 
product» of important aoclo­economic signifi­
cance and products exported to non­EC countríea 
ÍHíin^  favoured). 
Capital Grant 
As interest subsidy. 
As interest subsidy. 
Aa Intereat subsidy, except that the transfer 
of convertible bond» is not »quired of large 
projects. 
As interest subsidy. 
As intereat subsidy. 
As Interest subsidy, but, in addition, at 
least 50 percent of project Investment must 
be internally financed. 
In practice accelerated depreciation i» 
available throughout the designeted 
areas. Within the eligible areas, no 
scope for rate discrimination since rates 
are fixed. Award is, however, discretion­
ary (see 5 above)4 
In principle all projact types »re eligibr 
A condition of award that a minimum 20 new 
jobs be created (which of course meant the 
ly setting up projects end major 
extensions generally qualified) no longer 
applies. There is no rate disciiminstion 
between eligible projects, since rates »re 
fixed. Award is however discretionary 
(see 5 above). 
The rule that » minimum of 20 new jobs muK 
be created no longer applies ­ otherwise 
no specified discrimination (but see 5 
above). 
Accelerated Depreciation 
Eligible item» include industrial building) 
plant and equipment, subject to s minimum 
asset life of 5 years. Vehicles are 
ineligible. Certain items (such as ships 
and scientific research equipment) qualify 
for even more favourable accelerated 
depreciation nationally and are not 
therefore normally covered by the regional 
scheme. 
Assets purchased with cash or through, 
phaseü payment are eligible, aa would be 
asset» bought on hire purchase. Leased 
assets are not eligible. 
As Interest subsidy« 
Ca 
ςη 
J2. Actual Awards 
13. Tax Treatment 
14. Timing and 
Phasing 
15. Topping Up 
16. Addability 
Interest Subsidy 
17. Clawback 
On average, the regional subsidy is 4 percent 
age points over a period of 4 yeara on two-
thirds of investment costs. Since 1972 
Interest subsidies under the general 
expansion laws have been related to the 
following loan awards (FB Mill.): 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
coses 475 715 512 33Θ 
awards 10,974 23,404 15,612 10,587 
average 23 33 30 31 
The figures relate solely to cases where 
interest subsidies only were awarded. In a 
further 100 cases annually interest subsidies 
were awarded in combination with state 
guarantees. 
By reducing debt servicing chargea, the 
Interest subsidy is taxed in as far as it 
increases taxable profits. 
Application must be made, and conditionally 
accepted, before project construction atarte. 
Application processing period: on average 
2 montba. The interest subsidy is 'paid' as 
interest payments become due. 
No awards are possible beyond the formal 
maxima. 
Can be combined with capital grants, state 
guarantees and fiscal aids. However» when 
combined with α capital grant, the maximum 
value of the interest subsidy is reduced 
by the value of the grant (see capital grant) 
The provision that, when combined with a stati 
guarantee, the maximum value of the interest 
subsidy is reduced by 1 percentage point,has 
been deleted. 
Pos t-award checks are based on annual 
financial reports prepared by the beneficiary 
approved credit institute and on factory 
visita. Non-realisation of objectives can 
lead to reduction or withdrawal of subsidy. 
It is not clear to what extent this provision 
has been applied. 
Capital Grant 
No information on average percentage awards. 
Since 1972 the following capital grants have 
been awarded under the general expansion lawa 
(FB mill.); 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
cases 146 233 157 116 
awards 1,831 2,56 5 1,414 1,227 
average 13 11 9 10 
Indirectly taxed whenever profits are made 
since aided investment must be depreciated 
for tax purposes net of any grant received. 
Application must be made, and conditionally 
accepted, before project construction starts. 
Application processing period: on average 2 
months. The grant is paid in three equal 
annual instalments - the first not less than 
one year after positive decision on condition 
that a specific part of the inveatment has 
been carried out; the second one year there­
after provided the inveatment programme has 
been completed (or 75 percent completed in the 
case of extended programmes requiring 18 month: 
or more); and the third a further year later 
subject to the attainment of the project 
objectives. 
No awards are possible beyond the formal 
maxima. 
The grant replaces wholly or partly the 
intereat subsidy. Cranta and interest 
subsidies can therefore be awarded in combina­
tion, subject to the limitation that the com­
bined incentives do not exceed the intereat 
subaidy maxima. Grants can also be combined 
with fiscal aids. However, when added to 
accelerated depreciation the value of the 
grant is reduced since the net present value 
of the tax to be paid on it increasea. 
Crant instalments are paid out only on 
condition that the award conditions are 
being met. Otherwise, as for Interest 
subsidies. 
Accelerated Depreciatie 
No information 
Not relevant 
Project application must be made before 
tax claim is submitted, and would norm­
ally be made before project construction 
tarts (in conjunction with capital grant/ 
soft loan applications). Application 
processing period: on average 2 months. 
Claim relating to particular items of 
project expenditure are made along with 
the tax return. The concession applies 
for 3 consecutive years from the year in 
which expenditure ia incurred. 
No awards are possible beyond the formal 
maxima. The allowance is normally viewed 
as topping up the financial incentives. 
Can be combined with all other regional 
incentives. When added to the capital 
grant, the value of the grant is reduced 
since the net present value of the tax to 
be paid on it increases. This ís because 
the grant is, in effect, brought into 
income and hence taxable profits more 
quickly than under the normal depreciation 
schedule. 
Not relevant 
Interest Subsidy Capital Grant Accelerated Depreciation 
18. Turndown 
20. Jobs 
Associated 
121. Investment 
22. Anticipated 
Duration 
23. Change 
Provfelon 
24. Mlscellan-
In the period 1959 to October 1976, 19 per­
cent of applications made under the general 
explosion laws were turned down. One reason 
for turndown, other than general failure to 
meet award conditions, has been an abundance 
of own finance, vitiating the need for state 
aasistence. 
The cost» of interest subsidies payable under 
the general expansion law» (calculated on the 
basi» of the most unfavourable 'tlatng end 
phasing' assumption for the state) have been 
(FB alii.): 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
Ho information No information 
Estlasted annual expenditure on capital grants No Information 
awarded under the general expansion lows has 
been (FB mill.): 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
1,961 4,759 3,593 1,912 
No information on joba associated with 
Interest subsidie» alone. The figure» below 
relate to Interest subsidie» and capital 
grant» under the general expansion law·: 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
25,259 34,718 23,525 12,219 
Ho information for interest subsidies slone. 
For all financial aids, under the general 
expansion lows, planned investment was 
(FB mi l l . ) : 
1972 1973 
35,677 65,593 
No specified l i f e 
1974 
45,826 
1975 
36,501 
In the event of Incentive change, application 
under consideration would be treated under 
the new conditions. 
1,831 2,565 
See Intereat »ubsidy. 
See interest subsidy 
Ho specified life 
As interest subsidy 
1,414 1,227 
No information 
No Information 
No specified life 
A» interest subsidy 
CO 
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THE INCENTIVE VALUES 
As we have seen, the most commonly awarded regional financial 
incentive in Belgium is the interest subsidy. An interesting feature 
of this incentive is that it is simply the regional extension of a 
national incentive scheme. Whereas, for example, the maximum interest 
subsidy in the Development Zones (DZ) is 5 percentage points over 
5 years on up to 75 percent of eligible investment, the standard national 
maximum is 4 percentage points over 4 years on up to two-thirds of 
eligible investment. Since our prime concern is with the regional 
advantage conferred by any given incentive scheme, for the interest 
subsidy we consider both regional and national values in the valuation 
tables which follow. 
In Table A the effective values of both the interest subsidy and 
the capital grant (the other important financial incentive) are shown as 
ranges at the Development Zone level. In the case of the interest 
subsidy the range is a straightforward one reflecting simply the 
difference between the case where no principal repayment holiday is 
awarded and that where a period of two years principal repayment free 
(i.e. the maximum) is obtained. For the grant, however, the range is 
of a very different nature. The grant, it will be recalled, is available 
towards internal project financing wherever this represents at least 
50 percent of project expenditure. The lower end of the range in the 
table shows the value of the grant when this bare minimum of 50 percent 
internal finance is met. In contrast, the top end of the range 
represents the position where the capital grant is obtained on the 
maximum possible soft loan component (75 percent of eligible investment 
in the Development Zones, for example). In addition to these, the two 
main regional incentives in Belgium, the table also covers the 
accelerated depreciation allowance, the most important of the Belgian 
regional fiscal aids. As mentioned in the synopsis tables the 
accelerated depreciation allowance is available only in the 
Development Zones. 
From the table it can be seen that, in effective value terms, the 
capital grant is 'worth' considerably more than the interest subsidy -
a maximum 9.5 percent of initial capital costs after tax, delays and 
eligible items compared with an equivalent interest subsidy maximum of 
4.7 percent. It must however once again be stressed that the grant is 
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available only towards internal financing and only when such 
financing accounts for at least 50 percent of project expenditure. 
Between 1971 and 1974 less than 45 percent of gross capital formation 
in Belgium was internally financed. 
Table Β maintains the broad structure of Table A. Like that 
table it distinguishes between Development Zones and the nation. Where 
it differs from Table A is in its concentration on the effective value 
of incentives in combination rather than individually. In this regard, 
the bracketed figures represent the outcome when the accelerated 
depreciation allowance is received on top of either the capital grant 
or the interest subsidy, or both. No figures are given for the 
accelerated depreciation allowance on its own since it is normally 
awarded in conjunction with a capital grant/interest subsidy and indeed 
i s usuali y seen as a form of topping up of these incentives. 
Moving now to the contents of Table B, it can be seen that the 
highest effective values apply to the capital grant/accelerated 
depreciation allowance combination in the Development Zones - 12.6 
percent of initial capital costs, 11.2 percent of annual capital costs 
and 3.7 percent of value added. These percentages, however, give a 
misleadingimpression of the value of the Belgian regional incentive 
package. In the first place, they assume no less than 75 percent 
internal financing. With internal finance of only 50 percent (still 
a relatively high figure, as already noted, for projects in Belgium in 
recent years) the maximum value of the package in the Development 
Zones is 11.3 percent of initial capital costs, 10.1 percent of annual 
capital costs and 3.3 percent of value added; while with less than 
50 percent internal finance (and hence no capital grant - the position 
for three-quarters of all assisted projects) the equivalent maximum 
package values are 8.4, 7.5 and 2.5 percent rbspectively. Secondly, 
the effective values mentioned above are maxima. The average award 
made in the Development Zones for the capital grant/interest subsidy/ 
accelerated depreciation combination is (assuming 50 percent internal 
finance) 9.1 percent of initial capital costs, 8.1 percent of annual 
capital costs and 2.7 percent of value added; and (assuming less than 
50 percent internal finance) 6.6 percent, 5.9 percent and 1.9 percent 
respectively. The final reason why the percentages quoted earlier 
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give an exaggerated view of the value of the Belgian package is that 
they ignore the existence of similar national measures and hence do 
not represent the regional differential. In terms of award maxima 
the overstatement amounts to 3.9 percentage points (in respect of 
initial capital costs) 3.5 percentage points (in respect of annual 
capital costs) and 1.2 percentage points (in respect of value added), 
while in terms of average awards the overstatement is 1.2 percentage 
points, 1.1 percentage points and 0.4 percentage points respectively. 
Everything considered, therefore, the average regional value of the 
standard combination of incentives in Belgium is very much lower than 
at first sight - and indeed as we shall see in Part II, is low in 
comparison with the regional incentives in most other EC countries. 
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Table A: NOMINAL TO EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDY. 
AREA 
DEVELOPMENT IS 
ZONES 
CG 
AD plant fixed rate 6.0 - - 2.3 
AD building fixed rate 4.9 - - 1.4 
NATION IS Maximum 10.8 5.6 5.6 3.9 
average 6.7 3.5 3.5 1.2 
LEVEL 
Maximum 
average 
Maximum 
average 
NOMINAL 
VALUE 
15.3-17.4 
10.8-12.1 
13.8-20.6 
11.0-14.7 
EFFECTIVE 
TAX 
8.0-9.0 
5.6-6.3 
10.6-15.8 
8.4-11.2 
VALUE AFTER 
DELATS 
8.0-9.0 
5.6-6.3 
9.1-13.6 
7.2-9.6 
ELIGIBLE 
ITEMS 
4.2-4.7 
2.6-2.9 
6.4-9.5 
5.0-6.7 
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Table A: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) GENERAL: Discount rate 10.75 percent (EC reference rate 1976) 
(b) INTEREST SUBSIDY (IS) 
(i) Nominal value: Net grant equivalent of interest subsidy as percent 
loan award assuming: 
principal 
concession repayment 
period holiday 
interest interest 
free rate 
periods subsidy 
DEVELOPMENT maximum 5 years 
ZONES (DZ) . 
average 4 years 
■ ¡NATION maximum 4 years 
average 3 years 
0­2 year range 
reflected in 
table 
none 
none 
none 
none 
none 
none 
5 percentage points 
4 percentage points 
4 percentage points 
3 percentage points 
Loans are 10 year loans, repaid annually on a straight line basis. 
(ii) Taxation: Effective corporation tax rate: 48 percent (standard rate). 
(iii) Delays: None. Loans drawn down in relation to need. 
(iv) Eligible items: (a) Loan as a percentage of eligible investment ­
75 percent for the DZ maxima; 66.7 percent for DZ average and national 
maxima; 50 percent for national average, (b) Eligible investment as a 
percentage of all project capital costs ­ 70 percent, it being assumed that 
working capital accounts for 30 percent thereof. As noted in the synopsis 
table working capital is ineligible for aid except insofar as it involves 
the reconstitution of working capital. 
(c) CAPITAL GRANT (CG) 
(i) Nominal value: As percentage eligible investment costs ­ calculated by 
multiplying 5.5 percent (i.e. the undiscounted value of a one percent 
subsidy on a 10 year loan as a percentage of the loan) by the appropriate 
interest rate subsidy (see (b) (i) above) and then by the proportion of 
eligible investment costs covered by the loan (i.e. 75 percent for the DZ 
maxima; 66.7 percent for DZ average). The lower end of the range shown 
in the table is on the assumption that the loan covers only 50 percent of 
eligible investment costs. (At least 50 percent of eligible investment 
costs must be internally financed before a capital grant can be awarded). 
(ii) Taxation: Effective corporation tax rate: 23.5 percent. (Capital grants 
are taxed 'indirectly' by reducing the value of aided assets by the value 
of the grant for depreciation purposes. For depreciation purposes we 
assume that plant is depreciated straight line over a 10 year fiscal life 
and buildings straight line over 20 years). 
(iii) Delays: Grant paid in three equal annual instalments ­ the first, one year 
after ministerial approval (i.e. 6 months after asset expenditure assuming 
immediate project start, one year project construction period, and a 
uniform spread of project expenditure). 
(iv) Eligible items: Eligible investment assumed to be 70 percent of all 
project capital costs, it being assumed that working capital is 30 percent 
thereof. As noted in the synopsis table working capital is ineligible 
for aid except insofar as it involves the reconstitution of working capital. 
(d) ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION (AD) 
(i) Nominal value: Net present value of tax saving due to accelerated 
depreciation given an effective tax rate of 48 percent, 
(ii/iii) Taxation/Delays: Not relevant. 
(iv) Eligible items: With EC key of: land 5, buildings 40, plant 55 and with 
working capital assumed to be 30 percent of project capital costs, eligible 
buildings account for 28 percent and eligible plant for 38.5 percent of 
all project capital costs. 
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T a b l e Β: EFFECTIVE SUBSIDIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VARIOUS DENOMINATORS. 
AREA 
DZ 
INCENTIVE 
COMBINATION 
Maximum 
CG (+AD) 
CG + IS (+AD) 
IS (+AD) 
INITIAL 
CAPITAL COSTS 
9.5 (12.6) 
7.8-8.0 (11.1-11.3) 
4.2-4.7 (7.9-8.4) 
ANNUAL 
CAPITAL COSTS 
8.5 (11.2) 
6.9-7.1 (9.9-10.1) 
3.7-4.2 (7.0-7.5) 
VALUE ADDED 
2.8 (3.7) 
2.3 (3.3) 
1.2-1.4 (2.3-2.5) 
NATION 
IS 3.9 3.5 1.2 
DZ 
Average 
CG (+AD) 
CG + IS (+AD) 
IS (+AD) 
6.7 (9.9) 
5.7 (9.1) 
2.6-2.9 (6.3-6.6) 
6.0 (8.8) 
5.1 (8.1) 
2.3-2.6 (5.6-5.9) 
2.0 (2.9) 
1.7 (2.7) 
0.8-0.9 (1.8-1.9) 
NATION 
IS 1.2 1.1 0.4 
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Table Β: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) INITIAL CAPITAL COSTS 
In general the summation of the Table A results. Note, though that when 
a capital grant is awarded in conjunction with accelerated depreciation 
the value of the grant is reduced to 93.26· percent of its Table A level 
since tax on the grant is paid more quickly under the accelerated dep­
reciation regime. Moreover, when capital grant and interest subsidy 
are combined it is assumed that the notional loan on which the former is 
based (equivalent of course to the level of internal financing) covers 
50 percent of eligible investment costs (the minimum level of internal 
finance necessary before a capital grant can be awarded) and that the 
loan on which the interest subsidy is awarded covers 25 percent of 
eligible investment costs for the DZ maxima and 16.7 percent for 
DZ average. 
(b) ANNUAL CAPITAL COSTS (Discount/interest rate 10.75 percent), 
(i) Calculation 
Asset 
Buildings 
Plant 
of weighted annual 
Land/Working Capital 
Assumed 
Life 
50 
10 
­
capital cost factor: 
Annual Capital 
Charge Factor 
0.1082 
0.1680 
0.1075 
Weight 
0.280 
0.385 
0.335 
WEIGHTED ANNUAL CAPITAL COST FACTOR 
Weighted 
Factors 
0.0303 
0.0647 
0.0360 
0.1310 
(ii) Calculation of annual subsidy factor: 
­ AD building : 0.1082 (building subsidised) 
­ AD plant : 0.1235 (plant subsidised) 
­ CG, IS : 0.1166 (plant/building/land subsidised) 
Since replacement is not explicitly subsidised, the subsidy life 
of the plant element of the CG and IS, and of AD plant, is taken 
to be 20 years ­ see ρ 32 above. 
(iii) Calculation of annuitising factor ((ii) t (i)) 
­ AD building : 0.8260 
­ AD plant : 0.9427 
­ CG, IS : 0.8901 
(c) VALUE ADDED 
It is assumed that gross profits make up 33 percent of value added. 
This was the average figure for manufacturing industry in Belgium 
over thè period 1970­74. See Eurostat, National Accounts 1970­74 
Eurostat Yearbook 2 ­ 1975, Statistical Office of the European 
Communities, 1975, Table 5. 
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DENMARK 
THE INCENTIVES 
Denmark, like most other EC countries, has a considerable variety 
of regional incentives on offer. Many are, however, of only minor 
importance - at least in expenditure terms. There are seven such 
minor regional incentives. First, there are operational grants payable 
to industrial enterprises whose financial position -has seriously 
suffered because of location in a development area. To be eligible the 
enterprise must have received a company soft loan or have moved into 
industrial buildings aided under the municipality soft loan scheme. 
(Both of these incentives are discussed below). The grant is 
payable within three years of the signing of the contract for the company 
soft loan or of the move into a municipal industrial building. The 
funds available for the incentive are, however, limited and reserved 
for special cases; they can only be paid after consultation with the EC. Only 
three awards have in fact been made under this scheme since its introduction 
in 1969. Secondly, companies moving into a development area may 
receive company removal grants to cover the costs of removal where 
these are substantial. Only 13 such grants were awarded between 
1972 andl976 - having a total value of DKr 0.5 million. Thirdly, 
where essential for the operation of a company in its new location, a 
removal grant of DKr 4,000 can be awarded for each member of staff 
moved. Again, however, these awards are rare and between 1972 and 
1976 only 95 were made, totalling some DKr 380,000. Fourthly, grants 
may be paid for studies and plans for projects of importance for the 
industrial development of a region (as well as for the operation of so-
called Regional Development Committees). Between 1972/73 and 1975/76 
DKr 425,000 was awarded for project studies and DKr 1.75 million for 
the operation of the Regional Development Committees. Fifthly, loans 
and grants may be awarded to infrastructure projects of central 
importance to the industrial development of the region in that they 
safeguard or attract industrial activities. Since 1972/73, 
DKr 3.5 million has been awarded under this scheme - all of it in 
1975/76. Sixthly, companies which, within the previous three years, 
have received company soft loans or have moved into an industrial 
building financed by a municipality soft loan may be awarded guarantees 
on loans for working capital if it can be shown that it would otherwise 
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be impossible to procure sufficient working capital. The duration of 
the guarantee may not exceed 5 years, and the amount of the guarantee 
is reduced during this period. A 2 year period of grace may be allowed. 
These guarantees can only be awarded after consultation with the EC. 
In fact, no awards under the scheme have so far been made. Finally, 
companies can receive guarantees on loans for pre-rationalisation 
studies if it would otherwise be impossible to finance such studies. 
The duration and grace period is as with the working capital guarantees. 
There have, so far, been no applications for award under this scheme. 
All of these regional incentives, then, are small in terms of the 
amount of money expended upon them or the number of projects aided. 
There are, in fact, only three regional incentives which are of major 
importance. The main incentive, currently involving some DKr 130 
million annually, is a company soft loan of up to 20 years duration for 
buildings and up to 10 years for plant. This loan is at 7.5 percent 
interest, covers up to 90 percent of eligible investment costs and carries 
with it repayment holidays of up to 5 years (although in practice a 2 
year maximum period of grace is standard). Closely related to this loan, 
and indeed often offered in conjunction with it, is an investment grant 
covering a maximum 25 percent of eligible investment costs. Current 
investment grant expenditure is DKr 50 million per year. Unlike the 
company soft loan and the investment grant, the final important 
incentive in Denmark does not go directly to companies but rather 
subsidises the building of factories by municipalities. The subsidy 
takes the form of a low interest (7 percent) loan of 25 years duration 
on 75 percent of building costs. This subsidy must however be passed 
on in full to the occupant firm (either in the rent or in the sale 
price) and', moreover, municipalities must subsidise the remaining 25 
percent of building costs at the same rate. Expenditure on the munici-
pality soft loan amounts to some DKr 20 million per annum. The synopsis 
tables (and the valuation tables) which follow are concerned with these 
three key incentives. 
Before moving to the synopsis tables, however, two preliminary 
remarks need to be made. The first concerns the spatial coverage of 
the Danish incentives. From the accompanying map it can be seen that 
aided areas are of two types - General Development Regions and. 
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within these. Special Development Regions where the intensity of 
the regional problem is most acute. The former hold some 31 percent of 
the Danish population and the latter, some 16 percent. From the 
viewpoint of the regional incentives the major difference between the 
two areas is that investment grants are payable only in the Special 
Development Regions. Secondly, when calculating eligible investment for 
the company soft loans and grants, account is taken of so-called 
mortgage credit loans. In the case of the soft loan scheme, eligible 
expenditure is reduced by the value of any mortgage credit loan received. 
For the investment grant, the grant is awarded in respect of eligible 
investment minus the difference between the nominal and market price 
of the mortgage credit loan. These mortgage credit loans are peculiar 
to Denmark and involve a system whereby, in return for the deposit of 
mortgage deeds, special mortgage institutes issue bearer bonds having 
a nominal value equal to the loan to be awarded. The borrower must 
then sell the bonds for what they will fetch on the Stock Exchange. 
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Company Soft Loan 
3. AdmlnHtrat­
5. Activity 
6. Spatial 
DUcrjrain­
Τ 
at lar 
Project Type 
Disc ini..-
Ol»««Uon«ry, project­related soft loan of up to 20 
year« duration (for buildings) «id up to 1O years dur­
ation (for ¡.Unti. liptyMot »lx­monthly on « »traight­
l l n · basis. The M « ! · " * MpiyM« holiday Is 5 years 
(In practice, 2 year·) . No lntereat­free period IS 
available. A maximum OÍ M percent of e l igible project 
coat» (I .e . project fixed capital coats mlnu» the m»x­
l«iM «wrtujg«­cr*dit loan ­ normally about 60 perçant 
of project fined capital coat· ­ and any Invest sunt 
grant awarded) can bo covered. Current Interest ratei 
7.5 percent. Urning EC reference Kate aa the Market rate 
lhe current conc«««ion le 2.15 percentage points. 
Artici« 6 oí Regional Development * « 1972 (Act Ho. 219, 
7 Jur.e) . Act adalnlstered through "rules of procedur·" 
laid down by Minister of Co—ιe ree (the current rule» 
date fio« IS August 1973). 
Day­to­day administration by Regional Development Dir­
ectorate (HDD). ROD responsible to II »ember Regional 
OevuLuiMMnt Council IRDC1, appointed by Minister aC 
Cosmwrc«. RDC appraises project» and ma*·" awards. ADC 
decisione are final. 
In i.iw «.nly Industrial act iv i t ies (Including mining) and 
cerviCu· «re e l ig ib le . Agriculture and construction are 
not e l ig ible unleee their production le industrialised. 
In practice uwards are overwhelmingly towards Manuf­
acturing with service awards being Halted to the hotel 
sector. State Industry cannot be aided. 
No L}ca lUJ discrimination between e l ig ible ac t iv i t i e s 
but the decision whether or not to award and the rate of 
awaid {subject to the set «wtxlsuO are at the discretion 
of the duthorltlee (the decision being baaed on a "total 
evaluation" ­ see II below·), thus giving aome acope for 
dl ser leti na t lon. 
Ho specified discrimination wLthln the, e l ig ib le arcas 
(the Contrai Development Regions) but see S above on 
discretion. 
In law setting­up project · , extensions, ratlonallaatlons, 
réorganisations, «Odernisatlon* end transfere are a l l 
e l ig ib le . Neither takeovars nor wholly replacement proj­
ects are e l ig ib le . Aa far as rates of award ere con­
cerned project typo Is specifically taken into account 
In the "total evaluation". For exaaple, wherea» setting· 
up projects and maior extension· receive JO percent loen 
covtragu for building cos t · , «Mil extensions and a l ­
tération· can obtain So percent coverage (depeiidlng on 
tin­ mortgage­credit loan). Further discrimination la 
possible boceas* of the discretionary nature of the 
incentive nue S above). 
Investment Grant 
Discretionary, project­«»lated cepital grant. The grant 
smy not «xcaed 25 percent ot e l ig ib le project fixed 
capital coats 1 · · · the difference between the nosiinel 
value and the market price of the mortgage deed· leaned 
in tempoet oí th« çrojwct by the mortgage­ccedit Inst it­
ution which la part­financing the project. 
AxtLcl« 10 of Regional Development Act 1972 (Act Ho. 219, 
7 June). Act administered through "rule· of procedure" 
laid down by Mlnleter of Commerce (the current rules 
date fremi 15 August 1973). 
As company «oft loon. 
Aa company sott loon. 
As company »oft loan. 
Avallabl« only In the special Development Regions but 
otherwise se company «oft loan. 
Eligible project types ere a · company «oft loan. A« far 
a · rataa of «ward »re concerned, project type Is taken 
Into account In the "total eveluation", with setting­up 
projects being favoured. 
Municipality Soft Loan 
Soft loan available to municipali tie· to allow the« to 
build, for specified client·. Industrial building· which 
ara then normally rented but which can be bought. Loan 
repayment 1« eix monthly on a straight line basis over a 
standard 25 ye«rc (although the Legal maximum la 30 
year·). Current interest ratei 7 percent. Using LC 
reference rate aa the market rate the current conci «·1οη 
le 3.25 percentage polnts. No repayment holiday. No 
interest­free perioda. Loan covers a standard 15 perci­i.t 
of building costs but municipalities are obliged to sub­
sidise the rtimalnlng 2h percent on* the M I M term« when 
calculating the appropriate rental or sellin* prit«. 
Annual rent Is therefore 4 percent (i.e. l/25th) ci U>tal 
cost· plu· 7 purcent of the outstanding loan plus geneial 
running expense«. Leaseholder can buy tha Lulldlng at 
any tis* during the course of the lease at total tow t s 
(less subsidy) minus any rental instalments paid, 
Article 9 of Regional Devolojasent Act 1972 (Act No. 219, 
7 June). Act administered through "rules o( procedure" 
laid down by Minister ol Conocrcti (the current rule· 
dat« from 15 August 1973). 
Municipalities secure client« in advance and then apply 
to RDC. RDC aprirsi»*« project and, if decision favour­
able, «ward· the municipality the loan. 
Only industrial building« «re ellgLbl«. The loan 1« 
therefore generally limited to manufacturing. Stat« 
industry cannot be aided. 
Between ellgLbl* «ctlvitie« no rat« discrimination since 
rat·· ore in practice fixed. The decision whether or 
not to award i» however at the discretion of the autlior­
itl««, thus giving eos» »cope for discrimination. 
Aa company soft loan except that in practice no discrim­
ination In rates. 
Eligibility 1· limited mainly to setting­up projects. 
All other project type· (extensions, rationalisation», 
reorganisations, modernisation·, transfer·, takeover· 
end replacement) generally ineligible, although local 
Industrie· etartlng new production siay bn sympathetically 
9. t U j l b l e 
10. Eligible 
Forma of 
Espandi tui ι 
II. farther 
Condi Hoi 
14. Timing and 
Phasing 
15. Toppin<j 
Company Sof t Loan 
Loam* nut normally granted to project« involving f tied 
I meet—tit of !■■· than DKr 0.5 «111. or more thin 
DKr «O mill . No further specified dlecrlalaatlom (hit 
eee 5 oboe*). 
Eligible item» Include plant amd machinery, building», 
• i t e purché·· amd preliminary investigation*. Work­
in* capital and vehicle» *r* th* Ml« Ineligible item·. 
P .pUi .«n( 1» «nt e l i g ib le . Second­hai*! aséete are 
e l igible if · c* · · 1· m*d* for their necessity. 
Ancillary building* (e.g. worker** housing) «r« 
Ineligible but offices on the prmsU·*» *r* e l ig ib le . 
Low valu« and «hart llf* aa**t· or* not e l ig ib le . 
aaset· pwrchno­4 with c soh or through phaaed payment» aie 
e l ig ib le . A»Mt» bought on bit* purchase or leaeed «r · 
rut e l ig ib le . 
Aa part of the "total evaluation' the project *M*t, 
aeong Other thing*, b* "sound*, be on a reeeonsbla 
commercial b e · ! · , and «vak* on lepact oft the recipient 
«ree (In term« of botb Job· and growth!. Th* financial 
need» of the project la« reflected In available own 
capital) er* alao oonaldered. 
On «vera«·, loan duration» »re I« yesie ror building» 
(max. lo yeeral end β year» for plant Ima». 10 year*)ι 
while the standard repayment holiday 1» t or 2 year» 
(max. 5 year«), Mtween 1972­7} »nd 1975­7K the follow­
ing award» wer* maJe (DKr mill .)» 
1972­71 1973­74 1974­7» 1975­76 
99.2 
1.1 
c a s · · H Rã 
«ward» 91.7 99.« 
averag* LS l ­ i 
■y reducing debt servicing char«*·, the concessionary 
element of the loan 1* taxed in a» far · · It increase» 
taxable profit*. 
It la preferred that application be mirte and * decision 
received before project construction «tart». Application 
processing periodi on average I.5 month», toan start» 
when construction of th* project ha« been completed. 
No «ward· ire possili)· b«yond the formel maxima. 
wj,­n combinad with »n Inveatment «rent the maxlnua amount 
which can l.· loaned 1· reduced by the value of the «rent, 
«hun coaaMiied with e municipality aoft loan, only plant 
¿ost* can be coverert by the company loan. 
Investment Grant 
Cranta net normally mbWmmm to projects In­olvlng f i n d 
U M I U N I Of I . e . than DKr I Ki l l , mm further sr­cif­
led discrimination (but · · · S »bo*·). 
A» ocwapany «oft lo·« except that there 1* no minis*.· 
asset Hi« . 
A* company «oft loan. 
Aa company soft loan. 
formation on the svar·«· «rant award ι 
of e l igible investment but It would I Ho hard tnti percentage tas » i ^ w » »""■■­■■"■ —­ ­ ­ — — 
that 15 percent 1» normal. Since 1972­73 the following 
«rant award· have been made (DKr mila.)ι 
I972­7J 1971­74 1974­M I97S­7* 
c a · · · 34 « « « 
average Msatd 0.7 0.7 0.7 0 .1 
Orent i*«»rded a* incorno and therefor· taxed to th* 
extent that It lead» to increased prof i t · , however. It 
can b» brought into income anytime within 10 y**r» 
after It 1» received «nd thu» could be fed Into lncom* 
either when loss·» *r* being nede or in th* tenth year. 
As conpeny »oft loan eaeept that the «rant Is paid out 
la loa» »um whan conetructton or the project has been 
compieted. 
No awards ar· possible beyond the formal maxim». 
Normally awarded In combination with · company «oft 
loan. Wh*r* ■ «rent la »warded th* masi ems company 
soft lo*n which can b* attar­* M reduced by th* v«lu* 
of th* grant. 
Municipal i ty So f t Loan 
Thar* t* no «reclfled also discrimination. tmlLdlog* 
constructed normelly ran«· from *00 m2 to 1O.00O * ; . 
Th* construction cost» of th* building (Including office 
■ Ι ι II—siilil Inn) s i · e l ig ib le , a · are the cost» of » i t · 
purchaee and Infrestructure connection·. Th* cost of 
"usual InataIlatlona" (hnatlng, lighting, power, water 
• to . ) 1· also covered. All other project cost · (includ­
ing plant «nd machinery. v*hlcl ·* «nd votki­.j capital! 
•r« Ineligible. 
Mot relevant. 
Client mwt be known In advene* and mu*t be acceptable 
to th* MX. (For th* factor» considered, see company 
soft loan). Although loan limitad to a standard 75 
percent of building coat*, municipalities «r« obliged 
to subsidise th* remaining 25 percent on identical ten·» 
for th* pur posas of calculating th* appropriât* rental 
or tolling p r i e · . 
• i n c · 1972­73 th* following «ward» hav* bean mad· 
(DKr mill)ι 
1972­73 1973­74 1974­75 1975­7* 
»y reducing rental chargea or th» purchase prie* of the 
building to the c l ient , th» oonce»»tonary element of th* 
loan 1» taxed in *■ far a» i t Increases taxable profit«. 
ι coevany soft Loan. 
Mo award» are possible beyond the formal fl«*d r a t · · . 
If municipality «oft loan obtained, than company «oft 
loan/Investment «rant era obviously not available to ­
ward« building costs . Th«y could hovever be claimed In 
respect of al l e l igible project fixed capital costs not 
covered by th« municipality loan. 
Company Soft Loan 
17. Clawt.ark 
IB. Turndown 
NO d i r e c t I n f o r m a t l o a . Loan repayment smat b * s e c u r e d 
through mor tgage» , « u a r a n t · * » or by o t h e r mean« a c c e p t a b l e 
t o t h e a u t h o r i t i e s . 
1 9 7 2 ­ 7 3 1973­74 1974­75 1975­76 
a p p l i c a t i o n « 101 140 159 131 
turndown 36 SB 65 37 
p e r c e n t 3 5 . 6 4 1 . 4 4 0 . 9 2B.2 
Moat turndown 1« du« t o f i n s n c i n l wookn·«« o f a p p l i c a n t 
o r t o l a c k o f Impact o f p r o j e c t on t h * economic d é v e l o p ­
p e n t o f t h e problem a r e a s . 
Loan« p a i d o u t be tween 1 9 7 2 ­ 7 3 «nd 1 9 7 5 ­ 7 6 t o t a l l e d 
DKr 4 2 7 , 9 m i l l . , DKr I J o . o m i l l , b e i n g d i s b u r s e d i n 
1975­76 and DKr 9 9 . 2 m i l l , i n the p r e v i o u s f i n a n c i a l year 
No I n f o r m a t i o n f o r l o a n « a l o n e b u t Job» a s s o c i a t e d 
be tween 1 9 5 8 ­ 7 6 w i t h t h * I n c e n t i v e package «■ · w h o · · ­
on the b a s i » o f I n v e s t o r s ' own e a t l m a t u « o f a d d i t i o n a l 
joba c r e a t e d ­ hava been put a t 2 4 , 0 0 0 . 
E s t i m a t e * a r e n o t a v a l l a t i l e f o c t h * l o a n a i o n « . T o t a l 
p r o j e c t f i x e d c a p i t a ) c o s t s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h * t h r e e 
awin Danish i n c e n t i v e » have bean (OXr m i l l . ) ι 
1972-73 1973-74 1974-75 
276 465 4θβ 
Ho s p e c i f i e d l i f e . 
Whether p r o j e c t · a l r e a d y under c o n s i d e r a t i o n are awarded 
"o ld" o r "new* l a d e c i d e d ad luic f o r each chano* . 
Investment Grant 
I f t h e c o n d i t i o n * o f award axe broken w i t h i n 5 y e a r s 
the a u t h o r i t i e s c a n c l*wback t h * « r a n t . Th* amount t o 
be r e p a i d l a r e d u c e d by on» f i f t h f o r » v e r y year which 
p a * * · * a f t e r award. 
1 9 7 2 ­ 7 ] 1973­74 1 9 7 4 ­ 7 5 1 9 7 5 ­ 7 6 
appi l e a t lona 56 97 72 79 
turndown 22 45 38 45 
p e r c e n t 3 9 . 3 5 1 . 7 5 2 . B 5 7 . 0 
Turndown r a t · * r e f l e c t t h * h i g h l y s e l e c t i v e n a t u r e o f 
g r a n t «ward», b u t beyond t h i » th» r e a s o n » f o r turndown 
a r e ■ I m l l a r t o t h o s * f o r t h * company s o f t l o a n . 
Grant» approved between 1969­To and 1 9 7 5 ­ 7 6 t o t a l l e d 
DKr 16Θ.9 m i l l . , DKr 3 4 . 5 m i l l , b e i n g approved i n 
1 9 7 5 ­ 7 6 and DKr 2 3 . 3 m i l l . In 1 9 7 4 ­ 7 5 . 
S e e company s o f t l o a n . 
S e a company s o f t l o a n . 
Ho s p e c i f i e d U f a . 
Aa company s o f t Loan. 
Municipality Soft Loan 
No I n f o r m a t i o n . 
1972 ­73 1973­74 1974­75 1 9 7 5 ­ 7 6 
a p p l i c a t i o n · 30 16 14 21 
turndown 17 9 3 ­
p e r c e n t 5 6 . 6 5 6 . 3 2 1 . 4 2 9 . 6 
Th* r e a s o n · f o r turndown are g e n e r a l l y a* f o r company 
• o i t l o a n . 
Loan« p a i d o u t be tween 1961­64 and 1975­76 t o t a l l e d 
DKr 252 B i l l . , DKr 2 0 . 4 m i l l , b e i n g d i s b u r s e d i n 1975­76 
and DKr 1 9 . 1 m i l l , t h » p r e v i o u s f i n a n c i a l y e a r . 
S e * company » o f t l o a n . 
Uútween 1963­76, DKr 252 mill, ha· been awarded in th* 
form of municipality *oft loans, in support of total 
building investment of DKr 336 «Ull. 
NO specified lit«. 
soft loan.' 
DENMARK 
THE INCENTIVE VALUES 
As we have seen, there are three basic elements to the Danish 
regional incentive package - a company soft loan (CSL), an investment 
grant (IG) and a municipality soft loan (MSL). These are the incentives 
covered in this valuation. The most important of these incentives, 
at least in terms of number of awards made, is the company soft loan. 
There were 335 such awards in the period 1972/73 to 1975/76 (involving 
annual expenditure of DKr 130.0 million in 1975/76) - more than twice 
the number of investment grants awarded (annual expenditure, DKr 34.5 
million in 1975/76) and some seven times the number of municipality 
soft loan awards (annual expenditure, DKr 28.4 million in 1975/76). 
Indeed, there were on average a mere 12 municipality soft loans awarded 
annually over the period. 
Table A shows the effective values of these three incentives after 
taxation, delays in payment and eligible items have been taken into 
account. The table is in two parts reflecting the two main types of 
problem area in Denmark - the General Development Regions (GDR) and, 
within these, the Special Development Regions (SDR). While both the 
company soft loan and the municipality soft loan are available throughout 
the General Development Regions, the investment grant can be obtained 
only in the Special Development Regions. 
The main point to arise from the table is that the concessionary 
element of the two soft loan schemes is worth very much less, in 
effective value terms, than the investment grant. The effective value 
of the maximum company soft loan subsidy, for example, is only 2.6 
percent of initial investment costs (perhaps primarily due to the 
existence of the already-mentioned mortgage credit loans in Denmark which 
sharply reduce company soft loan coverage) compared with a maximum 
investment grant effective value of 14.5 percent. A further feature of 
the table is that while there would appear to be considerable discretion 
in the award of investment grants (the average rate being some three-
fifths of the maximum), the subsidy element of the average company soft loan 
lies very close to the maximum - particularly when it is recalled from 
the synopsis tables that the maximum five year principal repayment 
holiday assumed in the table is never awarded, the maximum in practice 
being only two years. 
72 
DENMARK 
Table Β has a similar structure to Table A, distinguishing between 
Special and General Development Regions and between maximum and average 
rates of award. In the table the five possible combinations of the 
main Danish incentives are valued - CSL alone (the standard case), 
MSL alone and MSL plus CSL (plant element only) in the General 
Development Regions outside the Special Development Regions; and CSL plus 
IG (the standard case) and MSL plus CSL (plant element only) plus IG in 
the Special Development Regions. The case of IG alone is not considered 
since, as already noted, the investment grant is virtually always awarded 
in combination with a company soft loan. 
From the table it can be seen that, where no investment grant award is 
made, the maximum effective value of the concessionary element of the 
Danish package is relatively low - 5.8 percent of initial capital 
costs, 5.0 percent of annual capital costs and 1.9 percent of value 
added (and then only if a municipality soft loan is awarded, a not 
particularly common occurrence). Where, however, an investment grant 
is obtained (and about half of projects aided by a company soft loan 
also secured an investment grant) the effective value of the package 
reaches levels which, as we shall see in Part II, gives an effective 
value similar to that found in most other EC countries - 10.0 percent 
of initial capital costs, 9.0 percent of annual capital costs and 
3.4 percent of value added in terms of average awards; and 15.4, 
13.8 and 5.2 percent respectively for maximum awards. 
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Table A: NOMINAL TO EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDY. 
AREA 
SDR, 
GDR 
SDR 
only 
INCENTIVE 
CSL buildings 
CSL 
MSL 
IG 
plant 
LEVEL 
siajrijium 
average 
maxi PUTT" 
average 
standard 
maximum 
average 
NOMINAL 
VALUE 
18.8 
14.9-16.3 
14.5 
8.9-10.8 
20.6 
25.0 
15.0 
9 
5 
EFFECTIVE VALUE 
TAX DELAYS 
12.2 11.6 
.7-10.6 
9.4 
.8-7.O 
13.3 
21.7 
13.0 
9.2-10.1 
9.0 
5.5-6.7 
13.3 
20.7 
12.4 
AFTER 
ELIGIBLE 
ITEMS 
1.5 
1.2-1.3 
1.1 
0.7-0.8 
4.7 
14.5 
8.7 
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Table A: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) GENERAL: Discount rate 10.25 percent (EC reference rate 1976). 
(b) COMPANY SOFT LOAN (CSL) 
(i) Nominal value: Net grant equivalent of loan subsidy as percent loan 
award, assuming : 
Building Plant 
maximum average maximum average 
- loan period (yrs) 20 18 10 8 
- principal repayment holiday (yrs) 5 0-2 5 0-2 
- interest free periods (yrs) No interest free periods are available. 
- interest rate subsidy Using EC reference rate as market rate, 
2.75 percentage points. 
- repayment system Repaid 6 monthly on straight· line basis, 
(ii) Taxation: Effective corporation tax rate 35.2 percent (standard 
corporation tax of 37 percent discounted 6 months - the average delay) 
(iii) Delays: Loan starts on completion of project construction (average 
construction period 2 months to 2 years). Assuming average one year 
construction period and a uniform spread of project expenditure, 
average delay from time of asset expenditure is 6 months, 
(iv) Eligible items: (a) Loan as percent eligible investment - maximum 90 
percent. (b) Eligible investment as percent project fixed capital 
costs - 40 percent (assuming the maximum mortgage credit loan is 60 
percent of project fixed capital costs). (c) Project fixed capital 
costs as percent all project capital costs - 70 percent. The maximum 
loan as percent of all project capital costs is 25.2 percent 
(i.e. 0.9 χ 0.4 χ 0.7). This is split evenly between plant and 
buildings/land (site purchase is eligible as part of the building 
loan) following the EC key for Denmark (5 : 45 : 50). Both the 
maximum plant and the maximum building loan are therefore 12.6 
percent of project capital costs. 
(c) MUNICIPALITY SOFT LOAN (MSL) 
(i) Nominal value: Net grant equivalent of subsidy passed on to clients 
in the form of reduced rents as a percentage of total building costs. 
The subsidy is equivalent to that on a 25 year loan, repaid six 
monthly on a straight line basis, with an interest rate concession of 
3.25 percentage points (using EC reference rate as market rate). 
(ii) Taxation: Effective corporation tax rate 35.2 percent (see above), 
(iii) Delays: None. 
(iv) Eligible items: The subsidy is on all building costs including site 
purchase. With the EC key of land 5, buildings 45 and plant 50; 
and with working capital assumed to be 30 percent of project capital 
costs, land plus buildings account for 35 percent of all project 
capital costs. 
(d) INVESTMENT GRANT (IG) 
(i) Nominal value: As percentage eligible investment costs . 
(ii) Taxation: Effective rate of corporation tax, 35.2 percent, applied 
in year 10, giving an effective tax rate of 13.3 percent, 
(iii) Delays: On average 6 months (see (b) (ill) above), 
(iv) Eligible items: Eligible investment assumed to be 70 percent of all 
project capital costs, it being assumed that (ineligible) working 
capital is 30 percent thereof. It is also assumed that the nominal 
and market price of the mortgage credit loan are identical. 
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Table Β: EFFECTIVE SUBSIDIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VARIOUS DENOMINATORS. 
AREA INCENTIVE COMBINATIONS 
SDR, CSL (maximum) 
GDR „„, , ( 
CSL (average) 
MSL 
MSL + CSL plant (maximum) 
MSL + CSL plant (average) 
SDR CSL (maximum) + IG (maximum) 
o n l v CSL (average) + IG (maximum) 
CSL (maximum) + IG (average) 
CSL (average) + IG (average) 
MSL + CSL plant (max) + IG plant (max) 
MSL + CSL plant (av) + IG plant (max) 
MSL + CSL plant (max) + IG plant (av) 
MSL + CSL plant (av) + IG plant (av) 
INITIAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
2.6 
1.9-2.1 
4.7 
5.8 
5.4-5.5 
15.4 
15.2-15.3 
10.3 
9.8-ΊΟ.O 
12.4 
12.3 
9.8 
9.5-9.6 
ANNUAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
2.3 
1.7-1.9 
3.9 
5.0 
4.6-4.7 
13.8 
13.6-13.7 
9.2 
8.8-9.0 
11.3 
11.2 
8.8 
8.5-8.6 
VALUE 
ADDED 
0.9 
0.6-0.7 
1.5 
1.9 
1.7-1.8 
5.2 
5.2 
3.5 
3.3-3.4 
4.3 
4.3 
3.3 
3.2-3.3 
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Table Β: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) INITIAL CAPITAL COSTS 
In general the summation of the Table A results. Note, though, that when 
an investment grant is awarded in conjunction with a company soft loan 
then eligible company soft loan investment is reduced from 40 percent to 
15 percent when the maximum investment grant award is made and from 40 
percent to 25 percent for an average investment grant. For this reason, 
the figures in Table Β involving an investment grant are lower than the 
sum of their Table A components. Moreover when company soft loans/invest­
ment grants are offered in conjunction with a municipality soft loan 
(which normally implies that the building is rented) they are available 
only on eligible plant costs. 
(b) ANNUAL CAPITAL COSTS (Discount/interest rate : 10.25 percent). 
(i) Calculation of weighted annual capital cost factor: 
Assumed Annual Capital Weighted 
Asset Life Charge Factor Weight Factors 
Buildings 50 0.1033 
Plant 10 0.1645 
Land/Working Capital ­ 0.1025 
WEIGHTED ANNUAL CAPITAL COST FACTOR 0.1244 
0.315 
0.350 
0.335 
0.0325 
0.0576 
0.0343 
(ii) Calculation of annual subsidy factor. 
­ MSL, CSL building, IG building 
­ CSL plant, IG plant 
­ CSL, IG 
O.1033 (building/land subsidised) 
0.1195 (plant subsidised) 
0.1114 (plant/building/land 
subsidised) 
Since replacement is not explicitly subsidised, the plant subsidy 
life is taken to be 20 years ­ see ρ 32 above. 
(iii) Calculation of annuitising factor ((ii) * (i)). 
­ MSL, CSL building, IG building : 0.8304 
­ CSL plant, IG plant : 0Í9606 
­ CSL, IG : 0.8955 
(c) VALUE ADDED 
It is assumed that gross profits make up 38 percent of value added. 
This was the average figure for manufacturing industry in Denmark over 
the period 1972­73. See Eurostat, National Accounts 1970­74 Eurostat 
Yearbook 2 ­ 1975, Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1975, 
Table 5. 
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FRANCE 
THE INCENTIVES 
The synopsis tables which follow cover the three main regional 
incentives on offer in France. Although all three incentives are 
available for both industrial and tertiary investment, for reasons of 
space we have restricted ourselves in the synopsis tables to describing 
them as they apply to industrial investment - in practice, they are 
awarded predominantly for industrial projects. Further below in this 
introduction, however, where we briefly describe service sector assistance 
in France, we shall note how the three incentives also apply to 
tertiary investment. Before that, we introduce the three incentives 
and provide background information and essential details which could 
not be sufficiently condensed for inclusion in the synopsis tables. The 
three incentives covered are the regional development grant, the local 
business tax concession and the special depreciation allowance. 
The regional development grant (prime de développement regional), a 
project-related capital grant, is the major regional incentive in 
France, accounting for some 45 percent of annual regional incentive 
spending. It is basically for setting-up and extension projects, with 
rates of award varying between three zones of award and ranging from 
12 percent of eligible investment or FF 12,COO per job created 
(whichever is the lower) for extensions in the minimum rate zone to 
25 percent and FF 25,000 respectively for setting-up projects in the 
maximum rate zone. The full details of the job and investment conditions 
for this grant were impossible to condense for inclusion in the 
synopsis tables without loss of important information. The details 
are provided in the accompanying table. 
The local business tax concession (exonération de la taxe profession-
elle) relates to a local tax, raised by each commune and département. 
A firm's liability to the tax is assessed according to the theoretical 
rental value of its fixed assets as well as to a proportion of its 
annual wage bill. The taxable value thus obtained is multiplied by a 
rate of taxation to obtain the firm's assessment. This tax rate is set 
by each commune and département separately, according to revenue needs. 
The concession, which is project-related, takes the form of a total 
or partial exemption on either or both the commune and département 
levies for a period of up to five years. Each commune and département 
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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT GRANT: JOB AND INVESTMENT CONDITIONS OF AWARD 
GENERAL CASE 
Size of locality 
Setting-up minimum jobs 
minimum investment 
Extension 
mimimum jobs 
minimum investment 
less than 
15,OOQ 
10 
FF 300,000 
10/25% increase 
or 
50/10% increase 
or 
120 
FF 300,000 
15,000 or 
more 
30 
FF 800,000 
Areas where only 
large projects eligible 
loo 
FF 10 million 
30/25% increase 
or 
120 
FF 800,000 
extension 
projects 
ineligible 
UPLAND AND RURAL AREAS AND CORSICA 
Size of locality 
Setting-up minimum jobs 
minimum investment 
less than 
15,COO 
15,000 to 
49,999 
50,000 
and more 
6 
FF 300,000 
6/20% increase 
or 
50/10% increase 
or 
120 
FF 300,000 
15 
FF 500,000 
15/20% increase 
or 
50/10% increase 
or 
120 
FF 500,000 
30 
FF 800,000 
30/25% increa! 
or 
120 
FF 800,000 
Extension 
minimum jobs 
minimum investment 
Note: For extension projects alternative job conditions exist. For example, in the general case for an 
extension in a locality with less than 15,000 inhabitants IO new jobs representing an increase of 
at least 25% of the original labour force are required or 50 new jobs representing a 10% minimum 
increase or 120 new jobs irrespective of the percentage increase. 
FRANCE 
decides for itself whether to offer a concession and also sets its 
value and duration, to which the Minister of Economics and Finance 
must agree before the concession can become effective. The incentive 
accounts for approximately 25 percent of annual regional incentive 
spending, calculated as its gross cost in terms of revenue foregone in a 
given year. 
The special depreciation allowance (amortissement exceptionel) 
is a project-related incentive allowing recipient firms to write down -
in addition to ordinary depreciation - 25 percent of the value of their 
new buildings in the first year. On the valuation assumptions which 
we employ in Part II of this report, the cost of the special depreciation 
allowance is some 5 percent of annual regional incentive spending. 
The spatial availability of the three incentives introduced above 
is shown on the accompanying two maps. The first map shows the areas 
eligible for the regional development grant, which account for almost 
50 percent of the national territory and in which some 30 percent of 
the population lives. The map shows the three award zones into which the 
designated area is sub-divided as well as the boundaries of the upland 
and rural areas and the localities where only large projects can qualify 
for assistance (see table). The second map shows where the local 
business tax concession and the special depreciation allowance can be 
obtained. The depreciation allowance is available only in the western 
and south-western parts of the country where the grant can be obtained 
(with the exception of food-processing projects - see synopsis). The 
local business tax concession has a wider availability, encompassing all 
the areas where the depreciation allowance and the grant are available 
as well as many other areas; in "Zone C", however, it is available 
only for projects transferring from either the Paris or Lyons region 
(Zone D). 
The three incentives covered in the synopsis tables account 
together for some 75 percent of annual regional incentive spending 
and are the three major regional incentives on offer in France. There 
are, however, a large number of other incentives and it is appropriate 
that we should briefly note the main ones at this point. 
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REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT GRANT 
¡υ 
m 
I 
"U 
Zonel 
Zone 2 
Zone 3 
Setting - up 
25000 F 
max. of 25% 
20000F 
max. of 17% 
15 000 F 
max. of 12% 
Extension 
22000F 
max. of 25% 
17000 F 
max. of 17% 
12000 F 
max. of 12% 
only large projects eligible here 
upland and rural areas 
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Of particular interest among the other regional incentives are 
two schemes aimed directly at service activities, at tertiary firms 
as well as at tertiary function projects of firms operating in the 
manufacturing sector. The service activities grant (prime de localisation 
de certaines activités tertiaires) is project-related and is given for the 
setting up, extension or transfer from the Paris region of management, 
administration, consultancy and data-processing activities. Thirty 
new jobs are required, 20 if the project involves the setting up or 
decentralisation of registered offices into the aided areas - which 
in the case of an extension must represent an increase of at least 50 
percent in the original labour force engaged in tertiary activities 
(alternatively, simply 100 new jobs if the project involves the 
creation of a new function or a decentralisation from the Paris region). 
There is no investment condition of award. This incentive is available 
throughout the country other than in the Paris basin (although only 
qualitatively and quantitatively significant projects may be assisted 
in the Lyons region). Awards are at the rate of FF 20,000 per job in 
areas where the regional development grant is awarded and FF 10,000 per 
job in the other designated areas. The second of the tertiary grants 
is the research activities grant (prime de localisation d'activités de 
recherche). This incentive is also project-related and is available 
for the setting up, extension and transfer of pure and applied 
research activities. Ten new research-related jobs are required, 
which in the case of an extension must normally represent an increase 
of at least 30 percent in the original research-related labour force 
(or 50 new jobs with no stipulated percentage increase for: extension 
by transfer from the Paris region; extension by the creation of a new 
activity; a first extension following the setting up of qualifying 
activities). There is no investment condition of award. The incentive 
is available in the whole of the country excluding the Paris basin 
(i.e. as for the services activities grant but with no restriction as 
regards the Lyons region). For projects involving eligible investment 
of less than FF 10 million the rate of award is 15 percent of eligible 
investment (20 percent in certain towns and cities considered as 
'centres of research' - métropole de recherche). For projects with 
eligible investment of FF 10 million or more the rate óf award is up to 
20 percent. In all cases awards are limited to a maximum of FF 25,000 
per job created (but this limit may be exceeded in exceptional cases). 
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FISCAL CONCESSIONS ( INDUSTRY) ( B S zone A (special depreciation available) 
H H H zone A (special depreciation not available) 
zone Β 
zone C 
zone D 
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Up until the reform of the regional incentive package in 1976 these 
tertiary grants had proved a disappointment: only 20 were awarded in the 
three years 1973 to 1975 (in which period 1,462 regional development 
grants had been awarded). Figures for more recent years are not yet 
available. 
Staying with the theme of incentives for tertiary investment, we 
noted in the opening paragraph that although the synopsis tables 
describe the three major incentives only as they apply to industrial 
investment, they are also available for tertiary investment. All three 
of them can be awarded for projects involving activities eligible for 
one or other of the two service grants (the local business tax 
concession is also available for certain hotel and other tourist 
accommodation projects). As regards the grant, virtually no awards 
(the conditions and rates are the same as for industrial projects) 
have been made for tertiary projects, and precisely because the 
tertiary-specific grants are available. Tertiary projects continue 
to be theoretically eligible for the regional development grant 
because job conditions can be less demanding and rates of award higher 
than for the appropriate tertiary grant, but there is an evident reluctance 
to make use of this discretion. In the cases of the local business tax 
concession and the depreciation allowance, tertiary awards are more 
frequent, but there are no figures available as to how many awards go 
to such projects. The job conditions of award differ in both cases 
from those described in the synopsis tables; they are in fact the same 
conditions which apply to the corresponding tertiary grant (thus there 
is no investment condition - see tertiary grant above). The rates of 
award are the same as those shown in the synopsis tables. 
Moving on from tertiary investment incentives, the land grant 
(bonification des terrains par le Fonds d'aide à la décentralisation et 
par les collectivités locales) is a project-related incentive 
available for investments which fulfil the requirements for the grant (or 
for either of the tertiary grants). In practice these awards almost 
invariably go to projects which actually receive a grant. The award 
is payable on the cost price of the developed site acquired for the 
project, provided that it is located on a designated industrial 
estate. Awards are U D ^ 0 one half of the price of the site, as 
long as certain minimum own contribution requirements are met. An 
award is usually also conditional upon 30 new jobs per hectare being 
created (although a proportionally reduced award may be given for 
fewer jobs). 
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The decentralisation grant (indemnité de décentralisation) is 
available for industrial firms to reimburse them part of the costs of 
transferring all or part of their production from the Paris Region 
(including the eight southern­most cantons of the département of Oise) 
to a location outside the Paris basin. The firm must vacate at least 
500 square metres of industrial floor­space. The award comprises: 60 
percent of the costs of dismantling the plant and equipment to be removed, 60 
percent of the costs of removal to the new location, and a further 30 percent 
of dismantling costs as a contribution to reassembly on the new premises. 
Awards are, however, normally limited to a maximum of FF 500,000. 
In the synopsis tables we cover the two major fiscal incentives in 
France (the local business tax concession and the depreciation allowance). 
In addition, there are two other fiscal incentives. The first involves 
the transfer tax (droit de mutation) applicable to the sale of certain 
intangible assets and, more importantly, of used industrial buildings 
(at least five years old). This incentive is available for setting up 
and extension projects (in Zones A and Β of the second map). The job 
conditions of award for these project types are the same as for the local 
business tax concession. For projects transferring out of either the 
Paris or Lyons region (the incentive can then be awarded also in Zone C) 
the job conditions of award are at least 10 new jobs for projects 
located in areas with a population of less than 15,000 inhabitants and 
30 new jobs in all other cases. The incentive is also available for 
regrouping onto an industrial estate or transfer to an industrial estate 
from a location in a residential area ­ and for a restricted number of 
.modernisation projects. For regrouping, transfer and modernisation, the 
maintenance of existing jobs is required. The award takes the form of 
a reduction in the normal rate of transfer tax, from 13.8 percent to 
2 percent for buildings amd from 17.2 percent to 2 percent for intangibles 
(though it should be noted that there is no reduction on the supplementary 
local levies). 
The second of the two minor fiscal concessions , and also not covered 
in the synopsis tables , is the capital gains tax upon the transfer of 
building land for development purposes (impôt sur les plus­values 
foncières). Award is conditional upon either a local business tax 
concession or a depreciation allowance having been received, since the 
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retained tax liablities must be fully invested in the project which gave 
rise to the award of the other (two) fiscal incentive(s). The conditions 
of award are identical to those for the fiscal incentive(s) already 
obtained. The concession reduces the normal rate of taxation from 25 
percent of capital gains to 12 percent. 
Still on the subject of minor regional incentives, soft loan 
facilities are available for regional industrial development through 
the central government's Fonds de développement économique et social (FDES) 
However, since 1973 all the loan facilities made available by the appropriate 
FDES committee (Comité Iter) appear to have been for reconversion and other 
structural reorganisation projects and not for regional development 
purposes per se. Soft loan facilities are also provided by the Regional 
Development Credit Institutes (Sociétés de développement régional). They 
are also able to take equity in new and developing ventures and this is 
a form of intervention which could grow rapidly in the wake of recent 
legislation (décret 76-438). However, these institutions operate 
throughout the country with the exception of the Paris region (which, 
however, will soon also be covered), and it is difficult to conceive of 
them as part of the regional incentive package proper because of the 
absence of any apparent spatial discrimination in their interventions. 
This is one of the reasons for their exclusion from the synopsis 
tables. 
Since 1974 four new grant schemes have been added to the regional 
incentive package. These are all aimed at providing incentives for 
small-scale, artisanal firms. The first of these (indemnité particulière 
de décentralisation en faveur d'entreprises artisanales de sous-traitance -
décret 74-444) is a decentralisation grant for artisanal sub-contractors 
in the Paris region who follow the (relocated) firms for whom they 
normally work. Awards are: 100 percent of the first FF 20,000 of 
incurred removal costs (dismantling, transport and reassembly of plant 
and equipment), 75 percent of the next FF 30,000 and 60 percent of any 
amount exceeding FF 50,000. 
The prime â l'installation d'enterprises artisanales (décret 75-803) 
is intended to encourage the setting up of artisanal firms in rural areas 
(and some selected urban locations). Awards are available in all 
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localities outside the Paris region with populations not exceeding 5,000 
(not exceeding 20,000 inhabitants in the designated upland and rural 
areas). There is a minimum capital investment requirement of FF 50,000 
and the rates of award vary according to location - with higher awards 
in the Massif central - and size of investment. The maximum award is 
30 percent of investment in the Massif and 16 percent elsewhere. 
The prime de développement artisanal - (décret 76-329) was brought 
in to complement the scheme just described, but only in the Massif central, 
by making assistance available there for extension projects in places 
with populations of less than 50,000 inhabitants. At least three new 
permanent jobs must be created within three years and a minimum of 
FF 150,000 must be invested in premises and plant and equipment. The 
rates of award are identical to those offered under the regional 
development grant scheme (part of the Massif falls in regional 
development grant Zone 1 and the other in Zone 2). 
The last of the four artisanal schemes, (aide speciale rurale -
décret 76-795) is the most general small-project scheme yet introduced. 
It is a grant scheme which applies in all cantons within the problem 
regions defined by the EC insofar as they recorded a population 
decline between the censuses of 1968 and 1975 and have a population 
density of less than 20 inhabitants per square kilometre, but excluding 
cantons with a population exceeding 5,000 inhabitants (as well as tourist 
centres with a capacity of SCO beds or more) . Aid is available for 
industrial, tertiary, commercial, tourist and hotel projects. There is 
no investment condition of award and no minimum job creation requirement. 
Awards are according to the number of jobs created and according to 
project type. For setting up, the amount paid per job created is 
FF 20,000 for the first 10 jobs, FF 15,000 for the next 10 and FF 8,0OO 
for the final 10, (i.e. no aid is given for any job above the thirtieth). 
For extension projects, account is taken of the existing labour force 
when calculating the award; for example, an establishment with 18 
employees which created three new jobs would receive FF 15,000 for each 
of the first two jobs and FF 8,000 for the third. 
Also on offer in France are a number of labour training and removal 
schemes. As regards labour training aids, regional development 
criteria are not the sole criteria giving firms access to them and they 
cannot therefore be seen as regional aids in the strict sense of the term. 
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Labour removal grants (allocation de transfert de domicile et de 
réinstallation) on the other hand do have a direct spatial element. 
They are payable to employees who move with a firm as well as to 
unemployed persons who have to move to a new locality in order to find 
employment appropriate to their qualifications and experience. No aid 
is available in principle for employees who move into the Paris and 
Lyons regions, although exceptions are not infrequently made for 
specialised staff; there is, however, a complete ban on awards for 
moves within or between these two regions. Awards compromise three 
elements: the second class rail fare for the family between the original 
and the new location; an amount for household removal costs up to 3,000 
kilogrammes; a resettlement grant calculated according to a number of 
factors - notably size of family and whether or not housing is provided 
by the employer - and which amounts to between 1,150 and 2,400 times 
the hourly rate of the national minimum guaranteed industrial wage 
(Salaire minimum industriel garanti). 
These, then, are the major national regional incentives on offer 
in France. In addition to these national schemes there are a number of 
forms of aid available from sub-national government. In the past 
sub-national financial aid has principally featured the sale and preparation 
of sites at concessionary prices, the supply of temporary factory 
premises (usines relais) and job creation grants. New legislation 
(décret 77-850) allows the regions (Etablissements publics régionaux) 
to make setting up awards of their own to supplement those made by 
central government. Although the powers which this legislation confers 
on the regions are limited, it will be interesting to see how they are 
used and how they develop over the next few years. 
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Regional Development Grant 
A project-related capital «rant, given predominantly to 
manufacturing Industry. Largely automatic e l i g ib i l i ty 
cordltlons and ratee of award which ««17 noth spatially 
and by project typa InatUng-wp/aetanalon). Tn« dee-
igniteJ eres* at« divided into Ihr·· OOM« of «ward «ftd 
award« ar« calculated aa Uw lowor of I paroant of e l -
igible Investment and FT ï per job crested, ranging Croo 
ÏS peccent/rr H .000 tac sett lt.·) «s in Usi maximum («t« 
ton« to IJ percent/rT 1Î.0OO for «stenslon In the minino» 
ret· «one. 
Herst 7 4 / j n Of 14 April 1974 and On TnSsrw«.,«r«r-l 
circular of 2« May 197«. 
Tor proleet« of tap to PT IO o l i i , of e l igible lnveets-nt, 
application« go to and decision» u « token by th« ptetel 
du departement, upon the advice of M InterulnlsierIsl 
advisory committee |Coolt4 deperlamentai pour la prom-
otion de ί ' · τ > ί ο ί ( . for «11 other project«, «ppllcattona 
«o to DATAM «nd decisions «r· takan by the Minister of 
Economy and Finance upon the advice of an Ir.terelnlster-
1*1 advisory committee (Comité I f « du rond« de dévelop­
pe—nt f ur­o» lg je et social) . Projecte are monitored 
a l « and award« «re disbursed by the Direction deportei 
de Ια concurience «t deg pri». 
Aid goo» predominantly to «obl i · nanti factor Ing Industry. 
The esi tactiva, construction, naulaa« and tour ise 
"lr..Jnslili­β* «r· excluded. Will· agriculture 1* generel 
ly ««eluded, food­prooaeelnf doas qualify. Tertiary 
function« (S.a. headquarter« function« of industrial 
f i t ·«) ani i l t es 'e .g . d«t«­proc««sing, r««««rch «nd 
dwvelppment) do qualify, but are virtually naver aldad. 
S t ock'holding project« sie excluded. Autonomously man­
•ged «tate industriar ar· e l ig ible , other stata 
Industri«» ar« not. 
H..1,· «peclfled. »Inc« « l lg lb l l ty and rat·« of award «re 
largely automatic, there la l i t t l e «cop« for activity 
discrimination. 
Local Business Tax Concession 
A project­related concession on the local bueiness tan. 
The concession Is Molted to a suslssjs of Up tø five 
years and too parcont of tan l i ab i l i t y . It «ay bo on 
either or both the departement or coeesuno levy. Th« 
typical coneeeelon goe» predominantly to Betting­up «nd 
esterillan projects In mobile manufacturing industry. In 
tho esse of esteneion projecte, th« award la limited to 
Uva net now investment. El ig ibi l i ty 1« largely autonatlc 
within a metrin of condition«. 
Arr3t4 la Journal off iciel of 14/2} nay UTi. 
lach risentili■ end depart««sent In the deelgnated area« 
doelde« for Itoel l whether to en*· a oonceeeLon availab­
le , and sets the value of the concession. This conces­
sion «ust be ngreed to by the Hlnleter of sconcary «nd 
Πnance, and In then velld for «11 qualifying projects 
In the respective coessune end depart «oen t . froject 
«ppllcatlon« for the concession are node to the 
Directeur daoeitesantal ¿o* ««rwlce« tl»cau», who siso 
decide« on «11 project« of up to fF 10 n i l ) , of e l ig ible 
investment. ΓΟΓ larger projects, ho forward« the 
application to Perl« fot 4 decielen by the Hlnleter of 
Economy «nd rinanc«. Decisione by the Minister are 
taken on the edvlce of en Interministerial ι osasi t tee 
(Cornit« f|ulnriul4» flu rood» de deve loppenen t économique et 
soc ia l ) . 
Award« go predominantly to nobile oarml«cturIng Industry. 
The ««tractive, haulage and construction ■Industrie«" 
are excluded. Agriculture Is excluded. Although many 
tertiary projects ere e l ig ible tednlnletratlv« functiene 
ee well as data­procesalng and r««««rch «nd develop­
awnt firmo and functional certain t e n i e « and hotel 
project«), th« great majority of concessione end th« 
■oat valuable concessione go to Industriel projects. 
Stock­holding projects «re inel igible . Autonomously 
managed «tat» Industrie** qualify, other «teta 
Indulti lee do not. 
None epeclfled. aii.ee e l tg lb l l ty le largely eutceutio 
and elnce the rete of concession Is fined for e l l 
projecte In the locality, there la l i t t l e eccpe ror 
activity dlacrlmlnatlon. There may be Indirect d ie · 
crlmlnetlon In that the theoretlcel rental velue of the 
project's essets end the else of Ite payroll affect 
l iab i l i ty to the tax «nd hence the value of e conceaalon. 
Special Depreciation Allowance 
A special fined 31 percent flret­year depreciation 
allowance on new building·. The coneeeelon le project­
related, for eettlng­up and «»tension projects. Although 
certain tertiary projecta qualify (administrativo func­
tlonn «e well ee reeearch a.id development and data­pro­
cessing firme end function«) «ward« go predominantly to 
mobile «mnufacturlng industry· 
Eligibi l i ty 1« largely automatic within a matti« of 
condition«. Th· apodal allowance 1« additional to 
ordinary linear depteclat Ion. Thus, aseuatng an Industr­
ial building depreciated over 20 yeere (the typical 
fl«c«l l i f e for industrial building«), th« actual f iret ­
yeer write­down when the special allowance Is received 
I« 2S percent plue S percent. I . e . IO petcent. 
Arrêté In Journal off ic ie l af 34/25 Hay 1976. 
Application procedure ae lucei buBlness tax concession. 
wt.sn both lhe ten concession end the special depreciation 
allowance are to be applied for, a single Joint applic­
ation la poeelble. 
Awards go pcedcetlnently to mobile manufacturing industry 
(the extractive, construction and haulag« "Industri·«" 
being excluded), rood­procesa1ng project« located any­
where OUtalde the Farle Bsein and Ly .in» Reg* un aleo 
qualify. With the exception of the food prucaaalng 
Industry, «tock­holdlng projectando not qualify. Auto­
nomously managed etate Industri·« qualify, 
other stete Industrlee do not. 
The largely automatic character of the Incentiva maana 
that there le l i t t l e scope for dlacrlmlnatlon with 
regard to industrial project«. Different job condition« 
•ttech to tertiary project«. 
State industr ies operating under competition 
fc. Spatial 
Dl«crimin­
ation 
, »toleet 
crlolnetlon 
Regional Development Grant 
Tie grant le available tn lexge perts of western and 
south­western France, Corsica and in a number of area* 
along the northern end north­eaatern bordere. Job end 
inveatment requirement» «re loee stringent In (1) upland 
and rural ereae and In Corsica than in (2) the reet of 
the designated «reaa. Within (1) and (2) these condit­
ion« become more stringent with increasing «l«e of 
loce l l ty . A« for rates, there are three rones of «ward. 
Inv«atm«nt/job formule determines award, hate« atei 
xone 3 tone 3 
eettlng­up 25 percent/ 17 percent/ 12 percent/ 
FF 25,000 rr 2o,ooo rr is.ooo 
lion 25 percent/ 17 percent/ 12 percent/ 
rr 22,000 rr 17,000 rr 12,000 
The largely automatic character of the grant glvee 
l i t t l e scope for further spatial discrimination (sea 
also 8 and 24 below). 
saelcally for setting­up end extenalon project«. Job and 
investment e l i g i b i l i t y conditions and rate« of award 
favour eettlng­up over extension (see 6 above). Setting­
up Include· certain take­over» of wstabilahments in dif­
ficulty (stringent conditions). Where project le »et­
ting­ up by trmsfer, award may be reduced to taka account 
of aa««t« disposed of. Extenalon includes certain re­
organisation projects (in α declining sector ­ product 
change required). Ratlonali«ntion, moderni»etion ond 
replacement project« ar« not e l ig ib le pet «a. The 
largely automatic character of the grant glvee l i t t l e 
•cope for further project­type dlacrlmlnatlon. 
Hlnlmum job and Inveatment requirement« (variable spatial­
ly and by project typo) preclude eld for «mall projecte. 
Even In the most favourable cireumatances, no aid 1« av­
ailable for any project providing leas than 6 new perm­
anent full­time job· «nd rr 3oo,ooo of e l igible Invest­
ment! 
Ae for ratea, for ex­
tenaione the amount per job creeted le limited to 
FT 10,000 once the labour force has exceeded 800. ror 
project« with FT 10 mil l , or more of e l ig ib le investment, 
an award of up to 25 percent can be given instead of the 
usual fixed rate* 
Land, building« (but not reeidentlal or social) end plant 
ai>d machinery (but not «econd­hand) aro a l l e l i g ib le . 
Working capital and offreite vehicles ere excluded. Site 
preparation, legal and consultancy f«e« «re e l ig ib le . 
Works other than orn«mcnt«l er« e l ig ib le . There are no 
specific rules with regard to short­l i fe or low­value 
«»«ute. Ko pi J emuli l investment la nut e l i g ib le . 
Local Business Tax Concession 
The crMkomaslon Is available In «U anon qualifying for 
th· regional development grant end «leo In many other 
ereae. Indeed, for project· involving e transfer from 
the Ferie or Lyons Regions the concession can be «warded 
anywhere outside the Perls Basin and the Lyor.» Region, 
Eligibil ity* job condition» are leas stringent in (1) 
upland and rural areaa and in Corale« than in (2) th« 
rest of th« designated ersaa. Within (1) and (2) the 
condition» become more stringent with increasing aire of 
local i ty . Reteat there may be discrimination between 
local i t ies in that less than th« maximum conceaalon may 
be awarded «nd because reto» of texatlon «lao very spat­
ia l ly . Any discrimination within loca l i t i e s i s Indirect 
(reflecting the theoretical rental values of different 
project«* ««set« «nd th« «la« of their payroll) aince 
th· rate of conceaelon la fixed for e l l qualifying 
projecte In th« locality. 
saelcally for setting­up, mxteneloa end («ome) Industrial 
réorganisation projecte. Job conditions favour setting­
up over «»tension. Setting­up by transfer from the 
Pari» or Lyon« Regions ia treated a« i t . e r « a t i « n in this 
regard. For setting­up by trensfer from outside the 
designated «reaa, but excluding the Parle «nd Lyon« 
Ragione, the concession may be limited to pert of the new 
investment In order to take account of a«««ta disposed 
of. For reorganisation project« (in e declining «ectorr 
product change required) maintenance of the original 
labour force le necessary. Sbtlonalisat ion, 
modernisation end replacement projects ere not e l ig ib le 
pet se . There le no direct diecrimination in the value 
of concessiona, since the rate of concession Is fixed 
far e l l qualifying project« in the loce l l ty , 
Hlnlmum job creation requirement« (variable spatially 
and by project type) preclude eld for «mall project«. 
Even in the moet favourable circumstances, no aid 1« 
available for any project creating lea» than 6 permanent 
full­tlmo jobai and i f the project ia an extenalon, the . 
job· must represent an at least 20 percent Increase in 
the original labour force. Since retes ere fixed for a l l 
qualifying projects in the local i ty , any discrimination 
in the rate« of award 1« indirect In that l i ab i l i ty to 
th« tax and hence the velue of e concession la determin­
ed by the local rat« of taxation, the theoretical rental 
value» of the project's fixed aaa«t«.«nd the »ire of I ts 
payroll. 
Hot directly relevant, olthough l i a b i l i t y to the tax i« , 
at l o u t In part determined by fixed capital Investment, 
eo that a l l investment in land, bulldlnga and plant and 
machinery (with some generally tr iv ia l exceptions) in ­
fluence« the value of a conceaslon (but also the velu« of 
post­concession tax l i a b i l i t y ) · 
Special Depreciation Allowance 
The allowance i s available in thoee parts of western and 
eouth­ western Prence where the regional devaloremnt grant 
le available. El ig ib i l i ty ee local business tax conces­
sion (but see 4 above for food­processlng projecta). No 
rate dlecrlmlnatlon poaalble since the rate of 25 percent 
la fixed. 
Eligibil i ty: ae local bualnese t«x concession. Ho dis­
crimination by rate« of «ward, since the rata of 25 
percent i s fixed. 
Hlnlmum job creation requirement« discriminât« «gainât 
■malL projecta exactly ae In the coso of the local 
buBlneae tax concession. There ia no discrimination by 
rates of «ward, since the rate of 25 percent la fixed. 
The concession i s strict ly limited to new, 1 .* . unu««d, 
building· (or thoee parte of buildings) directly related 
to production. 
Though usuallv no more Îhan the percentage ra tes for the local i ty 
VO 
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Regional Development Grant 
The inveetor amtet own the «»«et» or heve a contractual 
opUom om ownership. Thus rented Meets ere inel ig ible , 
but hire purché·*, leeeimg (le.se­back or «1ml 1er) «ad 
phased paymmnte are e l l e l i g ib le . 
Agreed job end Investment target« must be met within 
three year«. Project moat be Judged flnmnelelly and 
ccemsercielly vlebl«, «nd must not serve ■ purely local 
market. Job quality may be important at the mergln, end 
recruitment priority may be required for local unemployed. 
There la no Information evetlable by the three eward 
tone«, ror the designated aree· e« e ««hole, the ntxsber of 
award* agreed, their t..tal velue (IT mill . ) end the 
average value of each expreaeed »· e percentage of 
e l ig ib le Inveetamnt neve txteni 
I fTl 
total velum 422.7 
percent eward 11.1 
1974 
4 M . · 
8.5 
tvn 
390.5 
10.1 
Kote that e l i g i b i l i t y condition«, »oning and rates were 
reviiri in 1976, when the current system wee introduced. 
Grants «re viewed · · Income end hence subject to corpor­
«tlon tax. They ere bought into Income «a the ««sets to 
which they reiste «re depreciated, ror nun­depreciable 
asseti (notably land), the awards are ueually brought Into 
Income In ten equal annuel 1netaImmota. 
In principle, application la required before the project 
1« started, but e letter of Intent giving up to »i» months 
notice of application fulfi l» thla requirement and la 
cosoeon practice. Application proceeding periodi 2­1 
month«. Advance paymente of one­third of the value oí en 
eward are ainoat Invariably paid Upon the award declalon 
having been made. One or two lnatalmenta are ueually 
paldaa the project develop« end a final instalment 
upon completion. Daley« in payment ι ususlly 2­1 month», 
possibly longer for the final Instalment becauee of time 
required for checking that condltlone of eward have been 
ful f i l led. 
Exceptionally (end i t i s rar«) the amount per job may be 
w«lv«d and an «ward up to the etlpulated percentage of 
Investment for that location given, similarly, for 
project« with rr IO mill , or more of e l igible Invest mant, 
«η award of up to 25 percent of e l ig ible Investment can be 
given Irrespective of where the project la located within 
the designated sre.i» (again, very rare). Kote eleo that 
the lend aubaldy (see Introduction) almost only «ver goea 
to industrial project» rocolvlng the regional development 
grant, and hence may be vlewud a« ■ form of topping up. 
Local Business Tax Concession 
MM direct ly relevant («ee t «bovi . Sov «Met· e n 
is met effect their contributing to l i a b i l i t y 
Therm la no i*iv»»tment condition of eward.. Agreed job 
targete muet be ful f i l led within t h u s ymere. The 
project muet be judged financially viable. Th· investor 
SKI 11 hav« no record of seriou» l i s ta l offence». Multlpl* 
eetebllahment firm« muet not abed labour in any of their 
other eatabllehmentB anywhere In the nation ­ except i f 
the project le e transfer from the Perle or Lyons 
Regions, when the eheddlng of labour le permitted. 
The number of coneeeelon» «greed has beoni 
1971 1974 1975 
1,040 · » · CO« 
τη« "pi—r­ ewerd le the typical ewmrd. 
Local business tax l iab i l i ty Is deductible fram correl­
ation tax l i a b i l i t y . Thus the oonc««»ioo i s effectively 
subject to corporation tax. 
Application must be made before the project Is «terted. 
Application processing perlodi 3­4 months. The con­
cession i s taken when tax l iabi l i ty would ordinarily 
f e l l due. 
Ho ewerds ere possible beyond the ret« fixed la ■ locality. 
Spec ia l Deprec iat ion Allowance 
A« regional dev«10p«mnt giant. 
A» local business tax concession. 
•er of ewarde agreed hex beeni 
197] 1974 1975 
SI] 279 179 ­
Hot relevant. 
Application must be mede, at the latest , before the cloee 
of the financiei year in which conatructlon 1« termin­
ated. Application processing perlodi 1­4 month«. Th« 
concession 1« taken in the firm'« annual corporation tax 
return. 
Ho «ward« exm possible beyond the fixed 25 percent rata. 
16. Addability 
17. Clawbaçk 
1β. Turndown 
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2 1 . investment 
Regional Development Grant 
Receipt Of e regional development grant dlequallflea the 
project from receiving « tertiary grant. If a land aub­
eldy i s received, the el igible investment In land i s 
reduced by the ful l amount of the lend eubaidy. If « 
special depreciation allowance ie received, the effective 
value of the grant le reduced, elnce the pert thereof 
relating to the bulldlnga for which the allowance 1« 
awarded 1« brought Into profit «nd taxed mare rapidly 
than otherwlee, in line with the eccelereted depreciated 
schedule. 
Failure to meet agreed job and/or Inveatment target« 
results in clawback. The whole of the grant le recalled 
1C the minimum job end/or Investment condition· are not 
met, otherwise in proportion to the failure to meet 
targuta. Clawback la stringently enforced, although 
timi« la probably mar« monitoring of job creation than 
of lnvilstxwnt. Clawback r«celpta t«nd to amount to about 
10 percent of gros» annual expenditure on the grant. 
The percentage of application« turned down ha« declined 
noUcehly, most probably a« familiarity with the écheme 
lus Increased! 
percent turndown 18 13 7 
NO quantitative Information le available on the reasons 
ror turndown, but refusals »re probably most commonly 
bec«use of Job end/or Investment requirement not being 
Ho information on «mount« disbursed eech year. For total 
value of award» decided in each year see 12 «bove. 
On the baai« of job targete «greed between the Investor 
and the administration, the number of job· associated 
with aided investment and the averag» number of Jobe per 
•ldad project he« beenr 
1974 1975 
average 
On the basi« of Investment tergete agreed between the 
investor and the administration, the total value of e l i g ­
ible investment ««aoci*tmd with «11 aided projects and 
the average amount of qualifying investment per aided 
project wera (IT mill . ) 
1973 1974 1975 
total valua 
Local Business Tax Concession 
Ho oonstralnta or consequence«. 
Ho detailed information available, ror fiscal concess­
ione as a whole, i t I s estimated that between one third 
and one quarter of corica«« lone are aubaequently revoked 
beceuee of failure to achieve job and/or Investment 
target«. 
Ho quantitative Information available, but possibly 
•round one quarter. Ho quantitative Information avail­
able on reason» for turndown, but these Include l e t e ­
iii'O» of application, no coneeeelon available in the 
particular location, bad fl«cel record, project not 
judged to be viable. 
In terme of concessions operating in eech year (not 
concession« awarded In each year) the amount of fore­
gone revenue IFF mill . ) In eech year has beent 
1972 
IÎ6.2 
1973 
lB4.fi 
1974 
239.2 
Ho epeclflO Information available.. Ragionai f iscal 
incentives as « whole, on the basis of job tergete agreed 
In «ach year between investor« and the administrat­
ion. Involved associated jobe and average number« of 
jobs per aided project ex followxi 
1973 1974 1975 
number 64,819 55,977 39,600 
average 39 42 41 
Ho epeclflO information available. Regional fiscal 
incentives as a whole, on the bests of qualifying invest­
ment targata agreed in each yeer between investors and 
the administration, involved associated qualifying Invest­
ment per aided project «e followe (FT mi l l . ) ι 
1973 
total value 11,938 
averag· 7,2 
1974 
6,014 
S . l 
1975 
5,410 
S.6 
Special Depreciation Allowance 
This incentive may be awarded with any of thm other 
ragionai incentives. Mhen ewerded In conjunction with a 
regional development grant, i t reduce« the value of the 
grant ­ eoe regional development grant. 
M0 information available for thl« Incentive «loom, 
local business tax concession. 
Mo informktion. 
Ho published estimate« available (but «ee introduction). 
Mo information available for this Incentive alone, 
local buelnese tax concession. 
The only specific information available relates to the 
totat value of the buildings for which a l l concessions 
were ewerded. Theee values «od UM average value per 
aided project have been (FT mi l l . ) t 
total value 
overage 
1973 
609.S 
1.8 
1974 1975 
Ses also local buslni ι tax concession. 
Regional Development Grant Local Business Tax Concession Spec ia l Deprec iat ion Allowance 
. Anticipe tod The preeemt scheme «md« om 11 nemsÉìsr 194» with ι 
Duration territorial revisions due by II Dmceasher 197· amd 
other territoriel revisione pooelble et any time. 
21. Change The peet principle ha« bee* to apply the «fheme In 
eperetlom «t the Ume of application, with no ohange I 
award· already «greed but not yet (fully) dlebureed. 
Ouellfylng project· located Just outside the deelgnetmd 
«reas cam exceptionally (and i t le rere) be eeeleted. 
Cenerelly, mwcb projecte must offer substantial employ­
eont for people In the pcomlmmte designated ermee. The 
eward for theme projecte le 12 percmtU/rT IS.OOO for 
setting up end 13 pmrcent/rr 12.000 for estensione. A 
«mall isount of extra eaaletamcm le available on anti­
pollution Investment. 
Sto emeelfieeJ l i f e , but » re.lew con be expected la 1979, 
With poe.ibi« Chamgse being introduced lm 194». 
The peet principle Nes been to apply the condition» end 
rete of eemcmeelon (foe* the given location! 1m operation 
et the Ume of eppliceUom, with m» chemg« to concession» 
already agreed. 
Since th« velum of « concession varie· spatially «md 
einem the rete of taxation varies both spatially and 
over time, It 1 · diff icult few the f i n to weigh ehort­
tem gslns from e concession «meinet long­term tax 
l l o b l l l t l e e . 
M local *—­*ητ" tes cómemeeiom. 
FRANCE 
THE INCENTIVE VALUES 
As we have seen, there are three main regional incentives on offer 
in France - the Regional Development Grant (RDG), the Special Depreciation 
Allowance (SDA) and the Local Business Tax Concession (LBTC). Only the 
first two of these, however, are included in the valuation tables which 
follow. The problems inherent in the valuation, and indeed interpretation, 
of the local business tax concession make it more appropriate to consider-
that concession in this introduction rather than in the valuation tables 
themselves. 
The basic valuation problem with respect to the local business tax 
concession is the almost total absence of detailed statistics on both 
the tax and the concession. No information is available, for example, 
on the average rate of tax paid, although we do know that the range is 
extremely wide (in Alsace, to take but one region, the highest rate 
of levy in any commune in 1976 was 178.0 per cent of the tax base and 
the lowest 2.6 per cent) and that rates can vary markedly over time. 
Data on the typical rate of concession has similarly been elusive, 
although it is probably the case that the maximum award (of 100 per cent 
over a five year period on both commune and département 
common. Given this general lack of information, any attempt to value 
the local business tax concession must be based overwhelmingly on assump-
tions - assumptions, moreover, which would not be at all easy to validate. 
For this reason amongst others (see below) we have not included our 
valuation of the local business tax concession in the tables which follow. 
Our best guess of its value (assuming a full concession of 100 per cent 
of the tax for five years, an average tax rate of 20 per cent and tax 
liability calculated on the basis of annual rental values of 8 per cent 
of the purchase price of land/buildings and 16 per cent of the purchase 
price of plant, plus a labour cost element) is' that the concession is 
worth, in effective value terms, between five and six per cent of initial 
capital costs and one and two per cent of value added. 
We have already mentioned that, in addition to the problem of valuing 
the local business tax concession, there is a problem in interpreting 
the results of any valuation. The essential problem here is most simply 
posed by considering the position of a firm with a given project and a 
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choice of two locations for that project. In one location it is offered 
a concession on local business tax while in the other no concession is 
available. All else being equal, is it obvious that the project should 
be located where the concession is available? The answer is not un­
ambiguous, the dilemma being that the rate of taxation in the locality 
where the concession is offered may be so high compared to that in the 
alternative no-concession location as to favour this second location in 
the long run - a fact not taken account of in the valuation and therefore 
a further ground for not including the local business tax concession 
within the valuation tables. 
These tables, rather, are limited to the regional development grant 
and to the special depreciation allowance. The former is, as we have 
seen, far and away the most important regional incentive in France, 
accounting for about 45 per cent of annual regional incentive spending. 
Between 1973 and 1975 1,462 RDG awards were made. (In the same period 
791 SDAs were awarded). A key feature of the regional development 
grant scheme is the fact that rates of award vary between three award 
zones - the maximum nominal awards being 25.0 per cent in award zone 1, 
17.0 per cent in award zone 2 and 12.0 per cent in award zone 3. For 
this reason. Table A distinguishes between these three award zones. 
Since RDG values are dependent on a cost per job constraint which varies 
both spatially and by project-type, the table also draws a distinction 
between setting up and extension projects. (The presentation in Table 
A is somewhat simplified; see the synopsis tables for full details). The 
job-constrained percentages shown are averages, based on the position in 
1975 when the average assisted project involved some 81 jobs and about 
FF 9.15 million of eligible investment. 
It must be clearly understood that the job-constrained figures in 
Tables A and Β refer to awards for the average assisted project and not 
to average awards for all assisted projects. The point is that the cost 
per job constraints bite only lightly on the average project (hence the 
constrained percentages are not very different to the nominal maximum 
percentages) but bite quite severely on a small number of large and 
capital intensive projects - and because these latter projects account 
for a substantial proportion of all aided investment the average award 
for all assisted projects is much lower than our constrained percentages 
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might suggest. In fact, published figures show the annual average award 
(for all project types and award zones) to have varied between approximately 
8.5 and 11.0 per cent between 1973 and 1975 and although many details 
the RDG scheme which influence award values were changed in 1976 we would 
be surprised if the current average award is substantially different -
probably less than 12 per cent of qualifying investment. Thus an indica­
tion of the effective value of the average award for all assisted projects 
can be obtained from those rows of Tables A and Β relating to the maximum 
regional development grant award in award zone 3 (nominal value 12 percent). 
From Table A it can be seen that, aftertax, delays in payment and 
eligible items have been taken into account, the regional development 
grant is "worth" significantly more than the special depreciation allow­
ance- a maximum 11.8 per cent of initial capital costs compared with a 
standard rate (in the two award zones where the SDA is available) of 2.3 
per cent. Moreover, the grant has a markedly higher value in award zone 
1 (an average 10.5 per cent for setting-up projects and 9.2 per cent for 
extensions) than in award zones 2 (8.1 and 7.1 per cent respectively) and 
3 (5.7 and 5.0 per cent respectively). 
In Table B, the effective values of the regional development grant 
and the special depreciation allowance, both separately and in combination, 
are shown as a percentage of initial capital costs, annual capital costs 
and value added. Like Table A, the table is subdivided into the three 
award zones, and distinguishes between setting-up and extension projects. 
The table shows that the special depreciation allowance does not have 
a major impact on the overall package value (being "worth" only 2.3 per 
cent of initial capital costs, 2.0 per cent of annual capital costs and 
0.6 per cent of value added. These figures are, of course, only for 
award zones 1 and 2 since the allowance is not available in award zone 3. 
The table further shows that the maximum effective value of the French 
package is 13.5 per cent of initial capital costs, 12.2 per cent of annual 
capital costs and 3.7 per cent of value added. The incorporation of the 
local business tax into the valuation would (on the basis of the assump­
tions mentioned above) raise these percentages to some 19, 17 and 5 per 
cent respectively. Either with or without the local business tax con­
cession, the French package is of a value which, as we shall see in Part 
II, places it within the middle range of EC country schemes. 
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Table A: NOMINAL TO EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDY. 
AREA INCENTIVE 
AHARD RDG mav! mum 
ZONE 1 
LEVEL 
job-constrained rate: creation 
job-constrained rate: extension 
SDA fixed rate 
AWARD RDG maximum 
ZONE 2 
job-constrained rate: creation 
job-constrained rate: extension 
SDA fixed rate 
AWARD RDG maximum ZONE 3 job-constrained rate: creation 
job-constrained rate: extension 
NOMINAL 
VALUE 
25.O 
22.3 
19.6 
6.7 
17.0 
17.0 
15.1 
6.7 
12.0 
12.0 
ΙΟ. 7 
EFFECTIVE VALI 
TAX DELAYS 
17.7 
15.8 
13.9 
-
12.1 
12.1 
IO.7 
-
8.5 
8.5 
7.6 
16.8 
15.0 
13.2 
-
11.5 
11.5 
10.2 
-
8.1 
8.1 
7.2 
JE AFTER 
ELIGIBLI 
ITEMS 
11.8 
IO.5 
9.2 
2.3 
8.1 
8.1 
7.1 
"2.3 
5.7 
5.7 
5.0 
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Table A: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) GENERAL: Discount rate 10.75 percent (EC reference rate 1976) 
(b) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT GRANT (RDG) 
(i) Nominal value: As a percentage of eligible investment costs. The 
maximum rates of award (as shown) are subject to cost/job limits of 
FF 25,000, 20,000 and 15,000 in award zones 1, 2 and 3 respectively 
for creation projects and FF 22,000, 17.000 and 12,000 for extension 
projects. The job-constrained percentages are on the basis of the 
(1975) average assisted project which involved some 81 jobs 
and FF 9.15 million of eligible investment, 
(ii) Taxation: Effective rate of corporation tax 29.1 percent (standard 
rate 50 percent reduced by average 9 month delay before grant taken 
into account for tax purposes and by the fact that grant is fed into 
income - and hence taxable profits - in line with the depreciation 
schedules of the assets to which it relates. For depreciation 
purposes we assume that plant is depreciated reducing balance over 
an 8 year fiscal life and that buildings are depreciated straight 
line over 20 years. Land is non-depreciable and is brought into 
income over the 10 years following that in which the grant is 
received in equal annual portions). 
(iii) Delays: Assuming one year construction period (thus minimising 
benefit of advance payments), uniform project expenditure, and grant 
claims after 6 and 12 months then, given 3 month processing period, 
average delay in grant payment is 6 months, 
(iv) Eligible items: Eligible investment assumed to be 70 percent of all 
project capital costs, it being assumed that (ineligible) working 
capital is 30 percent thereof. 
(c) SPECIAL DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCE (SDA) 
(i) Nominal value: Net present value of tax saving due to accelerated 
depreciation given an effective tax rate of 46.3 percent (standard 
rate of 50 percent delayed 9 months). 
(ii) Taxation: Not relevant, 
(iii) Delays: Not relevant, 
(iv) Eligible items: With EC key of: land 5, buildings 50, plant 45 
and with working capital assumed to be 30 percent of project 
capital costs, eligible buildings account for 35 percent of all 
project capital costs. 
99 
FRANCE 
Table Β: 
AREA 
EFFECTIVE SUBSIDIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VARIOUS DENOMINATORS. 
INCENTIVE COMBINATION 
AWARD 
ZONE 1 
AWARD 
ZONE 2 
AWARD 
ZONE 3 
RDG 
RDG 
RDG 
RDG 
RDG 
RDG 
RDG 
RDG 
RDG 
RDG 
RDG 
RDG 
RDG 
(maximum) 
(constrained creation) 
(constrained extension) 
(maximum) + SDA 
(constrained creation) + SDA 
(constrained extension) + SDA 
(maximum) 
(constrained creation) 
(constrained extension) 
(maximum) + SDA 
(constrained creation) + SDA 
(constrained extension) + SDA 
(maximum) 
RDG (constrained creation) 
RDG (constrained extension) 
INITIAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
11.8 
10.5 
9.2 
13.5 
12.3 
11.1 
8.1 
8.1 
7.1 
10.0 
10.0 
9.1 
5.7 
5.7 
5.0 
ANNUAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
10.7 
9.5 
8.4 
12.2 
11.1 
10.0 
7.4 
7.4 
6.4 
9.0 
9.0 
8.2 
5.2 
5.2 
4.5 
VALUE 
ADDED 
3.2 
2.9 
2.5 
3.7 
3.3 
3.0 
2.2 
2.2 
1.9 
2.7 
2.7 
2.5 
1.6 
1.6 
1.4 
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Table Β: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) INITIAL CAPITAL COSTS 
In general, the summation of the Table A results. Note, though, that 
when an RDG is awarded in conjunction with a special depreciation 
allowance the value of the RDG is reduced to 95.20 percent of its 
Table A level since tax payments on the building element of grant are 
made more quickly under the SDA regime. 
(b) ANNUAL CAPITAL COSTS (Discount/interest rate: 10.75 percent). 
(i) Calculation of weighted annual capital cost factor: 
Asset 
Assumed Annual Capital Weighted 
Life Charge Factor Weight Factors 
Buildings 50 
Plant 10 
Land/Working Capital 
0.1082 
0.1680 
0.1075 
0.350 
0.315 
0.335 
0.0379 
0.0529 
0.0360 
WEIGHTED ANNUAL CAPITAL COST FACTOR 0.1268 
(ii) Calculation of annual subsidy factor: 
­ RDG : 0.1151 (plant/building/land subsidised) 
­ SDA : 0.1082 (building subsidised) 
Since replacement is not explicitly subsidised, the subsidy life 
of the plant element of the RDG is taken to be 20 years ­ see 
ρ 32 above, 
(iii) Calculation of annuitising factor ( (ii) i (i)) 
­ RDG : 0.9077 
­ SDA : 0.8533 
(c) VALUE ADDED 
It is assumed that gross profits make up 30 percent of value added. 
(Cf. for example. Ministère de l'industrie et de la recherche. 
L'industrie française, Paris 1975, page 9, Table 10, which shows 
that labour costs accounted for 70 percent of value added in French 
manufacturing industry in 1973). 
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THE INCENTIVES 
Since the second world war the Federal Republic of Germany has 
had on offer a variety of direct and indirect regional incentives. 
These range from direct financial aids awarded at the Federal and 
State (Land) levels to industrial infrastructure programmes, from 
worker removal aids to preferential public contract programmes, from 
concessions on the purchase of public land to freight transportation 
subsidies (payable in the ZRG - Zonal Border Area (Zonenrandgebiet) -
on specific commodities to compensate for the loss of supplies and 
markets with the creation of the Iron Curtain). However, the main 
regional incentives are in fact four in number. These are the invest-
ment allowance, (Investitionszulage), the investment grant, 
(InvestitionszuschuS), ERP regional soft loan, (ERP Regionaldarlehen) 
and a special depreciation allowance, (Sonderabschreibungen). 
The project-related investment allowance is the basic regional 
incentive. It is a fairly automatic incentive being a fixed 7.5 percent 
of eligible investment costs. The discretionary project-related invest-
ment grant can be interpreted as a topping up system for the investment 
allowance. It is awarded as a percentage of eligible investment up to 
maximum rates differing according to location and type of project. 
The maximum rates are identical with so-called maximum preferential 
rates. These are the maximum value (in grant equivalent terms) for 
direct public aids, with a few exceptions, which can be paid to specified 
areas and for project types. They are set out in the accompanying 
table. It can be seen that the maximum preferential rates go up to 
25 percent. In practice, as we shall see, actual grant awards are well 
below these maxima. 
The ERP soft loan is awarded to small or medium sized firms for 
projects that are not eligible for an investment allowance or an 
investment grant. The loan is a fairly straightforward one with few 
discretionary elements. The interest rate, currently at 6 percent 
(5 percent in the ZRG), is well below market rate and is fixed for the 
duration of the loan - this being up to 10 years for plant and machinery 
and up to 15 years for building and land, the actual duration being 
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Maximum Preferential Rates by Type of Locality and Type of Investment Project, 1975 8 
within key locality (SPO) 
- superior SPO 
- SPO in extreme border location 
- normal SPO 
outside key locality (SPO) 
taking over/setting up of premises 
- after 31.12.1971 
- between 1.1.72 and 31.12.7 4 
- before 1.1.1972 
within key locality (SPO) 
- superior SPO 
- normal SPO 
outside key locality (SPO) 
taking over/setting up of premises 
- after 31.12.1971 
- between 1.1.72 and 31.12.74 
- before 1.1.1972 
setting up 
25 
25 
15 
b,c 15 ' 
20 
15 
iob 
extension 
within Zonal Border Area 
reorganisation 
or basic 
rationalization 
(ZRG) 
1 
25 ) c a 25 > 10 (15) (25) 
(25)a 15 (25)a ) 
(25)a 15*' = (25)a 10* (15) = (25)a 
15d'C (25)a 10d (15)= (25)a 
15 (25) 10 (15) (25)a 
outside Zonal Border Area (ZRG) 
g } 10 (15,= 
(15)° 10* (15)= KK (15) = 
10d (15)= K> (15) = 
10 (15)c 10 (15)c 
Notes : a: ln proved exceptional cases only, if the location is in "extreme border area", i.e. adjacent to 
the border line, b: only if either the majority of new jobs is for female labour, or if the project is 
bound to the location because of the raw materials, or if the running of the business causes danger, noise 
or other severe inconveniences to living or housing areas, c: only if the project has a "high structural 
effect" (i.e. the introduction of new industries which leads to a diversification of the industrial structure 
of the area, for reorganisation and basic rationalisation the effect must be "exceptionally high"), d: only 
if the business had been set up or taken over during the time when the location had been an SPO. 
§: The sixth framework plan (1977-1980) has slightly changed the conditions for non-SPO projects, in that 
projects of establishments that have been set up or taken over after 31 December 1976 are only eligible under 
the conditions set under (b). 
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fixed on the basis of the life of the assets involved. A redemption 
free period of between 18 and 24 months (depending on the starting 
date of the loan) is normally awarded. The maximum loan is DM 200,000. 
The loan can cover up to two-thirds of eligible investment. In 
practice, only small projects, involving eligible costs of DM 75,000 
or less, get the maximum. From DM 75,O0O to DM 150,000 of eligible 
investment the loan declines steadily from two-thirds coverage to 
one-third. From DM 150,OOO to DM 600,OOO the loan stays at one-third. 
However, and this is important, the difference between the ERP loan and 
two-thirds coverage is met by additional loans paid from the so-called 
ME programme of the KW (Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau)- which also 
administers the ERP programme. The ME programme is specifically aimed 
at topping up the ERP loans. The loans have very similar conditions to 
the ERP loans but with a one percentage point higher rate of interest. 
The special depreciation allowance, of up to 50 percent for plant and 
machinery and up to 30 percent for buildings, is available to profit-
making firms for their investment in depreciable new assets in the ZRG. 
The allowance can be used together with normal straight line depreciation 
in the year of acquisition (or even in that of advance payment of tax) 
and in the subsequent four years. 
These four incentives are all operated at the national level and 
are by far the most important of the German regional incentives. It is 
these incentives, therefore, that are covered,in the following synopsis 
tables. In terms of promoted approved projects (1972-1975) the 
investment allowance (16,710) is the most important, followed by the 
ERP soft loan scheme (13,615); least important is the investment grant 
with 3,030 cases. The special depreciation allowance (39,047 cases) 
cannot be compared on this basis since it is item-related. In terms of 
investment aided (DM million) the order is: investment allowance (38,322), 
investment grant (13,626), special depreciation allowance (7,500) and 
the ERP soft loan (4,345). On the basis of the value of incentives 
awarded (again in DM million) the investment allowance (2,700) is 
followed by the special depreciation allowance (1,500 in terms of post-
poned tax assuming a tax rate of 50 percent), the ERP soft loan (1,000) 
and the investment grant (738). 
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FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY -
GA-AREAS 
GEBIETE DER GEMEINSCHAFTS­
AUFGABE 
"VERBESSERUNG DER REGIONALEN 
VWRTSCHAFTSSTRUKTUR" 
(as at January 1,1976) 
GA-areas 
boundaries and numbers of 
the Regional Action Programmes 
Α-and B-SPOs: 
up to 25% (within ZRG) 
up to 20% (outside ZRG ) 
C-SPOs: up to 15% 
E-SPOs: up to 25% in extreme 
border area location 
borderline of the Zonal 
Border Area (ZRG) 
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These incentives are available in the designated problem areas of 
the Federal Republic - Gemeinschaftsaufgabengebiete (GA areas). These 
are composed of three main types of area: first, the ZRG - a roughly 
forty kilometre wide belt along the Federal Republic's border with 
East Germany, Czechoslavakia and the Baltic Sea; secondly, the coal 
mining areas of the Ruhr and of the Saar region; and thirdly, other 
areas that suffer or are likely to suffer from below average economic 
development. The GA areas are a mixture of agricultural and industrial 
areas, rural and urban areas, having only one thing in common; and 
this is that they are characterised by economic development below the 
national average - measured by the weighted combination of three 
indicators (income per head, labour reserves and physical infrastructure, 
which are themselves already a combination of a variety of other factors). 
All local authorities in the Federal Republic (except Berlin for which 
a special promotion programme operates) are ranked according to the 
value of the weighted indicators with those at the lower end of the scale, 
covering 33.9 percent of the total population and some 60 percent of the 
surface of the nation, being designated as GA areas (see the accompanying 
map) . 
Within the GA areas, the incentives are not always awarded uniformly, 
and in particular the ZRG is generally favoured with higher rates of 
award and/or easier award conditions (and indeed the special depreciation 
allowance is, as we have seen, available only in the ZRG). In addition, 
a further form of intra-area discrimination is based on a growth point 
strategy - with some 326 SPOs (Schwerpunktorte) having been designated. 
These are generally favoured by the investment allowance and the 
investment grant, and indeed, as we have seen, for the investment grant 
there is also discrimination (in terms of eligibility and rates) 
between different types of SPO. Three types of SPO have been designated -
superior SPOs, SPOs in extreme border areas and normal SPOs. The extent 
and forms of spatial discrimination have been well illustrated by the 
table presented earlier which shows maximum preferential rates by 
project type and area. 
Before passing on to the synopses, one final aspect of German 
regional policy has to be mentioned and this concerns the problems of 
operating a regional policy in a federal state such as Germany, with 
the partly independent Lander running their own regional policies. 
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In order to cope with these problems, a constitutional arrangement 
(the so-called "Joint Task for the Improvement of Regional Structures" -
Gemeinschaftsaufgabe 'Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur') 
was made in 1969 whereby each year, a framework plan (Rahmenplan) is 
agreed which establishes rules for cooperation and the harmonisation 
of regional policies in the Federal Republic and, in particular, 
sets rates and conditions of award for assistance, delineates the GA 
areas, and determines location specific maximum ceilings for all direct 
public aids to firms in the GA areas - the maximum preferential rates 
discussed earlier. 
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1. Adwlnl»tta-
Investraent Allowance 
Palrly automatic project-related capitel 
grant of « fixad 7.5 percent of e l ig ib le 
investment 
lnveatltlonaxulagongeeetz (InvZulG)* 3 Hey, 
1977, i m BGBl. I , (1977), no. 27, p. 669| 
"Schreiben dc« Bund« «ml ni «ter« der Finan­
sen . . ." (5.5.77), im BStBl. I , (1977), no. 
10, p. .'4ό. 
Application through the responsible 1.1 nd τ 
nini sti luj to the Bundejamt für gewerbliche 
Wirtschaft (UMO or to the Pederel Hlnlatry 
Jole» IliHWl) which certify whether 
the project i» "especially worthwhile prom­
oting economically". In c«e« of .approval, 
t i e application for award must be «ent to 
applicant'« local tax board, which chuck« 
the e l ig ible Item« and also «ward« the 
allowar.ee li.n1n.­r In cash or, on requust, 
a» an Income tax or corporation t«X rr­li.ito} 
Permanent independent act iv i t ies for profit 
10«wvrh*;lK'irU'he) which are liable to in­
come/corporation tas, and where the lnvest­
munt ha» a "primary «Efact". Tbl« 1« the 
can« with thu production of coasnodlti«« 
which «to normally dlstilbutnd out»lde the 
r.r.jinn. In practice, e l ig ible act iv i t ies 
«re: milling, gaa, e lectr ic i ty , water, man­
iiíacturtng and tourist accoasaodation fac i l ­
i t i e s in GA tourist «red», plus tho«· aerv­
Ice act iv i t ies expl ic i t ly named for the 
ltivestxcnt grant. In general, excluded Act­
iv i t i e s arc: agriculture and forestry, con­
struction, fice professions, end e l l local 
service». 
.'ourlât act iv i t ies have leu« attingane loc­
.itlcn r>.qulii.­ment« (see 6 below) t othorwloe i.o disci imi nat Ion «Ince the awarde ere 
largely automatic as long as conditions of 
award ara ful f i l led , and thn rale is fixed. 
Investment Grant 
λ discretionary project­related capitel , 
grant with ratea of up to 2b percent of 
e l ig ible Inveatment depending on location 
«nd project type 
Geeecx Ober die Cemelnecheft«aufgäbe "Ver­
b«ea«rung der regionalen stirtschaf tseciuk­
tur* IGBW), 1969, In: &GB1.1, (1969), p. 
1861, «mended.1971 (Im BGBl. I , (1971), ρ 
31)t ennual "Rahmenplan der GemeIη«cheft■­
«ufgib« 'Verbes««rung der regionalen wirt­
•ch«ft«struKtur'" (for 1977­78 ­ Int BTDr. 
a/759, 1077). 
Application to th« responsible LAnder min­
istry which décidée whether or not to «werd 
and, within the formal maxima («ee 6 «nd 7 
below), the rate« of eward. Exceptionally, 
ratos can go «bov« th« maxima, and award« 
can be made to project« which «re not form­
ally e l ig ib le , with the agreement of the 
GA planning committee, within which the 
Landnr Government« «nd the Federal Govern­
ment «re represented. The grant 1« paid by 
th« f Jnder with SO percent being subse­
quently reimbursed by the Federei Govern­
ment. 
Permanent Independent ac t iv i t i e s for profit 
(Gewurtntbotriebe) the production of which 
has α "primary effect" (see lnvustment 
allowance). In practice, restricted (by 
GA planning committee) to industry 
numbers 200 to 219 (manufacturing) of 
the HZ industrial clauslfication, which are 
declarad to be a priori e l ig ible Industries 
plus several expl ic i t ly named service 
act iv i t ies (mall orderi import/export 
wholesale, heed office« of Industrial firms, 
banks, credit and Insurance companies! the 
production of soft­ware or data procesalng 
systems! publishing compente«} and certain 
congress and fair organising ac t iv i t i e s ) , 
a« well a« tourist accommodation f a c i l i t i e s 
In GA areas* All other ac t iv i t i e s are 
ineligible unless decided otherwise by the 
CA planning coaxnltteo. 
Tourist actlvLtlu« have leas »trlnguut loc­
ation requirements («e« 6 below)( otherwise no specified discrimination but the deci­
sión whether or not to «ward and the rate 
of dw.ird, subject to the «ut maxima, «re at 
t hi­ discretion of tho authorities, thus 
giving sow »copo for discrimination. 
ERP Regional Soft Loans 
A largely eutrxaatle, proJact­related »oft 
Joan of up to IS years duration for build­
ing« and up to 10 yeer* for pl«nt, Accord­
ing to th« lifetime of the «saet. Repayment 
le 6 monthly on e «trxlght­llne ba«l«. Re­
payment holiday of between IB and 24 month« 
depending on the starting dntu of thu loan. 
Ho interest­free period 1« available. 
Current Interest rate 1» 6 porcent (5 per­
cent ln the ZRG). Using EC reference rate 
as the market rete, the current coneeeelon 
1« 2 percentage points (1 percentage points 
ln the ÜRG). Loan covar« up to two­third« 
of inveatmunt with th« actual proportion 
being determined by set formula on the 
beala of project »ire. 
Gesetz aber die Verwaltung d«a ERP­Sonder­
ve mögen», 1953, Im BGBl. I , (1953), p. 
13121) Bennnntmachung der Allgemeinen Be­
dingungen flir die Vergabe von ERP Mitteln 
sowie der Richtlinien für die Gewährung von 
ERP Deriehen, vom 21.7.76, Im BAnz, Jg. 28 
(1976), no.UOi ennual "ERP­Wlrtachafts­
pl«ng«««tx" (for 1976 ­ Int BGBl. 1, (1976) 
no. 112, p. 2533) 
Application through « bank to the κred 11­
anstalt for Wiederaufbau (KW) which de­
cide« upon «nd «ward« th« loan through th« 
bank (on order of the Hlnlatar of econom­
i c s ) . The KW ι« ­ In reapect of the ERP 
loan« ­ supervised by the Federal Hlnlatry 
which admlnt«t«ra th« ERP fund. 
smell end medium permanent independent act­
iv i t i es for profit (Gewerbebetriebe) which 
do not have e "primary effect", but serve 
the local market. Retail, wholesale and 
local handicraft ac t iv i t i e s account for 
more than 60 percent of a l l case« aided. 
Activities which «re el igible for an Invest 
mant allowance or Investment grant (having 
a primary effect) «re explicit ly excluded. 
Hone epeclfled and, ln practice, l i t t l e 
ecope β1nee award end rate, aa long a« con­
dition« of award ere fu l f i l l ed , ere fairly 
automatic. 
Special Depreciation 
Allowance 
An Item­related concession, stpllc«bl« only 
in th« ZRG, Involving e high Ini t ia l deprec­
iation allowance of up to 50 percent (for 
plant and machinery) «nd up to 30 percent 
(for building«) of e l igible cost«. Th« 
coneeeelon can, in exceptional cásea, be 
uaed prior to acquisition of tha aa«ot «■ ■ 
t«K free reserv«. Although in principle the 
dec! «ion whetr.ur or not to award, «rid tha 
rate, 1« dlacratlonaryi ln practice l i t t l e 
discretion la e«cercl»»d. The allowance can 
only be used on condition that It docs not 
give rls« to losse» or «xac«ti<«te «n exis t ­
ing loss situation. Otherwise Lhe tlalng ol 
us« la , within « five­year limit, «t the 
discretion of the beneficiary. 
Gesetz cur Forderung das Zonenrand­jebtetes 
(ZRFG), 1971, lm BCtl). I, (1971), p. I2J7, 
In connection with Incorna tax and corporat­
ion tax acts and thalr regulations. Execut­
ive orderet "Schreiben des Bundesminister« 
der Finansen..." (18.β.1971), ir» BStBl. 1, 
(1971), ρ. 386. 
Application, with no «tandardisud fi.ic.ji 
to th« applicant'· local tax board which de 
cid·« whether or nut to award, and the rats 
of award (with the agreement of tlie Feder«! 
Klnlstry of Finance needed In c«sa« of 
allowance« of OH 2 mil l , and over). Advance 
tax payment wil l normally he adjusted to 
tak« account of any award. 
In principi«, · very wide cover«g« ­ «11 
pernanani Independent act iv i t ies for profit 
(Gewerbebetriebe) with only α few minor act 
i v l t l e s , l ike for Instance rent collecting 
or finance Inveatment, being npeclfically 
excluded. In practice, the requirement that 
the applicant must run a book­keeping sys­
tem for Lax purposes excludes most agricult 
urei and forestry unit« ar.d soot very small 
firm«. 
Very l i t t l e «cop« «Inc« award «nd rate, «<. 
long ax condition« of «ward «re fu l f i l l ed , 
ore largely autrxutlc. 
GA tou r i s t areas 
T. Project Type 
Investment Allowance 
t . e l ig ible 
Nome le zetern vtuct» ere fixed, but dlf­
f«remt project type« ere e l ig ible oml* If 
they fulfi l specified locetloe rogwiremmnte 
(«ee 7 b e l « ) except for tourlet activit ies 
utile·, hav* no «mem llmltstloem in the GA 
touriat «c·««. 
Mo dlecrlmlaetlom ia rate« which era fixed. 
However, eettlng­up end exteoeloa projecte 
lescept for factorlee eet up or taken over 
before I January '9 7 3> ■*"■ e l ig ible la 
xroe omlyi «inlmum Job tergete ere «at 
fur eatenelono, of 30 percent or ISO ad­
ditional Job· (ee· 23 below)t 
! trenn­
tet« originating from outside Ga erma· 
qualify ee eettlng up ­ lntre­GA area movme 
qualify partly ee esten«ion« if there I« «n 
•atenelon effect , «morgenI««tion and beeic 
rationalI«atlon projacta are el igible In 
the ZRG only. Wholly rapiècement project« 
«nd taking­over projecte ere not e l ig ib le , 
ludetalaatlem projecta at« not «Uglble 
except for «Uglble tourlet act iv i t ies , 
wi.i .h m«y qualify «a beale ratlonella­
etion. 
Hone, either In tarma of el igibi l i ty or 
retee. 
Ml nam tangible depreciable fixed aeeete 
ee long ee ueed for the production process 
(directly or Indirectly) i . e . pleat, equip­
ment end building« · end If their velue le 
over DM BOO «nd they have e l i f e of mote 
than one year. Ineligible «rei land, 
«econd­hand assets (Including ueed bulld­
inge), replecament essete, and working 
capital. Specially «quipped vehicle« are 
e l ig ible If e«««ntlal for production. 
All e l ig ible item« muât be uead for threa 
years and lesso vable item« muet be ueed to 
the «stent of at leeat 90 percent in the 
applicant.'« factory. 
Investment Grant 
Awerde poeelble within UM OR arme· only 
without agra»meat (rare) of tm« CA 
•Ite«, greet· c emne*, exornad tb · mmxlmmm pré­
férentiel tata oí looel l t lee i up io l i par­
vint for superior «TO· in the tau «nd STOe 
In estiem· border locatlonai up te M per­
cent for euperlor IROe outalde the ZRGi up 
to 15 percent for normal BPOe end, under 
specific conditicele only, lor non­aPO loc­
ation«. Further epetlel discrimination er­
lee« through project­type discrimination 
|ee« 7 below). The dlecretlonery nature of 
the grant (eee 5 above» glvee ecop« for 
other «patlel discrimination. 
Eligible project type», «nd location end 
other condition«, ere basically ae with 
the Investment allowanceι with the 
esceptlon that (1) beale rational issi lo« 
and leorganleetlon ere «lao «llgtbl« In 
non­Z"G areas, (21 taking over een be 
e l ig ible In exceptional caa«ai (1) Job 
tergete for exrenalona ere 15 percent or 
50,Including permanent Jebe for vocational 
tralnlngi and .(4) apeclflc reguietlone 
regerdlag Inter­ and lntra­GA aree trens­
fer« of firam. The ealn differente le 
that the maximum pralerentiel rete le lower 
ror reorgenteatloa and baelc ret lonal l · · 
atton projecte. The dlecretlonery nature 
of th · .riant (eee * «bov«) give« «om· ecope, 
wlthla the reguietlone, ror further project­
type discrimination. 
MO ewarde poe«lbl· am el ig ible investment 
•bove DM 100 mill . Within thla l imit, end 
within the regulation«, the dlecretlonery 
nature of the grent (ses » ebove) glvee 
eome acope ror e l te dlaerlad netlom. 
In principi«, a l l item· necessary for tbe 
project ere e l ig ib le . Different Under 
have different reguietlone on e l ig ib le 
Iteme. Often, however, e l ig ible item· e n 
a» with t h · Lnveetxmnt allowance. 
ERP Regional So f t Loans 
kenilani« wlthla OK armee omly. Ietre­Cå 
•ree dieci Uin»t loo by wey of an estia ome 
percentage (»Int interest reta rónceselo« 
la the KM. No farther spatial dlicrlmla­
atlon. 
according to the regulation«, omly ee t t lng . 
up, extamelon, reorganleetlon and baele 
rationalleetlon projecte ere e l ig ib le . For 
eatanelona, a Job target ten eddltional IS 
percent of Joba moet b· created) 1« ««t ­
though thin le leniently applied. In 
practice, a l l project type« except r «place 
ment projecta get through. Trenefer« «re 
e l ig ible only between durèrent local 
authority ereee. Ho «peclfled project­type 
diaeriminetleo, and the eutomatlc neture 
of th« incentIMS give« Little scop« for 
■ueh (eee 5 ebove). 
The Ioana ere for email end medium sired 
firma ­ broadly up to 200 aaployee« and/or 
annuel turnover of up to DM JO mill , 
(variabla by sector), but the«· condition· 
are generouely Interpreted. straightfor­
waril disci I mi nation by project «l«e In that 
th«re le e maximum value of award or 
DM 200,000. No further «peclUed elee dla­
crlmlnatlon, and th« automatic neture of 
the Incentive glvee l i t t l e «cope for euch 
(see 5 above). 
All tangible fixed assets nec««a«ry for the 
project (plant end equipment, lend, build­
ing«) having « minimum Uf« of S y««rsi 
«nd being ueed too percent within the 
applicant*· bualn*««. leeoni)­hand assets 
•re e l ig ib le . Pure replacement project« 
ere not e l ig ib le . Itock «nd other Iteme 
of working cepltel «re Ineligible, though 
with exceptions. 
Special Depreciation 
Allowance 
Available omly in th. Wû u 4 requiring 
proof of d1sedvantag·ou« location (though 
thle 1« very leniently «pplled). 
Hone, «Ime· the ewerd 1· item · 
project ­ related. 
Wo «pacified dl«crimination «Ither in 
else of applicant or In else of project 
except that eapenditure muat be an 
un«peel I led, minimum proportion of Invent­
ed cepltel or the applicant l ira (a · · II 
below), teyund this , s ize dl»citmln«tlon 
1« unlikely (ae« 5 above). 
Ax Inveatment allowance except that 
need not neoa«««rlly be related to I 
production procea·. 
Investment Allowance 
Hot «peeifled. In practica, ««set« par­
cheeed with ceeh or through pheeed payments 
ara e l ig ib le , ee ere leased «»set» end e s ­
set« bought on hire puren««« «■ long ae the 
«a««ts can be act Ln the applicant'« balance 
sheet. Thu«, for leasing, only esseta 
under finance leasing are e l ig ib le . 
1) Inveatment cost cell ing of DK 3.6 mil l . 
per newly created or secured Jnbi 2) the 
pioject must not receive more then th· max­
imum preferential rat · of th* local i ty In 
the form of direct public aidsi 3) th* 
investstant oust be In accordane· with town 
«nd area planning l«w»p 4) tha inv««tment must not eggrevet« monoatructurea or harm 
repet i t ion in the erea of location. 
The rate of «ward i s fixed et 7.5 percent. 
The table below «how« th« number of approved 
canee, i . e . certlflcatlone («ee 3 above) and 
award« In the form of actual expenditure 
(DM m i l l . ) . The «ward figure tor 1972 la 
not comparable with the other figurée sine« 
i t aleo include« expenditure on other 
Investment allowance«. 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
S.60I 4101 
(665) 700 
3.476 
a co 
Application for certification (Baecholnlgung) 
la possible after th· «tart of th · project 
and even after application for award 
(Bewilligung) 1« mad«. Tha application for 
award has to be made within the f irst three 
months of the year after the year of ex­
penditure. Claio­processing period averages 
some 6 month«. 
Investment Grant 
Aa inveatamnt allowance. 
A· investment «llowsnc« except that con­
dition Ho. 4 doae not apply. An addition­
al condition, however, 1 · that tha project 
must not have started before application. 
Ovar th · period 1972­75 the avmraga net­
ting­ up/ex ten β ion eward, where grant» only 
were Involved, wee 6.5 percent of e l ig ible 
Investment! B.S percent for reorganisation' 
beale rationallaatien projette in SPOa. 
Where the Investment allowance was also 
■warded the average wee 6.Β percent end 
2.9 percent respectively. The number of 
ciao» approved lor Investment grante, and. 
In DM mi l l . , the total valua of grant« In­
volved in these approvals and the everage 
grant per cas« hav· beent 
1972 1971 1974 1975 
ceeee 4S0 
eward» 0.22 0.21 
713 >ρβ3 
232 234 
0.32 O.22 
Taxed directly i f fed into tesatilo profite 
or indirectly tand thla le tha normal 
case) ln that the asset BUS t be deprec­
iated for tax purpose· net of eny grant 
received. 
Application muet be mad· before the «tart 
of the project, though projecte oen etart 
before declelon on application la received. 
The application.processing period le 6­12 
month«. The grant can b· called ln (after 
epprovai) one month in advance of actual 
expenditure at th« grant rate. Sometimes, 
the total grant la paid laced lately efter 
approval. 
ERP Regional Soft Loans 
«a inveatment allowance except that Jessed 
eeoete ere not e l ig ib le . 
1) to be ln need of the loan ι 2) guarantees 
(dingliche Sicherheiten) from e bank or by 
the Unde Π 3) project muet not have 
started before eppllcatloni 4) no cumul­
ation with other ERF lænet S) proof of 
"warthwhllenesa of promoting economically" 
( l i t t l e uaed)i 6) firma which «re part of 
a conglomerate or owned by banka are gen­
erally inel ig ible . 
In practice the concessionary elamant of th« 
■ban la «a with th« nominal rete» (■· · 1 
above). On everage 25 percent of e l ig ib le 
Investment le covered by « loan. The num­
ber of caaee approved, the value of tha 
loan« Involved («nd the everege) heve been 
(DM a l l l . h 
1972 1973 1914 197* 
eward 
everag· 
3¿51 363 5J2S 4,668 
247 27 Jin) 341 
O . l t 0-07 O.Ol O.Ol 
By reducing debt­servicing charges the con­
ceaalonary element of the loan 1« taxed in 
«« fer ee i t Increese« taxable profit«. In 
addition, th« lean i» («■ with «11 long­
tarn debt«) taxed by the local bualneaa tax 
on earning« «nd capital. Estimated addit­
ional coat equal to aome 1 percentage point« 
of interest rate. (These tax payments «r«, 
however, deductible expenses from nat­
ional Incorna end/or corporation tax) . 
Application must be made before tho «tart 
of th« project though project« can atart 
before e declelon upon the application hai 
bean reached. Appllcatlon­proceaaing per­
iod average» one month. The loan can be 
called in ee expenditure Is Incurred ln 
line with the agreed coverage. 
Special Depreciation 
Allowance 
Aa lnvmetmant allowance. 
1) the investment must not be "trifling" 
(generously applied)) 2) not payable to 
exceptionally well­off firm« (with except­
ion») ι 3) profit« au«t be made (key con­
dition)! 4) cannot be cumulated with other 
special depreciation allowance concession«. 
Ho hard information about autuai iate o( 
award but the evidence. 1« tiut thu «fuidard 
rate Is (with very f«w exception«) the max­
imum. The total number of case« of »peel«! 
depreciation allowance/tax Jiue ruservea 
ueed, amount (OH mill . ) Involved a., well a« 
the everege amount have tueni 
1972 1973 1974 191% 
average 
2720 11910 12,422 11395 
207 61S 'fü'J (¿Ol 
O . U 0 .01 O.OB Ο.οβ 
Hot relevant. 
Application not necaeeery before expend­
iture but muet be made before, or at , the 
final tax declaration for the year of ex­
penditure. The special depreciation a l ­
lowance con be used ln total to reduce 
advance payments immediately after approval 
(if th« profit« are high enough) or 
It can be distributed according to tha 
needs of the Investor over the year of 
acquisition and the following 4 yeara. 
Investment Allowance Investment Grant ERP Regional Soft Loans Special Depreciation Allowance 
IS, Topping 
16. Addability 
17. Clawback 
18. Turndrivn 
Ho award· are poe«Ibie beyond 'the formal 
fixed rer«. The Inveetemnt grent can bo 
viewed e« « topping­asp or th» ettnwmncm, 
th· limit« being «er In the me­xlssum piof 
erentlel rete »yete· . 
r i l g l b l l l t y condUlone em«n that th · e l ­
icasene·) I« not adVlahle to the BRP regional 
loene. Addeble to e l l other direct publie 
Aid as i­.ti­j «e th« total grant equivalent 
*»luee οΓ e l l thee· * ld · tin not exc**d th · 
mi l s i i s préférentiel rete of the location. 
IThv grant equivalent value or en Inveet­
ment elluvance I« counted ■· 7.9 p«rc«nt or 
th« total Inveetnmnt, not of e l i g i b l e iri­
veetss>>nt) . 
Award« ere clawed beck if reguietlone end 
condition« or ew«rd «re not met. 
Turndown over th« period 1972­75 le ehown 
below, tn the«e year« th» high rabee wer« 
largely '­«need fay uncerfilntl«« or eppllc­
•nt« regarding the definition of primary 
«rr«ct «c t l v l t l e e . Other reneon« Tor turn­
down i r s Ineligible (oration «nd the r«ct 
that Job requirement« not met, 
1972 1973 |g74 1975 
«pplicetlon« tyri', i,;ni fyDJO ',.tl « 
turndown 2,174 2,116 2¿D| If.4n 
porcent 31.1 31.7 37.B 31.0 
Expenditure on the investment a l l o v a n c · h · · 
been (DM m i l l . ) ι 
1972 1973 1974 I97S 
(Γ.Γ.5) 700 ΘΟΟ 579 
(Por an explanation oí th« 1972 figure ae« 
12 nbovel. 
Órente of e velue which. In coeaMnotlon 
with other direct ptsblle elde, would 
exceed th· maximum préférentiel rete for 
the locel l ty ere only poeolblt.wlth the 
ogroawnt or th · OA planning ccemalttem. 
Λ» Inveatment allomarte·. Whom awarded In 
conjunction with the epectel deprocletlon 
allowance th* value or th · grent 1« red­
uced «Ince It le brought into Incosse, nnd 
he>nc* taxable pronta, mar· quickly, than 
under the nonoel (lepr«cl«tlon echedule. 
Award« ere clewed back If th · reguietlone 
end'condìt lone of award «re not mat Urn 
1 · · · with th« agreemamt or the «warding 
body). An lntereet eurcherge or 2 per­
centage pointe above th* discount rate of 
the Peutecho Bundeebenlt le levied on th« 
repayable »urn. Intereet advantage· 
■•cured by the beneficiery whll · In r*c­
elpt of the grent ere payable tt> th · 
•warding euthortty. 
Ho comprahenalv« hard Information ­ per­
hepä he If of appi lc«t tone or · nofapproved 
or are wlthdrewn by appi ícente. No com 
prahenalve Information on reason« for 
turndown but etert of a project before ip­
pl lcet lon end Inability to nmet Job re­
quirement« ere not uncosmsjii re««ona. 
Mo Information on eirpmndlture tfor grant« 
approved «ee 12 above). Funde available 
■nd allocated to the On programme» for 
lnveetmmnt grente (Tor eettlng­up, ex­
tenalon, reorgenleatlon end bealo retlon­
«Liaatlon project«) h«ve l*«n (DM mi l l . ) ι 
ft l\ l iM 1975 1976 
217 217 263 253 
The rormel «asisens conce··ton«ry element« 
of Hi­ lomn cennot b« eacemded. I«cept 
for very emmll projecte (Involving e l i g ib l e 
coat · of up to DM Γ·.'·>·1 the ΕΠΓ loan 
cower« leee then the »mini s two­third» of 
• Uglb le Inve«tm»nti being replaced, at 
eet proportion« depending on total loan 
e l s e , by national MK lonne from the KW 
(with »lightly higher Interest rate«). 
Addeble to e l l other direct public aide ­
but not to t h · Inveatsstnt grant or Invest­
ment ellowanc· or to other rar loane . n n long · · the total grant equlvelent ol tt>e«e 
■Ida doee not exceed th · maxleum preferent­
ial ret« of ih» eree. (The grant equlv­
elent velue of the KRP «ort loen 1« « s · ­
eeured ln reletton to e 7.5 percent ref­
erence ret«) . 
Surcharge reguietlone «Imller to those of 
the lnv««tm«nl grent with, however, the 
queltf lcetlon that th« Interest charged 
■met b« at leaet 3 percenteg« pointe abov« 
th« Intereet rate of the loan. 
In 1974 6,711 application« were and* ror 
the** loane of which 1.06I (17 percent) 
war· turnad down. Th* figure* for 1975 
were 5,608, 772 arid 14 percent reepmctlve­
ly. In 1975 the reeeon· ror turndown were 
12 percent)eppllcent not e l i g ib l e ! 31 
percent project not «Uglble (location«, 
»irei ι 12 percent, financial reneon« 
(applicant'« own funde deemmd adequate / 
longterm flnencm l ike rnr loen not needed) 
6 ι— ι rent. project already «terted (or 
ev«n flnlehed). 
Aridabln to «tralght­lln« depreciation 
and to e) l other Incentive* except other 
notional apeclnl depreciation allowance·*. 
It la not Included In the calculation of 
the· maxl«n«s preferential rale«. Wlien 
added to (he Investiw­iit grant the vnlue 
οΓ the grunt I« reduced «ince the net 
preeent value of the tax to be r­ i l l on i t 
Wo expl ic i t régulât tonn. General ι 
le applied with « «urcharge ' '■ I" 
belnq levied on al l out.stntvllnti tn: 
mente. 
No hnrd 1ηΓοΓ·νιΐ.1οη available) nvldenci 
that turndown tate« ere t r iv ia l ly low. 
Mo Information on expenditure. 
approved eee 12 abov·). 
Ho direct cnet Infotamtlon «vwllnhla. 
Nominal temporary tax rel ief (estimate« 
baaed mi n tax rate of IS percent) ror the 
period 1972-75 wan ΠΜ 1,39ft mi l l . In tote l 
Investment Allowance 
Ajtaogjated 
21. Change 
24. Wlscel-
f.» t l u t e e of joba associated With applic­
ations approved ln the following yeara 
have beent 
1972 1973 1974 I97S 
new ]obe 104/J76 131,927 ΐογ,υΐ ι·ιΐ ju 
connoti ddt ed &49 119/122 11UJ7S Βφϊβ 
jote 
Notei Some of th« project« in receipt of 
an Investment allowance would also be In 
receipt of an Inveatment grant. Thue, the 
Job« associated above cannot be ellocated 
only to the investment allowance. 
Total e l ig ible Inveatment (PH mil l . ) ln 
application« certif ied In Lh« following 
years has beeni 
1972 1973 1974 197S 
setting-up 4,180 3J9S 2,341 L469 
extensions S/36S USO 7,234 4792 
reorganisation 4M 744 693 593 
and rationalis­
ation 
(»ee note at 20 above). 
Nu apeclflad l i f e . Regulation» for the 
investment grant on Job tergete wi l l be 
adopted for th« Investment allowenoa. Mew 
regulations are l ikely , deeming a» In­
e l ig ible those projects which «tart before 
application. Bee »luu investment grent. 
Date of application and date of project 
»tart (f irst expenditure) ee compared 
with th« firat Implementation of new reg­
ulation« determine whether or not th« new 
or old tugulatlona apply. In the «vent of 
ehm·]-« of the regulation«, arrangement« 
are largely ln favour of the applicant -
at least for · transitional period. 
Investment Grant 
Ba timet·« of joba associated With ap­
plicati lo» approved in the following 
year· heve ruteni 
1972 I97J 1974 1975 
new jobe 2S¿19 3BJ23 314.1Θ 26,213 
consolidated 4,265 26720 34£43 41126 
Job« 
Notei most project« ln receipt of e grent 
wi l l also be ln receipt of an Investment 
allowance* thu», those figure« do not 
raíate solely to the Inveatment grent. 
Total e l ig ib le Investment (OH mil l . ) ln 
Application« approved ln the following 
yuan have been: 
1972 1973 1974 197S 
net t lug­up 1,920 920 726 562 
extenalon· 916 1,740 2,759 3pi6 
reorganisation 156 Ιβΐ 273 456 
and rationalis­
ation 
: at 20 abov··). 
Ho opacified l i f e . Bl lg ib l · srese and 
maximum preferential ratee ere open to 
change annually (although they ere ln fact 
relatively atable). 
Decision« In the pipeline, are treetod un­
der the new condition», ee ere eny aséete 
acquired under the new condition«. In 
the case of aree changée, application« 
can bo made for e further year under the 
old regulation«. 
ERP Regional Soft Loans 
Mo information. 
Total e l ig ib le (EH mil l . ) lnv««tmmnt Ln 
application« approved In the following 
yeere wan 
1972 1973 1974 197S 
1,11)11 106 1743 ,371 
No specified l i f e . Intereat ratee for new 
loane are, broadly, ln line with the de-
velopment of market ratea and overall 
economic condition·. 
Mo alterations of condition« on «warded 
loane. In cea« of « change of condition« 
between dec« of application and data of 
approval, th« new r«gul«tlona apply. 
Special Depreciation 
Allowance 
Mo information. 
eat l u t e s on the besle of maximum catee of 
award (including tax frae reserve«) for the 
period 1972-75 «re DM 7,534 mi l l . , of 
which DM 3.330 mill, for ixnovabU eaaete 
and DM 1,201 «dll . for movable a*sut*. 
Ho «peelfled l i f e . 
Ma guideline«. 
GERMANY 
THE INCENTIVE VALUES 
As we have seen, there are four major regional incentives in the 
Federal Republic of Germany - two grants on capital (the investment 
allowance, IA, and the investment grant, IG), one soft loan (the ERP 
loan) and a special depreciation allowance (SDA). The first three of 
these are available throughout the assisted areas (the GA areas) while 
the fourth is restricted to the ZRG. 
The investment allowance is the basic grant. It is awarded more 
or less automatically and is at a fixed rate of award. In contrast, as 
was made clear in the synopsis tables, the investment grant is both dis-
criminatory (with differing maximum levels of grant being set for different 
project types and locations) and discretionary (with perhaps only about 
one fifth of eligible projects actually being awarded a grant). Whereas 
more than 16,OOO investment allowances were "certified" in the period 
1972-75 only 3,030 investment grant awards were approved. In many respects 
the investment grant can be viewed as a "topping-up" element in the grant 
system, tailoring the overall award to the needs of both applicant and 
the particular State (Land). 
While the investment allowance and the investment grant are comple-
mentary aids, both going to projects which have a "primary effect", the 
ERP soft loan goes to a completely different set of projects. Indeed, it 
is a condition of award that ERP loan-assisted projects do not have a 
primary effect, but rather are of a local character. Some 13,600 such 
projects were supported by an ERP soft loan between 1972 and 1975. The 
final incentive, the SDA, is available to both primary and non-primary 
effect industries. The key condition of its award, as already noted, is 
that the investment take place within the ZRG. 
Table A has been structured to take account of the main incentive 
features described above. A distinction has, for example, been drawn 
within the table between the ZRG and non-ZRG areas (within the GA areas). 
The table also differentiates between primary effect and non-primary 
effect industry, and, further, identifies - in view of the award matrix 
used for the investment grant - the key investment grant maxima. Within 
the ZRG, the prime determinants of an investment grant award are project-
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type and location. For setting-up projects and extensions, the maximum 
award is 25 per cent in both superior SPOs and SPOs in extreme border 
areas and 15 per cent elsewhere; while for reorganisations and basic 
rationalisations a general 10 per cent maximum applies. Outside the 
ZRG the picture is similar, the maximum 20 per cent award being restricted 
to setting-up projects and extensions in superior SPOs. In addition, 
setting-up and extension in normal SPOs receives a maximum 15 per cent 
award, while reorganisation and basic rationalisation again is limited 
to a lo per cent maximum. (For more details on the investment grant award 
matrix see p. lOtebove). As well as these maxima. Table A also contains 
information on average investment grant awards (1976 figures) both in 
combination with an investment allowance and when awarded alone (a very 
rare occurrence). Reflecting the scope for discretion in the administra-
tion of the grant, these average awards fall well below the possible 
maxima. Indeed, in combination with the investment allowance, the 
average investment grant is only 8.8 per cent in the ZRG and 6.5 per cent 
outside the ZR.G (see Table A) compared with possible award maxima (after 
subtracting out the investment allowance) of 17.5 per cent and 12.5 per 
cent respectively. 
A final structural feature of Table A worth mentioning is the 
distinction between average and maximum ERP loan awards. As we have 
seen in the synopses tables, project size is the crucial determinant 
of ERP loan coverage. For small projects, involving eligible costs 
of up to DM 75,OOO, the ERP loan covers two thirds of these costs. The 
larger projects the coverage decreases below this level and indeed is 
only one third of eligible costs where these lie between DM 150,000 
and DM 600,000. Moreover, for projects of over DM 600,000 coverage is 
further reduced since the maximum possible loan award is DM 200,OOO. 
It is as a result of this feature of the scheme that the overall average 
award used in Table A is only 26 per cent of project costs. The median 
award, on which we have no detailed information, would be much higher. 
Turning from the broad composition of Table A to the details of the 
table, there are three points to be made. First, although in terms of 
award maxima the investment grant is far and away the most valuable of 
the incentives (the maximum 25 per cent nominal award having an effective 
value after tax, delays and eligible items of 11.3 per cent) the average 
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investment grant is much less valuable being worth, in effective value 
terms, about 4 percent of initial capital costs in the ZRG and some 3 
percent outside the ZRG (compared with, for example, an investment 
allowance effective value of 4.6 percent in both areas). Secondly, 
ZRG awards are generally higher than those outside the ZRG. This is 
the case not only for the investment grant, it also holds for the ERP 
soft loan, its average effective value being 2.3 percent in the ZRG and 
1.5 percent in the non-ZRG areas. Moreoever, as already mentioned, the 
SDA is available only in the ZRG. Thirdly, in effective value terms, 
awards to primary effect industries are generally higher than those to 
non-primary effect industry. On average, the ERP soft loan is worth 
significantly less than both the investment allowance and the investment 
grant while - despite the fact that rates and conditions of award are the 
same for both industry types - the SDA is less valuable to non-primary 
industry (mainly due to its lower tax liability). 
Table Β has the same broad structure as Table A (distinguishing, 
for example, between the ZRG and non-ZRG areas and between primary 
effect and non-primary effect industry) but differs from that table in 
its emphasis on incentive combinations rather than individual incentives. 
For primary effect industry in the ZRG there are seven possible incentive 
combinations, all of which are shown in the table - IA alone, IA + SDA, 
IG alone, IG + SDA, IA + IG, IA + IG + SDA, SDA alone. Not all of these 
of course, are of equal importance. Some combinations are rare while 
others are fairly common. It is, for example, not at all usual to receive 
an investment grant, and yet not be awarded an investment allowance; and 
,it is similarly rare not to obtain a special depreciation allowance when 
an investment allowance has been secured. Given this, the combinations 
IA + SDA and IA + IG + SDA are the ones normally found for primary effect 
industries in the ZRG, with the former combination being more common 
than the latter. Outside the ZRG, there is no special depreciation 
allowance available, so that IA alone and IA + IG are the standard 
forms of award with IA alone being the normal case. For non-primary 
effect industry, neither the investment allowance nor the investment 
grant is available. For such industry, the standard combination is 
ERP + SDA in the ZRG and ERP alone in the non-ZRG areas. 
In terms of the standard combinations identified in the previous 
paragraph, the basic point to arise from Table Β is that the incentive 
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package in the Federal Republic of Germany is "worth" very much less 
outside the ZRG than within it. Whereas the investment allowance alone 
in the non-ZRG areas has effective values of 4.6 percent of initial 
capital costs, 3.9 percent of annual capital costs and 1.3 percent of 
value added (relatively low figures in international comparative terms 
as we shall see in Part II), the combination IA + SDA in the ZRG has 
significantly higher effective value percentages - 11.5, 9.8 and 3.3 
percent respectively. Nor does receipt of an investment grant change the 
basic picture. In the ZRG the combination, IA + IG + SDA has average 
effective values of 14.9 percent of initial capital costs, 12.7 percent 
of annual capital costs and 4.3 percent of value added, while, outside 
the ZRG, the IA + IG combination is "worth" on average 7.5 percent, 
6.4 percent and 2.2 percent respectively, in effective value terms. 
For non-primary effect industry the position is similar in that non-
receipt of the special depreciation allowance and a lower subsidy value 
for the ERP soft loan outside the ZRG makes for markedly lower non-ZRG 
effective values. 
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Table A: NOMINAL TO EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDY. 
AREA INCENTIVE LEVEL 
ZRG 
NOMINAL 
VALUE 
(a) primary effect industry 
IA fixed rate 7.5 
IG 25 percent max 25.0 
15 percent max 15.0 
10 percent max 10.O 
average (no IA) 8.5 
average (with IA) 8.8 
SDA plant fixed rate 9.2 
SDA buildings fixed rate 13.0 
EFFECTIVE VALUE AFTER 
TAX DELAYS ELIGIBLE 
ITEMS 
7.5 
16.5 
9.9 
6.6. 
5.6 
5.8 
6.9 
16.2 
9.7 
6.5 
5.5 
5.7 
4.6 
11.3 
6.8 
4.6 
3.9 
4.0 
4.2 
2.7 
(b) non-primary effect industry 
ERP maximum 14.2-17.9 
average 14.2-17.9 
SDA plant fixed rate 5.1 
SDA buildings fixed rate 7.2 
9.9-12.5 
9.9-12.5 
9.9-12.5 4.6-5.8 
9.9-12.5 1.8-2.3 
2.3 
1.5 
NON-ZRG 
(a) primary effect Industry 
IA fixed rate 
IG 20 percent max 
15 percent max 
10 percent max 
average (no IA) 
average (with IA) 
7.5 
20.0 
15.0 
lO.O 
7.0 
6 .5 
7 .5 
13.2 
9 .9 
6 .6 
4 .6 
4 . 3 
6 .9 
12.9 
9 .7 
6 .5 
4 .5 
4 . 2 
4 . 6 
9 . 0 
6 .8 
4 . 6 
3 .2 
2 .9 
(b) non-primary effect industry 
ERP maximum 9.5-11.9 6.7-8.3 6.7-8.3 3.1-3.9 
average 9.5-11.9 6.7-8.3 6.7-8.3 1.2-1.5 
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Table A: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) GENERAL: Discount rate 8.0 percent (EC reference 'rate 1976) 
(b) INVESTMENT ALLOWANCE (IA) 
(i) Nominal value: As percentage eligible investment costs, 
(ii) Taxation: Not taxed, 
(iii) Delays: Assuming calendar and financial years coincide (the normal 
case) then 12 month delay on average (average 6 months submission 
delay plus average 6 months processing delay). 
(iv) Eligible items: With EC key of: land 5, building 30, plant 65 and 
with working capital assumed to be 30 percent of project capital costs, 
eligible buildings/plant account for 66.5 percent of all project 
capital costs. 
(c) INVESTMENT GRANT (IG) 
(i) Nominal value: As percentage eligible investment costs. 
(ii) Taxation: Effective rate of corporation tax 34.1 percent (standard 
rate 56 percent reduced by the fact that there is an average six 
month delay in tax payment and because the grant is taxed "indirectly" 
through reducing the value of aided assets by the value of the grant 
for depreciation purposes. For depreciation purposes we assume that 
plant is depreciated straight line over an 8 year fiscal life and 
that buildings are depreciated straight line over 50 years. Land is 
non-depreciable with the result that the land element of grant is 
fed directly into income and hence taxable profits). 
(iii) Delays: Processing delay: average 9 months (range 6-12 months). 
Assuming grant application made just before project construction 
starts (in practice it can be made earlier but not later), a one 
year construction period and a uniform distribution of project ex-
penditure, the 9 month average processing delay implies an average 
3 month delay between asset expenditure and grant receipt. 
(iv) Eligible items: Eligible investment assumed to be 70 percent of 
all project capital costs, it being assumed that (ineligible) 
working capital is 30 percent thereof. 
(d) SPECIAL DEPRECIATION ALLOWANCE (SDA) 
(i) Nominal value: Net present value of tax saving due to accelerated 
depreciation given an effective tax rate of 53.9 percent for primary 
effect industry (standard 56 percent corporation tax reduced by 
average 6 month delay) and 30 percent for non-primary effect ind-
ustry (since it would tend to be subject to income tax). 
(ii/iii) Taxation/Delays: Not relevant, 
(iv) Eligible items: Given the assumptions in (b>(iv) above plant covers 
45.5 and buildings 21.0 percent of all project capital costs. 
(e) ERP SOFT LOAN (ERP) 
(i) Nominal value: Net grant equivalent of loan subsidy as percent loan 
award assuming: 
loan principal interest interest rate 
period repayment free subsidy (given EC 
holiday period reference rate) 
ZRG 10-15 yrs 2 yrs None 3 percentage pts 
NON-ZRG 10-15 yrs 2 yrs None 2 percentage pts 
Repayment is six monthly on a straight line basis, 
(ii) Taxation: Effective rate of tax (income tax): 30 percent, 
(iii) Delays: None, 
(iv) Eligible items: (a) Loan as percent eligible investment: (1975) 
average 26 percent; maximum 66.7 percent. (b) Eligible investment 
as percent project costs (given EC key) - 70 percent. Loan is there-
fore an average 18.2 percent of project costs, and has a maximum 
coverage of 46.7 percent of all project capital costs. 
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Table Β: EFFECTIVE SUBSIDIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VARIOUS DENOMINATORS 
AREA INCENTIVE COMBINATION 
ZRG 
(a) primary effect industry 
IA (+SDA) 
IG (25 percent max)(+SDA) 
IG (15 percent max)(+SDA) 
IG (10 percent max)(+SDA) 
IG (average)(+SDA) 
IA + IG (25 percent max)(+SDA) 
IA + IG (15 percent max)(+SDA) 
IA + IG (10 percent max)(+SDA) 
IA + IG (average)(+SDA) 
SDA 
INITIAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
ANNUAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
VALUE 
ADDED 
4.6 (11.5) 
11.3 (16.5) 
6.8 (12.7) 
4.6 (10.8) 
3.9 (10.2) 
12.5 (18.2) 
8.0 (14.4) 
5.7 (12.4) 
8.6 (14.9) 
6.9 
3.9 (9.8) 
9.6 (14.0) 
5.8 (10.8) 
3.9 (9.2) 
3.3 (8.7) 
10.6 (15.5) 
6.8 (12.3) 
4.8 (10.6) 
7.3 (12.7) 
5.9 
1.3 (3.3) 
3.3 (4.8) 
2.0 (3.7) 
1.3 (3.1) 
1.1 (3.0) 
3.6 (5.3) 
2.3 (4.2) 
1.6 (3.6) 
2.5 (4.3) 
2.0 
(b) non-primary effect industry 
ERP maximum 4.6-5.8 
(+SDA) (8.4-9.6) 
ERP average 
SDA 
1.8-2.3 
(+SDA) (5.6-6.1) 
3.8 
3.9-4.9 
(7.1-Θ.1) 
1.5-2.O 
(4.7-5.2) 
3.2 
1.3-1.7 
(2.4-2.8) 
0.5-0.7 
(1.6-1.8) 
1.1 
NON-ZRG 
(a) primary effect Industry 
IA 
IG (20 percent max)(+IA) 
IG (15 percent max)(+IA) 
IG (IO percent max)(+IA) 
IG (average)(+IA) 
4.6 
9.0 (10.3) 
6.8 (8.0) 
4.6 (5.7) 
3.2 (7.5) 
3.9 1.3 
7.6 (8.7) 2.6 (3.0) 
5.8 (6.8) 2.0 (2.3) 
3.9 (4.8) 1.3 (1.6) 
2.7 (6.4) 0.9 (2.2) 
(b) non-primary effect industry 
ERP maximum ' 3.1-3.9 2.6-3.3 0.9-1.1 
ERP average 1.2-1.5 1.0-1.3 0.3-0.4 
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Table Β: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) INITIAL CAPITAL COSTS 
In general, the summation of the Table A results. Note though that 
when an investment allowance is awarded in conjunction with an invest­
ment grant the maximum nominal value of the grant is reduced by 7.5 percent­
age points since the maximum value of the two incentives in combination 
must not exceed the maximum preferential rate for the locality (see p. 104 
above). In addition, when an investment grant is awarded in conjunction 
with a special depreciation allowance, the value of the grant is 
reduced to 84.98 percent of its Table A level since tax payments on the 
building and plant elements of grant are in effect made more quickly 
under the SDA regime. 
(b) ANNUAL CAPITAL 
(i) Calculation 
Asset 
Buildings 
Plant 
COSTS (Discount/interest rate 8.C 
of weighted annual 
Land/Working Capital 
Assumed 
Life 
50 
10 
-
) percent) 
capital cost factor: 
Annual Capital 
Charge Factor 
0.0817 
0.1490 
0.08O0 
WEIGHTED ANNUAL CAPITAL COST 
Weight 
0.210 
0.455 
0.335 
FACTOR 
Weightec 
Factors 
0.0172 
0.0678 
0.0268 
0.1118 
(ii) Calculation of annual subsidy factor: 
- IA, SDA : 0.0955 (plant/building subsidised) 
- IG, ERP loan : 0.0948 (plant/building/land subsidised) 
Since replacement is not explicitly subsidised, the subsidy life 
of the plant element of all the above subsidies is taken to be 
20 years - see p. 44 above. 
(iii) Calculation of annuitising factor ((ii) 
- IA, SDA : 0.8542 
- IG, ERP loan : 0.8479 
(i)) 
(c) VALUE ADDED 
It is assumed that gross profits make up 34 percent of value added. 
This was the average figure for manufacturing industry in Germany over 
the period 1970-74. See Eurostat, National Accounts 1970-74 Eurostat 
Yearbook 2 - 1975, Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1975, 
Table 5. 
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THE INCENTIVES 
Both fiscal and financial incentives are currently available in the 
Republic of Ireland. The main financial incentives are project-related 
capital grants awarded by the Industrial Development Authority (IDA). 
The IDA grant system covers the whole of the country, albeit with 
differentiation in terms of rates of award between Designated Areas 
(containing almost one third of the national population and covering over 
one half of the national land area - see accompanying map), Non-
Designated Areas, and Dublin. A feature of the system is its division 
into a number of separate grant programmes. 
The most important of these, in terms of expenditure, is the New 
Industry and Major Expansion Programme. Over the period 1973/74 - end 
1975 more than ¿140 million worth of grant expenditure was approved 
under this scheme (annual average ¿51.3 million), representing in 
expenditure terms almost three-quarters of all IDA capital grant approvals. 
0<rez the same period, a further one fifth of approved grant expenditure 
(averaging ¿14.1 million annually) was devoted to the second most 
important programme, the Re-equipment and Modernisation Scheme. Both 
the new industry/major expansion programme and the re-equipment/ 
modernisation programme are included in the synopsis tables which follow. 
Under the former, the maximum rates of award, for administrative purposes, 
are 50 percent in the Designated Areas, 35 percent in the Non-Designated 
Areas and 25 percent in Dublin; while under the latter, maximum rates 
of 35 percent, 25 percent and 25 percent respectively apply. There is 
moreover an upper limit of ¿850,000 set for any re-equipment/modernisation 
grant awarded, although this limit may be exceeded with Government 
approval. 
The remaining IDA grant programmes are of much less importance 
and indeed in terms of grant expenditure approved in the period April 
1973 to December 1975 accounted for less than 6 percent of the IDA grant 
total. Just over half of this (on average some ¿2.3 million worth of 
approved expenditure per annum) was devoted to the Small Industry 
Programme, designed to assist small manufacturing industry employing 
up to 50 persons with a fixed asset investment not exceeding ¿200,000. 
Under this programme, the maximum rates of award are ten percentage 
points more than those noted above for new industry projects and major 
expansions. 
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Other programmes, minor in terms of expenditure even though 
significant in the context of the development process, include the Joint 
Venture, Service Industries and Product and Process Development schemes. 
The primary objective of the Joint Venture Programme is to encourage 
the establishment of new manufacturing capacity through the promotion 
of partnerships between foreign and domestic entrepreneurs. The Service 
Industries Programme (like the Joint Ventures scheme offering grants at 
the New Industry/Major Expansion Programme maximum rates) is aimed at 
both domestic and overseas firms in certain areas of the service sector 
such as engineering consultants and computer technology, with a view to 
developing export services. The Product and Process Scheme, together 
with grants towards the provision of research facilities, has the objective 
of improving both the competitiveness and growth potential of Irish 
manufacturers through innovation and the development of industrial 
processes. Under this scheme, the maximum rates of grant award are as 
noted above under the re-equipment/modernisation programme. 
Turning from financial to fiscal incentives, the most important 
such aid is the export profits tax relief scheme - generally considered 
to be of key significance in attracting foreign investment to Ireland. 
Under this scheme, 1ÖO percent relief from corporation tax is given 
for a period of 15 years, with a reducing scale of relief for a 
further 5 years on profits attributable to the export of Irish 
manufactured goods. The scheme is scheduled to end in April 1990. 
In 1975, export profits tax relief is estimated to have 'cost' the 
exchequer £25 million in foregone revenue. The scheme is described in 
detail in the synopsis tables which follow. 
The last of the major incentives in Ireland are capital allowances. 
These are administered by the Revenue Commissioners, are available 
throughout the country and "cost" the exchequer some ¿i0 million 
annually. For new plant and machinery, they take the form of a 100 
percent initial allowance or of free depreciation; while for industrial 
buildings the standard allowance is an initial 50 percent allowance plus 
a straight line writing down allowance of 4 percent per annum (making 
a 54 percent allowance in the year in which the expenditure is made, and 
4 percent annually thereafter). Moreover, in the Designated Areas, a 
further allowance is available on plant and machinery - the "investment 
allowance". This allowance of 20 percent of capital expenditure is 
available on top of the capital allowances, thus permitting a total of 
120 percent of the cost of new plant and machinery to be claimed for tax 
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purposes in the Designated Areas. It is the investment allowance 
which is covered in the following synopsis tables. 
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Capital Grants 
5. Activity 
Pi acrimin­
ation 
6. Spatial 
Discretionary, project-related capital granta. In law a 
two-tier grant etructure, th · bexlo grant not exceeding 
40 percent ol e l ig ib le fixed investment in designated 
ere«« (25 percent eleewhero), while en extra maximum 20 
percent grent may be offered to projecte «atlefylng "add­
itional criteria", in practice the poeltlon la »ore com­
pio», the maximum edmlnlxtxstive percentages tor the two 
main grant scheme» being (for designated eroaa, nou-
JuSlgueted «rue« «nd Dublin respectively) ίο ι IS ι IS 
for »etting-up project« «nd major *»ten*Ion« end 35 ι 25 
2S for i«-aqulpment project«. Mut«over, the maximum re-
equlpaent grant Is ¿ΒSo, OOO although grants In «»c««« of 
tilis limit may he given with Government approval. 
Industrial Ouveloaxmint Act 19G9. 
crint «rtminl«tr*tlon le . in the hand« of the industrial 
DovalorxMtnt Authority (IDA) e»cept for the Hld­Heet Reg­
Ion (where the Shannon Tree Airport Development Company 
milnly acta a« agent for th« IDA) and th« Ceoltecht «ream 
(for which 0««ltjrr« Elr««nn 1« reaponxiblel. rinance le 
proviJ*J from voted c ipl te l of the Deportment of induxtry 
«nJ CcexMrc«, »nd indeed the Minister of industry end 
commerce 1« responsible to Parliament for the IDA. 
while in law no economic activity or sector i s speclf le­
tlly excluded, the genaral condition« of eward («ae 11 
below) mean tnat in practice award« «re mede principally 
to manufactucIng Industrie·.. Cettxlnly, egrlcuLture end 
con» ι ruction are not ganer*lly «Uglble while s erv ine 
«re covered by a «eparete IDA grant achem« (»oc intro­
duction) . 
Between e l ig ib le act iv i t ies no epeciried di acriminatIon, 
but the decision whether or not to ewerd end th· rata of 
award (subject to the edmlnietr«tlve maxim«) are et the 
discretion of the author 1tio», thu» giving «omm »cope for 
discrimination. Moreover, the legle let ive criteri« of 
«ward (»ee 11 below) mean that, ln practice, particular 
■ector« «re favoured In terme of e l i g i b i l i t y and rates. 
(¿rants «re available throughout the country but at dif­
ferent rate« corre»ending to the legal distinction drawn 
between deslgnatod and non­Jesignatad areas. A further 
administrative distinction «aparata« out Dublin ae a «poe­
tai case within the non­designated areas (sva 1 above for 
suslmum awards and 12 below for actual awards). Until 
the current recession, new industrial development was not 
uncouraqed In the Dublin «ren. Mithin e l ig ib le «imee no 
specified discrimination (buL «ee 5 above). 
Export Prof i t s Tax Relief 
ft non­dlecretionary f lacel Incentiva for campani·« which 
export menurectured good· ­ th· incentive being total 
r*U«E on taxable prof i t · attributable to auch export· 
("attribution" being on the proportion of export« to 
total ·■!·«) for IS yeere plue partiel rel ief for · 
further S yeere. However, elnce the incentive Will 
lapee In 199Q, only thoee companlee which atarted an 
export trad· before 1971 ere e l ig ible for the full leg­
i s la t ive rel ief . 
The Corporation Tex Act 1976 lncorporatee prevloue 
legislation in r«l«tlon to to» relief« on export profite. 
The écheme le edmlnletered ee pert of the­generel tax­
ation eyetem. Advice on borderline casa« (where unclear 
that product fe l l e within the definition of e manu­
facturai good) 1« ueually «ought before production 
»tart». Otherwise, the normal practice 1« that bueineaa 
account« ere aubmltted to th« inepector of T«xee, tog­
ether with a claim for export «­le» r«ll«f «bowing the 
proportion of goode manufactured going to export a*lea. 
The Inspector then «aaeseee the tax due. 
All manufacturing industri · · , plue specified manufactur­
ing proc«««eei certain deelgn «nd planning «ervlces for 
projects executed abroad, repair« to non­resident­
owned shlpsj a« wall es fleh firming «nd mushroom cul­
t i vita t ion «re e l ig ib le . In general, the primary eector, 
construction, tour i»n and s«rvlc·« «r« inel ig ible . At 
Shannon Airport however e l l ecttvit lee (including eervlce 
ect lv l t lee like packaging) which contribute to the use 
end development of the airport ere e l igible for Shannon 
rel ief , unlike tha export profita tax rel ief , Shannon 
rel ief can be cleimed in fu l l , without any scaling down, 
for any qualifying profite made before 6 April 1990. 
None. Award le automatic aa long a« condition» are 
fu l f i l led , end retee ere fixed. 
None in terme of r e t · · nor, ln general, ln th · decision 
wl.other or not to eward. However, ln th· Shannon Fre« 
Airport «one there le favourable treatment («lbelt only 
with Ministertal permission) due to the wider definition 
there of e l ig ible ect ivl t lea (eee 5 abov·). 
Investment Allowance 
Non*dleeretionery, item­related ft«cal concession. The 
allowance,α fixed 20, percent of capital expenditure on 
new plant end machinery, le evallabl« to «at «g«lnet tax­
able profit« In the designated araae only, f t i s awarded 
on top of the national capital allowance écheme (of, 
«mengst other thing«, free depreclstlon for plant and 
mechlnery) and tima permite e total of 130 percent of the 
cost of new plant «nd machinery to be cleimed for tax 
purpose« in the designated ar·««. 
Income Tax Act 1967, «ubsequent Plnanc« Acta end the 
Corporation Tax Act 1976. 
Inveatment allowance» «re admintatered uniformly through­
out the daaignatctl areee ae pert of the general taxation 
system. 
No eector 1 · »pacifically excluded. All eector» carrying 
out e l ig ib le inveetment ere e l i g i b l e . However, since the 
allowance i s restricted to new plant and machinery, most 
awards are mede within manufacturing. 
None· Award ia xutometlc a» long » · condition» ar· ful­
f i l l ed , reta« ere fixed. 
Available only 111 th· designated area». Rate» er · llxed 
end the declelon whether or not to eward 1« largely 
automatic, giving no acope therefore for discrimination 
within «llgLble ereae. 
7. rroìect Type 
β. I l se 
Plecrleim­
at ion 
K »pendl ture 
Capital Grants 
Settlng­np project» end mejor exteeulom· have higher 
grmmt mmxlrn« them "r«­mq<«lpmmmt* grant peojeet· i . e . 
mlmoc extenalon», modernisation», reorganisation» end 
ratlonelleatlone. ( teeeet le l ly the dletinctloo betemem 
th· two grant type· le that between «spending employment 
and maintaining existing employment). However, 
in practica, "re­equipment" giant criteri« «ppe«r le«e 
•trlng«nt than thoee for eettlng­up eo that »·« h grant· 
aie l e · · l ikely to be scaled down from the maxima eet. 
Indeed (eee 12 below) "re­equipment" grant« oftan hev* 
hi.jh«r avérai« lévele In percentage terme ­ though on the 
other hand they «re often more diff icult to obtain. Take­
overs and whully («placeaasnt project· at* not « l lg lble tut 
»••latonee, while trenafara do not qualify under the 
».­tiinj­up scheme but «r« «««tated under the ie­aqulrmwmt 
| . .ji ­*­e. Between e l ig ible project typwe no specified 
discrimination (bul ■*« S «bove). 
what« InweeiMtit ι« l««e then ¿Ì mil l , or ¿15,000 per Job 
•et 11 no­op projecte end major extenetone face coet per 
Jut» l imit · of ¿J,Sou, ¿S,ooo end ¿4,OOO in the de«lgn«ted 
atoes, non­de«Igneted ereee end Dublin re«p*ctlv«ly. No 
further «peclfl«d «is« dlecrlmluotlon (but «ee 5 abov·). 
AlmoBt «11 project fixed cepltel coet · ­ including a l t · 
purettaa« and development. Inf re« t rue tur· work« end ln­
«talletton» («.g. » U t i u t t l eer«lcee, water, telephone«! 
•re « l t g l b l · , ae long ee they ere "reaeonebl·" and dir­
ectly relevant to the production proces«. Working capital, 
o f f ­a l t · vehic le · , eecond­hand Item«, plant «nd machinery 
of le«· than ¿1,000, tool« «nd Implementa «nd Office 
decoration« ar« al l Ineligible, es le office «qui peewit of 
lea« than ¿7,00O. Offlc·« «nd c«ut«ene on the promt«·« 
■r« e l ig ible but «ncllltery building· (e.g. recreetlonel 
f a c i l i t i · · ] «r« not. Replacement 1« «l lglble where part 
of a re­equipment grant project, 
A«««t« purchased with caah or through plteeed peymente 
ere «llglbl« a« are aséete bought on hire purchase. 
iMir l ■■■!!> «r« not « l l g l b l · . 
I«jel ly, In addition to project viabi l i ty , there ere 
thra« basic condition« of award (the investment muet be 
of e reeeonabty permanent naturet muet need •••(■tance j 
and abeve a l l muet cr«»t« or emlnteln employment ­ B«e I ebove) end four euppleaentery condition· (reletlng to the 
significance and character of the employment ­ ekilled 
" I n being fnvouredj the degree of local linkage) th· 
growth potentiel of the undertaking) and Ite technolog­
ical end identif ie; content). In practice It appear· that 
al l the «bove condii lon» play a role in determining 
whether or not to mok« an award «nd the level of ewerd. 
Moreover, re­equipment grant project« mu«t be pert of e 
fully Integrated and raelleeble development plan and be ln 
line with tha IDA'S eectoral prlorlt lee. 
Export P r o f i t s Tax R e l i e f 
■orne, th« rel ief being om e rneaaej be«le. 
None, le term« of e l i g i b i l i t y ner, directly, la tarm· of 
ratee. Only to the extent that corporation tmx retee 
favour eeutll ecexpenlee ( i . e . thoee with taxable profite 
of lece then ¿15,000) done tha concmaelon, by relieving 
• Me tmx burden, favour lerger compente·. 
Mot relèvent. 
Hot relèvent. 
The re l ief la «vatlahl« to conpenlee only. Only thoee 
profit« which origínete from export eelee ere e l igible 
•nd then only where attributable to the esle of goode 
manufacturad In Ireland (or to th« actlvlt lee in 4 above) 
Investment Allowance 
»Ione, the allowance being on en item rether then β projet 
beeta. 
None, either l e t e n e of e l ig ib i l i ty er r e t · · . 
Only new plant «nd machinery le «Uglble . Second­hand 
Heme ere ineligible ee t» any dl«but«e«mnt on mainten­
ance, repaire or Looee tool · or email tool · l ikely to b* 
warn out in ■ «hort perlod. Replacement le ellgLble «m 
long ■· the ebove conditions ere smt. 
Aaset» purcheeed by c«sh, or through phased payment· or 
on hit« purchase ere e l ig ib le . Laaxed easete ar« not 
directly e l ig ib le . 
The mein condition le that the aaaet be In u«e «t the end 
of th« yeai ln Which th« allowance Is being claimed. 
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Capital Grants 
17. Clawback 
Ι β . Turndovn 
The t a b l e ehows g r a n t a p p r o v a l · o v e r t h e p e r i o d A p r i l 
1971 t o *nd I97S t¿ m l l l . ) > 
D e s i g n a t e d ftresx H o n ­ D e s i g n a t e d A r e · · 
S e t t i n g H e ­ e q ü l o ­ S e L t l n g B e ­ e q u l p ­
Up ment Up mont 
ΙΟβ 1S1 107 6o6 
5 6 . β 7 . 0 Θ4.1 3 1 . 8 
0 . 5 3 0 . 0 5 0 . 4 5 o,()S 
2 7 . 0 3 4 . 4 2 I . O 2 1 . 0 
c a s e « 
awards 
Th« b u i l d i n g « l a m e n t o f t h e g r e n t l e ( i n d i r e c t l y ) t a x e d 
whatever p r o f i t « « r e mad« « l n c e a i d e d b o l l i l i mj» can o n l y 
be d e p r e c i a t e d f o r t a x purpose» n e t o f any g r a n t r e c e i v e d . 
In c o n t r a » t , th« p l a n t and machinery e l e m e n t l e f r e e o f 
t a x s i n c e c a p i t a l a l l o w a n c e s app ly t o t h e t o t a l c o s t 
( I . e . i g n o r i n g g r a n t s ) o f e l d e d p l a n t end mach inery , 
AppLlcatUui must b e made and · d a c t e t o n g i v e n b e f o r e 
p r o j e c t c o n s t r u c t i o n s t a r t « . A p p l i c a t i o n procwaalng 
P«r tod 1» v a r i a b l e (b munti*« t o 2 y e a r s ) depending v e r y 
much on l e n g t h o f p r o j e c t p l a n n i n g p h a a s . T h e r e a f t e r 
c la im» fur grant p j y mo π t can be Submit ted ax b i l l « p a i d . 
Claim v e r i f i c a t i o n p e r i o d 1« about one month. 
Ho award» «re p o a a l b l « beyond t h e formal maxima. 
The two main i n c e n t i v a t y p e « ­ IDA c e p l t e l , gr«nta arid 
f i s c a l I n c e n t i v e « ­ « r · i n d e p e n d e n t o f e a c h o t h e r and e r e 
u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y a d d a b l e . Wi th in t h e IDA i n c e n t i v e p a c k ­
.».*­■ c a p i t a l g r a n t s can a l s o b e edded t o o t h e r , more minor, 
IDA a s s i s t a n c e ( e . g . l o e n g u a r a n t e e » , l o a n s u b s i d i e s , end 
t r a i n i n g g r a n t » ! « u b j e c t t o th« «dmln l a t r a t i ve mamma 
s e t o u t l n I a b o v e . 
Whure « c o n d i t i o n i « n o t m e t , o r l e broken w i t h i n t e n 
y e a r » ­ t n d th« c · · · comes t o IDA n o t i c e ­ g r a n t 1« r e ­
p a y a b l e . The normal p o l i c y la t o examine tha reason f o r 
» h o r t f a l l and t o t r y t o r e n e g o t i a t e l n t h e l i g h t o f t h e 
changed c i r c u m s t a n c e s . The l ew i s s l e s t r e e o r t . T o t a l 
g r a n t repayments amounted LO ¿ 9 6 4 , 0 0 0 from A p r i l 1970 t o 
t h e end o f 1975 . 
For s a t t l n g . u p p r o j e c t s «nd l a r g e « « t e n s i o n s t h u r « era 
no meaningfu l turndown r a t e s s i n e · p r o j e c t e which f a l l t o 
meet the IDA c r i t e r l e a r e d i s c o u r a g e d from making formal 
« l i ­ l l c a t l o n . Any turndown 1« thu« i n f o r m a l , end t h e r e l a 
no q u a n t i f i c a t i o n of t h e s c a l e . For r e ­ e q u i p m e n t g r a n t s 
t h e turndown r a t e f o r una r e c e n t y e a r wax e b o u t 40 p e r ­
c e n t ­ l a r g e l y f o r r o s o n a o f o v e r c a p a c i t y In t h e p r o d u c t 
a r e a , p r o j e c t n o n ­ v i o b l l t t y , l a c k o f growth p o t e n t i a l and 
f i n a n c i a l i n a d e q u a c y . 
Export Prof i t s Tax Relief 
No r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n . 
Not r e l e v a n t . 
The b e e l e o f e e e e e e m e n t end g r a n t i n g o f r e l i e f Le a» f o r 
C o r p o r a t i o n Tax , w i t h a p p l i c a t i o n f o r t h · e x p o r t p r o f i t e 
t a x r e l i e f be ing mad· «β t h e t e x account» « r e e u b m l t t e d . 
C o r p o r a t i o n t a x f o r any a c c o u n t i n g p e r i o d i e i n two 
e q u a l i n « t « l n e n t e , t h e f i r s t n i n e month« from t h · end 
o f t h e a c c o u n t i n g p e r i o d and t h e s econd s i x month« l a t e r , 
No «ward« are p o « « l b l « beyond the formal maxima. 
E x p o r t p r o f i t s t a x r e l i e f and e l l f i n a n c i a l i n c e n t i v e · 
e r e Independent and u n c o n d i t i o n a l l y e d d a b l « . Th · r e l i e f 
can e l e o b e awarded i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h c a p i t a l a l l o w ­
a n c e · , b u t i t ahou ld b« notad t h a t «van where r e l i e f 1« 
c l e i m e d on a l l t a x a b l e p r o f i t · the r e l è v e n t w r i t i n g 
down a l l o w a n c e « (but n o t any a c c e l e r a t e d a l l o w a n c e « ) « r e 
deemed t o havo b e e n t a k e n end c a n n o t , t h e r e f o r e , be 
c a r r i e d forward . Wear and t e e r a l l o w a n c e s hav« p r i o r i t y 
o v e r e x p o r t p r o f i t s r e l i e f . 
Not r e l e v a n t . 
A l though e formel a p p l i c a t i o n l e r e q u i r e d , t h e c o n e e e e l o n 
l e a u t o m a t i c s s l o n g s s t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f e l i g i b i l i t y 
a t e m e t . There s r e t h e r e f o r e no m e a n i n g f u l turndown 
Investment Allowance 
Mo I n f o r m a t i o n . 
riot r e l e v a n t . 
A p p l i c a t i o n l e made i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e annual t a x 
r e t u r n . Th« e l l o w a n e e 1« g i v e n l n t h e a c c o u n t i n g p e r i o d 
r e l a t e d t o t h e y««r o f e x p e n d i t u r e . C o r p o r a t i o n t a x f o r 
any a c c o u n t i n g p e r i o d i e i n two equat i n s t a l m e n t » , th« 
f i r a t n i n e months from t h e end o f th« a c c o u n t i n g p e r i o d 
and t h e second s i x months l a t e r . 
Ho «wards a r e p o s s i b l e beyond t h e termal f l x « J r a t e . 
I n v e s t m e n t e l l o w a n e e « can b« «.t.w.l t o a l l f i n a n c i a l I n ­
c e n t i v a s w i t h o u t l i m i t . Wh«n e x p o r t p r o f i t s t a x r e l i e f 
1« awarded, t a x a b l e p r o f i t « m«y be reduced t o such an 
e x t e n t t h a t t h e Inves tment a l l o w a n c e I s elt.ht.­i r e d u c e d In 
v a l u e o r n u l l i f i e d . 
Not r e l e v a n t . 
L i t t l e d i s c r e t i o n a v a i l a b l e t o t h « a u t h o r i t i e s end t h u s 
no maanlngful turndown r « t e s . 
Capital Grants 
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21. Change 
Provi a loi 
«jrpemditmse lm the perlod April 1971 ­ end 1*74 was 
¿3 ) . · mil l , toe setting­up pro)«cte and major extan.lon» 
(inclwdlmg service project· emd Joint «mature·) «nd 
t i l . i mil l , for re­equipment project«. Over the «am« 
period total IDA grent expenditure wee eppcoslmetelf 
¿57.0 mi l l . 
The IDA ••tímate· that the Job potentiel of projects ap­
proved between April 1971 »nd Peces**«r l»7S wea 59,4*4. 
Ftx«d eeeet teve«ternet «»«oci«t«d with setting­up proj­
•ct«/me}ee e«teneteme totalled ¿«11.9 mil l , in the mortod 
April 1973 ­ end 1*75. The curreiponJlrwj figure for re­
•gulpmwnt projecte wee **l7l.» mill.■ end for «11 IDA 
grent «xpeodltui« ¿«U7.1 «rill. 
Ho specified 111«. 
Where mejor lAenge« ar· envieogod, provision wi l l De med· 
through eistwte, order or régulât'on œ appropriata. 
Export Profits Tax Relief 
τη« ru »oeeeomm te the Exchequer, outald· «f th« 
shannon «rea (etter· foregone r»vmmee t« «»tlmated at 
il mi l l , pee­ Mmm) mee been (¿ mill .M 
1970/1I l*71/n 1*72/73 1*73/74 1*74/7* Ι*7*/7· 
» . 1 14.1 15.» l i . « Xl . t 24.« 
Mo Internatio*. 
NO Information. 
Under pcaeamt leqlalatlom I 
No guidatine« «vailabi«. 
I arnyebU ette« * Aprii IMO. 
Investment Allowance 
NO Information. 
NO epeclfled U f e . 
Por capital allómeme·« Ln general 
in the budget and normally orxse U t o 
ant f lacai ymer. 
IRELAND 
THE INCENTIVE VALUES 
As we have seen, the Irish incentive system is composed of both 
financial and fiscal measures. The main financial incentive is the IDA 
capital grant. In terms of expenditure, the major IDA grant programme 
is that devoted to new industry and major expansions, the re-equipment 
and modernisation scheme being second in importance. Over the period 
1973/74 - end 1975, 295 awards were approved under the new industry/ 
major expansion programme (average award ¿0.5 million) and 759 awards 
under the re-equipment/modernisation programme (average award ¿0.05 
million) For reasons of space, the valuation tables which follow are 
limited to the former programme though we do comment shortly on the 
value of the re-equipment and modernisation scheme. The tables also 
include the main Irish fiscal incentives - the export profits tax relief 
scheme and the investment allowance (this latter being available only in 
the Designated Areas and offering firms a first year 120 percent write 
down of plant for tax purposes, as against lOO percent in the rest of 
the country). The focus of attention however is on the IDA capital 
grant scheme. 
One of the reasons for this is the difficulty of valuing export 
profits tax relief - and this because of the lack of information on 
profits arising from exports in aided projects. In the absence of such 
information, Table A has to cover the extreme cases .- distinguishing 
between projects whose profits arise solely from exports (and are therefore 
eligible for export profits tax relief) and those with no export profits. 
The table also differentiates between Designated Areas, Non-Designated 
Areas and Dublin, the three main types of assisted area for IDA grant 
administrative purposes; and further distinguishes the legal and 
administrative maximum levels of grant under the new industry/major 
expansion programme from average awards made (these being for the period 
April 1973 to December 1975). 
From Table A it can be seen that export projects receive the highest 
effective rates of grant - the legal' maximum being 41.6 percent in the 
Designated Areas compared to 36.3 percent for comparable non-export 
projects - and this because the effective rate of tax on the grant for 
such projects is zero. Working in the opposite direction, however, it 
can be seen that the investment allowance is "worthless" for export 
projects, but is worth, in effective value terms, 2.1 percent of initial 
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capital costs where taxable profits are being made. The table further 
shows that Designated Area projects are treated significantly better than 
Non-Designated Area projects in terms of maximum rates of award, but 
that the difference in terms of average effective values is not major -
18.7 percent of initial capital costs in the Designated Areas for export 
projects compared with 14.6 percent in the Non-Designated Areas. 
As already noted, the table is limited to the new industry/major 
expansion grants of the IDA. Under the re-equipment and modernisation 
scheme the administrative maxima are 35 percent in the Designated Areas, 
and 25 percent in the Non-Designated Areas (including Dublin) while the 
average values over the period 1973/74 - 1975 were 34.4 percent and 21.0 
percent respectively. Re-equipment and modernisation awards - unlike 
those for new industry and major expansions - therefore, averaged close 
to the maxima over the period in question. Although, as we have said, 
Table A does not directly cover the re-equipment grant, both maxima and 
average re-equipment grant awards have comparable entries in the table. 
For example the 35 percent nominal administrative maximum in the 
Designated Areas has a "twin" in the administrative maximum for Non-
Designated Areas under the new industry/major expansion scheme. It is 
not difficult, therefore, for the reader to identify the appropriate 
effective values for the re-equipment and modernisation grant programme. 
Table Β has the same broad structure as Table A, distinguishing 
between export and non-export projects; between Designated Areas, 
Non-Designated Areas and Dublin; and between maximum and average levels 
of award. As well as IDA grant awards on their own, the table shows 
the value of the combination IDA grant plus investment allowance (the 
standard combination in the Designated Areas). 
From the table, it is clear that the investment allowance is not 
of major importance in effective value terms. Indeed, it only has 
a value for non-export project - and even then is not of major 
importance. In terms of maximum rates of award, IDA new industry/major 
expansion grants are high by international standards (a point to which we 
return in Part II) both in the Designated Areas and outside these areas, 
and irrespective of whether the aided project is an export project or not. 
The administrative grant maximum for export projects in the Designated 
Areas, for example, is worth, in effective value terms 34.7 percent of 
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initial capital costs, 32.1 percent of annual capital costs and 10.0 
percent of value added; while even a non-export project in the Non-
Designated Areas has an administrative grant maximum effective value of 
21.2 percent, 19.6 percent and 6.1 percent respectively. True, average 
awards fall well below the above maxima. But working in the opposite 
direction most aided projects in Ireland would in practice be in receipt 
of export profits tax relief, a point not directly taken account of in 
Table B. When export profits are being made (and most projects under 
the new industry/major expansion programme would be export-oriented) 
export profits tax relief can be very valuable indeed, placing the 
Irish incentive package among the top group of EC country schemes in 
terms of average as well as maximum rates of award. 
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Table A: NOMINAL TO EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDY. 
AREA INCENTIVE LEVEL 
(A) EXPORT PROJECTS 
DESIGNATED IDA grant legal maximum 
AREA 
administrative maximum 
average 
IA fixed rate 
NON- IDA grant legal maximum 
DESIGNATED .__. administrative maximum AREA 
average 
DUBLIN IDA grant legal maximum 
administrative maximum 
(B) NON-EXPORT PROJECTS 
DESIGNATED IDA grant legal maximum 
AREA 
administrative maximum 
average 
IA fixed rate 
NON- IDA grant legal maximum 
DESIGNATED ._,,...., .__. administrative maximum AREA 
average 
DUBLIN IDA grant legal maximum 
administrative maximum 
NOMINAL 
VALUE 
60.0 
50.0 
27.0 
EFFECTIVE VALUE AFTER 
TAX 
60.0 
50.0 
27.0 
DELAYS 
59.4 
49.5 
26.7 
ELIGIBLE 
ITEMS 
41.6 
34.7 
18.7 
45.0 
35.0 
21.0 
45.0 
25.0 
45.0 
35.0 
21.0 
45.0 
25.0 
44.5 
34.6 
20.8 
44.5 
24.7 
31.2 
24.2 
14.6 
31.2 
17.3 
60.0 
50.0 
27.0 
6.6 
45.0 
35.0 
21.0 
45.0 
25.0 
51.5 
42.9 
23.2 
-
38.6 
30.0 
ÍR.O 
38.6 
21.5 
50.9 
42.4 
23.0 
-
38.2 
29.7 
17.8 
38.2 
21.3 
35.6 
29.7 
16.1 
2.1 
26.7 
20.8 
12.5 
26.7 
14.9 
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Table A: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) GENERAL: Discount rate 13.75 percent (EC reference rate 1976). 
(b) INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (IDA) GRANT 
(i) Nominal value: As percentage of eligible investment costs. The 
percentages shown are for setting-up projects and major extensions, 
with the average percentages being for the period 1973/74-1975. 
(About one fifth of approved IDA grant expenditure goes on re-
equipment projects. These are not covered in Table A but are 
discussed in detail in the introduction). It will be noted that 
no average award figure is given for the Dublin area. This is 
because it is only recently - in response to high levels of 
unemployment - that IDA grant awards have begun to be made to 
Dublin-based projects, 
(ii) Taxation: Effective corporate tax rate 37.1 percent (standard rate 
45 percent, paid in two equal instalments, delayed 15 and 21 months). 
The capital grant tax rate is 14.2 percent since only the building 
element of grant is taxed and then only indirectly by reducing the 
value of the aided building for depreciation purposes, 
(iii) Delays: It takes on average one month to process claims for grant 
payment, 
(iv) Eligible items: Eligible investment assumed to be 70 percent of 
all project capital costs, it being assumed that (ineligible) 
working capital is 30 percent thereof. 
(c) INVESTMENT ALLOWANCE (IA) 
(i) Nominal value: Net present value of tax saving due to "accelerated" 
depreciation given an effective tax rate of 33.0 percent. Of no 
value to export projects since no taxable profits (due to export 
profits tax relief). 
(ii) Taxation: Not relevant, 
(iii) Delays: Not relevant. 
(iv) Eligible items: With EC key of land 5, buildings 50, plant 45 and 
with working capital assumed to be 30 percent of project capital 
costs, eligible plant accounts for 31.5 percent of all project 
capital costs. 
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Table Β: EFFECTIVE SUBSIDIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VARIOUS DENOMINATORS. 
INITIAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
ANNUAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
VALUE 
ADDED AREA INCENTIVE COMBINATION 
(A) EXPORT PROJECTS 
DESIGNATED IDA grant (legal max)(+IA) 41.6 (41.6) 38.5 (38.5) 11.9 (11.9) 
AREA 
IDA grant (admin max)(+IA) 34.7 (34.7) 32.1 (32.1) 10.0 (10.0) 
IDA grant (average) (+IA) 
NON- IDA grant (legal max) 
DESIGNATED 
AREA 
IDA grant (average) 
IDA grant (admin max) 
DUBLIN IDA grant (legal max) 
IDA grant (admin max) 
18.7 
31.2 
24.2 
14.6 
31.2 
17.3 
(18. .7) 17.3 
28.9 
22.4 
13.5 
28.9 
16.0 
(17, .3) 5.4 
9.0 
6.9 
4.2 
9.0 
5.0 
(5.4) 
(B) NON-EXPORT PROJECTS 
DESIGNATED IDA grant (legal max)(+IA) 35.6 (37.7) 33.0 (35.6) bu.2 (11.O) 
AREA. 
IDA grant (admin max)(+IA) 29.7 (31.8) 27.5 (30.1) 8.5 (9.3) 
IDA grant (average) (+IA) 16-1 (IS.2) 14.0 (17.5) 4.6 (5.4) 
NON- IDA grant (legal max) 
DESIGNATED 
AREA 
, IDA grant (average) 
IDA grant (admin max) 
DUBLIN IDA grant (legal max) 
IDA grant (admin max) 
26.7 
20.8 
12.5 
26.7 
14.9 
24.7 
19.3 
11.6 
24.7 
13.8 
7.7 
6.0 
3.6 
7.7 
4.3 
Note: For reasons explained in the text, no attempt is made to value 
the national export profits tax relief in the above table 
(although the impact of this concession on IDA grants and the 
investment allowance is shown). It is, however, perhaps worth 
noting that, if gross profits were in line with taxable profits, 
then the relief would (for a company which exported all if its 
output) be worth over 10 percent of value added in those years 
in which it was obtained. 
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Table Β: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) INITIAL CAPITAL COSTS 
As in Table A, with the investment allowance added to the IDA grant 
percentages where appropriate. 
(b) ANNUAL CAPITAL COSTS (Discount/interest rate : 13.75 percent). 
(i) Calculation of weighted annual capital cost factor: 
Asset 
Buildings 
Plant 
Land/Working Capital 
Assumed 
Life 
50 
10 
Annual Capital 
Charge Factor 
0.1377 
0.1899 
0.1375 
Weights 
0.350 
0.315 
0.335 
Weighted 
Factors 
0.0482 
0.0598 
0.0461 
WEIGHTED ANNUAL CAPITAL COST FACTOR 0.1541 
(ii) Calculation of annual subsidy factor: 
IA : 0.1899 (plant subsidised on an item basis 
i.e. replacement investment is explicitly 
aided) 
- IDA grant : 0.1427 (plant/building/land subsidised) 
Since replacement is not explicitly subsidised, the subsidy life 
of the plant element of the IDA grant is taken to be 20 years -
see p. 44 above. 
(iii) Calculation of annuitising factor ( (ii) * (i) ) 
- IA : 1.2323 
- IDA grant : 0.9260 
(c) VALUE ADDED 
It is assumed that gross profits make up 31 percent of value added, 
This was the average figure for manufacturing industry in Ireland over 
the period 1970-72. See Eurostat, National Accounts 1970-74 Eurostat 
Yearbook 2 - 1975, Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1975, 
Table 5. 
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THE INCENTIVES 
Since the mid 1950s the main regional incentives in Italy have 
consisted of one or more nationwide soft loan schemes for small and 
medium sized firms (with marked regional features in terms of concession-
ary elements) plus a special incentive package for the Mezzogiorno of 
grants, soft loans and tax concessions. In addition, since 1968, social 
security concessions have been in operation in the Mezzogiorno. 
The synopsis and valuation tables which follow cover the main 
current regional incentives. There are four of these. The first is a 
largely automatic, project-related grant with standard fixed rates 
determined by project size. The rates vary from 40 percent of eligible 
investment for projects up to Lire 2 milliard, to less than 26 percent 
for projects over Lire 15 milliard. In addition to this standard grant, 
premia are awarded to projects in priority sectors or priority areas -
a premium of one fifth in one or other of these priority categories, 
and two-fifths when both priority requirements are met. The second 
major Italian incentive is the national soft loan scheme. This 
is a largely automatic project-related scheme but containing a very 
strong spatial element. In the Mezzogiorno, for example, the maximum 
loan duration for setting up projects is 15 years, the interest subsidy 
is 70 percent of the market rate, and repayment holidays of up to 5 
years are available. Similar, but less powerful, concessionary elements 
are available in the insufficiently developed zones of central and 
northern Italy. Project related tax concessions on the two main 
profits taxes ILOR and IRPEG (with tax rates of 14.7 and 25 percent 
respectively) are the third main regional incentive in Italy.. A full 
ILOR exemption on profits for 10 years after profits first arise is 
available for projects in the Mezzogiorno and in the aided areas of 
central and northern Italy. In addition, a full ILOR exemption of up 
to 70 percent of profits earned in Italy and re-invested in industrial 
projects in the Mezzogiorno is also available. Finally, a 50 percent 
reduction of IRPEG for 10 years after profits first arise is available 
for companies which are newly founded in the Mezzogiorno and have both 
their legal and fiscal base there. The fourth, and last, of the major 
Italian regional incentives is a concession on employer social security 
liabilities. This is a very complicated subsidy but, in brief, it 
means that for a project setting up in Southern Italy (the only 
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area in which the concession applies) the full employer social security 
liabilities (amounting to some 27 percent of wage costs including 
overtime) would be paid by the State until 1986. 
The main orientation of Italian regional policy is the Mezzogiorno -
continental Italy roughly south of Rome plus a number of islands 
particularly Sardinia and Sicily. This area represents more than 
40 percent of the national territory and holds a population of nearly 
20 million - some 35 percent of the Italian total. Whereas, however, 
this large area is entirely defined as one problem region with, for 
many of the incentives, no further spatial differentation, there are, 
in central and northern Italy, a large number of comparatively small 
and scattered "insufficiently developed zones" - made up mainly of 
mountainous areas and remote rural areas. The accompanying map shows 
the designated Italian problem areas. 
In terms of incentive expenditure, between 1971 and 1975 Italy 
spent roughly Lire 20O milliard annually on grants in the Mezzogiorno, 
and a sum of at least the same scale on interest subsidies for soft 
loans (of which two thirds were allocated to the Mezzogiorno). 
Exchequer revenue foregone on the tax concessions amounted to perhaps 
Lire 70 milliard per annum while, by 1975, the annual cost of the 
social security concessions was some Lire 70O milliard. 
Beyond these main incentives, there are a number of smaller 
"national" regional incentives as well as some incentives awarded by 
the autonomous regions. These are not covered in the synopsis tables 
which follow. Among the national incentives in this category is the 
Mediocredito scheme for soft loans. This is a project-related loan 
scheme for small and medium sized firms with concessionary elements 
being available in the Mezzogiorno and the problem areas of the centre 
and north. A feature of these loans is that size discrimination is 
intertwined with spatial discrimination. The maximum size of loan 
which can be awarded is Lire 1.25 milliard in the Mezzogiorno and 
Lire 1.0 milliard and 0.75 milliard in the centre and north respectively. 
Because, however, of the presence of more generous loan systems in the 
Mezzogiorno, virtually no Mediocredito loans have been taken up there. 
They primarily go to the centre and north, and even there they are 
taken up only if there is no prospect of obtaining an award under the 
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national soft loan system. In terms of costs, the incentive is far 
less important than any of those covered in the synopsis tables - with 
the subsidy element currently running at some Lire 6 milliard per annum. 
Other minor national incentives not covered in the synopsis tables 
include soft loans available as reconstruction aids after catastrophies 
such as floods, earthquakes, epidemics, or because of especially acute 
political situations (e.g. some areas around Trieste). In addition, in 
the Mezzogiorno, there are three other minor incentives: a 25 percent 
reduction in electricity tariffs for firms with electrical power 
requirements below 30 kw (important only to the smallest of firms); 
a (similarly unimportant) 50 percent reduction of the indirect tax on 
the consumption of electricity for all firms, irrespective of size; and 
a total exemption from the taxes on oil and natural gas for firms 
located in the, very few, provinces where these are extracted. 
As already mentioned, besides the national incentive schemes the 
autonomous regions also run their own schemes. The importance of these 
incentives is, however, very limited in terms of the expenditure 
involved, especially when compared with the main state schemes. Among 
the autonomous region schemes is one, in Sardinia, which is a combined 
grant and soft loan scheme for industrial projects in the context of 
the second "Sardinia rebirth plan". The aids under this plan are 
largely in favour of areas of "regional interest", small projects, and 
problem sectors (like mining) related to local resources. In Sicily 
there is a soft loan scheme for Industrial projects, covering fixed 
investment and stocks. A soft loan scheme is also run for small and 
medium sized firms involved in large orders requiring several months 
of production time and which give rise to problems of liquidity. Among 
the autonomous regions in the north, Valle d'Aosta, gives grants and 
soft loans to industrial projects located in specified areas. In 
addition, "extraordinary" grants are available for the purchase of 
industrial land. In the autonomous province of Trento interest subsidies 
on loans are available for small and medium sized firms located in 
specified areas, as well as grants and interest subsidies not tied to 
the size of firms, for the purchase of industrial land. The autonomous 
province of Bolzano also offers interest subsidies for industrial 
projects of small and medium sized firms as well as soft loans for the 
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purchase of industrial land, again irrespective of the size of firm. The 
autonomous region of Friuli-Venezia Giulia runs two soft loan schemes for 
industrial projects, and gives grants of up to 20 percent of investment 
in new plants or 12 percent for extensions. 
Before moving on to the synopsis tables there are a number of 
miscellaneous context points which need to be made. The first of these 
concerns the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (called the Cassa hereafter) 
which plays a central role in the operation of Italian regional 
incentives. The Cassa is best defined as a national special development 
agency centralising the implementation of the "extraordinary inter-
ventions" in the Mezzogiorno. It is represented at the Government 
level by the Minister for the South, who is, among other things, a 
member of the inter-ministerial committee on economic programming (CIPE) -
the key body coordinating all national (and regional) economic policies. 
The Cassa shares the administration of the National Fund for Subsidised 
Credit to Industry (a key element of the national soft loan scheme) 
with the Ministry of Industry, which can allocate 35 percent of the 
funds to industry in the centre and north. Medium and long term loans 
in Italy are the special domain of the so-called "Special Credit 
Institutes" (called SCIs from now onwards). These normally lend their 
own funds, or special state-provided "rotation" funds, at interest rates 
below the market rates. The state then repays their "losses" through 
the National Fund for Subsidised Credit to Industry. 
The neat division of competences, mentioned above, between the 
Cassa and the Ministry of Industry dates only from 1976 when a major 
effort of coordination and harmonisation merged two predecessor soft 
loan schemes into the current national scheme. Since, in many cases, 
the only data available on the operation of soft loans in Italy (and 
the data used in the synopsis tables) concerns these two predecessor 
schemes it is worthwhile, at least briefly, describing them. The 
first of these was the Cassa soft loan scheme. Under this scheme, 
loans were project-related and largely automatic. They were payable 
only in the Mezzogiorno and were characterised by strong size discrimin-
ation. Small projects (then defined as those not exceeding Lire 1.5 
milliard of fixed investment) were awarded loans of a fixed 35 percent 
of their "global investment" i.e. fixed investment plus up to 40 percent 
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of stocks. There was neither sector nor project type discrimination but 
a priority area premium could bring an additional 10 percentage point 
coverage and a so-called infrastructure premium a further 5 percentage 
points - adding up therefore, in total to a maximum of 50 percent of 
global investment. Medium sized projects, defined as those between 
Lire 1.5 milliard and Lire 5 milliard of fixed investment could get a 
loan of between 35 percent and 50 percent of investment - the exact 
percentage being determined by sector and project type according to 
fairly automatic criteria laid down by the CIPE. Large projects, those 
with fixed investment exceeding Lire 5 milliard could get between 30 and 
50 percent loan coverage. However, this was not at all automatic but 
was at the discretion of CIPE as part of the process of "programmed 
bargaining". 
The second of the predecessor soft loan schemes was the so-called 
law 623 scheme. This was a project-related national scheme for small 
and medium sized firms with a strong regional element. In the 
Mezzogiorno, the maximum size of eligible project was Lire 6 milliard of 
fixed investment and loans could be awarded either on their own or on 
top of Cassa loans. The maximum loan duration in the Mezzogiorno was 
up to 15 years (for setting up projects), whereas it was only IO years 
in the centre and northern parts of Italy. In respect of the areas 
outside the Mezzogiorno spatial and size discrimination was roughly 
the same as under the current national soft loan system with eligibility 
limits relating to firms not projects. The maximum loan was defined in 
absolute terms (Lire 2.25 milliard in the Mezzogiorno and 0.75 milliard 
in the centre and north) and could not exceed 70 percent of eligible 
investment. There was, however, some sectoral and project type 
discrimination laid down in the regulations, leaving a large element 
of discretion to the awarding authorities (the SCIs and the Ministry 
of Industry). 
There are three final pieces of context which are essential for 
an understanding of the synopses tables. First, the social security 
concessions are administered by INPS, the major national social 
security institute in Italy and responsible, among other things, for 
unemployment insurance and old age pension schemes - both of which are 
key for the calculation of the value of the social security concessions. 
Secondly, Italy not only operates a regional incentive scheme, but 
also has a national location control system requiring authorisation 
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from CIPE for all setting-up projects exceeding Lire 10 milliard of 
fixed investment, and all other project types exceeding Lire 4 milliard. 
Finally, incentives are only awarded if a project receives a 
parere di conformità (judgement on conformity) issued by the CIPE or, 
for small and and medium size projects in the Mezzogiorno, by the 
Minister for the South. This is an attempt to ensure that projects 
comply with national economic plans and objectives. 
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•octal security contribution». IHfi 
checke whether sume rightly withheld. 
k«che<|uer refund· ï·*»* for "loamee". 
Por the "full" oonceeelon, M wlU. grant 
•nd national «oft loen. tbr the "hletor­
Ical" coneeeelon« much wider coverage with 
virtually no activity or eector ««eluded. 
Tax Concessions 
Project related tem cone·»·ton* rotating 
to the tara meia profit ta»· · ­ ILOR «nd 
IRKO (14.7 «nd 2S percent reapectlvely). 
Tarn cmncmMlotta tea.« three formai e) A 
full ILOA ««emptlon on project ι rollt» 
for 10 yeere «fter profite firet ar i ·« . 
TT»· coneeeelon epplies to project« In the 
Hertogtorno end in the aided area· of 
Central and Hortharn Italy, outside lhe 
Hw««oglornP i t i s limited to «mall and 
medium sleed firmat b) A tull t u » *»­
•mpllL.1 on up to TO perçant of profit · 
• arneJ in Italy «nd reinvested In i n v e t ­
riai project· In the Hi it­ ] l .rn ­ij c) A 
SO percent reduction ol l'urto ­>n profits , 
for 10 yeere after profit» f irst «rie«, 
where e company la newly fuurtuWd ln the 
Wssogtorno «nd ha« both « legal end fie­
cal b«»e Lheie. 
Amalgamated Heito^torno law no. IS21/JO 
June 1967, er t i c i« · 10« and Iu7 «nd aub· 
eeqwmnt aawndnent«. Presidential Decree 
no. S97/39 September 1971 (ten reform). 
Application in th· form of ■ written 
étalement to local ta« office eltner prior 
to tea declaration or on receipt of tan 
demand. Te« euthorltiee check whether 
condition» of e l i g ib i l i ty ere met. mo 
discretion In decision whether or not to 
eward. The Incentive le "paid" through 
the normal compeny tee »yete«. 
baelcelly ee grent. 
- J 
7, Proleet Typ« 
I . *t»e 
Placrlmln­
Capìtal Grant 
Priority ««clora ( e · defined by CIP«) 
l*ceW· «sent» on« f i f th above what they 
would otherwise be e l ig ib le for. Tbie 
"premium" cen be cumuleted with th« prior­
ity sres "premium" (se · & below). Cur­
rently e l i e t of »ome SO "««ctore" le in 
fore« (issued I June 1977). The sectore 
Involved are generally tho»· with good 
merker, proepecte end using edvenced tech­
nology. Beyond this discrimination the 
automatic nature of tha incentive (with 
fixed ratee end l i t t l e discretion by the 
«uthorlllw« on th« decision whether or not 
to «ward «■ long «■ general condition« ere 
fulfi l led) rjlvee virtually no scope for 
further dtaerimi netton. 
Tha grant Is «vsllobl« throughout th« 
Hestoglotno but project· In priority or eee 
( s t i l l to be delineated) receive grant· 
one fifth abov· whet they would otherwise 
be e l ig ible for. Thle "premi·*** c»n be 
cumulated with the priority aecrur "prem­
ium" (see S above). The automatic nature 
of the incentive q We« na eoopm for fur­
ther spatial dlacrlmlnatlon. 
Virtually a l l project typee, except 
restructurations end pure »placement, 
ere e l ig ib le . Mo specified discrimination 
between e l ig ib le project typee and v ir t ­
ually no «cope for discretion tee · S 
ebove). 
S i s · of project 1« tb · mejor determinant 
of grent rate. Ignoring th« priority 
««ctor (eee S «bove) end the priority «ree 
i l t ! & «bov«) ­premi«", the f i re t L 2 mrd. 
of e l ig ib le Investment le aubsldlecd et 
4θ percenti th« next L 5 mrd. 30 percenti 
the next L β mrd. 20 percent, end e l l 
further e l ig ib le Investment IS percent. 
Virtually no acope for further size d is ­
crimination (eee S above). 
National Soft Loan 
HO specified dl«cil*in«Uon between 
• Uglble ec t lVl tUe , The automatic natur« 
of th · incant.lv« glvee l i t t l e scop· for 
discrimination ln th · declelon whether or 
not to «w«rd| in terme of the concee­
alonary elemente discretion can only be 
•«ercleed through declelon» on loan dur­
ation «nd repayment holiday» (» · · 7 
below). 
Specified discrimination between (I) 
nsaiogiorno, (2) insufficiently developed 
•one« of Centrei Italy, (3) insufficiently 
developed sonee of Northern Italy end 
(4) the rest of Italy In terme of loan 
coverage, interest subeldy, loan duration 
end repayment holiday» («ee I above)ι end 
in term« of e l ig ib le project type (ee· 
7 below) and e l ig ible project/firm else 
(eee θ below) ­ with (1) in general being 
favoured over (2) and (3) which In turn 
•re favoured over (4). 
Jn the He«tootorno es well ee In the 
insufficiently developed ron«· of Central 
Italy and northern Italy e l l project 
typee ere e l ig ib le (except pure replace­
ment and restructurations,, In the 
reet of Italy only modernle«tIon· are 
• l l g l b l · . Ho specified project type d i s ­
crimination ln the concessionary element 
except that in the South the maximum dur­
ation can be up to IS year· (with up to 
5 year· repayment holiday) for setting up 
projecte ea against up to 10 ysare (and 
up to 3 year· repayment holiday) for 
other projecte (e«e also 5 ebove). 
Project· Involving investment of more than 
L 15 mrd.. (Including existiog investment) 
«t« not « l lg lb le . ritma hawing eeeete of 
mora than L 7 mrd. ara not « l l g l b l · ln the 
Insufficiently developed rone» of Central 
and Northern Italy. In the rest of Italy 
this limit is at L 4 mrd. No specified 
discriminetion by aise beyond e l i g i b i l i t y 
condition·, end virtually no ncope for 
other form« of alxe discrimination (·■« 
S above). 
Social Security Concession 
U0 specified activity di aerini nation. The 
highly automatic nature of th« Incentive 
yivu» no ecope for discrimination ln the 
declelon whether or not to «ward, end in 
the rete of coneeeelon, «inco r«tes «re 
fixed. 
Aval tobte only in the Hexeogiorno. Mo 
•pacified lntre­H«s«oalorno fllacrlmin­
etion (■»· S above). 
ie nut project­related. There 
1 · anyway no »pacified discrimination end 
no «cop· for discretion (eee S above). 
However, eine« additional Job« «nd mor· 
t«centLy created Jobs get higher ratee of 
coneeeelon, projecte involving edditlonel 
Jobs (eettlng up and extension projects) 
ar« favoured over, «ay, rationalisation 
«nd modernisation project · . 
Ho specif lsd else discriminetlon «nd given 
th« Automatic nature of award no «cop· for 
•uch (eee S abavo). 
Tax Concessions 
No «pec If led discrimination between 
•canonic »c t lv l t l ee . Th« authorities hav« 
only technical discretion In the declelon 
whether or not to «ward while the ratee of 
conce««lon ere fixed. 
The 10 year ILO« coneeeelon ,1s avallatile li 
the Hertog lorno «nd the elded areas of the 
Centr« end North. The ILOB oxtmptlon on 
relnveeted profite requires that the rein­
vestment be In the Hexioglcrno *V«n thou­jr. 
the profit« can be earned anywhere In 
Italy. The IRPEG concession «pplie« only 
to firm« who are based (with headquarter«) 
in th« Het»orgtorno. No discretion lor 
further spatlel discrimination (see S 
•bove). 
No specified discrimination. Possible 
advantage for setting­up projects as 
compared with other project typee becauee 
of technicalit ies in assessing non­«llglLl· 
end « l lg lb le profits in pre­«*I«tng 
plants. Mo discretion for further dle­
crimlnatlon (eee S above). 
Mo specified e l s · dleerlalnation ln the 
Herrogtorno. In Central and Northern 
Italy th· 10 year tUM exemption Is only 
for email end medlum­elsed firm«, defined 
in this context a« having up to L 3 mrd. 
current asiet velue. Virtually no scope 
for further discrimination (sec S above). 
Capital Grant 
Cremt· «re payable omly om fiend Invest­
ment. Lend end working cepltel ar« tJw* 
main ineligible Item·. The mele e l ig ible 
Item« «re bulldtnge, plant end «qulpment, 
stems connection·, end on­alt« vehicle«, 
o l t ­a l t e vehiclea «re eligible· only if 
port ol production proces« («.g. miaer 
lorrie«), «.¿placement te , «t lernet in 
principle, not ullglbte. 
Ho a«|muilture form I» excluded In prin­
ciple . Cash «nd phased payment« ore clear­
ly e l lu lbl« . Technical prubtenm leaped« 
, . , ι ι , | . to i t i d « bought on htr · purché»·. 
Lee« Ing I« « l l g l b l · , but requires « «peel ·! 
application (Nocedure tlirowgh a «tat« 
laaa'na company (riMC­l«a«ing). 
El igibi l i ty depende on conformity with 
national, regional «nd local «inmrnlc, 
urban «nd phy«lc«l planning «■ confirmed 
in e Ministerial Statement, tha parer· dl 
cunto«»It». Rllqlbll l ty ala . regulr·« «t 
1β.ι»< IO pel tf er. t own finance by the «p­
plleant (««eluding priority eector end 
priority arra "premie", «ee S end « above. 
It, ¡,. I. « arid national soft loen). Con­
tractual wanes must be p«ld to work«rS| 
plant and e<ruli«eent «mist l­e used for five 
year« for the originally eteted purpoeei 
any oiher relevant lawe (e.g. «nll­pollut­
iunl must tw respected. 
Ho tnforautlon on th« current system flret 
introduced ln 197«. Under the sl ightly 
lass generous 1971­7« legislation the 
•veron« grant w· · 3« percent of e l l g t b l · 
investment. Between 1972­75 the nianber of 
grent» approved «nd the value of grent« 
Involved li. mrd.) ·■ well a« the evareg« 
award­IL mrd.) werei 
1973 1971 1974 I97S 
1,157 1,365 1,672 1,924 
I I S 209 376 30l 
0 .12 O.tS 0.22 0 .16 
awards 
«verege 
Qrents ace not taxed es long ee th« grant 
le kept in a apeciel m « i v « which 1· then 
ueed for covering loesea (thle Is the 
standard case) . Othervlee the grent le 
treated J» Incoe« «nd thu» taint, though 
the availability of ta« concoaslons In the 
Hwa¿¡»jturno reducen te« l i ab i l i t y . 
National Soft Loan 
« · grant except that land l« e l ig ible ee 
are "technically mwceeeery stock· ' mp to 
to percent of f l «ed inveatment. 
Ae grant, out a id· the ^««oglorno tl 
project muet ρ · · · the "dlelncentlve" 
control · . (lee Introduction). 
Mo informat ion on the current eyetea 
introduced In 1976. Application» approv­
ed (L mrd.) total loane Involved and 
»verane loen under the two predeceseor 
system· (combined) between 1971 end 197S 
inclualV« were. 
Lew 623 loan» Co««« leene (ev­
in the Centre­ allabia ln Hox­
Morth (64» of sogtorno only) 
total award») plus law 623 
and in th· Hat' loans in the 
toglorno (J6t) Her«oglorno 
esses 18,712 4,297 
•wards 3,223.9 6,122.3 
•vere«· 0.1723 1.4713 
(On prevloue ayateme eee Introduction). 
Py reducing debt eervlolng charges the 
concessionary element of the loan 1· tem­
ed tn «s fer «s It increases texable 
profite ­ though i m conceaalona avail­
able In the problem areaa reducá tha tax 
Impact. 
Social Security Concession 
Not s tr ic t ly relevant. The "full" eoe­
ceeelon te om the earning· b i l l · · for 
IMPS old age pemelon écheme ( I . e . Includ­
ing overtime rMymrnte) while ttw 'h is t ­
oric»!· conce»«ton« ere In reepect of the 
IMPS unemployment «chmnm ( l . · . escludine, 
overtime) 
Mot relèvent 
Job· created «let be parmän««»t Job·. 
Th« "full" coneeeelon le worth roughly 27 
percent of the earnings b i l l Including 
overtime end adjust« automatically to the 
■•te of employers' IMPS contribution«. 
The "historical" concessions ring* between 
β.S percent end 29.5 percent of earning« 
b i l l («»eluding overtime) «nd depend on 
the «ctu«l composition of th« firm'« lab­
our force «ccor^lno to hiring dat« of 
■acb Individual worker. The «verege con­
cession« a« a percentage of e«rnlng« b i l l 
excluding overtime were* 
1972 197] 1974 1975 
13.1 IS.« Π.β 17.0 
Texed In »■ fer ee the concessions reduce 
labour oost· «nd giva ris« to higher tax­
able profite, though tax conceeslon« 
•vslleble In the MP»tog1orno reduce the 
Impact of thle. *~ 
Tax Concessions 
Mot relèvent, except tor the ILO«, ie In­
veatment exemption where el igible item« 
for the rolnveated profita ere e« with 
national soft loans. 
Mot relevant. 
Por the ILOR exemption on r«lnv««t«d 
profit« «n Investment project muat be 
ready to atert or elreody under constr­
uction, and the conceasion la limited to 
70 percent ot teaobl« profits. Th« 
»PEG coneeeelon 1« Only tut newly *»t­
eblUhed firm· and requires that th·' 
firm hae no holding«, plant« or tuLktd­
larie» outside the HC­rro­1 to* no. 
Mo etatiatlcal information. The non 
dlecretlonery nature of the Incentive, 
with ratee being fixed, mean« that 
actual ew*Td« ar« ttw* sane «e huminsl 
rates of sward. 
Hot relevant. 
VvS 
I S . Topping 
HE 
1 6 . » J d o b t l l t y 
18 . Turndown 
Capital Grant 
A p p l i c a t i o n muat be mad· b e f o r · « t a r t o f 
p r o j e c t . A p p l i c a t i o n p t o c e e e l n g by t h e 
SCI end C a s s a t a k e s some 6 month«ι p l u « 
« n o t h e r c o u t h for p a t e r e d l c o n f o r m i t i . 
A p p l i c a t i o n f o r payment o f urant can be 
mad« «■ p e r t « o f th« p r o j e c t e r e comple ted . 
Payment o f Bo p e r c e n t o f tho r e a p a c t l v e 
p r o p o r t i o n o f thu grant i « u a u a l l y mode 2 
month« a f t e r c l a i m . Th« r e s i d u a l 20 p e r ­
c e n t can o n l y be p a i d a f t e r c o m p l u t l o n o f 
p r o j e c t and v e r i f i c a t i o n by t h e a u t h o r i t ­
i e s ­ w i t h a d e l a y o f »ome 4 month» b e t w e ­
en c l a i m and payment . 
beyond t h e "premia" f o r p r i o r i t y s e c t o r » 
«nd ar«»« («e« S «nd 6 «bove) t h e r e e r e 
no p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f «w«rds above t h e 
f i x e d r a t o e . 
Can be cumulated w i t h eny o t h e r f i n a n c i a l 
i n c e n t i v e (1ft p r e c t l c e t h · n a t i o n a l « o f t 
l o a n ) «■ l o n g a s t h e combined i n c e n t i v e s 
do not e x c e e d To p e r c e n t Of p r o j e c t i n ­
v e s t m e n t ( » I n c e 30 p e r c e n t mu«t be own 
f i n a n ç a , s e s 11 a b o v e ) . H o t · t h a t f o r 
th« purpoa« o f t i n » l i m i t o n l y t h e b e a l e 
g r a n t i a c o n a l d e r e d i t h e p r i o r i t y e e c t o r 
l i e u S above) and p r i o r i t y « t e a ( e e e 6 
above) "premia" e r e I g n o r e d . 
Clawback 1« p o s s i b l e I f t h e c o n d i t i o n s 
o f award a r e b r o k e n . In p r e c t l c « , how­
e v e r , i t i s r a r « ( 3 . 1 p e r c e n t be tween 
1 9 6 0 ­ 7 5 ) . Between 1972­75 t h e number o f 
c o s e s where g i a n t « were c lawed back was: 
1972 1973 1974 1975 
approved 
a p p l i c a t i o n · 1 ,197 1 , 3 9 0 1 ,692 1 , 9 3 3 
c lawback 34 B7 35 É6 
r a i « 2 . a b 6 . 1 4 2 . 0 6 3 . 4 t 
Turndown l e r o r e i 4 . β p e r c e n t o f « p ­
p l l c a t l o n « be tween 1 9 6 0 ­ 7 5 , «nd b e l o w I 
p e r c e n t i n r e c e n t y e a r « , 
1972 1973 1974 »97* 
a p p l i c a t i o n · 1 , 9 3 5 4 , 2 0 9 3 , 1 7 7 2 , 8 9 4 
turndown 6 l « » « 
t a t e 0 . 3 1 0 . 4 3 0 . 9 B 0 . 9 0 
Award· a g r ^ e d / p e l d o u t have been (L m i d . ) ¡ 
1972 1973 1971 1975 
awards a g r e e d 
awards p a i d o u t 
135 209 376 301 
77 94 108 193 
National Soft Loan 
A p p l i c a t i o n p r o c e e d i n g p e r i o d b e e l c e l l y 
• e w i th t h e g r a n t , « r i d g i n g f i n a n c e a t 
s u b s i d i s e d i n t e r e s t r o t e s l e « v o l lo t i t« 
« h e r e Immedlete » t a r t o f p r o j e c t l e 
n e c e s s a r y . Loan drawing­down t a k e « p l a c e 
a c c o r d i n g t o n e e d . 
Mo «werde e r e p o e e l b l e beyond t h e formal 
Ae g r e n t . Where no g r a n t l a e v e i l a b l e 
( o u t e l d e t h · H e s s o q j o r n o ) t h e 70 p e r c e n t 
c e l l i n g l a u n l i k e l y t o b e r e e c h e d . 
Clawback i e p o s s i b l e I f t h e c o n d i t i o n · 
o f award e r e b r o k e n . M o n i t o r i n g o f Ioana 
i e e a s i e r than m o n i t o r i n g o f t h · g r a n t . 
N a v « r t h « l « « e v a r y l i t t l e c lawback i n 
p r a c t i c e . 
Turndown l a v e r y r e r e e f t e r a p p l i c a t i o n , 
b u t " i n f o r n a i * turndown t i n v o l v l n g v o l ­
u n t a r y w i t h d r a w a l o f a p p l i c a t i o n ) t a k e s 
p l a c e d u r i n g i n i t i a l c o n t a c t w i t h SCI . 
Tha b u d g e t e r y a l l o c a t i o n f o r payment o f 
I n t e r e s t « u b « l d l « s 1 · some L 2 5 0 mrd. p e r 
annum f o r H e t x o q t o r n o end L 125 mrd. per 
annua f o r C e n t r a l and Horthern I t a l y 
( b o t h t h e i n s u f f i c i e n t l y d e v e l o p e d » o n e s 
and t h e " r e s t " o f t h e c o u n t r y ) . 
Social Security Concession 
Under normal c o n d i t i o n » INPS c o n t r l b u t l o n e 
» r e p a i d monthly by t h e f i r m , r o u g h l y o n e 
month e f t e r wage« and « a l a r i · « »r« p a i d . 
Ho a w a r d · e r e p o s s i b l e beyond t h « formal 
f i x e d r a t · » . 
Can be combined w i t h o u t l i m i t w i t h e n y 
o t h e r i n c e n t i v a . 
c o n t r i b u t i o n » u n j u a t l y w i t h h e l d by em­
p l o y e r « must ba r e p a i d w i t h · «urcharg« 
o f 500 p e r c e n t . 
No « t a t l e t i c a i i n f o r m a t i o n . Given t h e 
a u t o m a t i c n a t u r e o f t h e écheme eny t u r n ­
down c o u l d o n l y b e f o r t e c h n i c a l r e a e o n e . 
The INPS income f o r e g o n e through t h e c o n ­
c e s s i t » i n th« H « t » o g t o r n o he« been 
(L m r d . ) ι 
1973 1974 197S 
Tax Concessions 
The exentptlon/conceaelon period (lo years) 
•tarte in the year­when taxable profits 
ars ftrét made. The aarllest date for 
application is when the tax declaration 
for that year is made, i.e. normally one 
year after the firm'« financial year. 
The Incentive is "paid" with normal cor­
porate tax payments. Tax demanda coma 
with roughly one year's delay after dec­
laration. Advance payments of tax are 
being Introduced. 
Ho swsrds are possible beyond th« formal 
max l u . 
Can be combined with any other incentive. 
Technically th« IO year Hi)» concession 
cannot be combined with the ILOR rein­
vestment concession. 
The ILOR reinvestment concession 1« 
awarded conditionally on th« completion 
of th« project. In ce«e of non­complet­
ion the «um« «warded «re clawed back and 
«auction« may be applied. Hot relevant 
for the other tax concession*. 
NO information. 
Ho information. 
►3 
κ 
Capital Grant 
2 J . Γ f.. ι n t« 
Μι Information om current ayat 
•d la 197«. tinder tb · rxevloua ayatem. 
Jofam «aeocteted (««tlmetmd by applicant) 
with projecte approved fos grant· (and 
in moat c i t e i other He »rogiti no lucenctve* 
« ino) we r · I L mtd.) ι 
1972 1971 1971 19/S 
Ι Ο Ι . 2 7 · «Ο,ΙΤΟ k9,« IO 7» ,«Ol 
Mo Informatio· em current sy»tem, Intro­
duced In 197«. Total ln«m«tmmmt ««■oclat­
•d with project· «op«oend for grant» lend 
in mo«t U H I other He««ogtorno incentive« 
alaol wee li. mad.li 
1972 I97J 1974 197*. 
•«9 1,17« 2,077 1,292 
:to b««lc changée «xpected until 1981 wham 
n«. qulmiulennlal Me nog 1 orno legislation 
le due. some minor end rather »hort term 
change« may be made by CIPI to the Hat 
of « l l g l b l · industri·». Priority ereee 
heve s t i l l to be delineated. 
. The principle Ie that no project should 
■uff«r disadvantage» from Cheng··. In 
general «11 project« with declelone pend­
Iny c*n opt for treatment landar hew or 
old «ehm*·. 
National So f t Loan 
Me Information om Barrem·, eyelets, Intro­
duced tm 197«. l« the ftegQjgojn Job· 
««eocteted with project« ««en­owed Cot 
loane from the two peevloue système (which 
would »lien eleo hem» other Hettoglomo 
Incentive·) verei 
1972 1971 1974 I97S 
ΙΟ Ι ,278 «O.S79 « 9 , « l o 79,«Ol 
Ovar UM «eme perlod of ttm· In Central 
end Northern Italy en eetlmetmd tot«! of 
Bo.QUO Job« wer· involved in «peeowed 
•oft loan·. 
Mo intoimition on current oyete· , intro­
duced In 197«. Under th« predecessor 
eyateme total invmetemnt eeeocteted with 
projecta approved for e toem In the 
Mwaoalorno (L mrd.) vest 
1972 
2,932 
1973 197« 197S 
2,277 2,138 4,723 
tlon for Centrei end morthern Mo infon 
Italy. 
Mo major chano­· «xpected et leeet until 
1981 when new He s «on lomo legislation 1· 
S o c i a l Secur i ty Concession 
He «tatlst lcal Information. The "hlolor­
leol" coneeeelon», ln that they «r» con­
ditional em net lncreue« pi ooploymmet, 
would go et leeat to ihoee project * which 
received e grant «nd/or · eoft loan for 
Inveetmmnts in the Hertog I orno. Equally, 
the "full" concession I« releted to net 
Increases in enp ten/want end therefor« 
retat.; t« the »ame project« «a other In­
centive· I»»· greet «nd national «oft 
loen). 
"ruil­ coméeselam t é l e t e · only to new 
Job created until II Decemtoer 1980. Thi« 
oonceealon le peyeble until 31 Per amber 
198«. "Mletoricel" concessions ere pey­
eble until 31 Ucmber I980. 
Mo «peelfled guldellneo 
from poet experience. 
and no precedent« 
Tax Concessions 
Mm siat i s t lca l Information.­ The 10 yeer 
IU7B end Ilffd conce»»ion» would, normally, 
be ewerded to the eerne projecte th«t «re 
1· receipt of the grant and national «oft 
loan (ee*, rere fu ie , national suit loon 
•nd «rant!. Th· ILO· relnvwetnvnt con· 
cession 1« awarded to (Irma all aver 
Italy, but only If carrying out investment 
project« In th« HaHonlori.o. The·· 
project« would therefur« noet probably be 
Included In tho· · In receipt o( the arant 
•nd/Or eoft loon, but i t I« not possible 
to know what proportion they represent. 
Mo information (but eee .'υ above). 
The legislation under which the em­
ees« Ion« can be ewerded expire» on 31 
Dece­ber Ι9Θ0. Awerd« mad« before that 
date, of couree, run their full term. 
During the la«t maior change (tax reform 
1971­7«) no particular t iar . innr. i l 
arrengements were applied. No lnlornotloi 
on likely future arrangement. 
ITALY 
THE INCENTIVE VALUES 
As we have seen, there are four main regional incentives in Italy, 
all of which are awarded more or less automatically if the conditions of 
award are met, and none of which is unimportant in terms either of cases 
aided or expenditure. The four incentives are, capital grants awarded 
by the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno to projects based in the Mezzogiorno ; 
national soft loans available both in the depressed regions of the 
Centre-North and in the rest of Italy as well as in the Mezzogiorno, 
but with both rates and conditions of award favouring the Mezzogiorno 
over the depressed Centre-North and these two areas over the remainder 
of Italy; concessions on the two main Italian profits taxes, ILOR and 
IRPEG, available primarily in the Mezzogiorno ; and a concession, 
awarded only in the Mezzogiorno, on the social security liabilities 
payable to INPS, the body administering the most important social security 
schemes in Italy. 
Only two of these incentives, the capital grant (CG) and the soft 
loans (NSL) are covered in Table A. The social security concession 
(SSC) is a labour subsidy and is therefore introduced into the 
calculations only with the move to the value added denominator in 
Table B; while the tax concessions are not valued at all within the 
valuation tables (for reasons mentioned earlier in this report, see 
P. 45). Rather they are treated in a note to Table Β - giving 
at least some broad indication of their possible value under certain 
very specific assumptions. 
The structure of Table A reflects the three criteria which determine 
the nominal capital grant rate - project size, project location and 
project sector. Of these, the first is far and away the most important 
since it determines the basic award made. The size criterion discriminates 
in favour of small projects. The grant is calculated with respect to 
quotas of eligible investment. The first L 2 milliard is subsidised at 
40 percent, the next L 5 milliard at 30 percent, the following L 8 
milliard at 20 percent, and all further eligible investment at 15 percent. 
The result of this quota system is that projects of up to L 2 milliard 
("small" projects) receive a fixed 40 percent grant; those of between 
L 2 and L 7 milliard ("medium" projects) receive awards of between 40 
and 33 percent; those of between L 7 and L 15 milliard ("large" projects) 
receive awards of between 33 and 26 percent; and all other projects 
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("very large" projects) receive awards of less than 26 percent. Rather 
than work in terms of these ranges we have chosen to base the table on 
single figures - L 2 milliard for small projects, L 5 milliard for 
medium projects, L 10 milliard for large projects and L 20 milliard for 
very large projects. 
As we saw in the synopsis tables, project size determines only the 
basic grant award. If a project belongs to a priority sector the basic 
award is increased by one fifth. There is also a one fifth premium if 
it locates in a priority location. Accordingly a priority sector 
project in a priority location would obtain a grant two-fifths above the 
basic award. This, too, it taken account of in Table A. 
As already noted, the soft loan scheme is a national one, but 
with strong spatial elements in both conditions and rates of award. 
For this reason, Table A is subdivided into the Mezzogiorno, the 
depressed regions of the Centre-North, and the remainder of Italy -
the main areas between which the scheme differentiates. 
Turning to the figures presented in Table A, it can be seen that, 
in effective value terms, the capital grant is "worth" very much more 
than the concessionary element of the soft loan - a maximum (including 
priority sector and location premia) 33.8 percent after tax, delays 
and eligible items as opposed to a maximum 12.5 percent for the soft 
loan scheme. Although for large and very large projects the maximum 
grant (at effective values of 24.5 and 19.5 percent respectively) is 
lower 'than for small and medium projects, this does not mean that the 
differential value between the grant and the soft loan for these size 
groups is less - and this because, as the synopsis tables make clear, 
maximum project and firm size conditions mean that soft loans are 
concentrated overwhelmingly on small and medium projects. One final 
point about Table A is that, although it would appear to show that the 
regional advantage to problem areas of the soft loan scheme is 
significantly reduced by the possibility of obtaining similar (if slightly 
less valuable) loans in the rest of Italy, this is somewhat misleading 
since the soft loan scheme is restricted, outside the problem areas, to 
modernisation projects only. For setting-up projects and extensions, 
the Mezzogiorno and depressed Centre-North soft loan percentages are a 
true measure of the regional advantage conferred by the scheme. 
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In structural terms, Table Β is very similar to Table A, the 
concentration remaining on the capital grant and national soft loan -
although the social security concession is introduced at the value added 
stage. It will be noted that the soft loan is added to the capital 
grant only for small and medium projects. The reason for this, as already 
mentioned, is that, because of size conditions of eligibility, the loans 
are available in the Mezzogiorno only on projects which, together with 
existing investment, do not exceed L 15 milliard fixed investment. For 
setting up projects this means that only small, medium and large projects 
would qualify for a loan. For other project types the position is less 
clear, being dependent on the level of existing investment. What can be 
said is that very large projects will not qualify and that it is unlikely 
that large projects will qualify - even for an expansion - since it 
would be unusual for new (project) fixed investment to exceed existing 
(firm) fixed investment. Even medium and small projects may not be 
eligible for loan assistance if undertaken by large firms. As a simplif­
ication of these somewhat complex considerations, we assume in Table Β 
that only small and medium projects qualify for the loan. 
From the table it can be seen that project size is the crucial 
determinant of the effective value of the Italian incentive package. 
Limiting ourselves to the capital grant/soft loan combination (the 
social security concession adds a further 2.8 - 7.9 percent of value 
added), the small project effective values (46.3 percent of initial 
capital costs, 41.7 percent of annual capital costs and 12.1 percent of 
value added) are clearly higher than those for medium projects (on 
average, 42.2 percent, 38.0 percent and 11.O respectively) and very 
much higher than those for both large projects (on average, 24.5 percent, 
22.2 percent and 6.4 percent respectively) and very large projects (on 
average, 19.5 percent, 17.7 percent and 5.1 percent respectively). 
If the values in the table are compared with those for the other 
EC countries (and this is done in Part II of the report) it is apparent 
that the value of the Italian package is among the highest of the EC. 
This is true of both small and medium projects even without the addition 
of the social security and tax concessions and is true also of the other 
project size groups when these concessions are added. For setting up 
projects in particular (such projects being assured of the "full" INPS 
concession for the next 10 years) the Italian package is indeed of high 
value by international standards. 
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Table A: NOMINAL TO EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDY. 
AREA 
MEZZO­
GIORNO 
INCENTIVE LEVEL 
CENTRE-
NORTH 
DEPRESSED 
REGIONS 
CG small: standard rate 
small: priority sector or location 
small: priority sector and location 
medium: standard rate 
medium: priority sector or location 
medium: priority sector and location 
large: standard rate 
large: priority sector or location 
large: priority sector and location 
very large: standard rate 
very large: priority sector or location 
very large: priority sector and location 32.2 
NSL 15 year loan (ILOR + IRPEG) 
15 year loan (ILOR only) 
IO year loan (ILOR only) 
NSL 10 year loan 
NOMINAL 
VALUE 
40.0 
48.0 
56.0 
35.0 
42.0 
49.0 
29.0 
34.8 
40.6 
23.0 
27.6 
ι 32.2 
34.6 
34.6 
30.3 
26.0 
EFFECTIVE VALUE AFTER 
TAX 
40.0 
48.0 
56.0 
35.0 
42.0 
49.0 
29.0 
34.8 
40.6 
23.0 
27.6 
32.2 
31.3 
28.0 
24.5 
18.1 
DELAYS 
36.4 
43.7 
50.9 
31.8 
38.2 
44.6 
26.4 
31.7 
36.9 
20.9 
25.1 
29.3 
31.3 
28.0 
24.5 
18.1 
ELIGIBLE 
ITEMS 
24.2 
29.1 
33.8 
21.1 
25.4 
29.7 
17.6 
21.1 
24.5 
13.9 
16.7 
19.5 
12.5 
11.2 
9.8 
10.9 
REST OF 
ITALY NSL 10 year loan 17.3 12.1 12.1 6.1 
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Table A: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) GENERAL: Discount rate 14.5 percent (EC reference rate 1976). 
(b) CAPITAL GRANT (CG) 
(i) Nominal value: As percentage eligible investment costs. Standard 
rate of grant is determined by project size according to a quota 
system described earlier in the text. We consider 
project sizes of L 5 milliard for medium projects, L 10 milliard 
for large projects, and L 20 milliard for very large projects, 
(ii) Taxation: Although in principle Cassa grants are treated as income 
for tax purposes, in practice they are virtually never taxed since 
firms are able to allocate them indefinitely to a tax reserve for 
accounting purposes, 
(iii) Delays: Claims made on completion of project construction (i.e. on 
average after 6 months assuming one year construction period and 
uniformly distributed project expenditure). 80 percent processed 
within 2 months, the remaining 20 percent 4 months after the completion 
of project construction. Delay between asset expenditure and grant 
payment: 8 months for 80 percent of grant; 10 months for remaining 
20 percent, 
(iv) Eligible items: With EC key of land 5, buildings 30, plant 65 and 
with working capital assumed to be 30 percent of project capital 
costs, eligible buildings and plant account for 66.5 percent of all 
project capital costs. 
(c) NATIONAL SOFT LOAN (NSL) 
(i) Nominal value: Net grant equivalent of loan subsidy as percent loan 
award assuming: 
Mezzogiorno 
Setting 
up 
- maximum loan period (years) 15 
- maximum principal repayment holiday (yrs) 5 
- interest subsidy: as percent EC ref. rate 70 
: percentage points 10.15 
- interest free periods (years) No interest free periods are available. 
- repayment system Equal six monthly instalments (total inter-
est due divided by number of instalments). 
Note: We assume that maximum loan periods are awarded. We further assume 
that the loan is drawn down uniformly over the one year project con-
struction period (see (b)(iii) above). It is worth noting that longer 
repayment holidays do not imply a higher loan value - on the contrary, 
a long drawing down period means that the concession attached to the 
loan is not being fully utilised, thus reducing its value. 
(ii) Taxation: Effective profits tax rate 30.3 percent (14.7 percent 
ILOR plus 25 percent IRPEG, both discounted two years - the average 
delay). New investment in the South pays no ILOR tax on profits 
arising for 10 years (the normal loan duration). Where this 
investment is made by a company setting up headquarters in the South 
the IRPEG concession (equal to 50 percent IRPEG tax) is available 
on top of the ILOR concession. Taking account of delays in payment 
of tax, a project in receipt of the ILOR concession would pay an 
effective rate of profits tax of 19.1 percent; while ILOR plus 
IRPEG lead to an effective 9.5 percent tax rate, 
(iii) Delays: None. 
(iv) Eligible investment: Loan as percent eligible investment - 40 
percent in South, 60 percent in depressed Centre-North, 50 percent 
elsewhere. Eligible investment covers most if not all project costs. 
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Other 
10 
3 
70 
10.15 
Depressed 
Centre-
North 
10 
3 
60 
8.70 
Rest of 
Italy 
10 
3 
40 
5.80 
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Table Β: EFFECTIVE SUBSIDIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VARIOUS DENOMINATORS. 
AREA 
MEZZO­
GIORNO 
CENTRE-
NORTH 
DEPRESSED 
REGIONS 
REST OF 
ITALY 
INCENTIVE COMBINATION 
CG (small, standard) 
CG (small, standard)+NSL(ILOR+IRPEG) 
CG (small, standard)+NSL(ILOR only) 
CG (small, priority) 
CG (small, priority)+NSL(ILOR+IRPEG) 
CG (small, priority)+NSL(ILOR only) 
CG (medium, standard) 
CG (medium, standard)+NSL(ILOR+IRPEG) 
CG (medium standard)+NSL(ILOR only) 
CG (medium, priority) 
CG (medium, priority)+NSL(ILOR+IRPEG) 
CG (medium, priority)+NSL(ILOR only) 
CG (large, standard) 
CG (large, priority) 
CG (very large, standard) 
CG (very large, priority) 
(+SSC) 
NSL 
INITIAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
24.2 
36.7 
34.0-35.4 
29.1-33.8 
41.6-46.3 
38.9-45.0 
21.1 
33.6 
30.9-32.3 
25.4-29.7 
37.9-42.2 
35.2-40.9 
17.6 
21.1-24.5 
13.9 
16.7-19.5 
ANNUAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
21.9 
33.0 
30.6-31.9 
26.3-30.6 
37.4-41.7 
35.0-40.6 
19.1 
30.2 
27.8-29.1 
23.0-26.9 
34.1-38.0 
31.7-36.9 
15.9 
19.1-22.2 
12.6 
15.1-17.7 
VALUE 
ADDED 
6.4 
9.6 
8.9-9.3 
7.6-8.9 
10.8-12.1 
10.2-11.8 
5.5 
8.8 
8.1-8.4 
6.7-7.8 
9.9-11.0 
9.2-10.7 
4.6 
5.5-6.4 
3.7 
4.4-5.1 
[+2.8-7.9) 
NSL 
10.9 
6.1 
9.7 
5.4 
2.3 
1.6 
Note: For reasons explained in the text, no attempt is made to 
value the ILOR/IRPEG tax concessions in the above table 
(although their impact on NSL and SSC is shown). It is, 
however, perhaps worth noting that, if gross profits were 
in line with taxable profits, then the concessions would 
be worth 3.3 percent (ILOR) and 5.5 percent (IRPEG) of 
value added in the IO years in which they were obtained. 
Spread over 50 years (but given a 14.5 percent discount 
rate the results would not be very different over 20 years) 
the concessions are "worth" 2.5 and 4.1 percent 
respectively of annual value added. 
156 
ITAI 
Table Β: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) INITIAL CAPITAL COSTS 
A drawing together and summation of the Table A results. As part of the 
drawing together "priority" awards are shown as a range (from 6/5ths to 
7/5ths of the standard award). NSL loan awards aided by an ILOR tax con­
cession are also shown as a range (from a 10 to a 15 year loan). 
(b) ANNUAL CAPITAL COSTS (Discount/interest rate: 14.50 percent), 
(i) Calculation of weighted annual capital cost factor: 
Assumed Annual Capital Weighted 
Asset Life Charge Factor Weight Factors 
Buildings 50 0.1452 0.210 0.0305 
Plant 10 0.1955 0.455 0.0890 
Land/Working Capital - 0.1450 0.335 0.0486 
WEIGHTED ANNUAL CAPITAL COST FACTOR 0.1681 
(ii) Calculation of annual subsidy factor: 
- CG : 0.1522 (plant/building subsidised) 
- NSL : 0.1498 (plant/building/land/working capital subsidised) 
Since replacement is not explicitly subsidised, the subsidy life 
of the plant element of the CG and NSL is taken to be 20 years 
see p32 above, 
(iii) Calculation of annuitising factor ((ii) τ (i)) 
- CG : 0.9054 
- NSL : 0.8911 
(c) VALUE ADDED 
It is assumed that gross profits make up 29 percent of value added. 
This was the average figure for manufacturing industry in Italy over 
the period 1970-74. See Eurostat, National Accounts 1970-74 
Eurostat Yearbook 2-1975, Statistical Office of the European Communities, 
1975, Table 5. 
(d) SOCIAL SECURITY CONCESSION (SSC) 
The "full" concession (see synopsis) is 27.3 percent of the wage/salary 
bill of net employment additions post July 1976. . The "historical" 
concession is more complex, its value varying by date of hiring of the 
project labour force. In 1974, however, it averaged 17.1 percent of 
wages/salaries. With wages/salaries 68 percent of labour costs the 
above percentages reduce to 18.6 and 11.6 percent respectively of 
labour costs. After tax (given receipt of the ILOR concession) these 
percentages reduce to 15.0 and 9.4 percent. A further reduction is 
necessary to take account of the limited duration of the concession -
10 years for "full" (until 1986), 4 years for "historical" (until 1980). 
Spread over 50 years (but given the 14.5 percent discount rate the 
results would not be very different over 20 years) the respective 
percentage subsidies reduce to 11.1 and 3.9 percent of project labour 
costs i.e. 7.9 and 2.8 percent of value added - the range shown in the 
table. Obviously, though, the value of the concession is further reduced 
the closer one moves to the "end years". 
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LUXEMBOURG 
THE INCENTIVES 
The Luxembourg authorities have at their disposal, under the 
general frame law of July 1973, six different incentives which can be 
used for regional development. 
First, there are interest subsidies which can be paid to credit 
institutes and other financial organisations to enable them to provide 
soft loans for enterprises investing in land, buildings or equipment; 
undertaking organisation or market studies or research and development for 
new products or new production methods; incurring expenses through 
the training, retraining and readaptation of the labour force; 
and installing anti-pollution plant and equipment. The maximum 
interest subsidy is 3 percent, with a maximum duration of 5 years, in 
respect of loans covering up to 75 percent of eligible costs. The 
interest subsidised loans cannot be combined with the capital grant 
(see below). For this reason, among others, interest subsidies have 
been used less and less in recent years, and in 1976 there were no 
applications for this incentive. Secondly, the Government can offer 
loan guarantees of up to 40 percent. This incentive has so far not 
been used. Thirdly, grants can be awarded to cover some of the expenses 
incurred through: organisation, management or promotion studies; the 
concentration or merger of firms; and the sale of capital goods to 
non-EC countries in order to compensate for commercial hazards not 
covered by the del credere legislation. As with loan guarantees, this 
incentive has not so far been used. Fourthly, the Government may 
acquire land or buildings for subsequent sale or rent to enterprises. 
Again, however, this incentive has not been used. 
All of these incentives, then, have either not been used or have 
been little used. The major incentives, and the ones covered by the 
synopsis tables which follow, are a capital grant and a tax concession. 
The capital grant is the basic incentive. It is a discretionary 
project-related grant having a maximum value of 15 percent of eligible 
investment - although awards are generally well below this ceiling. 
Over the period 1974-76, 44 grants were approved having a total value 
of FLx 219 million. The tax concession is very rarely awarded on its 
own. When awarded, it is generally in combination with a capital 
grant. The concession is a fixed 25 percent relief on taxable profits 
for a period of 8 years. The tax concession and the capital grant 
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together cannot exceed a grant equivalent of 15 percent. Over the 
period 1974-76 only 8 tax concessions were approved. 
The incentives on offer in Luxembourg are not specifically for 
regional problem areas; and indeed such areas have not been designated. 
There is, however, a strong regional dimension in that a condition of 
award is either that the project be conducive to the expansion or 
amelioration of the economic structure of the Grand Duchy, or that it 
contribute to a better territorial distribution of economic activity. 
In this latter context, attention was earlier paid to the North and 
East with its declining agriculture sector. However, with the steel 
industry currently going through a major crisis, the focus has increas-
ingly been moving towards the South and West. 
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specialised) «re the main ganerelly Ineligible Item·. Short­life and low­value items 
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project cost» or to projecte of mor· then r u 120 mil l . Tbr·· cesse heve been eo 
notified to (end »greed by) tha K ­ al l Involving the rm 1*0 mill , l imit. 
If the condltlono of »ward are broken within · three yeer period after eward, the grant, 
must be repaid in fu l l . In recent yeere no ceeee of clewbeck have been recorded. 
Detailed informal contact befor· formel applica t lun la mede, end thu« no meaningful 
turndown ratee. 
Annual expenditure hee been (Ftx mil l .I l 
1972 197) 1974 I97S 197· 
97.S 7e. l ej.S 79.9 Bï.fc 
No Informsrlon on Job· eeeocleted with the grent slone. However, between 1960­70 «om« 
boo Job« ware creeted annually by project· elded by e l l incentives together. The rebe 
fall to 200­100 e year efter 1970 with 21S Jobe beino created in 1976. 
tinder the 1973 frai 
I January 1982, 
In the event of changa, application« 
eccordlng to the new system. 
, grants ere payable in respect of Investment med· until 
the way to declelon would probeLly be treated 
Tax Concession 
No Urewmetlom beyond the ι 
197% r e s p e c t i v e l y . 
Not relèvent. 
■er of project approval« ­ 4, 1 and 1 In 1974, I97S and 
Application muât b* mad· befor· th· «md of tha f iret working y»«r of th« new enter­
prise^ product Ion Una. Application proc · · · ! ·« periodi one month. If «n «ward 1« 
mod« th· firm must keep «eparate account· for that onterprlee/ product Ion line for the 
duration of the concession · ο thst eech yea* th· tes «uthorltUs c«n take th« con­
c*e«lon Into account in assessing taxable profite. 
No awerde ere poeslble beyond the loi αϊ fixed rete. 
Although in law e tee concession con be offered on It« own. In practice when on «ward 
le made i t Is amd· In conjunction with · capital grant («lthough «word et a grant do·» 
not, ot course, automatical!·/ - u n «ward of e tax concaaaloo). Capital grant and ta» 
■■loe together cannot exceed IS percent uf project (laed capital coat«. 
Bine« th· eward le mede eech year only after the condition· of eward have been eet , 
clewbeck ie not relèvent. 
Aa capital grant. 
Ho Information. 
Bee capital grant. 
In I97S end 1974 projecta approved for receipt of · tax coneeeelon Involved e l ig ib le 
Investment coete ot run 400 end Πο mil l , respectively. 
The concemslon le available until 1 January 1942. 
Ae capital grent. 
LUXEMBOURG 
THE INCENTIVE VALUES 
As we have seen, there are two major regional incentives currently 
in operation in Luxembourg - a capital grant and a tax concession. The 
grant is the basic incentive, 44 awards having been made in the period 
1974-76 to the value of almost FLx 220 million. In comparison the tax 
concession is awarded only rarely. Eight tax concessions were approved 
between 1974 and 1976 and almost always in combination with the capital 
grant. 
Because of inadequate data on profits in aided projects (a common 
problem with tax concessions) it is not possible to value the tax 
concession with any acceptable degree of accuracy. It is not therefore 
covered in Table A. We do however know that the tax concession and 
capital grant in combination may not exceed the 15 percent maximum 
nominal rate of the grant. For this reason it is possible to place an 
upper limit on the capital grant plus tax concession combination 
in Table B. Neither table, it will be noted, draws a distinction between 
different types of problem area. Both are for the nation as a whole, 
and this because both incentives covered, and indeed all "regional" 
incentives in Luxembourg, are available nationwide. 
Turning to the tables in more detail, it can be seen from Table A 
that the standard grant award range of 5 to 8 percent (the average awards 
in 1974, 1975 and 1976 were 5 percent, 6 percent and 8 percent 
respectively) falls well below the upper 15 percent limit - and indeed 
our information is that the maximum award has never been made. As 
already mentioned, however, the maximum is of relevance when considering 
the capital grant/tax concession combination. 
From Table B, it is clear that the Luxembourg awards are relatively 
low - particularly the standard capital grant range. Whereas the 
maximum grant available (either on its own or in combination with the 
tax concession) has an effective value of 7.8 percent of initial 
capital costs, 7.1 percent of annual capital costs and 2.7 percent of value 
added, the effective value of the standard grant range is from 2.6 percent 
to 4.2 percent of initial capital costs, from 2.4 percent to 3.8 percent 
of annual capital costs and from 0.9 percent to 1.4 percent of value 
added. Indeed, as we shall see in Part II, Luxembourg has incentive values 
which are among the lowest in the EC countries. 
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Table A: NOMINAL TO EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDY. 
NOMINAL EFFECTIVE VALUE AFTER 
INCENTIVE LEVEL VALUE TAX DELAYS ELIGIBLE ITEMS 
Capital grant maximum 15.0 11.8 11.1 7.8 
standard range 5.0­8.0 3.9­6.3 3.7­6.0 2.6­4.2 
Table B: EFFECTIVE SUBSIDIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VARIOUS DENOMINATORS. 
INCENTIVE COMBINATION 
INITIAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
7.8 
2.6­4.2 
7.8 
ANNUAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
7.1 
2.4­3.8 
7.1 
VALUE 
ADDED 
2.7 
0.9­1.. 
2.7 
Capital grant (maximum) 
Capital grant (standard range) 
Capital grant ♦ Tax concession (maximum) 
Note: No direct attempt is made to value the national tax concession for 
reasons made clear above. It should, however, be noted that this 
incentive is awarded in practice only in conjunction with a capital 
grant and that, together, capital grant and tax concession cannot 
exceed the capital grant maximum level i.e. 15 percent of eligible 
investment costs. 
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Table A: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) GENERAL: Discount rate 10.25 percent (EC reference rate 1976). 
(b) CAPITAL GRANT 
(i) Nominal value: As percentage eligible investment costs. 
(ii) Taxation: Effective corporation tax rate 21.4 percent. (The 
standard nominal rate of tax of 40 percent is reduced by the fact 
that capital grants are taxed indirectly by reducing the value of 
aided assets by the value of the grant for depreciation purposes. 
For depreciation purposes we assume that plant is depreciated, 
reducing balance, over a 10 year fiscal life and that buildings are 
depreciated straight line, over a 25 year fiscal life). 
(iii) Delays: Grant claims submitted on completion of project construction. 
Assuming average one year construction period and a uniform spread 
of project expenditure, average claim submission delay from time of 
asset expenditure is 6 months. With one month processing delay, 
grant is paid out, on average, 7 months after asset expenditure. 
(iv) Eligible items: Eligible investment assumed to be 70 percent of all 
project capital costs, it being assumed that (ineligible) working 
capital is 30 percent thereof. 
Table B: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) INITIAL CAPITAL COSTS 
The capital grant and the tax concession together face the same upper 
limit as the capital grant alone. Otherwise, as in Table A. 
(b) ANNUAL CAPITAL COSTS (Discount/interest rate 10.25 percent) 
(i) Calculation 
Asset 
Buildings 
Plant 
of weighted annual 
Land/Working Capi tal 
Assumed 
Life 
50 
10 
-
capital cost factor: 
Annual Capital 
Charge Factor 
0.1033 
0.1645 
0.1025 
WEIGHTED ANNUAL CAPITAL COST 
Weight 
0.350 
0.315 
0.335 
FACTOR 
Weighted 
Factors 
0.0362 
0.0518 
0.0343 
0.1223 
(ii) Calculation of annual subsidy factor. 
- Capital grant : 0.1106 (plant/building/land subsidised) 
Since replacement is not explicitly subsidised, the plant subsidy 
life is taken to be 20 years - see ρ 32 above. 
(iii) Calculation of annuitising factor ( (ii) τ (i)) 
- Capital grant : 0.9043 
(c) VALUE ADDED 
It is assumed that gross profits make up 38 percent of value added. 
This was the average for manufacturing industry in Luxembourg over the 
period 1971-72. See Eurostat, National Accounts 1970-74 Eurostat 
Yearbook 2-1975, Statistical Office of the European Communities, 
1975, Table 5. 
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THE NETHERLANDS 
THE INCENTIVES 
Regional policy in the Netherlands has two distinct elements. On 
the one hand there are the financial incentives which apply to the 
Northern Development Area (the provinces of Groningen, Friesland, 
Drenthe and a small part of Overijssel) and the restructuring area of 
South-Limburg (the southern part of the province of Limburg); plus 
selected places in the provinces of Overijssel, Gelderland, Zeeland, 
North Brabant and Limburg. On the other hand there is a disincentive 
policy operated in the heavily populated western part of the country: 
basically, though not wholly, the provinces of North-Holland, South-
Holland, Utrecht and the north-western part of the province of 
Gelderland. 
The disincentiva operates through the Selectieve Investerings Regeling 
(Selective Investment Regulation). The SIR Act was passed by parliament 
in 1974 and put into operation on 1 October, 1975. Only a few sectors 
are excluded from the scheme: agriculture, residential construction, and 
public transport, as well as service industries, (public and 
private) if they perform a local/regional function. 
The control system was intended to operate through a system of 
levies, licences and notifications in respect of new industrial 
buildings, installations and offices. However, although the licence 
and notification system still applies, the levies were suspended from 
10 June, 1976, though they can be reintroduced when the Minister of 
Economic Affairs considers this necessary. 
The most important regional financial incentive in the Netherlands 
is the Investerings Premie Regeling (IPR) (Investment Premium 
Regulation). This capital grant was introduced on 13 January, 1967 
to promote the settlement of industrial firms in the Dutch development 
areas and in the restructuring area of South-Limburg. In the course 
of the years the IPR has undergone several changes with respect to 
eligible activités, rates of award and geographic coverage. In its 
present form, which dates from June 1977, the premium applies to 
industry and to services of a regional exporting character; 
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.'«f.'.S?, .'.»i 
« 25 per cent investment premium available 
• 15 per cent investment premium available 
Northern Development Area 
Twente 
S.IR. area 
IMI 
Restructuring Area of South Limburg 
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to setting up projects and to extensions. The standard award is a 
fixed 25 percent of eligible investment up to a maximum award of 
Fl 4 million (though with discretionary awards possible above this 
ceiling) except in a few areas where 15 percent is the standard and 
Fl 2.4 million the maximum award. 
The accompanying map shows the geographic coverage of the IPR and 
the SIR. Twente is marked separately since only industrial extensions 
are eligible in this area. The map also distinguishes areas where the 
25 percent premium applies from those with the 15 percent rate. 
Another but relatively small financial incentive in the Netherlands 
is the Premieregeling Stimulering Ontwikkeling Lelystad. Lelystad is a 
recently established city in the reclaimed agricultural IJsselmeerpolder 
Oostelijk Flevoland'. From the point of view of physical planning 
it was considered necessary to develop Lelystad as quickly as possible. 
To this end, the Lelystad premium was introduced in October 1968. It 
applies to industrial and regional exporting service setting up projects 
and involves a premium of Fl 10,OOO for every employee employed 
permanently by the project. These employees must come from outside 
Lelystad and have to settle and live there. Moreover, at least ten 
such jobs have to be created. The maximum value of the premium cannot 
exceed 25 percent eligible fixed investment, or Fl 3.5 million 
(although with ministerial agreement this limit can be broken). Further 
conditions of award and the application procedure are similar to those of 
the IPR. Since its introduction and up to 30 June, 1976, 22 awards 
have been made to projects involving 1,056 jobs. Because of its limited 
geographic coverage, it was decided to exclude this premium from the 
synopsis tables. 
Another incentive not covered in the synopsis tables (because, so 
far, no use has been made of it) is one introduced in 1975 - a 
concession on the price of land. This concession is awarded by industrial 
site administrators and is for projects which, because of the price of 
land, might have chosen an alternative, less favourable, location. 
This concession is to be applied selectively and is available in the IPR 
areas and in growth nuclei in the western part of the country. 
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An incentive which is, however, covered in the synopsis tables 
is the Accelerated Depreciation Allowance. This is a largely automatic 
fiscal concession on industrial and commercial buildings whereby half 
the cost price, up to a maximum of 25 percent in any one year, can 
be depreciated arbitrarily, with the other half being depreciated 
normally. This concession, it must be stressed, applies to a much 
wider area than the IPR - being available throughout the whole of the 
Netherlands outside the Randstad. It is a concession which was due 
to be withdrawn on 1 April, 1977. It continued because of the 
resignation of the government shortly before this date. Its future 
is not yet clear. 
The synopsis and valuation tables which follow are concerned 
with the two major regional incentives in the Netherlands - the 
Investment Premium and the Accelerated Depreciation Allowance. 
* It should be noted that in May 1978 (i.e. after the reference 
date of this report) the Accelerated Depreciation Allowance was 
withdrawn and a new incentive introduced, the WIR (Wet 
Investeringsrekening) , taken in the form of reduced tax payments 
when profits are made and negative tax payments (i.e. grants) 
when there are losses. Although the WIR scheme is basically 
national, there is some regional differentiation in terms of rates 
of award. In particular, projects in parts of the Northern 
Development Area and in South Limburg receive an extra 'regional' 
allowance (on top of the basic rate of the WIR) of 20 percent of 
building costs and IO percent of the cost of 'open air installations' 
(e.g. oil refineries); subject to the ceilings on aid set by the 
European Commission. 
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I. Basic 
Detalle 
3. hdeilnlstret­
Actlvlty 
Diecrlmln-
atlon 
' p r o i * c t 
Type Pig­
er imi netl on 
Sice 
Dlacrlmln­
atlon 
Project­related capital grant. The standard award le e fixed 25 percent οΓ e l i g ib l e 
Clued capitel comte up to s maximum grant of Π 4 mi l l , exempt in ■ tew epeclfled 
«unicipe11ties where It i s ■ fixed 15 percent up to · maximum grant of Fl 2.4 mi l l . 
Tor l , in» projects an eddltlonel die ereticai at y eward can be mad« for e l i g i b l e fixed 
capital coats beyond PI 16 mi l l . The «Mxlmum additional ewerd le 25 percent of the 
extre Investment (except ln th · few «pacified municipalities noted ebove where It Is 
15 percent). A l l t t l e ­ueed alternative to the 25 percent grant (bilt not th · 15 percent 
grant) 1 · β "mined premium", which l e beetid on Job creation «e w*Ll ae Inveetmnnt 
expenditure ( se · 24 below!. 
The Inveaterlngspremleregellng (Inveatment Premium Angulation) was f i r s t Introduced in 
Jenuary inr,7. The present fore* of the regulation date· from 7 dun· 1977, ( · · · 
Inveeteringspremleregetlng r a t ó n e l e vestiging en uitbreiding ven Industriële en 
stuwende dien·tverlenende bedrijven, ln Nederlandse Staatscourant nr. 1θ9, 8 Jun« 1977). 
Application 1« »rade to the appropriate regional developetent company (or, ln thoee aree« 
where no «uch company exl<*te, to the relevant provincial government). The reglonel ■ 
development company «nd both provincial and local authorities then advise the Ministry 
oí Economic Affair«. The Ministry décidée whether tonalt« an award and (for larger 
project·) the value of the award. I t al«o admlnletere the payment, of the grent. 
In general. Industrial ac t lv i t l e e plus "reglonel exporting* eervlca· ar · « l l g l b l · . An 
e result , the primary «notor, tourism, local eervlces end local building contractors 
«re Inel igible while manufacturing, "notional" Safvlce« and "national" construction 
a c t i v i t i e s (e .g . pre­fabrlceted housee, doote e t c . ) er« e l i g i b l e , ivivnnwvut Industry 
1 · e l i g ib l e but public u t l l l t l e · (water, gee, e l e c t r i c i t y rómpanle«) ara not. Labor­
atories nnd «Imllar reeearcri department« ere regarded a · industrial a c t l v l t l · · i f they 
are of great importance to Industriai development. 
Industrial projecte di t tar from service projecte in that they must be located on public 
Industriel ettas (although If an exist ing building i s purchased deviation from this 
condition ie poeelble) . he far a · rates ar* concerned there la no dlacrlmlnatlon for 
•mall project · (under Π 16 mi l l . ) e ine · re te · ere fixed. For large projecte, ■ · we 
havn eean, there le ROSM scope tor rate discrimination. For a l l projecte the decision 
whether or not to award i s at the discretion of the authorit ies , thus giving scow ecope 
for discrimination between e l i g i b l e industries. 
Th· 25 percent premium la available within designated nuclei In the northern development 
erne end the reetructuring area of South Limburg except for the mun1cipeItties of 
Roetmond end Malicie en Rerkenboech where the 15 percent premium Is available for In­
dustry and services . The 25 percent also applies to certain municipalltlee outside 
thee«, area· , while th* 15 percent premium «only for lnduatry) applies to · limited 
number of other specified municipsl l t lee. Beyond these rate difference«, the dlecret­
lonary nature oí th · award decision (and, for larga projects, a lso the rate decision) 
could g l v · r i se to further discrimination (see 5 above). 
Industrial smttlng­up projects, extension· (but with grants only being paid on net ex­
tension·) and transfers from the SIR area («ee Introduction) ere «11 e l i g i b l e ae ar* 
service eettlng­up projects and extension« (for difference« in e l i g i b i l i t y conditions 
see 11 below). Rationalisations, reorganisations, modernisation«, takeover and wholly 
replacement projects are a l l ine l ig ible though It i s possible to ues the premium to 
a s s i s t sectoral restructuring where thle has a major regional impact on employment. 
Beyond th i s , the discretionary neture of award could g i v · ris« to project­type d le ­
—'sinat Ion (sea 5 above). 
Grent» are not awarded to projects with fixed capital coets of less than Fl 0.2 mi l l . 
Large projects with fixed capital coats of more than Fl 16 mil l , receive less than 2S or 
percent grant. Other dlacrlmlnatlon possible through discretion of the authorities 
ι to whether or not to «ward (ace 5 ebove). 
An automatic, item­related, f i sca l concession on Lhe cost price of (rvluntrlal nnd en 
c la l building", applicable throughout t i» country apart from the Randstad. Hair of the 
cost prie* (up to a maximum 2*» percent In any one year) can be depreciated arbitrarily 
above tho normal rate of depreciatimi while the other half 1« depreciated normally. If 
accelerated depreciation te not used in »ny one year,then normal depreciation appliei 
in that yeer. In subsequent years the conrea·) ton ta available, in respect of hall' th" 
non­deprnclated part of the coat, price. 
Mat op de Inkomstenbelastlno, 16 December 1964, Staatsblad r.iu, enhuequen'ly amended 
oy Acts of 13 February 1969 and 29 August 1975. 
Concession f e l l e under the Jurisdiction οΓ the Ministry of Finance. Day­to­day erlmln 
latrai.Ion (application, declelon, eward) la carried out by the appropriate tax auth­
o r i t i e s . 
All a c t i v i t i e s are e l i g i b l e . 
Hon*. Awards ere eutomatlc as long as conditions ar« fu l f i l l ed . Rato 
"up to" provision mentioned in 1. above represents applicant freedom r 
lntratlve discretion. 
ι are rixed. 
ither than a' 
The concession i s available anywha: 
no «cop· for spatial discriminatie* 
■ outsido the RandaLaJ. 
(see 5 above). 
Within the e l i g ib l e area«. 
Hone­ The concession i s Item ( I . e . building) and not project­related. 
None ponnlble (see 5 above). 
Investment Premium Acce lerated Deprec iat ion Allowance 
». l l i q l b l e 
Iteme 
14. Timing and 
15. Tapping 
16. Addabi l i ty 
17. Clawback 
■Ileíble Item» Include plant and mathlaery, building«, s i t · purché·«, treavefer ta« · · 
«nd tnfr«strmctur· provision but esclude I emd D coste end feasibi l i ty »tulla«, rnort­
Img capital , vehlclee emd tools end implemente ( I . e . emell and tow value eeeets) «re 
the mels Ineligible iteme. h i · » · of project­type e l i g ib i l i ty r.place­ent le eleo 
generally lamllglble. Secon.l­han­1 ss««te and offices built on the premleee «re 
elisimi«. 
Asasta purchased with ca»h or Uirough. phased payments (If en integral part of the dml­
ivsiy «rionoemawit), «r· « l lg lbl* . Ass«t· bought on hlr · purché«· ere Ineligible 
leacept for buildings purchased through an Intermunicipal Institution), ee ere leaeed 
••«et». 
Labour merkst «nd «actor «1 condition» «re teken Into «ccounl I · asking an award. In 
edditlum 15 pmrcsnt of flsed Investment coet« au«t be 'own cepltel" financed. Hew 
Induetrlat building« havs to be located em «n Industriel e l te of e deelanetsd nucleu« 
■unlclpsllty. Batanólos· hev« to reeult In e eulflclent (but unepectfled) lacréese 
of amployswmt or of productive capacity. There muet be no environmantsl or physical 
planning objection to the project. 
Only Industrial emd commerci«! building» ere »l lglbl«. Dwelling» emd perte of build­
ing« meant for private wee ere inel igible . 
Aaset· purchased with cash 
on hire porches·. Leased 
through pria e «d payments ere e l ig ible es are eeeete bought 
«»■»ι» ere inel igible . 
The only published Information Is cu 
by project type wars (Fl mi l l . ) ι 
ulatlv«. A« «t M June 1*76 the momloe paid out No Information (but · · · 19 below). 
Industriel 
•Ottino­up 
(«lece IMI) 
269 
465.7 
1.73 
15.7 
Industrial 
latei.» lon 
(«ince 1969) 
841 
5S0.4 
0.(5 
l l . l 
Servie« 
Settlnrj­up 
(«ino« IM9) 
IS 
20.« 
I.J7 
21.1 
Servlee 
Batsnalon 
(«ince 1975) 
17 
7.0 
0.40 
25.0 
Notei Timing and phasing at award dletorte th· ebeve ««tímete·.. I t should e lse be 
noted that the M i l · » a­ard for lndu«Ul«l extension« we· In i t ia l ly IS 
percent, then 10 percent, then 15 percent before i t s current 25 percent. 
indirectly teaed whenever profit · ere b«mg sod« Binon elded Investment can only b* 
deprecleted for tee purpoese net of eny grent reoelvsd. 
Projecte c«n «t«rt before · deolslon le med· but only after application. Only 
Investment underteken efter the dete of application le e l i g ib le . Application pro­
cessing periodi 3­4 months. In theory grent claims can be «ubmltted only whsn 
project (or major pert thereof) operating. In practice, advance* (not «sceedlnm 75 
percent of the total agreed premium) available for bloce of et leeet 25 peroent of 
tot«l fixed Investment on evidence that b i l l e havs been peld. Ultimate claim ν«·1­
tiiat ir.n perloJi 1 month«. 
No «wards are poeslble beyond th« formel maxbsa. 
Not an Issue since the grent le virtually the only regional financial incentive 
»v.,leni« in the Nattierland«. 
No clewbeck conditions after th« final payment he· been ι 
Hot relèvent. 
Application 1· mede es pert of the company tms return. Payemnt of tax (and, hence, 
receipt of concmsalon) occur· In the year after the end of the financiei y«ar in which 
the industri«! building coste ere incurred. 
Ho award« ar· poasibla beyond the formel fixed r e t · . 
Can be added to »11 reglonel Incentive«. When edded to the Investment premiu«, th« 
valua ot the premlios le reduced since the net preeent velue ot the tas to be peld on i t 
lncreeses. This ie beceuse the premium 1«, in effect, brought into Income «nd hence 
taxable profits more quickly then under the normal depreciation «chedule. 
Not r e l è v e n t . 
]H. Turiidown 
21. Inveatment 
24. m s c e l -
Investment Premium 
Th· only figure· era cumulativa (up until 30 Jun· 1976) end er · ) 
Industrial 
Setting up 
(■inc· 1967) 
Induetrlal 
Bxtenelone 
(Hlncu l'J69J 
Service Setting up 
end Extension 
(»lute 1969 «ad 1975 reep.) 
22.0 
application· 336 92H 
turndown β7 87 
Percent 19.9 9.4 
For «etting up project · , th* main mesone for turndown e r · that the financial con­
dition* of «ward have not been ful f i l led or that the sector elready auff«r« from over­
capacity! while for extensions, turndown sterna mainly from the feet thet applicant 
projects are too small end marginei. 
See 12 above. 
The figure« below ere cumulât lv* <up to JO dune 1916), erm by projet», type end »r« 
based on applicant astlmatee. 
Industriel 
Setting­up 
(elnce 1967) 
Induetrlal 
Extension 
(since 1969) 
Service Servies 
Setting­up Extension 
(elnce 1969) (eine« 1975) 
Investment ln e l ig ible fixed asset · eseocleted with grant payment hae (up until 30 
June 1976 end with base uates as in 20 above) boen es follows (Fl mill .)* 
Industrial Setting up 
Industrial extension 
Service Setting up 
Setvlce Extension 
2,9f.J 
4,900 
No specified l i f e . 
Applications received after eny chenos ln th« incentive would be treated according to 
the new r u l · · . 
As noted ln I. ebove, en alternative to the 25 percent grant, but not th · 15 percent 
grant i s a, l i t t l e used, mixed premium. Thle consists of e grent of 15 percent of 
e l ig ible flxud investment up to a maximum of Fl 2.4 mil l , plua e premium of 
Fl 12,'■on for every permanent job created. The maximum "automatic" award Le 
Fl 5 mi l l . , there then being discretion ln tha award beyond thle n.ixlaum. The grant 
rotating to jobs created i s paid one year after construction of building. Jobs 
created «met be verified by local labour of f ice . 
Accelerated Depreciation Allowance 
t i t t l e diecretion available to the author i t i · « end thu· no meaningful turndown figure·, 
No dlr*Ct Information available. I t wee however estimated that tha Increase of the 
accelerated depreciation annual «wuitstum by S percentage pointe had e "financial s ig­
nificance­ of Π 185 mill.' ln 1975­76. Since the annual concession la a maximum 25 
percent i t can perhaps be hexarded that th« annual "tln«ncl«l significance" of the 
coneeeelon le «bout Fl 725 mill. 
No Information. 
No Information. 
No specified l i f e . Bowevsr, the coneeeelon would tuve been withdrawn on 1 April 1977 
hed th · government not reaignad on 22 March 1977. Haw election« took pl«ce on 
25 Hey 1977, As yet , the post­election position le not clear. 
Building costs incurred before ths dete of any change are treated under the old regule 
ions, while costs incurred after the change are treated under the new regulations. 
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THE INCENTIVE VALUES 
As we have seen, the key element of the Dutch regional incentive 
scheme is the investment premium (IPR). This capital grant, first 
introduced in 1967, was originally limited to industrial setting-up 
projects, but then was extended in 1969 to take in both industrial 
extensions and service industry setting-up projects and, more recently, 
in 1975 to include service extensions. Since the introduction of the 
IPR (and up until mid-1976) 269 industrial setting-up projects 
(involving grant expenditure of Fl 466 million), 841 industrial extensions 
(expenditure Fl 550 million), 15 service setting-up projects 
(expenditure Fl 21 million) and 17 service extensions (expenditure Fl 7 
million) have been assisted under the scheme. 
In June 1977 certain changes were made to the IPR. Amongst other 
things, a two-tier spatial system of award was introduced. For eligible 
investment up to Fl 16 million, the standard fixed award rate was set at 
25 percent of eligible investment in the main problem areas and 15 percent 
in other areas (see map presented earlier). In Table A we term these 
areas, the Development Areas and the Intermediate Areas respectively. 
As well as distinguishing between these areas, the table also separates 
out the other non-Randstad areas of the Netherlands since it is only 
outside the Randstad that the other major Dutch incentive - the 
accelerated depreciation allowance - is available. 
Project size is the crucial determinant of any IPR award. For 
small projects (up to Fl 16 million) the nominal rate of award, as 
already noted, is a fixed 25 percent in the Development Areas and 
15 percent in the Intermediate Areas. For large projects - perhaps some 
10 percent of the total - these percentage rates represent the maximum 
possible awards, and this because investment beyond Fl 16 million is 
aided only at the discretion of the administration and then only up to 
the 25 and 15 percent maxima. Moreover, average awards fall 
significantly below the possible maxima. For all industrial setting-up 
projects in the main assisted areas, for example, the average award over 
the period 1967 - mid 1976 (during which time the maximum rate was a 
constant 25 percent) was only 15.7 percent of eligible investment, 
unfortunately no direct information is available on the average award 
for large projects alone. Grant expenditure over the 1967 - mid 1976 
period was however split fairly evenly between large and small projects. 
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Given this, we can estimate (again, for industrial setting-up projects) 
that the "average" award for large projects was in the region of 11.5 
percent. This is the figure used in Table A. Although it is certainly 
of the right order of magnitude, it must be viewed with some caution, 
not least since - as part of the June 1977 changes - the dividing line 
between small and large projects was raised from Fl 14 million to Fl 16 
million. 
While the effective value of the IPR in Table A varies by both 
size of project and location (ranging from 13.2 percent of initial 
capital costs for small projects in the Development Areas, to some 7.8 
percent for small projects in the Intermediate Areas and perhaps 6.0 
percent for large projects, on average, in the Development Areas) that 
of the accelerated depreciation allowance is fixed. It is fixed, 
moreover, at a considerably lower level than the IPR being worth, in 
effective value terms, some 3.6 percent of initial capital costs. 
In Table B, which is broken down very much along the lines of 
Table A, the IPR is valued both alone and in combination with the 
accelerated depreciation allowance. It can be seen from the table that 
the value of the two incentives in combination is somewhat less than 
the sum of their separate values since tax on the building element of 
the IPR is paid more quickly when an accelerated depreciation allowance 
is taken up. Indeed, in most instances the receipt of the accelerated 
depreciation allowance does not have a marked impact on the value of the 
Dutch package. In general it is the IPR which has the determining role. 
Thus, where the IPR award is at a relatively low level (as in the 
Intermediate Areas or, on average, for large projects) the effective 
values shown in Table Β are relatively low - 9.2 percent of initial 
capital costs, 7.8 percent of annual capital costs and 2.8 percent of 
value added for the combination IPR (large project average) plus AD, 
for example; while a higher IPR award - as for instance granted to small 
projects in Development Areas - leads to markedly higher effective valueá -
15.9 percent, 13.7 percent and 4.9 percent respectively when the IPR is 
combined with an accelerated depreciation allowance. 
As we shall see in Part II, these levels of award are such as to place 
the Netherlands in the middle group of EC countries in terms of incentive 
values. 
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Table A: NOMINAL TO EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDY. 
AREA INCENTIVE LEVEL 
NOMINAL EFFECTIVE VALUE AFTER 
VALUE TAX DELAYS ELIGIBLE 
ITEMS 
DEVELOP­
MENT 
AREAS 
IPR small project: fixed rate 
large project: maximum 
large project: "average" 
industrial 
setting up : average 
AD fixed rate 
25.0 19.2 18.8 13.2 
25.0 19.2 18.8 13.2 
11.5 8.8 8.6 6.0 
15.7 
13.0 
12.1 11.8 8.3 
3.6 
INTER­
MEDIATE 
AREAS 
IPR 
AD 
small project: fixed rate 15.O 11.5 11.2 7.8 
laxge project: maximum 15.O 11.5 11.2 7.8 
fixed rate 13.0 - - 3.6 
OTHER, NON- AD 
RANDSTAD, 
AREAS 
fixed rate 13.0 3.6 
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Table A: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) GENERAL: Discount rate 9.25 percent (EC reference rate 1976) 
(b) INVESTMENT PREMIUM (IPR) 
(i) Nominal value: As a percentage of eligible investment costs. It must 
be stressed that the "average" figures relate only to industrial 
setting up projects aided up until mid 1976 (when a "small" project 
was one with eligible investment less than Fl 14 mill, not - as at 
present - Fl 16 mill.) and are based on the very rough estimate 
that grant expenditure during that period was split evenly between 
large and small projects. No direct information on average awards 
is available. 
(ii) Taxation: Effective corporation tax rate 23.2 percent. (The 
standard nominal rate of tax of 48 percent is reduced by the fact 
that the investment premium is taxed "indirectly" by reducing the 
value of aided assets by the value of the premium for depreciation 
purposes. For depreciation purposes we assume that plant is 
depreciated straight line over a 10 year fiscal life and that 
buildings are depreciated straight line over a 30 year fiscal life). 
(iii) Delays: If no advance payments, grant claims submitted on completion 
of project construction (i.e. assuming one year construction period 
and uniform spread of project expenditure, on average 6 months from 
time of asset expenditure). Given 3 month average processing period, 
grant is paid out some 9 months after asset expenditure on average. 
Advance payments are however available on blocs of 25 percent of 
project expenditure (i.e. on the above assumptions, quarterly). 
Given a one month processing period for advance payments, the 
average delay in grant payment is reduced to about 3 months. Since 
advance payments are standard, we assume a 3 month delay in Table A. 
(iv) Eligible items: Eligible investment assumed to be 70 percent of all 
project capital costs, it being assumed that (ineligible) working 
capital is 30 percent thereof. 
(c) ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION (AD) 
(i) Nominal value: Net present value of tax saving due to accelerated 
depreciation given an effective tax rate of 48 percent, 
(ii) Taxation: Not relevant, 
(iii) Delays: Not relevant, 
(iv) Eligible items: With the EC key of: land 5, buildings 40, plant 55 
and with working capital assumed to be 30 percent of project capital 
costs, eligible buildings account for 28 percent of all project 
capital costs. 
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Table Β: EFFECTIVE SUBSIDIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VARIOUS DENOMINATORS. 
AREA 
DEVELOP­
MENT 
AREAS 
INTER­
MEDIATE 
AREAS 
OTHER NON-
RANDSTAD 
AREAS 
IPR 
IPR 
IPR 
IPR 
AD 
IPR 
IPR 
IPR 
IPR 
IPR 
IPR 
AD 
IPR 
IPR 
AD 
INCENTIVE COMBINATION 
(small project, fixed rate) 
(large project, maximum) 
(large project, "average") 
(industrial setting-up, average) 
(small project, fixed rate)+AD 
(large project, maximum)+AD 
(large project, "average")+AD 
(industrial setting-up, average)+AD 
(small project, fixed rate) 
(large project, maximum) 
(small project, fixed rate)+AD 
(large project, maximum)+AD 
INITIAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
13.2 
13.2 
6.0 
8.3 
3.6 
15.9 
15.9 
9.2 
11.3 
7.8 
7.8 
3.6 
10.9 
IO.9 
ANNUAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
11.6 
11.6 
5.3 
7.3 
2.9 
13.7 
13.7 
7.8 
9.7 
6.8 
6.8 
2.9 
9.3 
9.3 
VALUE 
ADDED 
4.2 
4.2 
1.9 
2.6 
1.0 
4.9 
4.9 
2.8 
3.5 
2.4 
2.4 
1.0 
3.3 
3.3 
3.6 2.9 1.0 
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Table Β: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) INITIAL CAPITAL COSTS 
In general, the Table A results. Note, though that when the investment 
premium is awarded in conjunction with accelerated depreciation the value 
of the premium is reduced to 93.23 percent of its Table A level since tax 
on the building element of the premium is paid more quickly under the 
accelerated depreciation regime. 
(b) ANNUAL CAPITAL COSTS 
(i) 
(Discount/interest rate 9.25 percent). 
Calculation 
Asset 
Buildings 
Plant 
of weighted annual 
Land/Working Cap: 
Assumed 
Life 
50 
10 
.tal 
capital cost factor: 
Annual Capital 
Charge Factor 
0.0936 
0.1576 
0.0925 
Weight 
0.280 
0.385 
0.335 
WEIGHTED ANNUAL CAPITAL COST FACTOR 
Weighted 
Factors 
0.0262 
0.0607 
0.0310 
0.1179 
(ii) Calculation of annual subsidy factor: 
- IPR : 0.1034 (plant/building/land subsidised) 
- AD : 0.0936 (building subsidised) 
Since replacement is not explicitly subsidised, the subsidy life of 
the plant element of the IPR is taken to be 20 years - see p. 44 above. 
(iii) Calculation of annuitising factor ((ii) 
- IPR : 0.8770 
- AD : 0.7939 
(i>) 
(c) VALUE ADDED 
It is assumed that gross profits make up 36 percent of value added. 
This was the average figure for manufacturing industry in the Netherlands 
in 1970 and 1972 (comparable data for other· years is not available) . 
See Eurostat, National Accounts 1970-74 Eurostat Yearbook 2-1975, 
Statistical Office of the European Communities, 1975, Table 5. 
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THE 
UNITED KINGDOM 
THE INCENTIVES 
In addition to the special case of Northern Ireland, which we discuss 
later, there are three main types of designated problem area in the 
United Kingdom - Special Development Areas (SDAs), where the problem is 
viewed to be at its most serious, Development Areas (DAs) and Intermediate 
Areas (IAs). As the accompanying map. shows, these areas, taken together, 
cover the whole of Scotland and Wales, Northern and North-West England, 
Yorkshire and Humberside, parts of the Midlands and much of the South-
west. They contain about 43 percent of employees in Britain, some 20 
percent being located in the IAs, with the remainder being spread 
fairly evenly between the DAs and SDAs. The British incentive package 
operates within these areas. Before turning to discuss the package in 
detail it should be noted that, as a complement to it, a system of location 
controls operates outside the DAs and SDAs amongst other things to encourage 
mobile industry to move to the problem regions. This system, the Industrial 
Development Certificate (IDC) system, has had a somewhat varied history 
since its introduction in 1948 but currently applies to developments over 
12,500 sq. ft. in the South-East and 15,000 sq. ft. in all other areas 
outside the DAs and SDAs. 
Within the incentive package itself, the main instrument is the 
Regional Development Grant (RDG), an automatic, item-related grant on 
fixed capital expenditure. RDGs are available on new plant, machinery, 
buildings and works in the SDAs and DAs at rates of 22 percent and 20 
percent respectively. In the IAs only buildings and works are eligible 
for RDG assistance, the rate of subsidy being, as in the DAs, 20 percent. 
Over time, RDG expenditure has grown rapidly, moving from over ¿107 
million in 1973/74 to more than ¿212 million in 1974/75 and some ¿325 
million in 1975/76. Recently, however, the scheme has been trimmed back 
somewhat, coverage being limited broadly to manufacturing whereas 
previously both mining and construction were also eligible. Nevertheless 
the regional development grant still represents far and away the most 
important British regional incentive in expenditure terms. 
A key feature of the RDG scheme is that the payment of the grant is 
virtually automatic to eligible investment on qualifying premises. 
Selectivity and discretion enter into the British regional incentive 
system through the assistance available under Section 7 of the Industry 
Act 1972 - by cost, expenditure amounting to over ¿ 65 million in 1975/76, 
the second most important source of regional aid in Britain. Although 
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Section 7 assistance is, in theory, very wide ranging it has in practice 
tended to be mainly in the form either of a soft loan or, and this has 
increasingly been the case, an interest relief grant (calculated in 
relation to the notional loan which would have been awarded had a soft 
loan offer been made). Both these incentives are covered in the 
synopsis tables. 
Despite the fact that they are highly discretionary, both soft loans 
and interest relief grants - and indeed Section 7 aids in general - are 
administered with a high level of regional devolution. Within guidelines 
laid down jointly by Department of Industry headquarters and the Treasury, 
regional offices of the Department (in Scotland, the Scottish Economic 
Planning Department, and in Wales, the Welsh Office) can decide whether or 
not to make an award and also the level of that award (on the advice of the 
region's Regional Industrial Development Board - a body of experienced 
local industrialists, trade unionists, commercial and professional people. 
With respect to the decision whether or not to make an award, the decisive 
factor is that the project be viable; while regarding the level of award 
the guidelines stipulate public sector contribution maxima (which vary by 
type of problem region but normally require the majority of project finance 
to come from outside the public sector) and cost per job maxima (which set 
the maximum loan/notional loan levels in terms of jobs created or 
maintained) the lower of which determines the maximum possible award which 
can be made. 
Although soft loans and interest relief grants are the main forms 
of Section 7 assistance, other selective aids are worth mentioning. 
Removal grants, for example, are available on up to 80 percent of the 
reasonable costs of moving both plant and stocks to an assisted area 
location, as well as on the net redundancy payments arising from the move. 
In 1975/76 assistance to the value of over ¿2 million was approved under 
the removal grants programme. In addition, there is a service industry 
grant scheme aimed at encouraging the development of mobile services -
services with a genuine choice of location - in the problem regions. 
As part of this scheme (which, it must be emphasised is restricted to 
job-creating service projects) grants of ¿1500 per head are payable in 
respect of each employee (up to a limit of half the additional workforce) 
moving with his work to the problem regions. Moreover, for each service 
industry job created in the problem regions a further grant (again of 
¿1500 per new job created) is available; while the rental or purchase 
of office premises in the problem regions is subsidised through rent free 
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periods of up to 3, 5 and 7 years in the IAs, DAs and SDAs respectively. 
Finally the removal of office equipment to the problem regions is aided 
on the same terms as the removal grant scheme noted above. In 1975/76, 
when the service industry scheme was both less generous and less 
extensive than it is at present, 94 offers of assistance were approved 
to the value of ¿2.3 million. 
Moving away from Section 7 aid, another important component of 
regional incentives in Britain is the government factory building 
programme. Over the last 10 years or so expenditure on this programme 
has averaged some ¿15 million annually, although the most recent figures have 
tended to be nearer ¿20 million. New factories are built in advance of 
demand in areas of high unemployment and then rented or sold to 
industrialists. In addition, custom-built extensions are undertaken. 
Although rents are levied at the "current market value" as set by the 
local District Valuer, these tend to be below the full commercial rent 
in the assisted areas and are certainly below equivalent rent levels in 
the more pressured regions. In addition, rent free periods (of up to 
2 years in DAs and 5 years in SDAs) are available, albeit subject to a 
(not very onerous) cost/job constraint. Despite these rent concessions, 
the "incentive" element of the factory building programme probably lies 
more in the fact that the factories are ready for almost immediate 
entry than in any rent advantages there might be. 
The remaining regional incentives in Britian are of minor importance 
compared with those reviewed so far. Certain training services are 
provided free to firms in the assisted areas; labour mobility grants 
are available to aid the movement of both "key workers" and "nucleus 
labour forces"; and there is also a contracts preference scheme whereby 
the government favours assisted area producers in its purchasing arrange-
ments. However, even taken together, these incentives represent an 
insignificant proportion of the total regional incentive bill. 
It will be noted that the incentives covered so far have been 
discussed in the context of Great Britain rather than the United 
Kingdom. The regional incentives available in Northern Ireland differ 
from their British counterparts in two major respects. In the first 
place, there is a greater variety of incentive types on offer (including 
a labour premium the British version of which, REP, was abandoned in 
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January 1977); and, secondly, even where the type of incentive is the 
same, the rate paid in Northern Ireland tends to be higher. Under 
present circumstances, however, Northern Ireland is, as noted at the 
outset, very much a special case. It is not therefore covered in 
the synopsis tables which follow ,these being,in fact, limited to the 
three major British incentives - regional development grants, Selective 
Financial Assistance (SFA) loans, and SFA interest relief grants. 
Information on the regional incentive package in Northern Ireland 
produced by the Department of Commerce in Belfast is presented in 
Addendum 2. 
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Regional Development Grant 
2 . Legal « a « l i 
J. Adminis­
tration 
oo 
3·* 
3. act iv i ty 
6. Bestiai 
An «utomeMc, 11··»­related grant payeble on epsclfled 
type· or fixed cspttal lnvs«ts»nt In the designated 
problee* rsglons. h fixed 22 percent of oppiueed cepltel 
expenditure 1« nbtetnahlo In ths Bpectel Dswelu|—nt 
Ar*·«, with TO percent being the fixed «wsrd ln the other 
probles region·. Both plent/merhlnsry and bottdlnge/ 
worte expenditure 1« » l l g l b l · In th*> Bpscfel Development 
■nd |»nrsltepM>nt Area«, How*v*r. In lhe Interssdlat« 
Area« only bulldlnge/work« expenditure qusl l f lee for 
Industry Act 1972, rart I. 
Application I« «>ede to one of the four regional develop­
ment grent of ficee of the Department ot Induetry (Dl). 
Cases processed in «nd grent peld out f ro · thsee of f ices 
ln line with detailed edmlntetrotlvs lyuldellne· le id down 
by 01 hasdriusrters. Headquarter« directly involved only 
In "probi«»" esse«. 
Broedly «mmif«cturlng. Agriculture, s ining, conatructlon 
nnd service« ere «It ine l ig ib le . Rl lg lb l l l ty te deter­
sine*) et ths preste · l e v · ) . To be « l lg lb le , the majority 
of employes« on the presi«e« suet bs engeqed in qualifying 
·■ opposed to non­quel I lying (ha«lcally o f f i ce , atorag«, 
dletrlbutlon end welfere work) act! e i t l en . One· presione 
dssmnd "qualifying" e l l Investment on these prestes« ­ < 
Including that reletlng to non quel 1 tying ec t lv l t l e« ­ ts 
e l i g ib l e for aid. Hetlonallssd lnduetrlee ere e l i g ib l e 
(If on qualifying premi··«). 
Awntd« *rs «utoewtlc «e long se 
its «et . snd rstee e t s fixed. 
ths conditio. or 
Betoe of award ln ths Bpeclel Develops« n t Areee t BUA) , 
Oevslopewnt Aren« (DA) end tηtermed late Area« (ΙΑ) ­
covering.ths whol« of Scotland, Malee, Northern end Horth­
ss«t Bngtnnd, Yorkshire «nd Humbe­reld«, perte or the Mid­
lands end such of South­wrst Rnqland ­ are ee fol low«ι­
Aroa Bet« (percent) Kllglhle Invsetssnt 
RDA 22 building«, work«, plant, machinery 
DA To buildings, works, pluf , mechlnsry 
1A TO building«, worke. 
No further «patini discrimination. Awerd« «re euttxsatlc 
«■ long «« the condition« or «wnrd (which ere uniform 
throughout th«· problem r*olone) «re met, end retee «re 
fixed. 
Selective Financial Assistance Loan 
Oleerstlonsry project­rs le ted soft loss of betwssn 5 
end 7 ysers duration. Wspsyment Is si «­monthly on e 
s tre lght­ l lne bse le . Naslmum princip«! repsyssnt hol­
iday le 1 yeere ln the Special Deve I or—nt r.rsae and 
2 ysere In both ths Development end th · Intermediate 
Are· · . Intereet­fres perlede run concurrently with 
eny rspsyssnt holldsy ewerded. Dus to ths public eector 
contribution con«treint («·« introduction) th · maximum 
losn probsbly cover· ebout 15 percent of project capitel 
cost«. Ths ctjrrsnt Interest rete Is 1 percentage 
points below the Defwirtmsnt of Industry'· "broedly rom­
serc le l* rete (which, In 1976, «vereoed I J.Ο ρ ·reeni ) . 
Industry Act 1972. Psrt I I , section T. 
Application 1« mad· to ths regions! o f f l cs of the Depnrt­
ment or Induetry (DI) (in Bcotlend, ths Scottish Beonomlc 
riannlnq Dspertswnti in Malee, ths Msleh Offlc«) where 
ths project I« located. Apart fro· vsry leras project« 
(ess β bslow) thet o f f l cs epprel*· · the project end, 
efter eeeklnq ths sdvlce of It« Betone i lndu«trt«l Devsl­
o | s in t Bosrd, dscldse whether or not t s meke en «werd end 
the level of ewerd within Joint DI/Treosury guideline«. 
Dseplte dlecretion, svsras ers re le t lvs ly «tanâerd 
between regione. 
In principle, s in ing, msnufscturlng, conetructlon «nd 
mobile esrvlcse ( i . e . esrvlcee which havs e genuine 
choice of location end, moreover, wi l l creste e t ­ l eas t 
lO new Jobs in sowing to ths problem region« or 25 new 
Job· ln «spending in ths problem region«) ars e l l e l i g ­
ib le . In prect lcs , howsver, eeelatsncs le overwheImlngly 
concentrated on menutncturlng. Hatlonelleed Industries 
not elded In respect of m«tn line «c t lv l t l ee but »wiy 
receive ■eeletnnce for enc l l l l ery projecte. 
ms­dlscrlslnntlcat betwssn e l i g ib l e a c t i v i t i e s Is «pecir­
led tn th · Dl/Tr*aeury guide11nee («part from ths fact 
that service« mu«t bs mobil· ­ ees d •bovs). Mithin 
ths guidelines, howsvsr, thsrs le ecope for dlacrlmln­
atlon at the reglonel level ln respect of both the 
declelon whether or not to ewerd and th· rat« of award. 
In terms of rate Basirne, the guldellnee fevour SDAs 
(wtier· th · maximum lnterset­freo perlod/prlnclpsl re­
payment holldey 1« 3 years) over DAs end IBs (whers the 
maximum la 2 yeere). In terme of the public sector 
contribution conetrslnt they aleo favour SUA over DA 
end PA ovsf IA, although the dist inction betwssn theee 
■r««s I · not slweye rigidly npplled. Mithin the guide­
linee there le also ecope for spatial ¿Incrimination 
at the reglonel level In respect of both ths declelon 
whether or not to award «nd th · rate of award. 
In te res t Relief Grant 
Dlecretlonery, project­related capitel grent available s« 
en al ternat iv · to the STA Inen end calculated In relation 
to the notional lonn which «*o<itd hav· twen awarded had an 
STA loan offer berm mad· ( · » · BF* loan). Mtvre no tnte i ­
•nt­frse perlrd would hav· ho*n «warded In nwijunction 
with ttwt tonn th· grant 1« at J percent of tl*· notional 
losn for up to t year*. «Biste an lnt»­n>«(.­fr«*· period 
would h«vs Ι«·"! «verdad, th· grant 1« at whet 1« known .i" 
the hlghnr ISC rut· (hrosdty In Uns with tin· mar i f t rat* ­
1976 overea·! Ρ rw­rc«*ntl (or the duration of t_tw tnt*t«»«>t­
f r s · period ( I . · . « emi I mus of } ysers) before rnvvrtlnq 
to 3 percent of tlw notional tonn f"t up to a further ­t 
ysere. 
A« BFA losn. 
A« SFA losn. 
A« STA loan. 
Bs STA loan. 
Regional Development Grant 
¡o. Sil« 
CO 
Hone, the grent being on en Item rether than a project 
heels . 
Hon«, «ither in t«rss of «Ugibl l ty or r a t · · (ess 5 
Grant le ltes­relet«d end 1« restricted to plant, machln­
«ry, building« end works, working capital i s Ineligible. 
To be «l lglbl«, plant and machinery must be new, heve a 
slnloum value of ¿ΙϋΟ and e minimus l i f e Of two year«. 
Replacement Investment 1« i l i o «llglbl« If It meets the«· 
condition». Vehicle» «re ineligible (except for on-
preslne vuhU-le«) · · «re item« of furniture «nd so«t 
pipeline«. Building« and work«, too, simt be new 
(building« suet b« previously unoccupied), although the 
cost of adapting old buildings i s e l ig ib le . Land, 
crnanental/recreattonal building «t.d building expenditure 
of less than ¿1,000 «re «11 inel igible . 
C«»h payment, phased payment and hlr« purchase aro a l l 
e l ig ib le forma of expenditure (although for UP the 
reU­vant price 1» the c««h prie«, not th« UP prie«). 
Leasing, too, Is aided since leasing compani«« can submit 
rials» tor grant on the Items which they lease to 
companies on qualifying premises. 
There »re no significant further pre­condìtions of sward. 
Tho grant Is "virtually automati»". 
Mot relevant «lnce there le no «dsint «tredve dlecretlon 
ln the setting of grant ratee. They are fixed ln eech 
of tha probles erees (««e 6 abov· and 19 below). 
Selective Financial Assistance Loan 
8etting­up project· end extension« ( 1 . · . projects creat­
ing additional new employment) ere treated much more 
favourably und«r ths guideline« than moderni«ationa and 
rat lonel lsat lonsd.a . proleet« safeguarding employment), 
end Indeed most award« tiav« been ln rcepect of the 
former project typse. Replecement 1« e l ig ible only i f 
pert of «n «l lglbl« project type. Within the guidelines 
there 1« «leo ecope for project type dlacrlnlnstlon at 
th« regional level . 
In Enqlend, applications of sore than ¿2 million (ueual­
ly only one or two catte» annually) «rw procoa«ad ln 
London rether then by the regional off ice . Ho s i t e 
discrimination in the guideline«, but region« have ecops 
within the guideline» to dlacrlsln«t« between different 
project s ire groups, 
Eligible project coats ere defined in a negativ« way, 
excluding a l l revenue peymenta (with the exception of 
certain leased items ­ see 10 below). The cost of land 
purchase, land development, building« (including office«) 
plant «nd machinery, vehicles and working capital are 
normally «11 e l ig ib le If Justifiable ln the context of 
the project, tow value «nd short l l f s «saata ond 
r«pl«cenont Investment would be e l ig ible only If con­
eldered to be "capitel" «nd if pert of on e l ig ible 
project type. 
Cash payment, phaaed payment end hire purchaee are a l l 
• l l g l b l · forms of expenditure (although for UP tha re l ­
èvent price i s the ceah prie«, not the IIP price). The 
coet of plant and machinery leased for e minimum term 
of four yeere i s s leo Included in e l ig ib le project costs . 
There ere three basic condition· of award. Th· project 
muat be viable* tho public sector contribution con­
straint must be es t ( i . e . the greater part of funds suat 
come from out«ide the public eector)ι and th« cost per 
Job limit taes Introduction) mu»t not be broken. The 
f irst determines whether or not en ew«rd con be made, 
the remaining two the noxious Level of that eward. 
On average 78.9 percent of loan offere mads over the 
period !973/74­1975/76 carried with them an interest ' 
free period (of unspecified length). The offers mode 
wsrs as follows tr! s i l l . ) ι 
number of offers 
total loan awards 
average loan award« 
1974/75 1975/76 
113 91 
26.5 36.0 25.4 
0.13 0.32 0.28 
1971/7* 
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In te res t Relief Grant 
Ae STA loan . 
Ae SPA loan. 
Ae STA loan. 
Aa SPA loen. 
Aa STA loan. 
On average. Just under two­thirds of IRC offers vede ovei 
ths perlod 1973/74­1975/76 carried with thes en interest 
free period équivalant (of unspecified length). In 
1974/75 (the only year for which such information i« 
available), ISO offere averaged 21.1 percent of the 
notional loane on which they were based. LRG offers 
made between 1973/74 end 1975/76 were aa follows 
(ii mi l l . ) · 
number of offer* 
total IRG «wards 
average IBG «wards 
3/74 
l) 
5.4 
0.05 
1974/75 
599 
25.3 
0.04 
1975/76 
seo 34.7 
O.06 I Î 
15. T. 
HC 
OD 
OO 
17. glawbaçs 
IB. Turndown 
Regional Development Grant 
Ths great 1« sot treated for tas puxpoee« ·■ es Incesa 
receipt «sd la Ih­r.for· sot tesad. Aséete Can be deprec­
iated (or toa purpose· «rose of eny grent received. 
Grant clais» can bs «ubslttsd osly «ft«r the eeeet ha« 
been provided ( i . e . delivered or conatiuctwd and 1« r««dy 
for UM) or expenditure baa been defray·!, claim process­
ing periodi on «verace J months. There 1« then a fuithei 
recently lepoawd administrative delay ot 1 month« before 
grant 1« paid. 
Ho a­er.i« «re poealbl« beyond the formel fixed retee. 
mo e««st con b« aided through en BDO It It Is slreedy 
subsidised by rem· other government great. Moreover, 
through the public sector contribution constraint («ee 
introduction) receipt nf en ΒΓΛ limit« the «mount of 
•elective financial ««alatane« which a project can obtain 
Bided es««t« sust rassln on qualifying premiss« for 4 
year». Wliere thl« does not happen grant sui t , ln theory, 
be totally repaid. In practice, the «mount to b« repeld 
1« (t' l ' im I by the numbs» Of complet« month« from the 
«tart ot «ι* ι y««r condition period to th« date when 
tlie cunJltlone were broken ­ e« long «« the conditions 
were SMI for at least 1 year. 
Mo inforsatlon available. Virtually no discretion svs l l ­
oble to th« authorttt«« in th« administration of the 
St­lteM «nd Irene« no meaningful turndown rata«. 
Grant expenditure sines th« introduction of th« schsss 
he« b«»n «» follows (/ s i l l . ) ι 
1972/73 1973/74 1974/15 1971/76 
«Ppllc«tlone ptoceeaed 2,005 30,710 35,96s 40,673 
«xpandUut« 8.1 107.2 212.8 324.9 
Job creation Is not · pre­condition of en BOO award. Mo 
Inforsatlon 1« available on jobs «asoctatsd Wllh the 
grent. 
Selective Financial Assistance Loan 
By redwing debt «ervlclng charge», the eoscsesiomsry 
elrm.nl of the lOSS 1» tsssd U M ( V e l i t i n n · · » · « 
tsssbls prof i t · . 
Application must be ssds before project construction 
starts and can be mede up to 12 month· beforehand. 
Application proceeelng period« on averag· 2­1 months. 
Once approved, the loan le drewn down on proof of need. 
If epsclel Treeeury pareUsalon l e obtalnsd (os s csse­
by­cese best·) regions say go beyond the guideline 
mexLme. This however happen« only vsry rarely. 
Selective financiai easUtence loen« end inte rs« t rel ief 
grant« ere alternatives. No one project can receive 
both. In addition, the maximum loan which c«n bs «ward­
ed le affected ­ through the public sector contribution 
conatrelnt ­ by th« eward of en BDO, end lndesd of 
other public esalatane« ( U k · , for exaeple, rent free 
occupation Of a government f«ctory). 
Selective financial «eeletencs le monitored, but there 
ere no powers to clew back eld If terasts (In particular 
Job targete) ere not e s t . An unjuetlftable failure to 
sset psat target« would however be tek>n Into eccount ln 
the consideration ot any future c l« lss for assistance. 
Of 546 losn applications fully proceesed ( I . e . either 
approved or rejected) aver the period 1972/73 to 1974/15, 
152 ( I . e . 27.8 percent) were turned down. Over the 
••me period 534 losn application« war« withdrawn. The 
•s in reason for turndown was ncn­vlablllty of ths 
project or ths non­creation of Jobn. 
Loan expenditure (not the velue of the oonce««ton 
•tteched to the loans) bee been ee Collowe ii mill .)« 
1972/73 
0.36 
1973/74 
20.45 
1974/15 
21.13 
1915/16 
42.60 
dob« »eooleted with loan approvals'have been es followsi 
1872/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 
7,915 16,173 |5,«37 14,378 
Thssa figures ar« eppllcent eetlsatea and Include Job« 
a«reguardad es well «« eddltlonel Job« created. 
In te res t Relief Grant 
The grant 1« t «cardad s« Incorni end le therefore taxed to 
ths »»tent that I t leed« ta Increeesd profit«. 
The eubsie«loo end proceeelng ot application 1« a« for 
STA loens. The payment of grant 1« annuel, uaually over 
e four year period (4 ties« 1 percent of the notional 
loan) If no Intrrait ­ fr · · period «warded, hut up to 7 
year« (1 tias« th« higher IBG rat« «nd then 4 t l s s s 1 
percent) i t an interest­free period 1« obtained. Payment 
of the f iret ln«tals«nt can i s claimed whun one third of 
project fixed a»»«t «xpandltur« h«a bwen defrayed, with 
«ubaecuent Instalmente being paid on tha anniversary date 
of the first grant payment. 
Bs BTB loan. 
Interest rel ief grant« «r« en «ltarnetlve to SPA loan«. 
No one project can recelwu both. Moreover, the maxvsun 
notion«! loon which can be awarded I« «ffevted ­ through 
the public eector contribution constraint ­ by the «ward 
of an BDC, and Indeed other public aseistanee (Hk«, foi 
•■aspi· , rent fr·« occupation of a govamsent factory). 
See STA Loen. Interest relief grant instalment« «re 
paid out only if the condition* of award continu« tu b« 
met. 
Of 1,269 IBC application» fully processed (I .e . either 
approved or rsjscted) over the period 1912/1} to 
1974/75, 71 ( i . e . 5.6 percent) were tutned down, over 
the seme period 321 IBC applications vera wltltdrawn. 
The main reason for turndown we« non­vlablllty ol i t s 
project or the non­creation of jobs. 
1972/73 1971/74 1974/75 
0.05 2.86 9.64 
1915/16 
16.63 
Jobs assoclsted with grent approval» have been «sfollo«.» 
1973/73 1973/74 1974/75 1975/76 
3,319 54,601 63,181 38,023 
Theee figurée ere eppllcant e s t l s s t · « «nd lnclud« lobs 
eefeguerded es well as eddltlonel jobs created. 
22 
21 
Antic 
Durar 
gaas 
paced 
on 
sinn» 
Regional Development Grant 
CplteL espenditurs covsred by BDO sop"""«*» · received 
ln ths period 1972/73 ­ 1975/76 wee ae follow« U « i l l . ) . 
1972/73 
126 
Ι973Λ4 
722 
1974/75 1975/76 
1,145 1,700 
No opacified l i t « . 
Although there ar· no axpllcit guideline«, on the b s s l · 
of past experience the date of esset provision tends to 
bs crucial ln determining whether the old or the new 
ratee apply. 
Selective Financial Assistance Loan 
tttitfete« *xs «ot eveuebl« (or the loen alone. For «11 
■elective financial eeeletencs, project cos t · eeeocieted 
with Offar· mad« wer« ·■ follow· ii s i l l . ) I 
number of ottere B63 
•seocleted project costs 532.6 
HO »pacified l i f e . 
1974/75 
B17 766 
687.9 
Not expl ic i t ly covered ln the guidelines. Ones · loan 
oí fur hee been eccepted the terms of that offer cannot 
bs changed. 
In te res t Relief Grant 
Eatlsatse era not avallabia for the grent alone. 
BfA loan. 
Mo apecttied l i f e . 
Mot expl ic i t ly covered in Uve guideline*. Once an IRC 
offer has been eccepted the tersa of that offer cannot 
be changed. 
UNITED KINGDOM 
THE INCENTIVE VALUES 
As we have seen, there are three main instruments of British 
regional incentive policy. Far and away the most important of these 
is the Regional Development Grant (RDG), with expenditure of some ¿325 
million in 1975/76. In the same year, well over 40,000 RDG applications 
were received and processed. This however is not the number of projects 
assisted by RDGs since, as was stressed earlier, the grant is item- and 
not project-related. But nor is it the number of items subsidised, since 
it is common to group items for application purposes. The other two 
important incentives in the British package, Selective Financial 
Assistance (SFA) soft loans and interest relief grants (IRGs) are 
alternative forms of aid. Initially, the emphasis was on the former 
(in 1972/73 for example 78 soft loan applications were approved compared 
with 38 IRGs) but more recently IRGs have played the dominant role 
(in the period 1973/74 to 1975/76, over 573 IRG applications were 
approved annually on average, more than four times the number of soft 
loan applications approved). 
Since the value of both regional development grants and selective 
financial assistance varies by type of assisted area. Table A distinguishes 
between the three main types of assisted area in Britain - Special 
Development Areas (SDAs), Development Areas (DAs) and Intermediate Areas 
(IAs). It also distinguishes maximum from average selective financial 
assistance values. There are two areas in particular where discretion 
enters into the selective financial assistance scheme. One of these 
is in the determination of the appropriate interest free period/principal 
repayment holiday to award. The current maxima are three years in the 
SDAs and two years in the DAs and IAs. No information is available on 
average awards, not least since the above maxima were only recently 
introduced. We do know however that the majority of cases (nearly four-
fifths of SFA loans and some two-thirds of IRGs) have in the past received 
some sort of interest free concession and that, in 1974/75 (when the 
maximum interest free period was 2 years) the average IRG award included 
the equivalent of just under one year interest free. We have therefore 
assumed that the average awards are half the possible maxima - 1-2 years 
in SDAs, 1 year in DAs and IAs. 
The second area of discretion is in the determination of loan and, 
in the case of the IRG, "notional" loan awards (discussed earlier). 
190 
UNITED KINGDOM 
In 1974/75 (the last year for which information is available) these 
averaged 27.3 percent of project costs, and this is the average figure 
used in Table A. As far as the maximum award is concerned, this is 
set, in the main, by the public sector contribution constraint (the cost 
per job limit "bites" only in the most capital intensive cases). With 
the maximum public sector contribution being about one half, and with 
other public aids (in particular RDGs) accounting for perhaps 15 percent 
of project capital costs, we have assumed the public sector contribution-
constrained maximum to be 35 percent of project costs. 
Turning to the contents of Table A, it can be seen that RDGs are 
the most "valuable" part of the British regional incentive package in the 
SDAs and DAs (being worth, in effective value terms, more than double 
the average selective financial assistance award) but are much less 
important in the IAs where they are only available on buildings and works. 
The table also shows IRGs to be slightly more valuable than SFA loans. 
In terms of award maxima, IRGs have an effective value after tax, 
delays and eligible items of 8.5 percent of initial capital costs in 
the SDAs and 6.6 percent of initial capital costs in the DAs/lAs 
compared to equivalent SFA loan figures of 7.2 and 5.6 percent respectively. 
It is for this reason - in addition to the prompting of administrators keen 
to reduce government outlays (or at least make a given level of 
government expenditure go further) - that IRGs have been of increasing 
importance in recent years. Indeed it is really only in cases where 
inadequate external project finance is available that the SFA loan is 
continuing to play a significant role. 
In terms of structure, Table Β is in many ways' similar to Table A, 
distinguishing between SDAs, DAs and IAs and between maximum and average 
selective financial assistance awards. Where the table differs from 
Table A is (like the comparable tables in the other country sections) in 
its emphasis on incentive combinations rather than on individual 
incentives. Where there is a viable project, the standard combination is 
RDG (which is not of course project-related, but rather is available on 
an item by item basis) plus selective financial assistance, sometimes 
in the form of a soft loan but, as we have seen, now much more commonly in 
the form of an IRG. 
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There are three main points to arise from the table. First, the 
difference between the effective value of the British package in SDAs and 
DAS is small, but between these two types of assisted area and IAs is 
much more significant. The maximum package value (i.e. RDG plus 
maximum SFA IRG) is, for example, "worth" 21.5 percent of initial 
capital costs, 21.7 percent of annual capital costs and 4.8 percent of 
value added in SDAs compared to 18.4, 18.7 and 4.1 percent respectively 
in DAs and only 9.2, 7.9 and 1.7 percent respectively in IAs. Secondly, 
SFA loan and IRG values, although favouring the IRG, are, as we 
noted in the context of our discussion of Table A, not too dissimilar. 
In the SDAs for example the percentage point difference between these 
incentives (in terms of maximum rates of award) is only 1.3 for initial 
capital costs, 1.1 for annual capital costs and 0.3 for value added. 
Finally, since the withdrawal of REP, the British package has been 
significantly reduced in value and is now very much more in line, in 
effective value terms, with typical package values in, what we call in 
Part II below, the middle group of EC countries. 
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Table A: NOMINAL TO EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDY. 
AREA INCENTIVE LEVEL 
SDA RDG buildings fixed rate 
RDG plant 
SFA loan 
SFA IRG 
fixed rate 
maximum 
average 
maximum 
average 
NOMINAL 
VALUE 
22.0 
22.0 
35.5 
18.5-27.5 
51.0 
EFFECTIVE VALUE AFTER 
TAX 
22.0 
22.0 
20.6 
10.7-16.0 10.7-16.0 2.9-4.4 
29.6 24.2 8.5 
ELAYS 
2 0 . 7 
20 .7 
20 .6 
ELIGIBLE 
ITEMS 
2 .9 
10 .1 
7 .2 
25.0-38.0 14.5-22.0 12.7-18.8 3.5-5.1 
DA RDG buildings fixed rate 20.O 20.O 18.8 2.6 
RDG plant fixed rate 20.0 20.0 18.8 9.2 
SFA loan maximum 27.5 16.0 16.0 5.6 
average 18.5 10.7 10.7 2.9 
SFA IRG maximum 38.0 22.0 18.8 6.6 
average 25.0 14.5 12.7 3.5 
IA RDG buildings fixed rate 20.0 20.0 18.8 2.6 
SFA loan maximum 27.5 16.0 16.0 5.6 
average 18.5 10.7 10.7 2.9 
SFA IRG maximum 38.0 22.0 18.8 6.6 
average 25.0 14.5 12.7 3.5 
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Table A: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) GENERAL: Discount rate 13.0 percent (EC reference rate 1976). 
(b) REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT GRANT (RDG) 
(i) Nominal value: As percentage eligible investment costs, 
(ii) Taxation: Not taxed, 
(iii) Delays: Grant claims submitted on provision of the asset. Payment 
delay 6 months (average 3 months processing delay plus 3 months 
"imposed" delay). 
(iv) Eligible items: With EC key of: land 10, buildings 20, plant 70 
and with working capital assumed to be 30 percent of project 
capital costs, eligible buildings account for 14 percent and 
eligible plant for 49 percent of all project capital costs. 
(c) SELECTIVE FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE (SFA) LOAN 
(i) Nominal value: Net grant equivalent of interest subsidy as percent 
loan award assuming: 
- market rate of interest: 13 percent (1976 "broadly commercial" rate average) 
- period of loan : assumed 7 years (in practice 5-7 years) 
- principal repayment SDA, maximum 3 years, average 1-2 years 
holiday 
interest free periods 
interest rate subsidy 
repayment system 
DA/ΙΑ, maximum 2 years, average 1 year 
concurrent with the above repayment holidays 
fixed 3 percentage points 
loan repaid 6 monthly on a straight-line basis 
(ii) Taxation: Effective corporation tax rate: 42.0 percent (standard 
mainstream corporation tax rate of 52 percent discounted 21 months -
the average delay). 
(iii) Delays: None. The loan is drawn down in relation to need, 
(iv) Eligible items: Loan assumed to average 27.3 percent of project 
capital costs (1974-75 average for loan and notional loan together). 
No direct information on maximum possible coverage but, given public 
sector contribution limits, assumed to be about 35 percent of project 
capital costs. 
(d) SFA INTEREST RELIEF GRANT (IRG) 
(i) Nominal value: As percentage of the notional loan which would have 
been awarded had a loan (see (c) above) been awarded, 
(ii) Taxation: Effective corporation tax rate: 42.0 percent (see (c) (ii) 
above). 
(iii) Delays: Grant paid in annual instalments. Claim for IRG can be 
submitted when one third of project expenditure is made - with the 
first instalment of grant tending to be paid when one half of project 
expenditure has been made. Assuming a uniform distribution of 
project expenditure, we take the first instalment as our base date, 
(iv) Eligible items: Notional loan assumed to average 27.3 percent of 
project capital costs (1974/75 average for loan and notional loan 
together). No direct information on maximum possible coverage but, 
given public sector contribution limits, assumed to be about 35 
percent of project capital costs. 
194 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Table Β: EFFECTIVE SUBSIDIES AS A PERCENTAGE OF VARIOUS DENOMINATORS. 
AREA INCENTIVE COMBINATION 
INITIAL ANNUAL 
CAPITAL CAPITAL VALUE 
COSTS COSTS ADDED 
3.1 
4.5 
SDA RDG (buildings + plant) 13.0 14.3 
RDG (buildings + plant)+SFA loan(maximum) 20.2 20.6 
RDG (buildings + plant)+SFA loan(average) 15.9­17.4 16.8­18.1 3.7­4.0 
RDG (buildings + plant)+SFA IRG(maximum) 21.5 21.7 4.8 
RDG (buildings + plant)+SFA IRG(average) 16.5­18.1 17.3­18.7 3.8­4.1 
DA RDG (buildings + plant) 
RDG (buildings + plant)+SFA loan(maximum) 
RDG (buildings + plant)+SFA loan(average) 
RDG (buildings + plant) SFA IRG(maximum) 
RDG (buildings + plant)+SFA IRG(average) 
IA RDG (buildings) 
RDG (buildings)+SFA loan(maximum) 
RDG (buildings)+SFÄ loan(average) 
RDG (buildings)+SFA IRG(maximum) 
RDG (buildings)+SFA IRG(average) 
11.8 
17.4 
14.7 
18.4 
15.3 
2 .6 
8.2 
5 .5 
9 .2 
6 .1 
13.0 
17.9 
15.5 
18.7 
16.0 
2 .2 
7 .1 
4 . 7 
7 .9 
5 .2 
2 .9 
3 .9 
3 .4 
4 . 1 
3 .5 
0 . 5 
1.6 
1.0 
1.7 
1.1 
Note: At the time of its withdrawal at the end of 1976 we estimate 
that REP was "worth" 2.2 percent of the labour costs of aided 
firms in SDAs and DAs after tax and payment delays. Had REP 
remained at this level, the percentages under "value added" in 
the above table would have been increased by 1.7 percentage 
points in SDAs and DAs since REP was automatically available to 
manufacturing industry in these areas. REP was not available in 
IAs. 
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Table Β: NOTES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
(a) INITIAL CAPITAL COSTS 
The summation cf the Table A results for appropriate incentive combin­
ations . 
) ANNUAL CAPITAI 
(i) Calculation 
Asset 
Buildings 
Plant 
COSTS (Discount/ 
of weighted annual 
Land/Working Capital 
Assumed 
Life 
50 
10 
-
Interest rate: 13.0 percent). 
capital cost factor: 
Annual Capital 
Charge Factor 
0.1303 
0.1843 
0.1300 
Weight 
0.140 
0.490 
0.370 
WEIGHTED ANNUAL CAPITAL COST FACTOR 
Weighted 
Factors 
0.0182 
0.0903 
0.0481 
0.1566 
(ii) Calculation of annual subsidy factor: 
- RDG building : 0.1303 (both buildings and plant are subsidised 
RDG plant : 0.1843 under the RDG scheme on an item basis 
i.e. replacement investment is explicitly 
aided). 
- SFA loan; SFA IRG: 0.1363 (plant/building/land/working capital 
subsidised). 
Since replacement is not explicitly subsidised as part of the SFA 
scheme, the subsidy life of the plant element of the SFA loan and 
SFA IRG is taken to be 20 years - see p. 44 above, 
(iii) Calculation of annuitising factor ( (ii) i (i)): 
- RDG building 
- RDG plant 
- SFA loan, SFA IRG 
0.8321 
1.1769 
0.8704 
(c) VALUE ADDED 
It is assumed that gross profits make up 22 percent of value added. 
This was the average figure for manufacturing industry in the United 
Kingdom over the period 1970-73. See Eurostat, National Accounts 
1970-74 Eurostat Yearbook 2-1975, Statistical Office of the European 
Communities, 1975, Table 5. 
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PART II 
COMPARISONS AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 

Part I of this report was country-specific. This part is 
comparative. Its basic aim is to draw together the information in Part I 
so as to show the differences and similarities between countries in terms 
of features covered in the synopsis tables and in terms of the 
valuation results, and to draw out where possible the policy implications 
for the member countries and for the EC. It is in three sections. The 
first is a comparison of the main incentive features covered in the 
synopsis tables; the second involves an inter-country comparison of 
incentive values; and the final section examines the implications of 
our findings for the EC. 
A COMPARISON OF INCENTIVE FEATURES 
Seven aspects are covered in this section, each under a separate 
head. Head number 1 - Discretion - compares the various regional 
incentive schemes in terms of the extent to which they are discretionary -
discretionary in rates and also in the decision whether or not to award. 
The advantages and problems of discretionary schemes as against automatic 
ones are also discussed. Head number 2 - Coverage - examines and comments 
on activity and project-type eligibility for regional incentives, and 
discrimination between eligible activities and project types. Head 
number 3 is concerned with Eligible Expenditure - eligible items and 
eligible forms of expenditure. Within this head, the issue of 
replacement investment coverage by the incentives is discussed. As we 
have already seen in the valuation sections of Part I, tax treatment of 
regional incentives can markedly reduce their effective value. Tax 
Treatment is the topic of head number 4. Timing and Phasing of Awards 
is the subject of head number 5 - dealing with application processing 
delays as well as delays between expenditure being incurred and the 
payment of the incentives. Head number 6 has the general title of 
Integration and covers a variety of issues including addability of 
incentives, cumulability, and the relationship between regional 
incentives and national incentive schemes. It also discusses the issue 
of regional autonomy in the award of incentives. Finally, head number 7 
is concerned with the Monitoring, Evaluation and Design of regional incentives. 
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Table 1 : Discretion in Incentives 
(a) RATE DISCRETION 
Rates Fixed Little Discretion Much Discretion 
B. accelerated depreciation 
D. municipality loan 
Γ. special depreciation 
F. local business tax concession 
G. investment allowance 
IR. export profit relief χ 
IR. investment allowance χ 
IT. capital grant 
IT. social security concession χ 
IT. tax concessions 
L. tax concession 
N. accelerated depreciation χ 
Die. regional development grant χ 
F. regional development grant 
G. special depreciation * 
G. ERP soft loan 
IT. national soft loan 
B. capital grant 
B. interest subsidy 
D. company soft loan 
D. investment grant 
G. investment grant 
13. capital grant 
L. capital grant 
N. investment premium 
UK. soft loan 
DK. interest relief grant 
(b) DECISION DISCRETION 
SIight/Technical Marked 
F., regional development grant 
F. local business tax concession 
F. special depreciation 
G. investment allowance 
G. ERP soft loan 
G. special depreciation χ 
IR. export profit relief χ 
IR. investment allowance χ 
IT. social security concession χ 
IT. capital grant 
IT. national soft loan 
IT. tax concessions 
N. accelerated depreciation χ 
CX. regional development grant χ 
Β. accelerated deprecia­
tion 
capital grant 
interest subsidy 
company soft loan 
investment grant 
municipality loan 
investment grant 
IR. capital grant 
L. capital grant 
tax concession 
investment premium 
soft loan 
interest relief grant 
L . 
N . 
CK 
OK 
Country Key: B. « 
D. » 
F. m 
G. -
IR. -
IT. -
L. » 
N. -
UK. -
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
rJon-pro;ect-related and item-related incentives are asterisked. 
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DISCRETION 
Discretion in award can take two forms - discretion on the part of 
the authorities in the decision whether or not to award, and discretion 
in the rate of award. In Table 1 we have tried to indicate, for each 
incentive included in the synopsis tables, the scope of these two forms 
of discretion. The table also shows whether or not the incentive is 
project-related, since this is often associated with discretion. From 
the table it can be seen that, at least in terms of rates, there is little 
or no discretion for many incentives. This is particularly true of the 
tax concessions and various accelerated depreciation allowances but it 
also applies to most of the soft loan schemes. Item-related grants, too, 
tend to be in terms of fixed rates for obvious administrative reasons. 
Indeed it is only in respect of the project-related grants that rate 
discretion is at all marked. These grants, however, form a very 
important part of individual incentive packages. 
The chief drawback of a discretionary system is that it significantly 
reduces the visibility of the incentives on offer in that industrialists 
are unsure about whether or not they will receive an award and the level 
of that award. Moreover it can favour particular types and sizes of 
firm (especially those with influence and expertise) - not necessarily 
those most in need of aid or most suited to the problem regions. For 
smaller firms discretion, often combined with complexity, must be a 
serious impediment to the consideration of incentives in investment or 
location decisions. Indeed, in general, there would seem to be strong 
grounds for arguing that schemes should be made as simple and predictable 
as possible if firms are going to be able to assess the strength of the 
schemes and incorporate them into the decision process. There is little 
information available as to when and at what stage of the investment 
decision incentives are considered (and in what way) by those firms which 
do take them into account. One would suspect, however, that where they 
are going to be incorporated, they enter in at an early stage of the 
investment appraisal - and certainly before the firm has submitted its 
application. And yet, where this is the case, firms need to have a 
clear idea of the prospects of getting incentives and of the likely rate 
of subsidy. Without this, they will either undervalue the incentives 
or not incorporate them at all. Simplicity and predictability are thus 
essential requirements for regional incentives. One could also add that, 
at the international level, uncertainty and unpredictability in respect 
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of the eligibility and award of particular incentives make it 
difficult for firms to compare these incentives, and incentive packages 
in general, between countries. This, at least, makes for imperfect 
competition between countries in terms of regional incentives - a 
situation which few would argue is desirable. 
But, lack of automaticity can have further drawbacks. In particular 
it can lead to a lengthening of the time required by administrators to 
make award decisions. For a firm undertaking an investment or location 
decision, speed can be of extreme importance. Delays in deciding on 
the award of an incentive can therefore only mean that incentives are 
either ignored by the investor or are "deflated" in order to take into 
consideration the risk of not receiving an award or of receiving only a 
token award. 
Of course, there will always be the argument that discretion 
enables the award to be tailored to the needs of the region and the 
applicant, and avoids the "wasting" of public money - a criticism 
frequently levied against automatic schemes (although it should be 
noted that these are often less expensive to administer). Discretion is thus 
seen as a way of applying a "marginal" system of award. The detailed inform-
ation which we have from a few countries operating discretionary systems does 
not however lend itself to this argument. Even where incentives have "up 
to" clauses (i.e. discretion in rates) the result is often that 
applicants are given awards which are close to the maximum, or are 
standard, or are token. But this is understandable. Administrators are 
in a difficult position when making decisions on incentive awards in 
"up to" situations. They are fearful of making an award at a rate which 
is so high that it sets a precedent for the future, or one which is so 
out of line with past awards that the decision can be subject to public 
questioning. The outcome, anyway, would seem to be a tendency on the 
part of administrators to standardise rates of award. But if this is the 
case then we would argue that it should be overtly recognised that systems 
will behave according to the people involved in their administration as 
much as the objectives which are set. We therefore feel that simple 
fixed rate awards (with topping up facilities as extra "icing" if this is 
seen as needed) have much to commend them. 
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Simplicity and automaticity need not, of course, mean a single 
rate of award. What has interested us is that a number of countries 
have been combining simplicity with selectivity - with fixed and overt 
rates (or rates in small bands) being set for specified areas, specified 
industries, and specified project types, even though as we shall see 
shortly, such overt discrimination is often not easy to introduce. 
This "matrix approach" has the advantage for the industrialist that it 
makes for predicitability, while also forcing the policy-maker to decide 
explicitly on his priorities - both strong arguments for making an overt 
matrix approach more common practice. 
Of course, there will always be a need to cater for special cases 
and to give the administrator the scope for "fire fighting". This can 
be accommodated within the matrix approach by allowing the matrix rates 
to be topped up in special, not necessarily specified, circumstances. 
The matrix then becomes a basic rate matrix, allowing the industrialist 
to incorporate what will be a minimum award into his calculations. 
COVERAGE 
Activities 
In terms of activity coverage, regional incentives are very similar 
in the EC countries, being concentrated overwhelmingly on manufacturing. 
Even those incentives which are not explicitly limited to the 
manufacturing sector tend to be applied almost exclusively in that sector. 
From the synopsis tables it can be seen that non-manufacturing activités 
are aided only rarely. Agriculture, for example, is almost never 
eligible for assistance unless "industrialised" in 'some sense 
(e.g. processing activities). Construction, too, is normally ineligible 
unless it is concerned with industrialised construction systems 
(e.g. pre-fabricated parts). Extractive industries are more borderline, 
qualifying, for example, for depreciation allowances on plant and 
machinery and industrial buildings but being ineligible for a number of 
the major grant schemes. 
Services, like the rest of the non-manufacturing sector, also 
tend to be relatively neglected. Only France, Ireland and the United 
Kingdom have regional incentive schemes aimed specifically at the service 
sector in the problem regions, while the general regional incentive 
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schemes tend not to have a service element within them. Of the grants 
and soft loans/interest subsidies covered in the synopsis tables only 
United Kingdom selective financial assistance, the French regional 
development grant, the Danish company soft loan and investment grant, 
the Belgian interest subsidy and capital grant and the German ERP soft 
loans are available to services and then normally only to mobile or 
potentially mobile services (the main exception being the ERP soft loan 
which is available to all non-primary effect industries). Moreoever, 
awards to the service sector tend to be rare - not surprising in the 
case of the UK and France where there are, as already noted, specific 
service sector schemes. True, the various capital and depreciation 
allowances often do not explicitly exclude services. They are, however, 
of only limited relevance to a service sector which, for the most part, 
uses little plant and machinery and rents the buildings which it occupies. 
Why services should be neglected in the regional incentive systems 
of the Community countries is uncertain, particularly since service 
activities are often of a type (e.g. female employment and/or high 
grade employment) which is much needed in the regions. Moreover, even 
small local services represent an essential base for development. To 
argue that such services follow other developments and do not therefore 
need a stimulus assumes that demand is all that is needed for 
development - a point which if applied rigorously to the manufacturing 
sector would also exclude many applicants there from eligibility since 
many surveys of the location decisions of manufacturing industry 
indicate that locational expansion is largely a consequence of market 
opportunities in the region or area of location. 
Perhaps more interesting than the coverage of the service sector 
in regional incentive schemes is the poor impact of these schemes on 
service development where services are covered. The inevitable question 
is whether this reflects the nature of service industries (with their 
incremental rather than disjointed form of expansion, the importance of 
immobile key female workers, their flexibility in the use of premises) 
or whether it, alternatively, reflects the inappropriateness of the 
incentives on offer. Our work has done little to throw any light on 
this issue. It does seem to us, however, that service coverage within 
the general schemes is often likely to be inappropriate, not least since 
the service cost structure (particularly in respect of labour costs. 
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leasing and renting) is very different from that of manufacturing (such 
as to lower the value of the incentives on offer). There is much more 
research which needs to be done before it will be possible to decide on 
an appropriate service industry incentive. While hard information 
on investment decisions and location experiences and requirements of 
manufacturing is often poor (though improving) that for services is 
very limited indeed. However, given the downward or stagnant trend in 
manufacturing employment, and the growth of the service sector, the 
needs and scope for trying to design policies and regional incentives for 
services is clear. 
Apart from the treatment of the service sector, which is somewhat 
uneven, the activity coverage of the EC country regional incentives is, 
as we have seen, broadly similar. A further similarity between the 
various incentives is that specified rate discrimination between eligible 
activities is quite rare. Indeed it is found only in Italy (where the 
grants awarded by the Cassa are one-fifth higher for priority sector 
projects). Of course, discretionary systems do offer scope for activity 
discrimination, but there is no way of determining the extent to which it 
is used. 
The reason for the general lack of specified discrimination along 
industrial or sectoral lines is not immediately obvious. It may reflect 
a conclusion by policy-makers that, with present information, it is not 
possible to decide overtly on which industries are most suited to the 
problem areas or the view that all industry attracted to the problem 
regions is 'good'; or perhaps it is simply due to the political problems 
of specified discrimination of whatever form. 
Experience in the EC countries does seem to suggest that overt 
discrimination is difficult to incorporate into schemes. This is true 
not only of activity and industry discrimination but also applies to 
problem area spatial discrimination in any form other than very broad 
banding. Highly discriminatory growth area policy, for example, has in 
recent years given way to one of dispersed concentration rather than 
concentration per se, with large numbers of growth areas often being 
designated in countries which operate such a strategy. Specified 
discrimination within regional incentive schemes in favour of growth areas 
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is now rare, and, where it is found, the discriminatory element is often 
slight. The general point anyway is that the EC country experience 
(and it would seem to be a political fact of life) indicates that overt 
activity and spatial discrimination with regional incentives is very 
difficult to introduce. 
Project types 
Like activity eligibility, project type eligibility is fairly 
similar between the various incentives and countries. As would be 
expected, setting up projects are eligible in all the countries while 
extensions are similarly widely covered except for the Danish 
municipality soft loan (because of the nature of the incentive) and 
in Luxembourg unless the project involves a new production line. 
Rationalisation projects are also generally eligible (although often 
with the proviso that jobs must be maintained or safeguarded), the 
exceptions being the Danish municipality soft loan, the Luxembourg 
incentives, the Dutch investment premium and, with some qualifications, 
the main French incentives. A similar picture holds for reorganisation 
and modernisation projects - though this probably reflects more the 
problems of distinguishing between rationalisation, reorganisation and 
modernisation than any calculated intention since, apart from setting-up 
projects, classification by project type is quite a major problem. 
Indeed there is often a considerable overlap between the various project 
types. Extension projects, for example, generally also involve an element 
of rationalisation or modernisation in the establishment as a whole. 
We made the point above that overt discrimination between eligible 
activities was not common. Project-type discrimination also occurs 
only rarely. Only the Federal Republic of Germany's investment grant, 
the regional development grant in France and (but only to a very limited 
degree) the Danish company soft loan have specified rate discrimination 
between eligible project types - generally in favour of setting up 
projects. The discretionary schemes could, of course, operate a system 
of covert discrimination but there is no information available to allow 
us to judge on the extent of this. 
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That there is so little explicit project-type discrimination is 
surprising. Although, as noted earlier, political factors may account, 
at least in part, for the lack of spatial or industrial rate 
discrimination they are unlikely to operate in respect of project type. 
Moreover, if incentives are aimed at compensating for short run dislocation 
costs or are attempting to overcome inertia then (despite the difficulties 
of classification) one really would expect much more project type 
discrimination, particularly in favour of setting-up projects. 
ELIGIBLE EXPENDITURE 
Eligible items of expenditure for regional incentives can, as 
we saw in our discussion of incentive values in Part I, have a marked 
impact on effective values. In as far as there are large differences 
between countries in the treatment of eligible items the relative 
effective value of incentives could also be affected. In point of fact 
the similarities between countries are greater than the differences. 
Land is an eligible item of expenditure for most grants and soft loans 
in the EC countries. The exceptions are the investment allowance of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (probably reflecting its fiscal origins), 
the regional development grant in the United Kingdom (reflecting its 
item-related nature) and the capital grant in Italy. Obviously, in 
that land is not depreciable, it is not eligible for the accelerated 
and special depreciation schemes. Buildings are an eligible item 
within all schemes (except the plant-based Irish investment allowance) 
and the term usually also includes the cost of mains and other "works". 
Plant and machinery is always eligible except for building specific 
incentives like the Danish municipality soft loan, the Dutch accelerated 
depreciation allowance and the French special depreciation allowance. 
Vehicles are, for the vast majority of incentives, not eligible unless 
they are on-site and/or have a highly production-specific character. 
Some countries exclude low value items and "short life" items (with 
short life being defined in a variety of ways, generally not less than 
one year but the definition can include items with lives of up to five 
years - as is the case with the German ERP soft loan). Indeed, in 
general soft loans are not available on assets with a life less than the 
duration of the loan. 
The major excluded items in most schemes are stocks and working 
capital. Stocks are eligible only for the Italian national soft loan 
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and the so-called ILOR investment tax concession, while working capital 
qualifies only for selective financial assistance in the United 
Kingdom. There seems therefore to be a general reluctance to subsidise 
stocks and working capital; and yet, given that these can form a 
substantial proportion of project costs, the value of incentives is 
cut considerably by their exclusion, and especially the exclusion of 
stocks. Admittedly, other sources of finance can nearly always be 
secured for the financing of stocks; but the prime objective of incentives 
is not simply to substitute for commercial capital but to substitute for 
it at a lower cost. Moreover, given that many firms in the problem 
areas will have to carry higher stocks (because of distance to suppliers 
or markets) there would seem to be good grounds for taking a more generous 
view towards working capital, or at least a part of it, in the list of 
eligible items. If nothing else, there seems to us to be grounds for 
trying to aid, perhaps with a grant on interest payments on stock loans, 
setting up projects (and perhaps extensions although one could see 
administrative problems here) for the first few years before full output 
is obtained, and when stocks are disproportionately high relative to 
output. 
It is almost impossible to discuss the issue of eligible items 
for incentives in an EC context without raising the issue of the 
eligibility of replacement investment. Much ink has been spilled on 
the issue of regional incentives aimed at replacement investment and 
the acceptability of this form of incentive in the context of the 
coordination of EC regional policy. The United Kingdom, whose policy 
explicitly supports this kind of investment (as does the Irish 
investment allowance) has been in the forefront of the debate. Perhaps 
fools rush in where angels fear to tread but our view on this issue is 
two-fold. First, most studies of investment appraisal systems used by 
industry would suggest that small value investment (which would characterise 
most replacement investment) is rarely subjected to any quantified invest-
ment appraisal, which could mean that awards on replacement may not be 
influencing investment decisions. This in itself would argue that, for the 
purposes of the current EC coordination solution with its emphasis on the 
location of investment, the issue of replacement coverage is not a major 
one. There is, however, a second point and this is that replacement is not 
inevitably excluded from the regional incentive schemes in operation in the 
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various EC countries. In the case of setting up projects and projects where 
a change of product is required replacement is, of course, unlikely to get 
through. However in other cases - even where countries specifically try 
to exclude it - replacement can and, on the basis of our informal interviews, 
does get aided in some countries as long as it is part of an eligible project -
even pure replacement. But, and this is the key point, most replacement is 
not pure replacement - technological progress being what it is, identical 
machines are rarely bought to replace existing ones; and where a machine 
involves technological change then there is a very good chance indeed for 
such investment getting through, within an eligible project, in many of the 
schemes in the EC countries. In other words, the differences between 
countries and their treatment of replacement would seem to be the extent to 
which countries are overt in their policies towards it and on the scale to 
which replacement is aided rather than on a black and white picture of 
replacement/no replacement coverage. Given this, and given the problem of 
excluding replacement entirely from awards, we see little justice in singling 
out for criticism the overt replacement schemes. Since replacement is anyway 
not an issue when viewing the international location of firms (there is little 
evidence of firms valuing incentives very highly, let alone particular features 
of incentives like replacement coverage - and a firm would be irresponsible 
to assume in its location decision that regulations on replacement would 
continue in the future) the importance of the issue diminishes considerably 
from the viewpoint of current regional policy coordination. 
We have so far been concerned with eligible items of expenditure, 
but it is worthwhile briefly commenting on the position in respect of 
eligible forms - cash, phased payments, hire purchase, and leasing. 
Even though an asset may in itself be deemed eligible, the form in 
which it is financed can, in some countries and in some schemes, debar 
it from eligibility for the purposes of an incentive award. Cash and 
phased payments are, as might be expected, eligible forms of expenditure. 
The position in respect of hire purchase and leasing is more varied. 
Table 2 shows the position for grants and soft loans. The general 
picture is that for most countries and most incentives, assets purchased 
under hire purchase and leasing arrangements are not generally eligible -
or if they are eligible, only particular forms of leasing or hire 
purchase are acceptable. On the issue of whether assets purchased under 
hire purchase or leasing should be eligible, our view would be that there 
seems little reason to discriminate against these forms of finance and 
209 
Table 2: The treatment of hire purchase and leasing. 
ELIGIBLE FORMS OF EXPENDITURE 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
INCENTIVE 
capital grant 
interest subsidy 
company soft loan 
municipality soft loan 
investment grant 
regional development grant 
investment allowance 
investment grant 
ERP soft loan 
IDA capital grant 
capital grant 
national soft loan 
capital grant 
investment premium 
regional development grant 
soft loan 
interest relief grant 
HIRE PURCHASE 
x1 
x2 
x2 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
LEAS: 
X 
X 
X 
x: 
x' 
χ 
X 
X 
χ 
χ 
χ 
χ 
Notes : 1. The investor must own the assets or have a contractual option 
on ownership. 
2. Assets must appear in the applicant's balance sheet. 
3. A special application is required through a state leasing 
company. 
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that incentives should be awarded for assets in projects which are 
financed in this way. We see little difference in principle between a 
project which is partly financed by say a bank and one which is 
"financed" by a leasing company. The only major difference is that 
these assets often do not pass into the balance sheet (a requirement 
in some countries for eligibility) but apart from the need for this 
for clawback purposes (which is anyway rare in most countries) there 
seems little reason why a waiver clause for leased assets or those bought 
under hire purchase could not be introduced to cover this point. There 
are policing and administrative problems involved in deeming assets 
under hire purchase or leasing arrangements as eligible but in that 
there are a number of countries which allow assets financed in this 
way to be eligible, the problems would not appear to be insurmountable. 
It must be said that for most industry, the exclusion of hire 
purchase or leasing from eligibility is not of major significance 
(although by all accounts leasing in particular is of growing importance 
as a form of company finance), but for some sectors it is important -
in particular the service sector. For this reason alone, then, there 
could be grounds for a review of present practices. More than this, a 
generous attitude towards leasing within regional incentive schemes 
could encourage the development of leasing companies in the problem 
areas - bringing with it not only benefits in terms of job creation but 
also, more important, indirect benefits for the area as a whole beyond 
those firms and projects in receipt of regional incentives. 
TAX TREATMENT 
A major factor which influences the relationship between nominal and 
effective values of incentives is, as we have seen in Part I, their tax 
treatment. It also introduces an element of opaqueness for the 
industrialist. The taxing of incentives is in fact widespread in the 
EC countries. The concessionary element of all soft loan schemes is taxed 
since the concession, ceteris paribus, results in an increase in taxable 
profits. All employment premia are similarly taxed through the increased 
taxable profits which they generate. Fiscal concessions are not generally 
taxed except in one circumstance - that is, if the tax on which the 
concessions are made is deductable for the calculation of tax liabilities 
in respect of another tax. Grants, however, do tend to be taxed either 
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Table 3: The taxation of capital grants 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
GRANT 
capital grant 
investment grant 
regional development grant 
investment allowance 
investment grant 
IDA capital grant 
capital grant 
capital grant 
investment premium 
regional development grant 
interest relief grant 
METHOD OF TAXATION NOT 
"DIRECT" "INDIRECT" TAXED 
Definitions: 
"Direct" taxation means that the grant is regarded as income and hence 
passes directly into taxable profits. "Indirect" taxation means 
that the value of aided assets is reduced by the value of the grant 
for depreciation purposes thus indirectly increasing income and hence 
taxable profits. 
Notes : 
1. Grant regarded as income but can be brought into income any 
time within ten years after it is received. This delay is 
normal and markedly reduces the impact of taxation. 
2. Grant regarded as income but is brought into income in line with 
the depreciation schedule of aided assets (except for the land 
element of grant which is brought into income in ten equal 
1 instalments). This method of taxation is broadly equivalent to 
"indirect" taxation. 
3. Only the building element of grant is taxed. 
4. Grant regarded as income but possibility of allocation to a tax 
reserve means that it is rarely taxed in practice. 
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by entering directly into income and hence taxable profits or, more 
commonly, because firms are not allowed to depreciate for tax purposes 
that part of the asset to which the grant relates. In Table 3 we 
show how grant schemes are taxed in the various countries. 
It can be seen from the table and its accompanying notes that only 
the investment allowance in the Federal Republic of Germany and the 
regional development grant in the United Kingdom are not taxed; that the 
capital grant in Italy is in practice rarely taxed; that the Danish 
investment grant is normally taxed only after ten years; and that for 
IDA grants in Ireland only the building element of grant is taxed (and 
then "indirectly"). In the remaining cases, the standard procedure is 
for the grants to be taxed "indirectly" since aided assets can only be 
depreciated for tax purposes net of any grant received. The principal 
exception to this is the interest relief grant in the United Kingdom 
which is "directly" taxed, and this because it is meant to be broadly 
equivalent to the concessionary element of UK selective financial 
assistance soft loans. 
The extent to which incentives are actually taxed depends, of 
course, not only on the formal position but also on whether firms 
make taxable profits. In some countries, many companies are not making 
taxable profits in the current economic conditions and in this sense 
the incentives are taxed only once removed in that where forward transfer 
of losses is possible they diminish losses and thus reduce the losses 
which can be carried forward to be set against future tax liabilities. 
In many cases, a new project will anyway not make profits in the initial 
years and this will diminish the tax burden on the incentive, although 
this point should not be exaggerated since taxes are levied on companies 
and not projects and it would thus be the case that only where the 
project was a major part of the firm's activity (and was making losses) 
that it would give rise to firm losses. Where taxable profits are being 
made, the exemption of incentives (and particularly grants) from taxation 
would obviously increase the effective value of incentives considerably -
between a fifth and a half depending on the rate of corporation tax 
and how the incentives are drawn into taxable income. Incentives taxed 
directly as income have their effective value reduced more than those taxed 
simply because the assets aided can only be depreciated net of any aid 
received. 
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Table 4: Timing and phasing of grant claims. 
GRANT CLAIMS CAN 
BE SUBMITTED: 
- before asset 
expenditure 
- only after asset 
expenditure 
- only after given 
proportion of project 
expenditure 
- only after all 
project expenditure 
- only in financial year 
after year of expenditure 
BELGIUM 
CG 
DENMARK 
IG 
FRANCE 
RDG 
GERMANY 
IA IG 
IRELAND 
CG 
ITALY 
CG 
LUXEMBOURG 
CG 
NETHERLAND 
IPR 
UNITED KINGDOM 
RDG IRG 
Key: CG - capital grant; IG - investment grant; RDG - regional development grant; 
IA - investment allowance; IPR - investment premium; IRG - interest relief grant. 
Note: This table is necessarily simplified. The reader is referred to the synopsis 
tables for more details. 
TIMING AND PHASING OF AWARD 
Tax treatment is one factor which can lower the effective value of 
incentives. Timing and phasing of award is another, even though of more 
minor importance. Table 4 brings together in summary form our synopsis 
information on the timing and phasing of grant claims. In particular, 
the tables tries to show when, in relation to asset expenditure, grant 
claims can be submitted. From the table, it can be seen that claim 
submission ranges from before the asset is invoiced to after completion 
of project construction. The most common procedure, however, is that 
grant claims are made either in line with expenditure or on the basis of 
blocks of expenditure (though in this latter case advance grant payments 
are often available). It is an obvious point that systems which do not 
allow claims to be made in line with expenditure inflict liquidity 
problems on firms - problems often made worse by delays in the payment 
of grant (although the claim processing period is generally reasonably 
short, ranging from one to three months on average). At least some 
countries could - at little or no cost to the exchequer - increase 
the effective value of their grants by adopting a more generous approach 
to the timing and phasing of both grant claims and payment. 
For fiscal concessions, the delays between expenditure and receipt 
of award can be very long indeed since these concessions are generally 
only "paid" in respect of profits generated by aided investment. Given 
the standard delays in the payment of corporation tax, anything up to 
two or more years can lie between asset expenditure and receipt of a 
fiscal concession on that expenditure. It is difficult to see an easy 
solution to these delays in the sense of cutting them back - except a 
greater effort by the authorities (and some countries already do this) 
to vary advance payments of tax (where such payments exist) to take account 
of fiscal concessions. The fact that there are often significant delays 
before receipt of fiscal concessions is probably one reason why they 
are rarely offered on their own within incentive packages, but rather 
tend to "top up" the more basic capital grants and soft loans. For 
their part, soft loans do not normally suffer from major delays - being 
drawn down generally in line with need. In this sense, they have 
an advantage over grants and fiscal concessions - an advantage which 
has, perhaps, been underrated by many observers. 
215 
We have so far been concerned with timing and phasing in the 
payment of incentives. There is, however, a related issue which is 
concerned with the timing and phasing of decisions on applications, 
and involves the question of whether or not application is required 
before the start of the project. The picture among the EC countries is 
a varied one but generally projects which have already started cannot 
then apply for an incentive. The major exceptions are the depreciation 
allowances in all countries (for which normally no formal application is 
made before the submission of tax claims to the appropriate tax office), 
the investment allowance in the Federal Republic of Germany (which 
anyway has fiscal roots), the item-related regional development grant 
in the United Kingdom, and the Luxembourg capital grant. The Danish 
incentives also belong to this list, although application is preferred 
before project construction starts, as perhaps does the French regional 
development grant where a letter of intent giving no more than 6 moaths 
notice of application allows the investor to commence the project before 
formally submitting his application. 
The intriguing question, of course, is whether, when projects can 
start before application, the incentive can be viewed as influencing 
the investment decision and, thus, whether such "retrospective awards" 
are merely windfall gains. The answer depends on a variety of factors -
and, in particular, on the automaticity of the incentive (and many of the 
schemes that do allow projects to start before application are fairly 
automatic) and on the extent to which the system allows informal contacts 
and discussions before formal application. Our own view would be that, 
to avoid the dangers of retrospective awards, application should be 
required before project start, at least for the discretionary schemes. 
Of course, this does not guarantee that the incentive will be incorporated 
into the investment decision, but it gives a slightly greater chance of 
incorporation. Ideally, one might argue that the project should not 
start until a decision has been reached (and fewer countries insist on 
this than insist on application before project start). But given 
the processing time of applications (and this varies considerably 
between countries, from one month to one year) this is probably not 
acceptable unless countries could cut back substantially on application 
processing times - and on other grounds there may be good reasons for 
trying to do this. Requiring firms to wait for the decision before 
project start would, again, not guarantee incorporation into the investment 
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decision, but would at least increase the chances of this being done. 
Unless somebody can design a system which ensures incorporation of 
incentives into investment decisions, there is not a lot more that can 
be done in this area. 
There is one final point which deserves to be made in the context 
of timing and phasing, and this concerns the way in which grant awards 
are determined or fixed. In some countries, grants are agreed in 
percentage terms on the basis of anticipated expenditure and the fixed 
sum resulting is then the amount for which the applicant is eligible. 
In others, grants are fixed in percentage terms and are then paid out 
on the basis of incurred, not expected, costs (with some safeguards 
to protect against major overspending). The former approach can reduce 
grant "values" if firms tend to underestimate project costs (and even 
in non-inflationary days this seems to have been common). The 
alternative system of paying on the basis of actual costs does of 
course have its dangers - especially in making firms perhaps less 
cost conscious; but it would surely be a foolish firm that relaxed its 
cost consciousness merely because it had been awarded an incentive. 
It does seem to us, therefore, that the system of paying the grant on 
the basis of actual expenditure (even though this may make for some 
budgetary difficulties for the administration) rather than anticipated 
expenditure has the considerable advantage of holding the value of the 
incentive; and we would suspect that it would have more appeal (given 
firms' inflationary fears) than any numerical appraisal would 
suggest. 
INTEGRATION 
A standard problem in the operation of any policy with a variety 
of instruments to attain its objectives is integration between 
instruments. Regional incentive policy is no different from other 
policies in this respect. Even though the incentives may have broadly 
the same objective, they sometimes have different delineations and 
definitions of eligible industries, eligible items of expenditure, 
eligible forms of expenditure, conditions of award etc. It seems to us 
that in many countries some standardisation of conditions and other 
features between schemes is needed (even without proposing a separate 
administrative body - or at least a separate contact and/or design body 
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for all regional incentives, a proposal which is worthy of active consider-
ation) . Such standardisation would be to the advantage of the industrialist 
since he will often want to evaluate regional incentives as a package 
rather than individually. 
This issue of the package approach to incentive policy brings 
us to another aspect of integration, and this concerns the addability 
of incentives. We have already seen in Part I that incentives are 
frequently not addable - either covertly or overtly - and that where 
they are combined the award of one can detract from the value of another 
such as to give a misleading impression of the size of the incentive 
package as a whole. Moreover, most countries impose cumulability 
limits on incentive combinations - sometimes in the form of public sector 
contribution constraints and at other times (and this is normally the 
reverse side of the same coin) through "own finance" limits. 
But, perhaps more interesting, are some of the side effects of 
adding incentives and viewing them as packages. We have found cases 
where the issue of addability has so blunted the value of incentives 
that an objective of the policy maker (e.g. to favour setting up as 
opposed to extension projects) has not been fulfilled. On a more general 
level we have a number of examples in countries where the objectives of 
selectivity in the main schemes have been seriously blunted when 
incentives are viewed as a package. Our view would be, anyway, that 
there are substantial prospects for standardising and integrating 
schemes such as to allow a better appreciation by applicants of the package 
on offer and its likely effects. 
A further point on the integration of schemes needs to be made 
and this is that even for their own purposes governments are not always 
clear on the addability of incentives. Most countries have systems 
for limiting total public contributions (although these differ 
markedly between countries not only in terms of values but also in terms 
of definition) and yet these systems do not always cover all incentives. 
Sometimes this is because of the problems of including particular 
incentives into the formula for the calculation of maxima, but on other 
occasions it seems to reflect arbitrary decisions. If there is a real 
interest in controlling the maximum public contribution or the maximum 
aid awarded then there is a lot of distance still to go in many countries 
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in terms of incorporating the whole of the incentive package. The simple 
exercise of reviewing the position in this respect would be of value in 
illustrating to the policy-maker more clearly the offsetting nature of 
some of the incentives when combined together. 
The problem of integrating or coordinating regional incentive 
schemes is made more difficult by a variety of tiny incentives in some 
of the EC countries. A lot of these small incentives were introduced 
long ago, have often been reduced in value by inflation, and are 
frequently poorly integrated into the major schemes. In some cases, 
the impression we have is that these schemes are almost forgotten 
anachronisims. One indication of this is that they are not always 
considered when own capital requirements or public sector contribution 
limits and similiar maximum conditions are being calculated. Many of 
the schemes are poorly documented and publicised. Since in addition 
they are often old and have only been adjusted ad hoc over time they tend 
to be complicated and can be expensive to administer. Indeed, some 
must cost more to administer than they pay out in benefits. Our view 
would be that there is a need to review such schemes either with the 
objective of integrating them into current incentive packages or of 
scrapping them. Many countries have incentives which are probably 
candidates for withdrawal or, given the psychological and political 
problems of dropping incentives, being phased out. On the other hand, 
wild cutting would be undesirable. Some of the minor schemes still 
fulfil a useful function for particular sectors, firms or areas. All 
that we are saying is that these schemes need to be examined to check 
on the justification for their continuance. 
The integration and coordination of schemes could grow as a 
problem in the future with the trend in many countries towards greater 
regional autonomy in the award of incentives. So far, however, our 
evidence is that, although regional devolution of the administration 
of awards is becoming common, control is generally still strongly 
exercised from the centre. Since the policy is often financed from 
the centre, and the people involved.in incentive administration tend to 
have a loyalty to the centre (career prospects are often centre-
orientated) this control is likely to continue. On the other hand, as 
regions increase in political power the pressure for regionally-operated 
and initiated measures will grow. 
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Such devolution is, of course, not necessarily a "bad thing" 
even in economic terms; and in many instances, given the regional 
and local aspirations (and knowledge) in many countries it is to a 
large extent inevitable. But what it can do is to increase the risk of 
wasteful outbidding between regions. That some outbidding will take 
place is to be expected - it is one of the inevitable consequences 
of the devolution of power. We would argue, however, that there is a 
need for some system of coordination - certainly involving centralised 
information on awards and with maxima being set for projects (and with 
all incentives being included in these maxima). Although the setting of 
such maxima is technically difficult, it is necessary if any coordination 
is to take place. To ease the problem of getting such proposals accepted 
some flexibility will no doubt be required, such that regions can go 
over the maxima with the permission of the central coordinating body 
(as in the Federal Republic of Germany). The coordination of regionally 
awarded incentives is going to be a major issue in a number of countries, 
particularly in the current and foreseeable economic conditions with a 
shortage of mobile projects. Certainly it is no answer simply to ban 
regionally-operated schemes since the experience of many of the EC 
countries is that local and regional aspirations will, in one form or 
another, win through. The task of the centre therefore is to adjust to 
the trend and to try to evolve systems of control which will avoid at 
least the worst side effects. 
One final point must be made on the issue of integration although 
it does take us outside our immediate remit. Many administrators have 
commented to us that perhaps the most serious problem of integration, 
even within countries, concerns integration with other, non-incentive, 
aspects of regional policy and with national policies - whether these 
latter concern incentives or not. Examples to illustrate the problem 
in this context are not rare. While, for example, regional incentives 
are being operated to encourage regional development in particular areas, 
the other arms of policy are closing railway lines or turning down 
infrastructure improvement schemes. While regional incentives are 
operated to give preferential treatment to the problem areas, sectoral 
or national incentives are introduced which cut down substantially on 
the net advantage conferred by the regional incentives per se. Such 
problems of overlap and contradiction are probably of growing importance 
since tjjere seems to be a general trend towards a greater use of 
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micro-policy, perhaps because of the inadequacies of macro-policies 
in the current economic conditions. From the viewpoint of the net 
advantage conferred by regional schemes this is a worrying trend since 
our impression is that the regional schemes have not been adjusted 
accordingly. In a number of countries, micro-policies have been 
introduced for sectors and for the nation as a whole which have very 
similar characteristics to the regional incentives. This is 
particularly true in the area of soft loans where, in many countries, 
although the regions superficially enjoy soft loans of a very generous 
character, similar soft loans (admittedly often slightly less generous) 
are paid to much industry in the non-problem areas. In other cases, 
but these are few, national schemes can indirectly mean little benefit 
for the regional scheme. A national accelerated depreciation scheme, for 
example, can reduce to virtually zero a regional fiscal incentive since 
even for the nation as a whole the consequence of the national scheme 
is that profits are virtually free of tax. 
Of course, if micro-policies have been introduced with the clear 
intention of diminishing the regional advantage of the regional 
incentive schemes, then there are no grounds for criticism. In a 
number of cases, however, it would seem that they have been brought in 
with no clear assessment of what they would do to the power and 
effectiveness of the regional incentives, or indeed without any great 
consideration of their regional implications. It is vital that the 
regional dimension be taken into account in the design and formulation 
of all national schemes and policies. Indeed, in many cases, there would 
be advantages if they had a distinct regional element. There are many 
who would argue, and it is a viewpoint with which we would agree, that 
unless regional policies per se are supplemented by regionally-
oriented national policies, no major step forward will be possible in 
regional development. 
MONITORING, EVALUATION AND DESIGN 
There is one feature of the regional incentives in the Community 
countries which was not covered in Part I of this report (which was 
concerned with current policy) and this is the changeability of policy 
over time. In all countries, policies have, over the post-war period, 
changed frequently and often radically. Some policies have gone round 
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in circles. In one country, for example, the regional incentive policy 
has switched from one of spatial spread to concentration, and then back 
to spread - all in 12 years. In another, a policy hailed initially as 
the saviour of the backward regions was scheduled for scrapping a few 
years later, but in the event was doubled in value (subsequently, less 
than three years thereafter, to be withdrawn a few months after new 
revised rates were announced and just before they were to be introduced). 
Such changeability certainly reduces the visibility of policy (and thus 
its effectiveness) and can, if not handled correctly, inflict costs on 
firms. 
Many location surveys have argued that the changeability of policy 
is seen by firms as one of the main shortcomings of the regional 
incentive system - and one which results in the incentives being 
severely "discounted" in any investment or location decisions. On these 
grounds alone, there are reasons for arguing for more stability. But, 
of course, policies can never be held indefinitely; nor would this be 
desirable, practical or feasible. But, given changeability, the least 
that is required are clear systems to protect applicants in the event 
of policy changes. Most countries have such schemes, but, as the 
synopsis tables will have made clear, the systems are quite wide-ranging. 
Indeed in some countries incentive change is treated only in an ad hoc 
manner. In line with our general philosophy of the need for simple and 
overt systems we would argue that such ad hoc approaches have serious 
disadvantages. If we were to choose from the various possibilities we 
would suggest that firms which have already applied for the incentive 
be awarded the "old scheme" rates irrespective of whether these are 
better or worse. It was, after all, on the basis of the scheme existing 
at the time of application that the firm made its investment or location 
decision. If incentives are meant to influence the investment or 
location decision of the firm, then to make a more generous award 
merely because the scheme has changed results only in a windfall profit 
for the firm and does not affect the decision. In any event, we would 
argue strongly that the systems used in thè event of an incentive change 
should be overt and widely known if firms, fearful of change, are not to 
discount the incentives. Moreoever, it is surely desirable that the 
change be implemented quickly after announcement if, when systems are 
made more generous, firms are not to hold back their plans and applications. 
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There are a variety of reasons for the changeability of policy; 
political as well as economic. But, in addition, we would argue that 
changeability reflects the lack of a firm base on which many policies 
are founded - and deficiencies in the monitoring, evaluation and design 
of incentives. 
Monitoring of firms and projects awarded regional incentives is 
less than we expected and, when done, the information is often spread 
(and not shared) between administrative groups responsible for the 
various incentives. At times, it almost seems as if the awarding 
authorities did not want to know the outcome. This, incidentally, 
would not be as surprising as it might seem at first sight since 
monitoring can lead to problems of deciding on appropriate action. A 
firm, for example, which has not fulfilled its agreed employment targets 
could have been placed in this position because it had become more 
efficient than anticipated. The inevitable question is whether it should 
be penalised for such efficiency. On the other hand, a failure to meet 
employment targets may come about because the firm has encountered problems 
in the implementation of its project; and the question which arises here 
is whether its possible collapse would be precipitated by clawing back 
the incentive awarded. In practice, in most countries, clawback is 
rare. But monitoring has other uses beyond that of enforcing the law 
and checking on abuses. It has extremely useful feedback advantages 
for the authorities when they are required to check on the realism of 
applications and to assess the impact and results of policy, 
i.e., in policy evaluation. 
There is, in most countries, an apparent lack (though with a few 
major and impressive exceptions) of hard evaluation of the effectiveness 
of schemes - the jobs and investment created (as opposed to the quite 
different issue of jobs and investment associated), the quality and 
stability of the jobs involved, and the general worthwhileness of 
policy. In one country, (our view is that it would apply to most others 
also), a parliamentary enquiry into regional policy made the point that 
"regional policy has been empiricism gone mad, a game of hit and miss 
played with more enthusiasm than success. We do not doubt the good 
intentions, the devotion even of those who have struggled over the 
years to relieve the human consequences of regional disparities. We 
regret that their efforts have not been better sustained by the proper 
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evaluation of the costs and benefits of the policies pursued". The lack 
of research on the issue of effectiveness, is particularly unfortunate 
since in the current and foreseeable economic climate there is a real 
need for continuing proof of the cost effectiveness of regional incentives 
and regional policy generally if these policies are to be continued or 
strengthened. 
But monitoring and research are needed not only for scheme evaluation, 
they are also needed in the design of schemes. Without comprehensive and 
structured information on the results of current policies and the 
features and needs of recipient firms, it is difficult to design 
appropriate incentives. Monitoring would go some way towards meeting 
design needs; but not the whole way. There is a remarkably large dark 
area of ignorance concerning the actual use to which incentives are 
put by firms. This is an area where further research is particularly 
urgent. In general incentives tend to be "designed" and proposed with 
little detailed analysis, and on the back of little research. 
But research takes time (and the recommendations which fall out 
are not always acceptable, or even feasible 1) and the inevitable 
question is what can be done in the meantime. One possibility which 
appeals to us, and to a degree has already been implemented in at least 
one country (and is implicit in many of the package schemes in 
other countries) is that, given the different (and often unknown) needs 
of firms, industries and sectors, 'incentive options' should be offered. 
Thus, if a firm wants to take its incentives wholly in the form of 
grants, or any other of the incentives on offer, then it would be 
allowed to do so. In brief, the proposal would be to permit a firm to 
"trade-in" those incentives for which it is eligible for that type or 
types which it considers itself to need. The outcome would be that firms 
would receive those incentives which were best suited to their own 
position, thus increasing the likelihood of the incentives actually 
having an impact on decisions. Such an approach would also provide the 
administrator with invaluable feedback on firm preferences, and this 
in itself would help in incentive design. The approach would require 
more flexible budgeting than is to be found in many countries (and at 
least multi-year budgets). In addition there are technical problems of 
calculating conversion ratios between incentives, but this kind of 
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problem has beeen faced by the regional authorities in other contexts 
and would not appear to be insurmountable. 
Throughout this section we have argued the need for more evaluation 
and a better design of incentives. Unless this is done, regional policy, 
particularly in the current economic climate, runs the risk of being 
cut back. Regional incentives as an arm of regional economic policy take 
up substantial resources. Expenditure has, as we have seen, been 
growing in the Community countries and has now reached very high levels. 
In total (and limiting the calculations to the major regional incentives), 
some 1,150 million U.S. dollars worth of investment grants were approved 
in 1975, together with subsidised loans to the value of 5,270 million 
dollars and various tax and social security concessions to the value 
of some 1,220 million dollars. Moreover, on top of this there were 
various fiscal concessions awarded which cannot in general be quantified. 
Expenditure at such levels must, we would argue, warrant more attention 
to evaluation and design than would appear currently to be applied. 
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Table 5: Effective Subsidies as a Percentage of Various Denominators 
maximum rates and maximum incentive combinations by top 
priority region in each country 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom 
MAIN PROBLEM 
REGION 
Development Zones 
Special Develop-
ment Regions 
Award Zone 1 
Zonenrandgebiet 
Designated Areas 
Mezzogiorno 
-
Development Areas 
Special Develop-
ment Areas 
INCENTIVE 
COMBINATIONS 
CG+IS+AD 
CSL+IG 
RDG+SDA 
IA+IG+SDA 
IDA grant + Ii 
CG+NSL 
(+SSC 
CG+TC 
IPR+AD 
RDG+IRG 
EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDIES 
INITIAL ANNUAL 
CAPITAL CAPITAL VALUE 
COSTS COSTS ADDED 
11.3 10.1 3.3 
15.4 
13.5 
18.2 
34.7 
46.3 
7.8 
15.9 
13.8 
12.2 
15.5 
32.1 
41.7 
7.1 
13.7 
5.2 
3.7 
5.3 
10.0 
12.1 
(+2.8-7.9) 
2.7 
4.9 
21.5 21.7 4.8 
Incentive keys: 
Belgium: capital grant (CG); interest subsidy (IS); accelerated depreciation (AD) 
Denmark: company soft loan (CSL); investment grant (IG) 
France: regional development grant (RDG); special depreciation allowance (SDA) 
Germany: investment allowance (IA); investment grant (IG); special deprecia-
tion allowance (SDA) 
Ireland: Industrial Development Authority (IDA) grant; investment allowance (IA) 
Italy: capital grant (CG); national soft loan (NSL); social security concession (SSC) 
Luxembourg: capital grant (CG); tax concession (TC) 
Netherlands: investment premium (IPR); accelerated depreciation (AD) 
United Kingdom: regional development grant (RDG); interest relief grant (IRG) 
Note: For the derivation of these figures, and a discussion of the incentives 
covered, see country-specific valuation tables. 
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A COMPARISON OF INCENTIVE VALUES 
So far we have concentrated, for the most part, on the conclusions 
and implications arising from a comparison of the key incentive features 
noted in the synopsis tables in Part I. We have not, however, considered 
the Part I valuations in any detail, and it is to these that we now wish 
to turn. But before doing this it is necessary once again to stress a 
number of important points made initially in the context of the general 
valuation introduction (see pps. 32-45 above) - namely, that we are measuring 
the intensity of policy (i.e. the value of an incentive to those projects 
in receipt of that incentive), not its scale; that we are concerned only 
with the regional advantage which incentives confer; and, above all, 
that our prime objective is the comparison and ranking of regional incen-
tives individually and as packages. 
In Table 5 some of the main valuation results from Part I are brought 
together in summary form. The table presents, in terms of the three 
standard valuation denominators (initial capital costs, annual capital 
costs and value added), the effective subsidy value of the maximum 
combination of incentives in the top priority region of each of the 
Community countries, assuming the maximum incentive award has been made 
in each case (subject, of course, to the "addability" constraints of 
each incentive package). 
From the table it can be seen that the incentive packages in the EC 
countries fall into three broad groups. The top group is clearly made 
up of the Italian and Irish packages, and this despite the fact that 
neither export profits tax relief in Ireland nor the IRPEG and ILOR tax 
concessions in Italy are directly included in the table due to the 
problems of valuing these concessions in a way comparable with that 
used to measure the value of the main financial concessions. Given 
that Ireland and Italy have perhaps the most serious and intractable 
regional problems in the Community, the high-ranking of their 
incentives is, however, understandable, and not particularly surprising. 
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Table 6 : Effective Subsidies as a Percentage of Various Denominators 
maximum rates and maximum incentive combinations in all 
designated problem regions by country. 
EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDIES 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
PROBLEM 
REGIONS 
Development Zones 
Special Develop-
ment Regions 
General Develop-
INCENTIVE 
COMBINATIONS 
CG+IS+AD 
CSL+IG 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom 
ment Regions 
Award Zone 1 
Award Zone 2 
Award Zone 3 
Zonenrandgebiet 
Non-Zonenrandgebiet 
Designated Areas 
Non-designated Areas 
Mezzogiorno-priority 
Mezzogiorno-
non priority 
Depressed Centre-
North 
-
Development Areas 
Intermediate Areas 
Special Development 
Areas 
Development Areas 
Intermediate Areas 
MSL+CSL 
RDG+SDA 
RDG+SDA 
RDG 
IA+IG+SDA 
IA+IG 
IDA grant + IA 
IDA grant 
CG+NSL 
(+SSC) 
CG+NSL 
(+SSC) 
NSL 
CG+TC 
IPR+AD 
IPR+AD 
RDG+IRG 
RDG+IRG 
RDG+IRG 
INITIAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
11.3 
15.4 
5.8 
13.5 
10.0 
5.7 
18.2 
10.3 
34.7 
24.2 
46.3 
36.7 
10.9 
7.8 
15.9 
10.9 
21.5 
18.4 
9.2 
ANNUAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
10.1 
13.8 
VALUE 
ADDED 
3.3 
5.2 
5.0 
12.2 
9.0 
5.2 
15.5 
8.7 
32.1 
22.4 
41.7 
33.0 
9.7 
7.1 
13.7 
9.3 
21.7 
18.7 
7.9 
1.9 
3.7 
2.7 
1.6 
5.3 
3.0 
10.0 
6.9 
12.1 
(+2.8-7.9) 
9.6 
(+2.8-7.9) 
2.3 
2.7 
4.9 
3.3 
4.8 
4.1 
1.7 
Incentive keys: See Table 5 above. 
Note For the derivation of these figures, and a discussion of the 
incentives covered, see country-specific valuation tables. 
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At the other extreme, though obviously not as clearly separate from 
the middle group of countries as Ireland and Italy, come Belgium and 
Luxembourg. That the Belgian package does not belong to the middle group 
is perhaps not immediately obvious, since the values for Belgium in 
Table 5 are not so very different from those for the French package. 
However, to the extent that the French local business tax concession is 
not included within the French incentive package in Table 5 (for reasons 
noted within the French country valuation in Part I) the table understates 
the value of the French scheme. Moreover, and again for reasons explained 
in Part I, Table 5 overvalues the regional advantage of the Belgian package 
by ignoring the very similar nation-wide aids in Belgium which "eat into" 
the regional differential. 
Finally, the remaining countries in Table 5 fall into a middle group. 
Less important than the ranking of countries within this group is the fact 
that - with the possible exception of the United Kingdom package - the 
spread of incentive values within the group is not large, especially 
bearing in mind that the French figures are probably understated. In 
terms of the initial capital cost denominator the range is .from 13.5 
percent (France) to 21.5 percent (UK); in terms of annual capital costs 
it is from 12.2 percent (France) to 21.7 percent (UK); and in terms of 
the value added denominator, it is from 3.7 percent (France) to 5.3 percent 
(Germany). We return later to the implications of this relatively narrow 
spread of values. For the moment, however, the United Kingdom position 
is worth noting since it brings out two important points in the table -
the fact that only for the United Kingdom package is the "annual capital 
cost" percentage higher than the "initial capital cost" percentage (and 
this because item-related replacement is subsidised as part of the UK 
regional development grant scheme); and the fact that in the United 
Kingdom (and indeed it is also true of Italy) gross profits make up a 
relatively low proportion of value added (and this primarily because of 
the impact of inflation on the gross profits figures). 
So far, our discussion has been solely in terms of the overall maximum 
values of the various incentive packages. In practice, the incentive rate 
maxima in most countries are differentiated by type of problem region. 
In Table 6 we show the rate maxima (again for the maximum incentive com-
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binations) in all designated problem regions in the Community countries. 
It can be seen from the table that, in general, incentive packages 
in our middle group of countries are far less valuable outside the "top 
priority" problem regions than within them. This is particularly true 
of the packages on offer in the Danish General Development Regions, 
French Award Zone 3 and UK Intermediate Areas - all of which are worth 
less than half of the "top priority" area packages in their respective 
countries and all of which amount, in effective value terms, to less 
than 2 per cent of value added. But it is also true, if to a slightly 
lesser extent, of the Dutch Intermediate Area, German non-Zonenrandgebiet 
and French Award Zone 2 packages, these being worth between 10 and 11 
per cent of initial capital costs (2.7 to 3.3 percent Of value added). It 
is far less true of the UK Development Area package. Indeed this package 
is worth over 85 per cent of the package on offer in the UK Special 
Development Areas - not entirely surprising since the basic problem area 
distinction in the United Kingdom is between Development Areas (including 
Special Development Areas) and Intermediate Areas. 
As far as Ireland and Italy are concerned it can be seen that, apart 
from the obvious exception of the depressed areas of the Centre and North 
of Italy, package values outside the top priority problem regions remain 
high by international standards and indeed are above those found in the 
top priority areas of the other Community countries. Even after taking 
account, therefore, of differences by type of problem region, the gap 
between our top and middle group of countries remains clear. That between 
the middle of bottom country groups is however blurred by the existence 
of far less valuable maximum incentive combinations outside the top 
priority regions in the middle group of countries. 
It may be felt that since the foregoing discussion of the results 
presented in Tables 5 and 6 is wholly in terms of incentive package 
maxima, it does not get to grips with the reality of the situation in 
the respective countries. It takes no account, for example, of the 
relationship of average to maximum values; nor does it give any indica-
tion of the probability of obtaining (and hence the relative importance 
of) the maximum incentive combinations shown in the tables (although 
both of these topics have already been considered in the country-specific 
sections of Part I). We now turn to consider these factors in more detail. 
230 
By way of introduction, and bearing in mind that the combination of 
incentives in any given country can have an important bearing on the 
value of that country's incentive package, Table 7 shows (in terms of our 
three standard denominators) the maximum effective subsidy value of 
individual incentives, broken down by incentive, type. It can be seen 
from the table that, in effective value terms, capital grants are the most 
important element of the incentive package in all Community countries -
ranging from 2.7 per cent of value added in Luxembourg to almost 9 per 
cent of value added in Ireland and Italy. By comparison both soft loans/ 
interest subsidies (ranging from 0.9 to 3.2 per cent of value added) and 
accelerated depreciation allowances (ranging from 0.6 to 2.0 per cent of 
value added) are far less valuable. In general, capital grants are the 
prime factor determining incentive package values. 
Moving on to consider the available incentive packages in detail, we 
begin with our top group countries - Italy and Ireland. The important 
point to make about the Italian figures in Tables 5 and 6 is that they 
relate only to small projects, projects of less than Lire 2 milliard 
eligible investment. In the Mezzogiorno project size is the crucial variable 
in determining the value of incentives. It sets not only the level of the 
basic capital grant awarded but also (together with firm size) helps to 
determine whether a national soft loan can be offered. For very large 
projects, for example, (those over Lire 15 milliard eligible investment) 
the basic capital grant is at least 35 percent lower than for small projects. 
Moreover, there is no possibility of very large projects obtaining a 
national soft loan. The result is that for such projects (and indeed for 
certain large projects - those of between Lire 7 and 15 milliard eligible 
investment) the effective subsidy value of the combination capital grants 
and national soft loans is much lower than shown in Tables 5 and 6 - 13.9 
percent of initial capital costs, 12.6 percent of annual capital costs and 
(before taking account of the social security concession) 3.7 percent of 
value added for very large projects, for instance. 
In Ireland, too, the Table 5 and 6 maxima may give a somewhat over-
stated impression cf the value of the incentive package since average 
IDA grant awards for setting-up projects and major extensions are signi-
ficantly lower than the administrative maxima shown in the tables. In 
the period April 1973 to December 1975, for example, setting-up/major 
extension awards averaged just over half the administrative maxima. 
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Table 7 : Effective Subsidies as a Percentage of Various Denominators 
maximum rates of individual incentives. 
EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDIES 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
« 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
INCENTIVE 
(A) CAPITAL GRANTS 
capital grant 
investment grant 
regional development grant 
investment allowance 
investment grant 
IDA capital grant 
capital grant 
capital grant 
investment premium 
regional development grant 
interest relief grant 
INITIAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
9.5 
14.5 
11.8 
4.6 
11.3 
30.2 
33.8 
7.8 
13.2 
13.0 
8.5 
(B) INTEREST SUBSIDIES/SOFT LOANS 
interest subsidy 
company soft loan 
municipality soft loan 
ERP soft loan 
national soft loan 
SFA soft loan 
(C) ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION 
accelerated depreciation 
special depreciation 
special depreciation 
investment allowance 
accelerated depreciation 
4.7 
2.6 
4.7 
5.8 
12.5 
7.2 
3.7 
2.3 
6.9 
2.1 
3.6 
ANNUAL 
CAPITAL 
COSTS 
8.5 
13.0 
10.7 
3.9 
9.6 
28.0 
30.6 
7.1 
11.6 
14.3 
7.4 
4.2 
2.3 
3.9 
4.9 
11.1 
6.3 
3.3 
2.0 
5.9 
2.6 
2.9 
VALUE 
ADDED 
2.8 
4.9 
3.2 
1.3 
3.3 
8.7 
8.9 
2.7 
4.2 
3.1 
1.6 
1.4 
0.9 
1.5 
1.7 
3.2 
1.4 
1.0 
0.6 
2.0 
0.8 
1.0 
Note: For the derivation of these figures, see country-
specific valuation tables. 
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During this period the average value of the Irish package for export 
projects was 18.7 per cent of initial capital costs, 17.3 per cent of 
annual capital costs and 5.4 per cent of value added. 
Like those for the Italian package noted above, these figures are 
not out of line with those presented in Table 5 for our middle group of 
countries. It should not, however, be concluded from this that Italy 
and Ireland should be allocated to this middle group. As already pointed 
out on more than one occasion, the Table 5 and 6 results take no direct 
laccount of the award of export profits tax relief in Ireland or of the 
availability of the ILOR and IRPEG tax concessions in the Mezzogiorno -
incentives which place Ireland and Italy firmly back into a separate top 
country group. 
In the passing, it is perhaps worth pointing out that these 
'difficult-to-value' incentives have often been criticised because of 
the problems inherent in their measurement; and that they all have a 
'limited life at present - as indeed does the INPS social security 
concession in Italy. However, and this is an important point, without 
these aids the average Irish and Italian incentive packages are no 
longer clearly in the top group, a position which most would argue the 
severity of their regional problem demands. It is, moreover, doubtful 
if more easily measurable aids could recoup the loss of these more opaque 
measures - unless pushed to very high levels indeed. 
At the other end of the scale from Ireland and Italy we have 
already seen that, in Belgium, the regional differential is less 
than the absolute value of the regional incentive package. To this we 
should add that the Belgian figures in Tables 5 and 6 are maxima. 
Average awards are about three-quarters of the figures shown in Tables 
5 and 6. In Luxembourg, too, the average or typical award falls well 
below the maxima. Only 8 cases (less than 20 percent of the total 
processed) received a tax concession in the period 1974-76; while of 
those awarded a grant alone not one obtained the maximum rate, and 
indeed the average offer was in the region of half the maximum. 
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Turning now to the middle group of countries, the five incentive 
packages to be considered fall into two broad categories - those where 
the average award falls well below the Table 5 and 6 figures and those 
where rates of award tend to be fixed such that values in practice do not 
differ markedly from those shown in the tables. Within the first category 
come the Danish, German and (with some reservations) French packages; within 
the latter, the Netherlands (again with qualifications) and the United 
Kingdom. 
In Denmark, it will be clear from the country valuation in Part I, 
that the prime determinant of the value of the incentive package is 
whether or not an investment grant is awarded and the value of that grant. 
The investment grant, it will be recalled, is available only in the 
Special Development Regions. At a minimum (i.e. assuming all company 
soft loan awards are restricted to the Special Development Regions, which 
is obviously an extreme assumption) about half of those projects assisted 
through a company soft loan in the Special Development Regions also 
received an investment grant over the period 1972/3-1975/6, the average 
value of the investment grant award being about three-fifths of the 
maximum. In those cases where an investment grant is obtained the Danish 
regional incentive package belongs firmly to the middle group of countries, 
having an average effective value of 10.O per cent of initial capital 
costs, 9.0 per cent of annual capital costs and 3.4 per cent of value added. 
Where no investment grant award is made (and, as already noted, this was the 
case for about half the projects in receipt of a company soft loan) then 
the value of the Danish package is very much lower - being worth, for 
example, 5.5 per cent of initial capital costs, 4.7 per cent of annual 
capital costs and 1.8 per cent of value added when both average municipality 
and company soft loans are obtained. 
In Germany, the position is somewhat similar, the figures in Tables 
5 and 6 being highly dependent on the award of a maximum investment grant. 
In practice the (1976) average investment grant in the Zonenrãndgebiet 
(and average awards were even lower outside this area) was only 8.8 per 
cent of eligible investment when awarded in conjunction with an investment 
allowance and 8.5 per cent of eligible investment when no investment 
allowance award was made, compared with possible maxima of 17.5 per cent 
and 25 per cent respectively. Moreover, only about one fifth of eligible 
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cases actually obtained an investment grant. Both these factors have a 
not insignificant impact on the Table 5 and 6 values. Outside the Zonen-
randgebiet in particular, awards tend to be low when no. investment grant 
is obtained since special depreciation allowances are not available. 
Awarded on its own, the investment allowance is worth only 4.6 per cent 
of initial capital costs, 3.9 per cent of annual capital costs and 1.3 
per cent of value added. Within the Zonenrandgebiet the German package 
falls much more within the middle range of effective values, the "standard" 
combination of investment allowance and special depreciation allowance 
being worth 11.5 per cent of initial capital costs, 9.8 per cent of annual 
capital costs and 3.3 per cent of value added. When an average investment 
grant is obtained on top of this these figures rise to 14.9, 12.7 and 4.3 
per cent respectively. 
In France, the crucial factor conditioning the level of a regional 
development grant award (other than location and project type) is the 
capital intensity of the project being assisted - awards generally being 
at fixed percentage rates subject to both area and project-type cost per 
job limits. As we noted in the introduction to the French valuation, 
the average award - as opposed to the award for the average project -
tends to be considerably lower than the figures shown in Tables 5 and 6. 
We estimated that the actual average award under the current regional 
development grant scheme is probably less than 12 per cent of qualifying 
investment. Moreover, although there are no specific figures for average 
awards in each of the three zones of award, the best possible estimates 
(based on average awards by region in 1975) suggest that there is little 
variation in the average grant by zone. If the average award in the maximum 
zone is assumed to be about 12 per cent of qualifying investment the 
figures shown in Tables 5 and 6 for the regional development grant and 
special depreciation allowance in combination reduce to roughly 7.7 per 
cent of initial capital costs, 6.9 per cent of annual capital costs and 
2.1 per cent of value added. It must not be forgotten, however that, on 
top of these incentives, the local business tax concession is also avail-
able in the French problem regions. 
In the Netherlands, as in Italy, project size is of central importance 
in determining the level of the investment premium, the basic Dutch regional 
incentive. For small projects (with eligible investment up to Fl 16 
million) the nominal rates of award of the investment premium are fixed 
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at 25 per cent and 15 per cent in Development and Intermediate Areas 
respectively such that the Table 6 figures (showing the Dutch package 
to be worth 15.9 per cent of initial capital costs, 13.7 per cent of 
annual capital costs and 4.9 per cent of value added in the Development 
Areas and 10.9, 9.3 and 3.3 per cent respectively in the Intermediate 
Areas) are representative of the position in practice. For large projects, 
however, (accounting for perhaps 10 per cent of the total number of cases 
processed) the 25 and 15 per cent rates represent maxima below which 
standard awards normally fall. Indeed, on average, large projects tend to 
obtain less than half the percentage award received by small projects. Given 
this, large projects in the Netherlands have very much lower effective 
values - the Development Area "average" being just 6.O per cent of initial 
capital costs, 5.3 per cent of annual capital costs and 1.9 per cent of 
value added. 
In the United Kingdom, the main element of the incentive package, 
the regional development grant, is both automatic and at a fixed rate. 
In terms of averages, therefore, the Table 5 and 6 figures remain broadly 
representative of the United Kingdom position. In effective value terms, 
the combination of regional development grant and interest relief grant 
is worth, on average, 18.1 per cent of initial capital costs, 18.7 per 
cent of annual capital costs and 4.1 per cent of value added in the 
Special Development Areas, 15.3 per cent, 16.o per cent and 3.5 per cent 
respectively in the Development Areas and 6.1 per cent, 5.2 per cent and 
1.1 per cent respectively in the Intermediate Areas. 
To summarise the position, it is clear that even in terms of average 
awards and standard incentive combinations the Irish and Italian packages 
are significantly more valuable than those found in the other Community 
countries. The distinction between our previously identified middle and 
bottom groups is, however, less clear. Indeed in particular problem regions 
and for particular incentive combinations it disappears completely. 
Before moving on to discuss the implications of the various valua-
tion results presented above, it must of course be stressed that these 
results are based on assumptions and that they will vary as these assump-
tions vary. However, as long as the tables are seen in their intended 
light - that is, as comparisons of the value of incentive schemes between 
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countries (as these schemes affect comparable projects) - then the varia-
tion in relative scheme values is slight. Thus while working capital 
levels will vary from high to low from project to project, they are 
unlikely to show marked variation between countries for broadly comparable 
projects. Moreover, whether the typical working capital level is above 
or below the assumed 30 per cent level (which our evidence suggests is 
typical) influences the relative value of only selective financial 
assistance in the United Kingdom and national soft loans in Italy -
neither of which is of major importance in effective value terms within 
their country packages - since working capital is not aided by any other 
incentives. Similarly, the assumptions made in relation to the annual 
capital cost denominator are sensitive, as far as the ranking of incen-
tives is concerned, only in the case of UK regional development grants 
and the Irish investment allowance since only for these incentives is 
item-related replacement subsidised. 
The general point, then, is that variation of the valuation exercise 
assumptions will not have a significant impact on the ranking of the 
various incentive schemes. Where changing the assumptions does have an 
effect, however, is on the absolute value of incentives and incentive 
packages, and on their value at the project level. Indeed, from project 
to project there are likely to be quite major valuation differences. 
To take a simplified (we ignore the impact of taxation and delays 
in payment), but in no way extreme example, a 20 per cent grant on initial 
fixed capital costs would have an effective value of 10 per cent of 
initial capital costs (assuming 50 per cent working capital), 8 per cent 
of annual capital costs (assuming an annuitising factor of 0.8) and 
0.8 per cent of value added (assuming gross profits to be 10 per cent of 
value added); while an identical nominal grant would have an effective 
value of 18 per cent of initial capital costs (assuming 10 per cent 
working capital), 21.6 per cent of annual capital costs (assuming item-
related replacement is subsidised and the annuitising factor is 1.2) and 
10.8 per cent of value added (assuming gross profits to be 50 per cent 
of value added). Clearly, incentives "worth" 0.8 per cent of value added 
and 8 per cent of annual capital costs will have a different impact from 
those "worth" 10.8 per cent of value added and 21.6 per cent of annual 
capital costs. Project level variations on this scale thus have obvious 
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(and serious) implications for the ex ante control of incentive awards 
and, in particular, for any EC co-ordination solution - requiring project-
based and not scheme-based control. We return to the problem of EC 
co-ordination policy in the next section. 
For the moment, there are two final points which we want to make about 
the valuations. The first is that, within the three groups which have been 
identified (at least in terms of award maxima) it would seem to us that the 
narrow range of incentive scheme values is such that regional incentives 
per se (and, of course, in practice, they can never be divorced from the 
context - both national and regional - in which they operate) are unlikely 
to have a major impact on international investment and location decisions. 
Even between the three groups, it could be argued that incentives have only 
a limited impact given the peripheral nature of both Ireland and the 
Mezzogiorno, and the relatively minor effective value differences between 
the middle and low group country packages. 
Our second point concerns whether or not incentives of the value we 
have calculated are likely to have a marked impact on international 
competition and trade, or on investment and location decisions within a 
country. The honest answer is that we do not have much to say here. We 
would certainly be wary, in the context of this report, of using our 
vaulation figures to take a line on this; they have anyway, as was 
stressed above, been calculated primarily for international ranking and 
comparative purposes. 
In respect of competition and trade it could of course be argued 
that the maximum values which we have calculated of less than five 
percent of value added (say, some two percent of total production costs) 
for the middle and bottom group of countries are unlikely to provide any 
major competitive or pricing advantage for those in receipt of the 
incentives - particularly since no account has been taken in our 
calculations, (not least because of lack of information), of incidence 
(i.e. the proportion of the incentives used to increase factor rewards 
rather than reduce prices) or of dislocation costs (although many 
observers would claim that these are substantial) Moreover, as we have 
seen, average values tend to fall well below the maxima. But there again, 
it needs to be stressed that for particular projects incentives can assume 
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high levels in relation to value added or total production costs and 
that even a one or two percent advantage could be important for firms 
in particular marketing conditions. 
Moving from the impact of incentives on pricing to their effect on 
investment and location decisions within countries the picture is no less 
uncertain. On the one hand it could be argued that investment and (even 
more so) location decisions are so problematic - with high margins of 
error and a large number of unknown and unpredictable factors within them 
that it is unlikely that incentives of the values noted earlier would be 
incorporated within the decision process, never mind turn a "no-go" 
project into a "go" project. On the other hand the argument could run 
that, moving away from the valuation averages, incentives can indeed have 
a high value for individual projects; that investment at the margin 
would anyway be influenced by values of the scale discussed earlier; 
and, further, that incentives have, in any case, a "value" beyond our 
calculations - in, for example, providing liquid funds at a key stage 
and giving a safety net to projects. But the truth of the matter is 
that until more is known about the investment decision-making process 
within firms we have no way of judging whether values of 5 or 10 or 20 
percent are likely to have an impact on investment, and indeed location, 
decisions. 
239 
SOME IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
So far in this report we have largely focussed on the member states, 
describing their regional incentives, comparing the effective values of 
their principal incentives and drawing a number of conclusions about 
their regional incentive policies. In this section we wish briefly to 
consider sane Community issues on which our work has a bearing. We do 
this under the three headings of "co-ordination", "harmonisation" and 
"own policy". 
COORDINATION 
By "co-ordination" we mean the regulation by DG IV (Directorate 
General for Competition) of the member states' regional incentive policies 
by setting maximum limits to the value of regional incentive assistance 
which may be given for a particular investment project. 
The operational goals of co-ordination are not easy to identify. 
We understand the general goals to be the containment of any distortions 
of trade which could arise because the member states offer regional 
incentives which might influence the location decisions of firms and 
which might distort trade flows between the member states. The goals 
of the policy concern, therefore, both location and trade. 
DG IV currently employs fixed capital investment as its control 
denominator - which is in keeping with the, admittedly still scanty, 
empirical evidence that same form of rate of return on capital criterion 
(which is essentially an extension of the fixed capital denominator) is 
a key criterion in investment and location decisions. On the other hand, 
this denominator can give rise to a bias against labour intensive projects 
a feature which, given the fact that a shortage of job opportunities is 
a prime feature of the problem areas, has been considered by many to be 
unwelcome. In response to this bias and in order to facilitate the 
accommodation of labour-related aids in the current valuation methodology, 
DG IV has been working on a revised co-ordination solution. Proposals, 
which are still (at late summer 1977) tentative, have been outlined in 
Opaque Aids Papers II (lV/58/77-E) and III (Iv/l26/77-E). 
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In the revised co-ordination solution the nominal ceiling on aid 
involves the present percentage limit in terms of net grant equivalent 
of fixed capital investment or a specified amount per job, the amount 
varying like the percentage limit between the four regions into which 
the Community is divided for co-ordination purposes. Calculations which 
we have made suggest that the revised solution would provide a fair 
proxy for project-level variations in the factor mix in value added and 
would hence remove the bias against labour intensive projects which 
characterises the present valuation method. Indeed, our calculations 
suggest an over-compensation for very labour intensive projects, i.e., 
they would receive a greater advantage than capital intensive invest-
ment. 
In general, therefore, we believe that the revised proposals repre-
sent a valuable step forward. At the same time, however, two features 
must cause some concern. The first is the assumption implicit in the 
use of a fixed amount per job that labour costs between the member states 
are at comparable levels. However, Community statistics show that even 
at the sectoral level differences of over 1O0 per cent are not uncommon. 
Similarly large discrepancies at the project level would imply a bias 
in favour of projects locating in the low labour cost countries of the 
Nine (though other factors might tend to cancel out the labour cost 
advantage, at least partially). If further investigation were to confirm 
an undesirable bias a possible remedy would be to express aid values in 
relation to labour in terms of actual (estimated) project labour costs. 
The second point about the revised co-ordination solution is that 
certain member states are apparently concerned that aids expressed in 
terms of labour costs could exceed total investment costs 
for more labour intensive projects. DG IV has accordingly asked whether 
a maximum ceiling should not be imposed in addition to the nominal ceiling 
(ibid, p. 26). It has proposed a possible ceiling for the 20 per cent 
zone of 80 per cent, i.e., four times the nominal ceiling. But the same 
formula would yield ceilings of 100, 120 and 400 per cent in the other 
three co-ordination regions, thus only partially solving the problem. 
If, alternatively, a ceiling of 100 per cent (i.e., equal to the total 
investment) were fixed for the other three zones, this would represent 
a reversion back towards the old bias in favour of capital intensive 
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projects, thus defeating the object of the exercise. There is no easy 
solution to this problem - which is an important one not only in its 
substantive implications but also because it underlines very clearly an 
element of goal conflict inherent in co-ordination. 
This conflict may not be immediately apparent from what has gone 
before. But it should be evident when it is recalled that the investment-
related denominator is appropriate to the goal of containing incentive 
outbidding and that the labour-cost-related denominator proxies the 
factor mix in value added and is therefore a relevant denominator for 
regulating trade distortion effects. If, therefore, as outlined in the 
previous paragraph, the labour-cost-related denominator is to be con-
strained so as to preclude awards exceeding total investment costs, the 
further implication is that the goal of containing trade distortion 
effects is being sacrificed in favour of regulating incentive outbidding. 
Hence our belief that co-ordination, as currently conceived, contains 
an inherent element of goal conflict. 
Our discussion of co-ordination up to this point has been limited to 
the objectives and effects of the policy. In addition, we have one 
point to make about the implementation of the policy. This is to stress 
the need for project-based co-ordination. While it has always been 
intended that the policy should be applied at the project level (cf. 
Communication of the Commission to the Council on General Regional Aid 
Systems SEC (71) 3885 final of October 27, 1971) it is not certain that 
all of the member states have done so all of the time. 
It would appear, for example, that the policy has sometimes been 
applied at the scheme level rather than at the project level, by calculating 
whether maximum levels of assistance awarded to average projects 
would exceed Community limits. But project-related co-ordination is 
absolutely essential for, as we have indicated earlier in this report, 
there can be marked differences in incentive values at the project level 
because of the considerable variation in the cost profiles of individual 
projects. When the policy is applied at the scheme level, by contrast, 
it is insensitive to this variation - and is anyway of, doubtful practical 
relevance because, as we have also seen earlier in this report, the differ-
ences at the scheme level in the value of incentives between the member 
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States are, except in certain peripheral regions, small and unlikely to 
have any significant impact on investment location decisions. In order 
to ensure project-based co-ordination we would propose that DG IV should 
scrutinise from time to time the amounts of assistance actually awarded 
for a randomly selected number of projects. 
Co-ordination is closely linked to "harmonisation", which is the 
second facet of Community regional incentive policy on which our work 
has a bearing. 
HARMONISATION 
In broad terms, the "harmonisation" policy of DG XVI (Directorate 
General for Regional Policy) includes ensuring that the regional incentives 
offered by the various member states are generally consistent with the 
development priorities of the different problem regions in the Community. 
It is evident that there is a close relationship between "co-ordina-
tion" and "harmonisation": co-ordination has a marked harmonisation 
component, namely the closer alignment of the value of regional incentives 
in the member states. This implies that there will need to be particularly 
close cooperation between DG IV and DG XVI as harmonisation proceeds. 
Indeed, there could well be grounds for a review of competences -
even though the Directorate General for Competition would obviously 
continue to be involved in the trade implication of regional incentive 
awards. 
This general issue of the relationship between coordination and 
harmonisation to one side, our work has a number of further implications 
for harmonisation. Once Regional Development Programmes and bi-ennial 
reporting on the socio-economic development of the Community have been 
fully implemented and have allowed measurement of the scale and intensity 
of regional problems in the Community - and we have no recommendations 
to make in this respect other than to emphasise strongly how indispensible 
this preliminary step is to any meaningful attempt at harmonisation -
work will have to begin on identifying those features of the member states' 
regional incentive policies most in need of greater alignment, and on how 
a greater alignment can be achieved. 
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As we have seen earlier in this report, there is a significant degree 
of similarity already existing between the policies operated by the member 
states. Moreover, harmonisation does not require policies which are 
identical as much as policies which are equivalent. For both of these 
reasons, harmonisation is not necessarily the formidable task which it 
might at first appear. 
We would envisage harmonisation proceeding in two stages. The first 
stage would be an agenda-setting exercise in which the member states and 
the Commission would discuss the key features of regional incentives on 
the basis of their respective experience. Earlier sections of this report 
have indicated areas where such debate could be useful: discretion versus 
automaticity; the merits of different forms of assistance (grants versus 
loans versus fiscal concessions); broad-banding versus growth pole 
approaches to spatial discrimination; multi-level administration and 
problems of co-ordination; the relationship between regional incentives 
and other forms of economic development incentives. These issues appertain 
to the general principles of regional incentive policy. More detailed 
facets of existing national policies which would merit discussion from 
the viewpoint of harmonisation - and again covered in earlier sections 
of this report - would be: aids on working capital; the eligibility of 
hire purchase and leasing; aids for tertiary investment; aid for rationalisa-
tion, reorganisation and modernisation projects; the timing and phasing 
of payments; tax treatment of incentives; and indeed many other of the 
features covered in the synopsis tables in Part I. The merit of this 
kind of agenda-setting exercise is twofold. It provides a forum within 
which experience can be shared to mutual advantage and in so doing can 
allow, secondly, consensus - if indeed there is felt to be a need for 
greater harmonisation in respect of the particular issue under discussion -
to emerge. This then leads directly into the second stage of harmonisation, 
which is the setting of priorities for harmonisation and the working out 
of objectives on which the regional incentive policies of the member states 
should converge over a shorter or longer period of time. 
Any discussion of harmonisation of the member states' policies raises 
again the issue of the complexity involved in the comparison of these policies 
for the investor. This leads to the first of our "own policy" proposals, 
i.e., promotion policies which could be operated by the Community using its 
own funds. 
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OWN POLICY 
The potential mobility of new investment in the Community is inhibited, 
and could even be distorted, by a lack of comprehensive, comparable and 
up-to-date information on location factors in the nine member states of 
the Community. We believe that a Community initiative to make available 
such information could contribute much to the development of the problem 
regions and the proposal along these lines in the Commission document 
(Guidelines for Community Regional Policy, COM (77) 195 final, para. 55) 
must be a welcome one - even if, in our view, it is too modest. We should 
like to see the establishment of a European Regional Documentation Centre. 
This Centre, to maximise its effectiveness, should not merely supply 
information but should also actively encourage the choice of problem 
region locations by firms, perhaps by undertaking location studies for 
investors, but certainly by putting them in contact with appropriate 
national agencies. The Centre's objective should be not only to encourage 
existing Community investors into the problem regions but also to attract 
new investment from outside the Community into those regions. The informa-
tion required by the Centre could be obtained, in part at least, within 
the framework of Regional Development Programmes and the system of bi-
ennial reporting. 
In addition to providing information the Community can also provide 
direct financial assistance to firms. Even now, of course, there are 
several Community sources of aid for regional development. Chief among 
these is the European Regional Development Fund. So far, however, its 
resources have been very limited (and have been further diminished by 
inflation) and have been spread over very wide areas and over a very 
broad range of project types. In brief, a small Fund has dissipated its 
effectiveness by seeking to do too much. We see little prospect of 
betterment in the near future (for proposals here see Guidelines for 
Community Regional Policy, ibid.) not least because the budgetary 
allocation seems likely to remain small and because the geographical 
spread could be even wider with the introduction of "specific action 
regions". We would prefer to see the Fund concentrate its interventions. 
Until such time as global Community regional development priorities have 
been set (and in line with which one presumes the Fund would devote the 
major part of its resources) this could be done by limiting Fund assistance -
as far as direct assistance to investors is concerned - to setting-up 
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projects in the national priority regions. We would argue that aid should 
be limited to setting-up projects since these generally involve the 
greatest dislocation costs for the investor; the national priority areas 
might be defined as those where the highest levels of aid are currently 
available (reflecting the fact that, from the individual country stand-
point, these are the extreme problem areas). Consistent with our oft-
repeated preference for incentives which are simple and automatic, we 
would argue that Fund assistance should be given automatically to every 
project in the defined regions and of the defined type which receives 
national assistance; we would in fact propose that the Fund "top up" 
national assistance by a specified percentage margin. 
Obviously, the value of the Fund contribution would be eroded if 
member states adjusted upwards the value of their incentives in other 
regions, or reduced the value of aid in the regions receiving Community 
supplements. To avoid these problems, there would have to be agreement 
that the member states would continue to supply aid at the usual levels. 
This should not be difficult to ensure for the automatic rate schemes 
in the member states which, as we have seen, are in the majority; nor 
need it be that difficult to ensure for the discretionary rate schemes 
since, as we have also seen, the awards are in practice often at "standard" 
rates. Moreover, by ensuring that aid is paid as of right for specific 
(named) projects in relatively small areas, there is every reason to 
believe that local economic and political self-interest can be relied 
upon to ensure that a substantial degree of "additionality" is achieved. 
We might finally note that the proposal effectively gives the Fund 
protection against inflation (although at the price of requiring a more 
flexible form of financing it) and, moreover, that it gives a greater 
degree of visibility to the Fund's interventions. 
The Fund is, of course, still in its infancy and over 
the years it may well, indeed should, come to expand the scope of 
its operations by taking on new functions. In the present austere 
economic climate it is rather difficult to conceive of new policies being 
adopted in the short term. Such new policies would anyway probably be 
premature before the Community has developed a global regional policy 
strategy. But it is not difficult to think even now of directions 
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in which the Fund might develop. The awarding of exchange rate sub-
sidies (i.e., meeting the exchange risk associated with providing and 
servicing loans denominated in foreign currencies) in conjunction with 
European Investment Bank loans to firms - which is not to be confused 
with the current Commission proposal for interest rate subsidies - is 
one possible new departure worthy of attention. Similarly, an idea 
which could have considerable substantive as well as symbolic merit 
would be the establishment, within or alongside the Fund, of a European 
Industrial Estates Corporation which, particularly in the frontier 
regions of the Community, could provide a significant contribution to 
regional development, not merely by the provision of industrial estates 
but by providing further stimulus to the member states to co-ordinate 
more closely their infrastructure programmes in these regions. 
Our proposal in Part I of this report that there are grounds for 
the member states to allow recipients of aid to "swap" incentives for 
which they are eligible could give rise to national budgetary problems. 
The Fund's resources could be used to allieviate, through loans and 
possibly in certain priority regions only, the budgetary problems which 
these swap arrangements imply - at least and particularly in the early 
years when these constraints would be at their greatest. 
We could also envisage a role for the Fund in supporting, through 
grants, some of the promotion activities (and perhaps particularly 
investment prospecting activities abroad) of the priority regions. Moreover, 
given that location studies are rarely eligible items of expenditure 
for incentives in most countries, the Fund could undertake to 
partially re-imburse firms for location studies aimed at a priority 
area location and for sending delegations to visit such locations. 
Many national incentive schemes do not include social, health and 
welfare investment by firms as eligible items of expenditure. The 
Fund could usefully assist such investment (e.g. sports facilities, worker 
accommodation, facilities for the firm's retired workers) in the priority 
areas, thereby contributing generally to the quality of life of the 
labour force in those areas and simultaneously reducing the demands on 
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and supplementing the often deficient social infrastructure of the problem 
regions. 
If the view were to be taken that the Fund might most usefully 
intervene by "filling the gaps" in most of the member states' existing 
incentive schemes, there are a number of features at which such 
assistance could be directed: leasing and leasing companies; stock-
holding projects by firms; vehicles as an eligible item of expenditure; 
many service activities. Another gap would be filled by making 
available funds to allow more and larger advance payments to be made 
by member states to recipients of regional incentives. 
Many of these ideas may seem somewhat extravagant, partly because 
they imply resources which are massive compared to those currently 
available to the Community for promoting regional development by 
incentives to firms and partly because they might seem to fly in the 
face of political realities. On the first point, we would like to see 
the Community being supplied with more funds to allow it to intervene 
directly in the promotion of the problem regions not least because this 
would facilitate the implementation of a European regional policy. 
There is a wealth of evidence from inter-organisational studies to 
demonstrate that co-operative policies such as "harmonisation" and 
"co-ordination" are more assured of success when sanctions can be 
imposed and that among the more effective sanctions are financial 
sanctions. On the second point, namely that some of our proposals 
might seem to fly in the face of political realities, we would only 
comment that anyone who wishes to advance novel policies - and a 
European regional policy is still a novel policy in search of acceptance -
must be something of a dreamer in the first instance, prepared to voice 
"unthinkable" ideas. 
However, whatever the substantive merit of our policy proposals 
they do bear witness to the view that there remains much that could -
some would say "should" or even "must" - be done at the Community level 
to promote the regions in need. It is our earnest hope that this 
report will assist not only a greater appreciation of the rich variety 
of regional incentive policies and practices in the countries of the 
Nine, but that it will serve equally as a reminder that much remains to 
be done in understanding and meeting the needs of the problem regions of 
the Community. 
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ADDENDUM 1 
SENSITIVITY OF EFFECTIVE VALUE CALCULATIONS 

Addenda Table 1 : Effective Subsidies as a Percentage of Value Added 
given various capital : labour keys - maximum rates 
and maximum incentive combinations by top priority 
region in each country. 
COUNTRY 
MAIN PROBLEM 
REGION 
EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDIES 
INCENTIVE AS A PERCENTAGE OF VALUE ADDED 
COMBINATIONS ASSUMING CAPITAL : LABOUR KEYS OF: 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom 
Development Zones 
Special Develop-
ment Regions 
Award Zone 1 
Zonenrandgebiet 
Designated Areas 
Mezzogiorno 
-
Development Areas 
Special Develop-
ment Areas 
C G + I S + A D 
CSL + IG 
RDG + SDA 
IA + IG + SDA 
REPORT, 
TABLE 5 
3.3 
5.2 
3.7 
5.3 
IDA grant + IA 10.0 
CG + NSL 
(+SSC) 
CG + TC 
IPR + AD 
RDG + IRG 
12.1 
(+2.8-7.9) 
2.7 
4.9 
4.8 
5:95 
0.5 
0.7 
0.6 
0.8 
1.6 
2.1 
(+3.7-10.5) 
0.4 
0.7 
1.1 
54:46 
5.5 
7.5 
6.6 
8.4 
17.3 
22.5 
(+1.8-5. 
3.8 
7.4 
11.7 
Incentive keys: See Table 5 in the report (page 226). 
Note: For a derivation of the report, Table 5,results and a 
discussion of the incentives covered, see the country-
specific valuation tables in Part I of the report. 
251 
The Services of the Commission requested that we show the impact of 
a high and a low gross profits : value added key on our Table 5 results 
using the value added denominator. For this purpose they suggested we use 
the most extreme capital : labour keys found at the industry level in 
Eurostat, National Accounts 1970-74 Eurostat Yearbook 2-1975, Statistical 
Office of the European Communities, 1975, Table 5 applied uniformly tc 
all countries. These extremes are 5:95 (United Kingdom, transport equipment) 
and 54:46 (Ireland, chemical products). The results are shown, together with 
the value added column taken from Table 5 of the report, in Addenda Table 1. 
From the table, it can be seen that the application of these extreme 
keys changes the absolute value of the various incentive packages signific-
antly. This of course is wholly in line with what is said on many occasions 
in the main body of the report'. The table does little more than reinforce 
our point that "project level variations on this scale have obvious 
(and serious) implications for the ex ante control of incentive awards" 
(report page 237-238). But for our purposes more important is that the 
international ranking is not significantly affected by the application of 
common capital : labour keys. The only change is that the United Kingdom 
moves up the ranking, and this because in the United Kingdom "gross profits 
make up a relatively low proportion of value added" (report page 229 ). 
The report also made the point that "with a common gross profits : value 
added key the ranking of incentive packages is obviously identical to that 
thrown up by the annual capital cost denominator (except perhaps where 
labour subsidies are paid)" (report page 45). A comparison of Addenda 
Table 1 and Table 5 in the report confirms this, and indeed shows Èhat 
even the ranking of the Italian package, with its social security concession, 
is unaffected by the capital : labour key chosen. 
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Addenda Table 2: Effective Subsidies as a Percentage of Annual Capital 
Costs given various plant life assumptions - maximum 
rates and maximum incentive combinations by top 
priority region in each country. 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom 
MAIN PROBLEM 
REGION 
INCENTIVE 
COMBINATIONS 
Development Zones 
Special Develop-
ment Regions 
Award Zone 1 
Zonenrandgebiet 
Designated Areas 
Mezzogiorno 
Development Areas 
Special Develop-
ment Areas 
CG+IS+AD 
CSL+IG 
RDG+SDA 
IA+IG+SDA 
IDA grant+IA 
CG+NSL 
CG+TC 
IPR+AD 
RDG+IRG 
EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDIES AS 
A PERCENTAGE OF ANNUAL CAPITAL COSTS 
ASSUMING PLANT LIVES OF (IN YEARS) 
5 8 10 12 15 
7.8 9.4 10.1 10.6 11.1 
10.7 12.9 13.8 14.4 15.1 
9.8 11.4 12.2 12.6 13.1 
11.0 14.1 15.5 16.6 17.9 
26.7 30.6 32.1 33.2 34.1 
32.9 39.3 41.7 43.5 45.3 
5.6 6.6 7.1 7.4 7.7 
10.2 12.6 13.7 14.4 15.2 
21.4 21.6 21.7 21.7 21.9 
Incentive keys: See Table 5 in the report (page 226). 
Note: For a derivation of the results based on a 10 year 
plant life assumption and a discussion of the incentives 
covered see the country-specific valuation tables in 
Part I of the report. 
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The Services of the Commission also requested that we show the 
impact of varying the IO year plant life assumption used in moving from 
the initial capital cost denominator in Table 5 of the report to the 
annual capital cost denominator. For this purpose we have chosen lives 
of 5, Θ, 12 and 15 years. The results are shown, together with those 
taken from Table 5 of the report (where, as already noted, a IO year 
plant life assumption was used) in Addenda Table 2. The table simply 
confirms our point that "alternative asset life assumptions are 
possible but would not affect the ranking of the various incentive 
schemes unless there were marked differences between countries in asset 
lives" (report page 43). 
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Addenda Table 3: Effective Subsidies as a Percentage of Annual Capital 
Costs given various rates of inflation - maximum 
rates and maximum incentive combinations by top 
priority region in each country. 
EFFECTIVE PERCENTAGE SUBSIDIES AS A 
PERCENTAGE OF ANNUAL CAPITAL COSTS 
ASSUMING INFLATION RATES FOR 
REPLACED PLANT OF (SEE KEY BELOW) 
COUNTRY 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom 
MAIN PROBLEM 
REGION 
Development Zones 
Special Develop-
ment Regions 
Award Zone 1 
Zonenrandgebiet 
Designated Areas 
Mezzogiorno 
-
Development Areas 
Special Develop-
ment Areas 
INCENTIVE 
COMBINATIONS 
CG+IS+AD 
CSL+IG 
RDG+SDA 
IA+IG+SDA 
IDA grant+IA 
CG+NSL 
CG+TC 
IPR+AD 
RDG+IRG 
(1) 
10.1 
13.8 
12.2 
15.5 
32.1 
41.7 
7.1 
13.7 
21.7 
(2) 
9.9 
13.6 
12.0 
15.2 
31.9 
41.3 
7.0 
13.4 
21.7 
(3) 
9.3 
12.8 
11.3 
13.6 
30.5 
39.0 
6.6 
12.5 
21.6 
(4) 
8.4 
11.5 
IO.4 
11.9 
28.3 
35.6 
6.0 
11.0 
21.5 
(5) 
8.2 
11.4 
10.1 
12.7 
26.3 
31.8 
5.9 
11.3 
21.4 
Inflation keys: (1)= zero (i.e. as in Table 5 in the report) 
(2)= IO percent price increase in IO years 
(3)= 5 percent annual increase in price 
(4)= 10 percent annual increase in price 
(5)= X percent annual increase in price where X equals 
the discount rate in each country. 
Incentive keys: See Table 5 in the report (page 226). 
Note: For a derivation of the report, Table 5, results and a 
discussion of the incentives covered, see the country-specific 
valuation tables in Part I of the report. 
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Finally, the Services of the Commission requested that we show the 
impact of inflation on the results contained in Table 5 of the report 
when moving from the initial to the annual capital cost denominator. 
In particular they asked that we take account of the fact that, under 
inflation, replaced equipment will cost more than the equipment it 
replaces, since they felt that this would change relative rankings, and 
especially the ranking of the United Kingdom with its regional 
development grant. They were, however, unable to suggest an appropriate 
rate of inflation for the exercise. We have therefore chosen four 
separate rates - 10 percent inflation over 10 years, 5 percent annual 
inflation, 10 percent annual inflation and rates of inflation in each 
country equal to that country's discount rate (see the country-specific 
valuation tables in Part I of the report). The results are shown, 
together with those taken from Table 5 of the report, in Addenda Table 3. 
From the table it can be seen that the ranking of the incentive 
packages does not change from column to column. Only if there were 
major differences in inflation rates between countries, and this over 
a long period of time, might the ranking change (as made clear in the 
report, page 36) , but even then the table suggests that, ceteris 
paribus, any change would not be marked. Even so, we want to stress 
our doubts about the meaningfulness of Addenda Table 3. While we have 
done the calculations at the request of the Services of the Commission 
we do not believe that inflation can be taken into account in such a 
simplified manner involving, in particular, such a heavy input of 
ceteris paribus. Inflation has a variety of effects which would be 
relevant to a serious calculation of its impact on incentive values -
effects, for example, on asset lives, subsidy lives, factor mixes and 
discount rates. We have no model, and know of none which exists, 
which would enable comprehensive account to be taken of inflation. 
Moreover, any relevant calculation should incorporate anticipated 
rates of inflation in each of the individual countries. Such forecasts 
do not exist. For obvious reasons, we were not prepared in the 
report - and are not prepared here - to speculate in this area. 
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ADDENDUM 2 
NORTHERN IRELAND : FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO INDUSTRY 
Note : This addendum was prepared by the Department 
of Commerce in Belfast. It describes the 
Northern Ireland package as at summer 1977 
(the reference date of this report), using 
broadly the same format as the report itself. 
It should be noted that the Northern Irish 
incentive package was significantly improved 
in August 1977. 
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Northern Ireland is designated by the Industry Act 1972 as an 
Assisted Area of the United Kingdom. Because of its severe 
economic problems, stemming essentially from its weak economic 
structure, the industrial incentive package in Northern Ireland is 
more comprehensive and flexible than in other areas of the United 
Kingdom. This paper outlines the various incentives which are 
available. 
There are 2 main schemes of financial assistance available to 
industry in Northern Ireland. Standard capital grant assistance, 
which is the Northern Ireland analogue to Regional Development Grants 
in Great Britain, is a standard item-related grant on fixed capital 
expenditure. Capital grants are available on new plant, machinery, 
buildings and works at a rate of 30 percent. Capital grant 
expenditure has increased from £16.9 million in 1969/70 to 
£27.9 million in 1976/77. In common with the RDG Scheme in Great 
Britain, the capital grant scheme was trimmed back in April 1977 with 
the exclusion of both the mining and construction sectors. A synopsis 
of the capital grants scheme is attached (Synopsis Table 1). Northern 
Ireland can also offer loans or interest relief grants to companies 
receiving grant aid under the capital grants scheme. These loans are 
available for major re-equipment and re-housing schemes and are 
offered on a discretionary basis up to a limit of 75 percent of the 
fixed capital cost of the project, net of grant. 
The other major form of incentive is selective financial assistance, 
which is offered under the Industries Development legislation. This 
form of assistance is basically related to the creation and safeguarding 
of employment through attracting new investment and encouraging 
existing companies to expand or to maintain their employment. unlike 
capital grants selective assistance is not automatic, but is made 
available at the discretion of the Department. This provides an 
element of flexibility in the scheme and allows scope for negotiating 
or bargaining with a company. One of the attractive features of this 
Northern Ireland incentive system is therefore that the package of 
assistance to a company can be specially 'tailored' to meet its 
particular needs. 
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The main forms of selective financial assistance are:-
(i) selective capital grants on buildings, plant and 
machinery. These grants are modulated according 
to Industrial Development zones and the rates range 
from 30 percent to 40 percent according to zone; 
(ii) medium term loans at commercial or concessionary 
rates of interest, sometimes with an interest-free 
period and/or deferments of capital repayment; 
(iii) interest relief grants to offset interest charges 
on loans or other borrowings raised through banking 
and other financial institutions; 
(iv) per capita employment grants to offset the initial 
start-up costs of a project; 
(v) provision of factories (on rental or amortised terms) 
and sites; 
(vi) removal grants of up to lOO percent on the costs of 
moving an undertaking into Northern Ireland; 
(vii) key worker housing grants and loans. 
The scheme of assistance is wide ranging with the main elements being 
selective capital grants, loans, interest relief grants and employment 
grants. These incentives are covered in Synopsis Table 2. 
Selective financial assistance is administered centrally in 
Northern Ireland by the Northern Ireland Department of Commerce (DOC) . 
Within guidelines laid down jointly by the DOC, the Department of 
Finance for Northern Ireland and HM Treasury, the Department of 
Commerce, on the advice of an Industries Development Advisory Committee, 
can decide whether or not to make an award and the level of that award. 
With respect to the former, the decisive factor is that the project be 
viable; while regarding the level of award the guidelines stipulate 
a Government contribution limit and cost per job maxima, which vary 
acoording to industrial development zones and which set the limits on 
the amount of assistance which can be given to a particular project. 
Apart from the incentives mentioned in the synopsis tables there 
are other selective industries development aids which are worth 
mentioning. The public provision of factories and sites is a 
significant instrument in Northern Ireland's industrial incentive 
package. Since 1945 the Government has built some 130 advance 
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factories and over the last 5 years or so expenditure on this 
programme has averaged £4.3 million annually. New factories are 
built in advance of demand in areas where they are most needed at 
any particular time and the n rented, sold or 'amortised' to 
industrialists. In addition, custom built extensions are undertaken. 
Rents are levied at the 'current market rental', assessed by the 
Commissioner of Valuation, and rent-free periods of up to 3 years may 
be offered in the outer ID zone. Special purpose factories are 
also leased on an 'amortisation' or repayment basis ie. the cost of 
the factory 'less any grant given is repaid at the current Government 
or concessionary interest rate over a period of 15 - 20 years. 
The remaining incentives, namely removal grants and key worker 
housing grants and loans, are of relatively minor importance. Removal 
grant assistance over the last 5 years averaged £0.25 million. 
In addition to the wide range of industrial incentives, the 
Government has attached and continues to attach Importance to measures 
which seek to increase the level of skills available in Northern 
Ireland. Since the mid-sixties the Government has developed a network 
of strategically located Training Centres and today there are 14 
GTCs providing over 3,OOO places for adults, young persons and 
apprentices in the construction and engineering fields. In addition 
the opportunity is also available for training ¡by attachment to 
industry, in skills which are not easily taught in a GTC setting. 
Government also encourages the development of skills within industry 
through a range of generous grand-aid schemes (e.g. the Training on 
Employers Premises Scheme makes available a grant of £15 per week per 
worker) to enable employers to provide adequate training for their 
workers. In addition Northern Ireland is the only region of the 
United Kingdom which retained the Selective Employment Premium, a 
weekly wage subsidy (E2.00 for eitployees over 18) which is available 
to companies in the manufacturing sector in Northern Ireland. 
261 
SYNOPSIS TABLE 1 
STANDARD CAPITAL GRANTS 
BASIC DETAILS: A Standard item related grant payable on 
specified types of fixed capital investment. 
A fixed 30% of approved capital expenditure 
is available. Both new plant and machinery 
and new buildings/works expenditure is eligible. 
LEGAL BASIS: I n d u s t r i a l I n v e s t m e n t ( G e n e r a l A s s i s t a n c e ) A c t 
1 9 6 6 a s amended b y t h e 1 9 7 0 and 1 9 7 1 Amendment 
A c t s . 
T h e c u r r e n t r a t e o f g r a n t w a s f i x e d a t 30% b y 
SR and O No 2 1 4 , 1 9 7 2 . 
ADMINISTRATION: A p p l i c a t i o n i s made t o t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f 
Commerce, N o r t h e r n I r e l a n d , w h e r e c a s e s a r e 
p r o c e s s e d and g r a n t i s p a i d o u t i n l i n e w i t h 
d e t a i l e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e g u i d e l i n e s . 
ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES: B r o a d l y m a n u f a c t u r i n g i n c l u d i n g s h i p r e p a i r i n g 
and c e r t a i n a c t i v i t i e s i n t h e e x t r a c t i o n t r a d e 
( e . g . s t o n e c r u s h i n g ) . To b e e l i g i b l e a 
company m u s t b e c a r r y i n g on a p r o c e s s i n t h e 
m a n u f a c t u r e o f a n i t e m . 
ACTIVITY 
DISCRIMINATION : 
SPATIAL 
DISCRIMINATION: 
PROJECT TYPE 
DISCRIMINATION : 
See 4 above. 
All qualifying investments in Northern Ireland 
are eligible for a 30% grant on expenditure on 
new building works and new plant and machinery. 
See 4 above. 
8 . SIZE DISCRIMINATION: N o n e . 
9. ELIGIBLE ITEMS: Grant is item-related and is restricted to new 
plant, machinery and new buildings and works. 
Working capital is ineligible. There are no 
de minimis rules on the value of eligible 
equipment, but machinery must have a minimum 
life of 2 years. The eligibility of expenditure 
on the replacement of parts is dependent on 
whether the part can be identified as an entity 
in its own right. Replacement parts which improve 
the productivity of the complete machine may 
qualify for grant. Grant is paid only on the 
difference between the cost of the new part over 
the actual cost of replacing the original with 
a like part. Vehicles are ineligible (except 
for fork-lift trucks or certain vehicles used 
in quarries where an eligible trade is carried o~) 
as are items of furniture and most pipelines. 
Building and works too must be new. The purchase 
of previously un-occupied buildings will qualify 
for grant only on the actual cost of construction. 
Land and ornamental/recreational building 
expenditure are ineligible. 
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10. ELIGIBLE FORMS OF 
EXPENDITURE: 
Cash payment phased payment and hire purchase 
are all eligible forms of expenditure (although 
for HP and other forms of extended credit only 
principal repayments qualify). Grants may 
also be paid to leasing companies on eligible 
items which they lease to companies on 
qualifying investments. 
11. FURTHER CONDITIONS: The other main conditions relate to the 
repayment of grant in cases where buildings 
are not completed and where buildings and plant 
and machinery cease to be used or are not put 
to the purpose described in the application. 
See 16. 
12. TAX TREATMENT: The grant is not treated for tax purposes as 
an income receipt and is therefore not taxed. 
Assets can be depreciated for tax purposes gross 
of any grant received. 
13. TIMING, PHASING: Grant claims are normally submitted after the 
asset has been provided, although grant may be 
paid on progress payments. Claim processing 
period is variable. 
1 4 . TOPPING UP: 
1 5 . ADDTTIONALITY : 
16. CLAWBACK: 
No award is possible beyond the formal fixed rate. 
No asset can be aided through a CG if it is 
already subsidised by another Government grant. 
See 11. Aided assets must remain on qualifying 
premises for 3 years in the case of PME and 
5 years in the case of buildings. Where this 
does not happen, grant must be repaid, except in 
cases where items are sold to another purchaser 
in an eligible activity and the latter purchaser 
accepts the conditions attaching to the original 
grant for the balance of the control period. 
17. REJECTIONS: 
18. COST: 
No information is available on the numbers of 
applications rejected. 
Grant expenditure since 1969/70 has been as 
follows:-
Year 
1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
No. of firms 
1464 
1546 
1519 
1086 
963 
1223 
1286 
1503 
Amount of Grant 
Assistance 
(£m) 
16.9 
17.6 
13.9 
7.9 
8.8 
15.3 
30.1 
27.9 
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19. JOBS ASSOCIATED: Job creation is not a precondition of a CG 
award. No information le available on 
jobs associated with the grant. 
20. INVESTMENT Em. 
42.2 
45.1 
31.8 
26.3 
32.6 
56.0 
103.1 
105.8 
2 1 . ANTICIPATED DURATION: No s p e c i f i e d U f e . 
N TM
ASSOCIATED: 1969/70 
1970/71 
1971/72 
1972/73 
1973/74 
1974/75 
1975/76 
1976/77 
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SYNOPSIS TABLE 2 
SELECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
1 . BASIC DETAILS: 
LEGAL BASIS: 
Selective Capital Grant (SCG) . Discretionary 
project - related capital grant, at rates ranging 
from 30% to 40% on fixed capital investment. 
Both plant and machinery and buildings/works 
expenditure is eligible. 
Concessionary Loan (CL). Discretionary project-
related soft loan of between 5-10 years duration. 
Repayment in 6 monthly intervals on a straightline 
basis. Maximum principal repayment holiday is 
3 years. Interest free periods run concurrently 
with any repayment holiday awarded. The 
concessionary interest rate is 3 percentage points 
below the current Government interest rate (which 
in 1977 averaged 12*5%). 
Interest Relief Grant (IRG) . Discretionary 
project-related grant available as an alternative 
to the concessionary loan and calculated in 
relation to the interest rate charged by a bank 
or lending institution up to a maximum rate equal 
to the broadly commercial rate of interest plus a 
grant at the fixed rate of 3% for up to a further 
4 years. 
Employment Grant (EG). Discretionary project-
related per capita grant payable on the number 
of additional jobs created or maintained by an 
investment project. The grants are usually 
earned over a labour build-up period and cannot 
be paid until earned. They are normally paid 
in 6 equal half yearly instalments on the average 
employment in the preceding half yearly period. 
SCG. Industries Development (NI) Acts 1966 and 
1971, as amended by section 15 of the Industries 
Development (NI) Order 1976. 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
ADMINISTRATION: SCG. Application is made to the Department of 
Commerce, where the project is appraised and which, 
after seeking the advice of the Industries 
Development Advisory Committee, decides whether 
or not to make an award and the level of award 
within joint DOC/Department of Finance for 
Northern Ireland/Treasury guidelines. 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
ELIGIBLE ACTIVITIES: SCG. In principle mining, manufacturing, 
construction and mobile services i.e. service 
sector projects shown to have a genuine choice of 
location within the UK and to hold prospects of 
net employment in Northern Ireland. In practice, 
assistance is concentrated on manufacturing. 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
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ACTIVITY SCG. No discrimination between eligible 
DISCRIMINATION: activities is specified in the guidelines 
(apart from the fact that services must be 
mobile - see 4 above). 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
SPATIAL 
DISCRIMINATION : 
7. PROJECT TYPE 
DISCRIMINATION: 
ELIGIBLE ITEMS: 
ELIGIBLE FORMS OF 
EXPENDITURE: 
IO. FURTHER CONDITIONS: 
SCG. Rates of award vary according to ID Zones 
Inner Area 30% 
Intermediate Area 35% 
Outer Area 40% 
The cost per job maxima also vary between Zones, 
CL. The concession is available in all areas. 
No discrimination between Industrial Development 
Zones is specified, but projects locating in 
areas of high unemployment will receive more 
generous assistance than those locating elsewhere. 
IRG. EG as for CL. 
SCG. Rates of award are determined by spatial 
rather than by project type considerations. 
CL. New projects and expansions of existing 
companies which result in additional employment 
are treated more favourably than job maintenance 
cases. Projects which introduce new products and 
skills into Northern Ireland, thus diversifying 
the industrial base, will also be treated more 
favourably. 
IRG, EG as for CL. 
SCG. The cos ts toward which ass is tance may be 
provided are the fixed cap i t a l and working cap i t a l 
cos t s , including i n i t i a l losses . Fixed cap i t a l 
costs include expenditure on land, s i t e 
prepara t ion , bui ldings p lan t , machinery and 
veh ic l e s . 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
SCG. Cash payment, phased payment and hire 
purchase are all eligible forms of expenditure. 
In the case of a hire purchase arrangement grant 
is only paid on the capital repayments element. 
Grant is not payable on leased machinery. 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
SB8. There are 3 basic conditions of award. 
The project must be viable, the Government 
contribution limit must be met and the cost per 
job limit must normally be respected. In cases 
where it is thought essential to exceed the cost 
per job limit, the award may be negotiated with 
HM Treasury. The first condition determines 
whether an award can be made, the remaining two 
the maximum level of the award. 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
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11. ACTUAL AWARDS: 
12. TAX TREATMENT: 
13. TIMING AND PHASING: 
14. TOPPING UP: 
SCG. See 18 below. 
CL. IRG, EG as for SCG. 
SCG. The grant is not treated for tax purposes 
as an income receipt and is therefore not taxed. 
Assets can be depreciated for tax purposes gross 
of any grant received.; 
CL. By reducing debt servicing charges, the 
concessionary element of the loan is taxed in 
as far as it increases taxable profits. 
IRG. The grant is regarded as income and is 
therefore taxed to the extent that it leads to 
increased profits. 
EG. As for IRG. 
SCG. Application must be made before project 
construction starts and can be made up to 12 
months beforehand. Application processing 
period: on average 2-3 months. The normal 
practice with plant,machinery and equipment is 
to pay grant after its installation and grants 
are usually paid at quarterly intervals. 
Building grant is also payable at quarterly 
intervals based on certified expenditure. 
CL. The submission and processing of 
applications is as for selective capital grants. 
Once approved the loan is offered on an annuity 
basis with equal repayments of loan and interest 
at 6 monthly intervals. Loans are drawn down 
on basis of need. 
IRG. The submission and processing of 
applications is as for selective capital grants. 
The grants are paid out on the amount of interest 
actually incurred by a company on its borrowings. 
Payments are usually made six-monthly. 
EG. The submission and processing of 
applications is as for selective capital grants. 
The grants are usually earned over a labour 
build-up-period and cannot be paid until earned. 
They are normally paid in 6 equal half-yearly 
instalments on the average employment in the 
preceding half-yearly period. Where employment 
grants and loans are given, the Company may be 
permitted to extinguish its repayment of loan in 
total or in part by employment grants as they 
are earned. 
SCG. No awards are possible beyond the formal 
fixed rate. If special Treasury permission is 
obtained it is possible to go beyond the cost 
per job maxima specified in the guideline. These 
cases are, however, exceptional. 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
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15. ADDITIONALLY : 
16. CLAWBACK: 
17. TURNDOWN: 
SCG. It is theoretically possible to offer 
all forms of assistance as a 'package' of 
incentives to a project, subject to the cost 
per job and Government contribution maxima. 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
SCG. All projects in receipt of assistance 
are monitored. Periodic inspections are made 
to ensure that the requirements of offers have 
been fulfilled and payments may be withheld 
or reduced if progress is considered to be 
unsatisfactory. 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
SCG. The figures below show the total number 
of applications processed in the last 2 financial 
years. Figures in brackets show applications 
approved 
1975/76 1976/77 
51(50) 107(104) 
CL, IRG, EG as f o r SCG. 
1 8 . COST: Expenditure since 1975/76 has been as follows 
million) (£ 
SCG. 
CL. 
IRG. 
EG. 
1975/76 
12.98 
1975/76 
7 .53 
1975/76 
.61 
1975/76 
1.73 
1976/77 
12 .50 
1976/77 
1.64 
1976/77 
1.44 
1976/77 
2 .62 
19. JOBS ASSOCIATED 
WITH APPROVALS 
IN YEAR: 
SCG. Est imates are not a v a i l a b l e for t h i s grant . 
For a l l s e l e c t i v e f i n a n c i a l a s s i s t a n c e 
jobs a s s o c i a t e d wi th o f f e r s were ( inc ludes jobs 
promoted and maintained) 
1975/76 1976/77 
16,566 19,503 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
20. INVESTMENT 
ASSOCIATED WITH 
OFFERS: 
SCG. Estimates are not available for this grant. 
For all selective financial assistance, project 
costs associated with offers are not readily 
available. 
21. ANTICIPATED 
DURATION : 
SCG. No specified life. 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
22. CHANGE PROVISIONS: SCG. Not explicitly covered in the guidelines. 
Offers may be amended even after the original 
offer has been accepted. 
CL, IRG, EG as for SCG. 
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STUDIES/PROGRAMMES 
published so far or in preparation in the Regional Policy Series! 1): 
8 4 1 9 - N o . 1 
The development of Flemish economy in the international perspective 
Synthesis and options of policy 
1973, 84 p. (DA,DE,EN,FR,IT,NL).BFR 170. 
CB-NS-77-002-EN-C - No. 2 
Regionär development programme for Greenland 1977-1979 
1977, 50 p. (DA, EN, FFO.UKL 1; USD 2; BFR 60. 
CB-NS-77-003-EN-C - No. 3 
Non-production activities in UK manufacturing industry 
1977,178 p. (EN).UKL 1.60; USD 3.10; BFR 100. 
CB-NS-77-004-EN-C - No. 4 
Regional concentration in the countries of the European Communities 
1977, 124 p. (DE, EN, FR, IT). UKL 2; USD 4; BFR 120. 
CB-NS-77-005-DE-C - No. 5 
Feasibility-Studie über den Stand und die Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten von 
vorausschauenden regionalen Arbeitsmarktbilanzen in der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft 
1977, 292 p. (DE + summary ¡n EN/résuméen FR). UKL 4; USD 7.50; BFR 240. 
CB-NS-78-006-EN-C - No. 6 
Regional development programme Mezzogiorno 1977-1980 
1978,358 p. (DE, EN(2), FR, IT). UKL 6.20; USD 12.40; BFR 380. 
CB-NS-78-007-EN-C - No. 7 
Regional development programme Ireland 1977-1980 
1978,130 p. (DE, EN, FR). UKL 3; USD 5.80; BFR 180. 
CB-NS-78-008-EN-C - No. 8 
Regional development programmes for the Netherlands 1977-1980 
1978, 126 p. (DE, EN, FR, NL). UKL 3; USD 6; BFR 175. 
CB-NS-78-009-FR-C - No. 9(2) 
Les travailleurs frontaliers en Europe 
(DE, FR, NL). 
(1) The abbreviations after each title indicate the languages in which the documents have been or will be published: 
DA = Danish, DE = German, EN = English, FR = French, IT = Italian, NL = Dutch. 
(2) In preparation. 
Studies/Programmes 
published so far or in preparation in the Regional Policy Series( 1) ; 
CB-NS-78-010-EN-C - No. 10 
Regional development programme United Kingdom 1978-1980 
1978. 126 p. (DE, EN, FR). UKL 3.60; USD 7; BFR 220. 
CB-NS-78-011 -EN-C - No. 11 
Regional development programme Grand Duchy of Luxembourg 
1978, 62 p. (DE. EN, FR). UKL 1.30; USD 2.60; BFR 80. 
CB-NS-78-012-EN-C - No. 12 
Regional development programmes Denmark 
1978,68 p. (DA, DE, EN, FR). UKL 1.50; BFR 90; USD 2.90 
CB-NS-78-013-EN-C - No. 13 
Regional development programmes France 1976-1980 
1979. 196 p. (DE, EN, FR). UKL 2.95; USD 5.85; BFR 175. 
CB-NS-79-014-EN-C - No. 14(2) 
Regional development programmes Belgium 1978-1980 
IDE, EN.FR.NL). 
CB-NS-79-015-EN-C- No. 15 
Regional Incentives in the European Community. 
A comparative study 
(DA. DE, EN. FR, IT, N U . 
CB-NS-79-016-EN-C- No. 16(2) 
Regional development programmes 
Federal Republic of Germany, including Berlin(West) 1979-1982 
(DE. EN. FR). 
CB-NS-79-017-EN-C- No. 17(2) 
The regional development programmes 
(DA, DE. EN, FR, IT, NL). 
(1 ) The abbreviations after each title indicate the languages in which the documents have been or will be publis 
DA = Danish, DE = German, EN = English. FR = French. IT = Italian, NL = Dutch. 
(2) In preparation. 
European Communities — Commission 
Regional incentives in the European Community 
— A comparative study 
A report by the International Institute of Management, Wissenschafts­
zentrum, Berlin to the Federal German Ministry for Economics, the 
Land of Hesse and the European Community 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications 
of the European Communities 
1979 — 270 p. — 17,6 χ 25 cm 
Collection Programmes, Regional Policy Series— 1979 — 15 
DA, DE, EN, FR, IT, NL 
ISBN 92-825-1215-0 
Catalogue number. CB-NS-79-015-EN-C 
BFR 275 DKR 48,40 DM 17,40 FF 40 
LIT 7800 HFL 18,80 UKL 4.60 USD 9.20 
The objectives of this study were: to compile a comprehensive, detailed 
and up-to-date survey of regional incentives in the European 
Community countries; to develop and apply methodologies foran inter-
country comparison of incentive values; and to draw out policy 
implications from both the comparative survey and the comparative 
valuations. 
The study is in two parts. Part I is a survey of the key features and values 
of the major regional incentives in the individual European Community 
countries. It is both country-specific and largely descriptive, in contrast 
to Part II which is comparative and analytical — involving a comparison 
of incentive features and values between countriesand a drawing out of 
the policy implications for individual member states and for the 
European Commission. 
The study is foreseen to be published in Danish, German, English, 
French, Italian and Dutch. 
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